Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see

Activity in the posterior parietal cortex mediates visual dominance over kinesthesia

When both visual and kinesthetic information of a limb are available, vision is usually the dominant source of information used to perceive the spatial location. In this study, we conducted behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments to examine the brain mechanisms underlying the visual dominance over kinesthesia in perceiving the position of a hand. We used tendon vibration to induce an illusory percept of flexion movement of an immobile hand, while the participants viewed a live image of either the vibrated or nonvibrated static hand through an on-line video camera. The intensity of illusory movement was significantly attenuated (for both the left and right hands) only when the participants viewed the static image of the vibrated hand. The fMRI study showed that the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is specifically involved in the attenuation of illusory movement and that the activity of the PPC was associated with the degree of attenuation. This indicates that PPC is involved in the multisensory processing that occurs when vision overrules simultaneously available kinesthetic information for estimating the spatial location of a limb. It is thus suggested that the human parietal cortex may play a critical role in the maintenance of a coherent body image when the brain receives potentially conflicting multisensory information from the body.

Alleviating the ‘crossed-hands’ deficit by seeing uncrossed rubber hands

Localizing and reacting to tactile events on our skin requires the coordination between primary somatotopic projections and an external representation of space. Previous research has attributed an important role to early visual experience in shaping up this mapping. Here, we addressed the role played by immediately available visual information about body posture. We asked participants to determine the temporal order of two successive tactile events delivered to the hands while they adopted a crossed or an uncrossed-hands posture. As previously found, hand-crossing led to a dramatic impairment in tactile localization, which is a phenomenon attributed to a mismatch between somatotopic and externally-based frames of reference. In the present study, however, participants watched a pair of rubber hands that were placed either in a crossed or uncrossed posture (congruent or incongruent with the posture of their own hands). The results showed that the crossed-hands deficit can be significantly ameliorated by the sight of uncrossed rubber hands (Experiment 1). Moreover, this visual modulation seemed to depend critically on the degree to which the visual information about the rubber hands can be attributed to one's own actions, in a process revealing short-term adaptation (Experiment 2).

The relationship between the sense of self-agency and schizotypal personality traits

People with schizotypal traits may possess abnormal self-awareness, particularly with regard to their sense of self-agency, that is, the sense that it is oneself who is causing or generating an action. Participants in Experiments 1A (N = 11), 1B (N = 12), and 2 (N = 20) moved a mouse device and viewed resultant feedback, which was biased either temporally or spatially. They then judged whether there was a bias or whether they felt they had moved the cursor on their own. The authors found, for the 1st time, that a sense of self-agency can be experienced even if some degree of temporal bias is perceived. Furthermore, they determined that highly schizotypal people have an abnormal (weaker) sense of self-agency.

Referral of tactile stimuli to action points in virtual reality with reaction force

When we touch something with a tool, we feel the touch at the tip of the tool rather than at the hand. Yamamoto and Kitazawa [Yamamoto, S., Kitazawa, S., 2001b. Sensation at the tips of invisible tools. Nat. Neurosci. 4, 979-980] previously showed that the judgment of the temporal order of two successive stimuli, delivered to the tips of sticks held in each hand, was dramatically altered by crossing the sticks without changing the positions of the hands. This provided evidence for the referral of tactile signals to the tip of a tool in hand. In this study, we examined importance of force feedback from the tool in the referral by manipulating the direction of force feedback in a virtual reality. The virtual tool consisted of a spherical action point that was moved with a stylus in hand. Subjects held two styli, one in each hand, put each action point on each of two buttons in the virtual reality, and were required to judge the order of successive taps, delivered to the two styli. We manipulated the direction of reaction force from each button so that it was congruent or incongruent to the visual configuration of the button. When the arms were uncrossed, judgment primarily depended on whether the action points were crossed or not in the visual space. But when the arms were crossed, judgment critically depended on the direction of force feedback. The results show that tactile signals can be referred to the action point in the virtual reality and that the force feedback becomes a critical factor when the arms are crossed.

On agency and body-ownership: phenomenological and neurocognitive reflections

The recent distinction between sense of agency and sense of body-ownership has attracted considerable empirical and theoretical interest. The respective contributions of central motor signals and peripheral afferent signals to these two varieties of body experience remain unknown. In the present review, we consider the methodological problems encountered in the empirical study of agency and body-ownership, and we then present a series of experiments that study the interplay between motor and sensory information. In particular, we focus on how multisensory signals interact with body representations to generate the sense of body-ownership, and how the sense of agency modulates the sense of body-ownership. Finally, we consider the respective roles of efferent and afferent signals for the experience of one's own body and actions, in relation to self-recognition and the recognition of other people's actions. We suggest that the coherent experience of the body depends on the integration of efferent information with afferent information in action contexts. Overall, whereas afferent signals provide the distinctive content of one's own body experience, efferent signals seem to structure the experience of one's own body in an integrative and coherent way.

Self-attributed body-shadows modulate tactile attention

Our body-shadows are special stimuli in the visual world. They often have anatomical resemblance with our own body-parts and move as our body moves, with spatio-temporal correlation. Here, we show that self-attributed body-shadows cue attention to the body-part they refer to, rather than the location they occupy. Using speeded spatial discrimination for tactile or visual targets at the hands, or for visual targets delivered near the hand-shadows, we demonstrate that mere viewing of task-irrelevant shadows can selectively facilitate tactile discrimination at the body-part casting the shadow (Experiment 1). In addition, such facilitation only develops through time for cast-shadows that have no resemblance with the body-part, but move in spatio-temporal correlation with it (Experiment 2). Conversely, facilitation fades away rapidly for shadow-like images that resemble the stimulated body-part, but are in fact static pictures (Experiment 3). Thus, recognising oneself as the owner of a shadow affects distribution of tactile attention.

Morphing the body: Illusory feeling of an elongated arm affects somatosensory homunculus

Recent studies suggest that in contrast to traditional views of the body map the topographic representation in primary somatosensory cortex (SI) reflects the perceived rather than the physical aspects of peripheral stimulation. Here, we created a simple illusion of feeling an elongated arm by using the dominance of the visual domain over the tactile sense: employing an artificial hand and arm, which were connected to the body, subjects were given the visual impression that they had an extended arm. Since it is known from animal studies that tactile illusions alter early sensory processing in SI, we expected a modulation of the topography in SI corresponding to this illusion. Behavioral results showed that during the illusion the participants felt that their arm was elongated. Neuromagnetic source imaging of the functional organization in SI revealed that the cortical distance between first (D1) and fifth digit (D5) decreased when subjects felt the arm elongated. Since this modulation was significantly positively correlated with the illusionary feeling of an extended arm, the results suggest an involvement of SI during perceived changes in the size of body parts. We discuss the results as possible top-down modulations of SI by higher order somatosensory areas.

Motor imagery and action observation: cognitive tools for rehabilitation

Rehabilitation, for a large part may be seen as a learning process where old skills have to be re-acquired and new ones have to be learned on the basis of practice. Active exercising creates a flow of sensory (afferent) information. It is known that motor recovery and motor learning have many aspects in common. Both are largely based on response-produced sensory information. In the present article it is asked whether active physical exercise is always necessary for creating this sensory flow. Numerous studies have indicated that motor imagery may result in the same plastic changes in the motor system as actual physical practice. Motor imagery is the mental execution of a movement without any overt movement or without any peripheral (muscle) activation. It has been shown that motor imagery leads to the activation of the same brain areas as actual movement. The present article discusses the role that motor imagery may play in neurological rehabilitation. Furthermore, it will be discussed to what extent the observation of a movement performed by another subject may play a similar role in learning. It is concluded that, although the clinical evidence is still meager, the use of motor imagery in neurological rehabilitation may be defended on theoretical grounds and on the basis of the results of experimental studies with healthy subjects.

The rubber hand illusion: Sensitivity and reference frame for body ownership

When subjects view stimulation of a rubber hand while feeling congruent stimulation of their own hand, they may come to feel that the rubber hand is part of their own body. This illusion of body ownership is termed 'Rubber Hand Illusion' (RHI). We investigated sensitivity of RHI to spatial mismatches between visual and somatic experience. We compared the effects of spatial mismatch between the stimulation of the two hands, and equivalent mismatches between the postures of the two hands. We created the mismatch either by adjusting stimulation or posture of the subject's hand, or, in a separate group of subjects, by adjusting stimulation or posture of the rubber hand. The matching processes underlying body ownership were asymmetrical. The illusion survived small changes in the subject's hand posture, but disappeared when the same posture transformations were applied to the rubber hand. Mismatch between the stimulation delivered to the subject's hand and the rubber hand abolished the illusion. The combination of these two situations is of particular interest. When the subject's hand posture was slightly different from the rubber hand posture, the RHI remained as long as stimulation of the two hands was congruent in a hand-centred spatial reference frame, even though the altered posture of the subject's hand meant that stimulation was incongruent in external space. Conversely, the RHI was reduced when the stimulation was incongruent in hand-centred space but congruent in external space. We conclude that the visual-tactile correlation that causes the RHI is computed within a hand-centred frame of reference, which is updated with changes in body posture. Current sensory evidence about what is 'me' is interpreted with respect to a prior mental body representation.

Attention influences the excitability of cortical motor areas in healthy humans

We investigated whether human attentional processes influence the size of the motor evoked potentials (MEP) facilitation and the duration of the cortical silent period (CSP) elicited by high-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). In healthy subjects we assessed the effects of 5 Hz-rTMS, delivered in trains of 10 stimuli at suprathreshold intensity over the hand motor area, on the MEP size and CSP duration in different attention-demanding conditions: "relaxed," "target hand," and "non-target hand" condition. We also investigated the inhibitory effects of 1 Hz-rTMS conditioning to the premotor cortex on the 5 Hz-rTMS induced MEP facilitation. F-waves evoked by ulnar nerve stimulation were also recorded. rTMS trains elicited a larger MEP size facilitation when the subjects looked at the target hand whereas the increase in CSP duration during rTMS remained unchanged during the three attention-demanding conditions. The conditioning inhibitory stimulation delivered to the premotor cortex decreased the MEP facilitation during the "target hand" condition, leaving the MEP facilitation during the other conditions unchanged. None of the attentional conditions elicited changes in the F wave. In healthy subjects attentional processes influence the size of the MEP facilitation elicited by high-frequency rTMS and do so through premotor-to-motor connections.

Threatening a rubber hand that you feel is yours elicits a cortical anxiety response

The feeling of body ownership is a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness. The underlying neural mechanisms can be studied by using the illusion where a person is made to feel that a rubber hand is his or her own hand by brushing the person's hidden real hand and synchronously brushing the artificial hand that is in full view. Here we show that threat to the rubber hand can induce a similar level of activity in the brain areas associated with anxiety and interoceptive awareness (insula and anterior cingulate cortex) as when the person's real hand is threatened. We further show that the stronger the feeling of ownership of the artificial hand, the stronger the threat-evoked neuronal responses in the areas reflecting anxiety. Furthermore, across subjects, activity in multisensory areas reflecting ownership predicted the activity in the interoceptive system when the hand was under threat. Finally, we show that there is activity in medial wall motor areas, reflecting an urge to withdraw the artificial hand when it is under threat. These findings suggest that artificial limbs can evoke the same feelings as real limbs and provide objective neurophysiological evidence that the rubber hand is fully incorporated into the body. These findings are of fundamental importance because they suggest that the feeling of body ownership is associated with changes in the interoceptive systems.

Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency

There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the "comparator model". In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able to explain either. Rather, we argue for a two-step account: a multifactorial weighting process of different agency indicators accounts for the feeling of agency, which is, in a second step, further processed by conceptual modules to form an attribution judgement. This new framework is then applied to disruptions of agency in schizophrenia, for which the comparator model also fails. Two further extensions are discussed: We show that the comparator model can neither be extended to account for the sense of ownership (which also has to be differentiated into a feeling and a judgement of ownership) nor for the sense of agency for thoughts. Our framework, however, is able to provide a unified account for the sense of agency for both actions and thoughts.

Central mechanisms in phantom limb perception: The past, present and future

Phantom limbs provide valuable insight into the mechanisms underlying bodily awareness and ownership. This paper reviews the complexity of phantom limb phenomena (proprioception, form, position, posture and telescoping), and the various contributions of internal constructs of the body, or body schema, and neuromatrix theory in explaining these phenomena. Specific systems and processes that have received little attention in phantom limb research are also reviewed and highlighted as important future directions, These include prosthesis embodiment and extended physiological proprioception (i.e., the extension of the body's "area of influence" that thereby extends one's innate sense of proprioception, mirror neurons and cross-referencing of the phantom limb with the intact limb (and the related phenomena of perceiving referred sensations and mirrored movements in the phantom form the intact limb). The likely involvements of the body schema and the body-self neuromatrix, mirror neurons, and cross-callosal and ipsilateral mechanisms in phantom limb phenomena all suggest that the perception of a "normal" phantom limb (that is, a non-painful phantom that has the sensory qualities of an intact limb) is more than likely an epiphenomenon of normal functioning, action understanding and empathy, and potentially may even be evolutionarily adaptive and perhaps necessary. Phantom pain, however, may be a maladaptive failure of the neuromatrix to maintain global bodily constructs.

Handedness differences in body image distortion and eating disorder symptomatology

OBJECTIVE

Previous research has shown decreased access in strong right-handers to processes lateralized to the right cerebral hemisphere. The current studies tested the hypothesis that decreased access to right hemisphere processes, as indexed by increasing strength of right-hand preference, is associated with deficits in body image representation.

METHOD

Experiment 1 measured individual's perceived versus actual BMI values. Experiment 2 involved the administration of the Eating Disorders Inventory-2 (EDI-2).

RESULTS

Experiment 1 revealed that strong right-handedness was associated with a larger discrepancy between actual and perceived BMI, relative to mixed-handedness. In Experiment 2, strong-handers scored higher on the EDI-2 than did mixed-handers.

CONCLUSION

The results indicate that strong degrees of handedness are associated with deficits in accurate representation of body image and with increased eating disorder symptomatology in a nonclinical sample. Implications for research into the neural bases of eating disorders are discussed.

Is that near my hand? Multisensory representation of peripersonal space in human intraparietal sulcus

Our ability to interact with the immediate surroundings depends not only on an adequate representation of external space but also on our ability to represent the location of objects with respect to our own body and especially to our hands. Indeed, electrophysiological studies in monkeys revealed multimodal neurons with spatially corresponding tactile and visual receptive fields in a number of brain areas, suggesting a representation of visual peripersonal space with respect to the body. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we localized areas in human intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and lateral occipital complex (LOC) that represent nearby visual space with respect to the hands (perihand space), by contrasting the response to a ball moving near-to versus far-from the hands. Furthermore, by independently manipulating sensory information about the hand, in the visual (using a dummy hand) and proprioceptive domains (by changing the unseen hand position), we determined the sensory contributions to the representation of hand-centered space. In the posterior IPS, the visual contribution was dominant, overriding proprioceptive information. Surprisingly, regions within LOC also displayed visually dominant, hand-related activation. In contrast, the anterior IPS was characterized by a proprioceptive representation of the hand, as well as showing tactile hand-specific activation, suggesting a homology with monkey parietal hand-centered areas. We therefore suggest that, whereas cortical regions within the posterior IPS and LOC represent hand-centered space in a predominantly visual manner, the anterior IPS uses multisensory information in representing perihand space.

Assessing the influence of schematic drawings of body parts on tactile discrimination performance using the crossmodal congruency task

Seeing one's own body (either directly or indirectly) can influence visuotactile crossmodal interactions. Recently, it has been shown that even viewing a simple line drawing of a hand can also modulate such crossmodal interactions, as if the picture of the hand somehow corresponds to (or primes) the participants' own hand. Alternatively, however, it could be argued that the modulatory effects of viewing the picture of a hand on visuotactile interactions might simply be attributed to cognitive processes such as the semantic referral to the relevant body part or to the orientation cues provided by the hand picture instead. In the present study, we evaluated these various different interpretations of the hand picture effect. Participants made speeded discrimination responses to the location of brief vibrotactile targets presented to either the tip or base of their forefinger, while trying to ignore simultaneously-presented visual distractors presented to either side of central fixation. We compared the modulatory effect of the picture of a hand with that seen when the visual distractors were presented next to words describing the tip and base of the forefinger (Experiment 1), or were superimposed over arrows which provided another kind of directional cue (Experiment 2). Tactile discrimination performance was modulated in the hand picture condition, but not in the word or arrow conditions. These results therefore suggest that visuotactile interactions are specifically modulated by the image of the hand rather than by cognitive cues such as simply semantic referral to the relevant body sites and/or any visual orientation cues provided by the picture of a hand.

Effects of visual stimuli on temporal order judgments of unimanual finger stimuli

Successive tactile stimuli, delivered one to each hand, are referred to spatial representation before they are ordered in time (Yamamoto and Kitazawa in Nat Neurosci 4:759-765 2001a). In the present study, we examined if this applies even when they are delivered unilaterally to fingers of a single hand. Tactile stimuli were delivered left-to-rightward relative to the body (2nd-3rd-4th) or in reverse with stimulus onset asynchrony of 100 ms. Simultaneously with the delivery of tactile stimuli, three of nine small squares arranged in a matrix of 3 x 3 were turned on as if they appeared near the tips of the fingers. Although subjects were instructed to ignore the visual stimuli and make a forced choice between the two orders of tactile stimuli, the correct-judgment probability depended on the direction of visual stimuli. It was greater than 95% when the direction of visual stimuli matched that of the tactile stimuli, but less than 50% when they were opposite to each other. When the right hand was rotated counterclockwise on the horizontal plane (90 degrees ) so that the fingers were pointing to the left, the preferred direction of visual stimuli that yielded the peak correct judgment was also rotated, although not to the full extent. These results show that subjects cannot be basing their tactile temporal order judgment solely on a somatotopic map, but rather on a spatial map on which both visual and tactile signals converge.

Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples

A concise sketch of the self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT; Metzinger, 2003a), aimed at empirical researchers. Discussion of some candidate mechanisms by which self-awareness could appear in a physically realized information-processing system like the brain, using empirical examples from various scientific disciplines. The paper introduces two core-concepts, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR), developing a representationalist analysis of the conscious self and the emergence of a first-person perspective.

Neural signatures of body ownership: a sensory network for bodily self-consciousness

Body ownership refers to the special perceptual status of one's own body, which makes bodily sensations seem unique to oneself. We studied the neural correlates of body ownership by controlling whether an external object was accepted as part of the body or not. In the rubber hand illusion (RHI), correlated visuotactile stimulation causes a fake hand to be perceived as part of one's own body. In the present study, we distinguished between the causes (i.e., multisensory stimulation) and the effect (i.e., the feeling of ownership) of the RHI. Participants watched a right or a left rubber hand being touched either synchronously or asynchronously with respect to their own unseen right hand. A quantifiable correlate of the RHI is a shift in the perceived position of the subject's hand toward the rubber hand. We used positron emission tomography to identify brain areas whose activity correlated with this proprioceptive measure of body ownership. Body ownership was related to activity in the right posterior insula and the right frontal operculum. Conversely, when the rubber hand was not attributed to the self, activity was observed in the contralateral parietal cortex, particularly the somatosensory cortex. These structures form a network that plays a fundamental role in linking current sensory stimuli to one's own body and thus also in self-consciousness.

Spatial limits on referred touch to an alien limb may reflect boundaries of visuo-tactile peripersonal space surrounding the hand

In this study, the spatial limits of referred touch to a rubber hand were investigated. Participants rated the strength of the perceived illusion when the rubber hand was placed in one of six different spatial positions (at a distance of 17.5-67.5cm horizontal from the participant's own hand). The results revealed a significant nonlinear relationship in the strength of the illusion, with the strongest ratings given when the two hands were closest; decaying significantly after a distance of 30cm. The time taken to elicit the illusion followed a similar trend. These results may reflect the response properties of bimodal visuo-tactile cells encoding peripersonal space around the hand.

Self and other in the human motor system

Observation of another's action can selectively facilitate the brain's motor circuits for making the same action . A "mirror-matching mechanism" might map observed actions onto the observer's own motor representations . Crucially, this view suggests that the brain represents others' actions like one's own. However, this hypothesis has been difficult to test because the experience of one's own body differs from that of others' bodies with respect to viewpoint, morphological features, familiarity, and the hallmark feature of kinaesthetic experience. We used an established method for manipulating the sense of body ownership ("rubber-hand illusion") to compare effects of observing actions that either were or were not illusorily attributed to the subject's own body. We show that observing another's actions facilitated the motor system, whereas observing identical actions, which were illusorily attributed to the subject's own body, showed the opposite pattern. Thus, motor facilitation strongly depends on the agent to whom the observed action is attributed. This result contradicts previous concepts of equivalence between one's own actions and actions of others and suggests that social differentiation, not equivalence, is characteristic of the human action system.

Visual-proprioceptive mismatch and the Taylor illusion

When a participant moves a hand-held target in complete darkness after an afterimage of that target has been obtained, an illusory increase (with movements away from the participant) or decrease (with movements towards the participant) in the apparent size of the afterimage is reported (the Taylor illusion, reported first in Taylor, J Exp Psychol 29: 1941). Unlike typical Emmert's Law demonstrations, the Taylor illusion shows that a motor-related signal can be used to specify distance for the computation of real size. A study by Carey and Allan (Exp Brain Res 110: 1996) found that the Taylor illusion did not occur in a condition where an afterimage of one hand was obtained while the other hand performed a movement away from the participant from directly behind the first. It was proposed that, for the illusion to manifest itself, proprioceptive and visual information must be in strict "register" when the afterimage is obtained. To evaluate this hypothesis, 14 participants performed "towards" and "away" movements after obtaining afterimages of hand-held cards. Participants wore either plain lenses or prism lenses during the trials, the latter of which displaced visual stimuli 10 degrees to the left. No significant difference was found between the two lens conditions in terms of the effect on the perception of the Taylor illusion. It was concluded that the illusory size distortions may depend on register of visual and proprioceptive position in terms of depth, rather than in the picture plane. Several suggestions for future studies of the Taylor illusion are proposed, and limitations of size judgements of afterimages are outlined.

Cortical networks related to human use of tools

Greater manual dexterity and greater conceptual knowledge of tool use represent two main features that distinguish humans from other primates. Studies of human brain lesions suggest that the left hemisphere (at least in right-handed people) includes a system for processing manual skills that is specialized for tool use that interacts with another system involved more with conceptualizing, planning, and accessing knowledge associated with tool use. Growing evidence from recent neuroimaging studies supports this organization, and studies have begun to highlight specific brain regions and pathways that may be necessary for tool use. This review compares and summarizes results from 64 paradigms published over the past decade that have examined cortical regions associated with tool use skills and tool knowledge. A meta-analysis revealed cortical networks in both hemispheres, though with a clear left hemisphere bias, which may be organized to optimally represent action knowledge. Portions of this network appear to represent part of a system that is tightly linked with language systems, which is discussed together with the effects that handedness may have on the cortical organization for tool use.

A critical review of congenital phantom limb cases and a developmental theory for the basis of body image

Reports of phantom limbs amongst aplasics (i.e., subjects who congenitally lack one or several limbs) have often been presented as evidence that body image is 'hard-wired' in the brain and that neither sensory input nor proprioceptive feedback are essential to its formation. Although attempts have been made to account for these phantoms by other means, these have been on a case by case basis and no satisfactory alternative framework has been proposed. This paper collates the accounts of aplasic phantoms and presents them as compatible with a four-part hypothesis, in which body image is learnt from experience during both pre- and post-natal development, and in which cross-cortical connections and mirror neurons play prominent roles. This model unites several previously disparate theories to offer a viable solution to several longstanding phantom limb mysteries and serves to highlight avenues worthy of further inquiry.

Reaching with alien limbs: Visual exposure to prosthetic hands in a mirror biases proprioception without accompanying illusions of ownership

In five experiments, we investigated the effects of visual exposure to a real hand, arubber hand, or a wooden block on reaching movements made with the unseen left hand behind a parasagittal mirror. Participants reached from one of four starting positions, corresponding to four levels of conflict between the proprioceptively and visually specified positions of the reaching hand. Reaching movements were affected most by exposure to the real hand, intermediately by the rubber hand, and least of all by the wooden block When the posture and/or movement of the visible hand was incompatible with that of the reaching hand, the effect on reaching was reduced. A "rubber hand illusion" questionnaire revealed that illusions of ownership of the rubber hand were not strongly correlated with reaching performance. This research suggests that proprioception is recalibrated following visual exposure to prosthetic hands and that this recalibration is independent of the rubber hand illusion.

Back-to-front: Improved tactile discrimination performance in the space you cannot see

We investigated any differences in people's ability to reconstruct the appropriate spatiotemporal ordering of multiple tactile stimuli, when presented in frontal space (a region where visual inputs tend to dominate) versus in the space behind the back (a region of space that we rarely see) in professional piano players and in non-musicians. Even though tactile temporal order judgments were much better in the musicians overall, both groups showed a much reduced crossed-hands deficit when their hands were crossed behind their backs rather than at the front. These results suggest that because of differences in the availability of visual input, the spatiotemporal representation of non-visual stimuli in front versus rear space is different.

Delayed Intermodal Contingency Affects Young Children's Recognition of Their Current Self

This study investigated whether 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds use their video feedback as a reflection of their current state, even when their feedback was presented with a short temporal delay. In Experiment 1, the effects of 1- and 2-s delayed feedback were examined on an analog of the mark test. In the case of live and 1-s delayed feedback, 3-year-olds passed the test; however, they failed in the case of 2-s delayed feedback. Experiment 2 examined the effect of prior experience of delayed contingency and explorative behavior. The results showed a significant effect of prior experience. These results suggest that detection of visual-proprioceptive contingency contributes to recognition of visual feedback as one's current self.

Shared representations in body perception

The ability to understand events that happen to other people is a characteristic feature of the human mind. Here, we investigate whether the links between mental representation of one's own body and the bodies of other people could form the basis of human social representations. We studied interpersonal body representation (IBR) in a series of behavioural cueing experiments. Subjects responded to tactile events on their own body after a visual event was presented in either the corresponding anatomical location on a model's body, or in a non-corresponding location. We found that reactions were faster when the visual cue was in register with the tactile stimulation. This effect was absent when identical visual events were presented on a non-body control stimulus, suggesting a body specific mechanism for interpersonal registration of purely sensory events. Similar interpersonal systems have been demonstrated previously for the coding of action and emotion, but we believe that our results provide the first behavioural evidence for interpersonal body representation at the purely sensory level. We show that a sensory processing mechanism specific for bodies is automatically activated when viewing another person. Interpersonal body representation may be an important precursor to empathy and theory of mind. In our social world, we understand the percepts of others by registering them against the representations used to perceive our own body, and this mechanism involves an interpersonal somatotopic map.

Direction-dependent integration of vision and proprioception in reaching under the influence of the mirror illusion

Recent models of multisensory integration predict differential weighting of information from different sensory modalities in different spatial directions. This direction-dependent weighting account suggests a heavier weighting for vision in the azimuthal (left-right) direction and a heavier weighting for proprioception in the radial (near-far) direction. Visually induced reaching errors, as demonstrated in previous 'mirror illusion' reaching experiments, should therefore be greater under visual-proprioceptive conflict in the azimuthal direction than in the radial direction. We report two experiments designed to investigate the influence of direction-dependent weighting on the visual bias of reaching movements under the influence of a mirror-illusion. In Experiment 1, participants made reaches straight forward, and showed terminal reaching errors that were biased by vision in both directions, but this bias was significantly greater in the azimuthal as compared to the radial direction. In Experiment 2, participants made reaches from right to left, and showed a significant bias only in the azimuthal direction. These results support the direction-dependent weighting of visual and proprioceptive information, with vision relatively more dominant in the azimuthal direction, and proprioception relatively stronger in the radial direction.

Touching a rubber hand: feeling of body ownership is associated with activity in multisensory brain areas

In the "rubber-hand illusion," the sight of brushing of a rubber hand at the same time as brushing of the person's own hidden hand is sufficient to produce a feeling of ownership of the fake hand. We shown previously that this illusion is associated with activity in the multisensory areas, most notably the ventral premotor cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2004). However, it remains to be demonstrated that this illusion does not simply reflect the dominant role of vision and that the premotor activity does not reflect a visual representation of an object near the hand. To address these issues, we introduce a somatic rubber-hand illusion. The experimenter moved the blindfolded participant's left index finger so that it touched the fake hand, and simultaneously, he touched the participant's real right hand, synchronizing the touches as perfectly as possible. After approximately 9.7 s, this stimulation elicited an illusion that one was touching one's own hand. We scanned brain activity during this illusion and two control conditions, using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Activity in the ventral premotor cortices, intraparietal cortices, and the cerebellum was associated with the illusion of touching one's own hand. Furthermore, the rated strength of the illusion correlated with the degree of premotor and cerebellar activity. This finding suggests that the activity in these areas reflects the detection of congruent multisensory signals from one's own body, rather than of visual representations. We propose that this could be the mechanism for the feeling of body ownership.

Dynamic modulation of the primary somatosensory cortex during seeing and feeling a touched hand

Previous work has demonstrated cross-modal links between vision and somatosensation at an early stage of sensory processing. Furthermore, recent behavioral studies have shown that viewing the stimulated body part can enhance tactile discrimination ability at the stimulated site. This study aims to investigate the role of the primary somatosensory cortex (SI) during visuotactile integration processes. Subjects looked at a hand in a video being touched on the first digit (D1) in synchrony with felt touches on their real hidden hand as compared with watching a video with asynchronous touches. During synchronous stimulation, subjects reported to feel the tactile sensation on the video hand, thus indicating that in this condition the subjects regarded the video hand as their own touched hand. This feeling disappeared in the asynchronous condition. Using neuromagnetic source imaging, we assessed the topography of the functional organization of SI related to tactile stimulation of D1. The cortical representation of D1 moved to a more inferior location during synchronous in comparison to asynchronous stimulation and rest. This modulation of the map in SI was significantly positively correlated with the feeling that the seen touch in the video represented the touch on the real hand. Thus, only if the seen touch is attributed to the own body, SI seems to be modulated.

Role for Human Posterior Parietal Cortex in Visual Processing of Aversive Objects in Peripersonal Space

The posterior parietal cortex of both human and non-human primates is known to play a crucial role in the early integration of visual information with somatosensory, proprioceptive and vestibular signals. However, it is not known whether in humans this region is further capable of discriminating if a stimulus poses a threat to the body. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we tested the hypothesis that the posterior parietal cortex of humans is capable of modulating its response to the visual processing of noxious threat representation in the absence of tactile input. During fMRI, participants watched while we "stimulated" a visible rubber hand, placed over their real hand with either a sharp (painful) or a blunt (nonpainful) probe. We found that superior and inferior parietal regions (BA5/7 and BA40) increased their activity in response to observing a painful versus nonpainful stimulus. However, this effect was only evident when the rubber hand was in a spatially congruent (vs. incongruent) position with respect to the participants' own hand. In addition, areas involved in motivational-affective coding such as mid-cingulate (BA24) and anterior insula also showed such relevance-dependent modulation, whereas premotor areas known to receive multisensory information about limb position did not. We suggest these results reveal a human anatomical-functional homologue to monkey inferior parietal areas that respond to aversive stimuli by producing nocifensive muscle and limb movements.

Having a body versus moving your body: How agency structures body-ownership

We investigated how motor agency in the voluntary control of body movement influences body awareness. In the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), synchronous tactile stimulation of a rubber hand and the participant's hand leads to a feeling of the rubber hand being incorporated in the participant's own body. One quantifiable behavioural correlate of the illusion is an induced shift in the perceived location of the participant's hand towards the rubber hand. Previous studies showed that the induced changes in body awareness are local and fragmented: the proprioceptive drift is largely restricted to the stimulated finger. In the present study, we investigated whether active and passive movements, rather than tactile stimulation, would lead to similarly fragmented body awareness. Participants watched a projected image of their hand under three conditions: active finger movement, passive finger movement, and tactile stimulation. Visual feedback was either synchronous or asynchronous with respect to stimulation of the hand. A significant overall RHI, defined as greater drifts following synchronous than asynchronous stimulation, was found in all cases. However, the distribution of the RHI across stimulated and non-stimulated fingers depended on the kind of stimulation. Localised proprioceptive drifts, specific to the stimulated finger, were found for tactile and passive stimulation. Conversely, during active movement of a single digit, the proprioceptive drifts were not localised to that digit, but were spread across the whole hand. Whereas a purely proprioceptive sense of body-ownership is local and fragmented, the motor sense of agency integrates distinct body-parts into a coherent, unified awareness of the body.

The self in action: lessons from delusions of control

Patients with delusions of control are abnormally aware of the sensory consequences of their actions and have difficulty with on-line corrections of movement. As a result they do not feel in control of their movements. At the same time they are strongly aware of the action being intentional. This leads them to believe that their actions are being controlled by an external agent. In contrast, the normal mark of the self in action is that we have very little experience of it. Most of the time we are not aware of the sensory consequences of our actions or of the various subtle corrections that we make during the course of goal-directed actions. We know that we are agents and that we are successfully causing the world to change. But as actors we move through the world like shadows glimpsed only occasional from the corner of an eye.

Integration of visual and tactile stimuli: top-down influences require time

In a visuotactile congruency task, a distracting flash of light presented near a tactile target can influence speeded judgments of tactile location. Localization of the tactile target is more rapid when the elevation of the visual distractor is congruent with the tactile stimulus than when it is incongruent. The goal of the present study was to examine the degree of control that can be exerted on the process proposed to integrate the visual and tactile stimuli. To this end, the proportion of spatially congruent items was manipulated across blocks of trials. A robust congruency effect was observed across three experiments. There was no effect of proportion congruency (varied between 75 and 11% congruent) when the visual event was presented only 30 ms prior to the tactile event. When this lead-time was increased to 100 ms there was a significant increase in the congruency effect, for errors, in the high proportion congruent conditions (experiment 3). We conclude that with sufficient lead-time, top-down influence can be exerted in this task, however, when presented at near simultaneity, visuotactile integration is independent of top-down effects.

Fooling your feelings: artificially induced referred sensations are linked to a modulation of the primary somatosensory cortex

Recent studies demonstrated tactile illusions in healthy subjects by manipulating visual and tactile information. For example, a rubber hand, lying on a table in front of the subject and not connected with the body, can be felt by the subject as belonging to his or her own body by a simple visuotactile manipulation. Aim of the present study was to create an illusion in which the subject feels touch on a body site which is different from the actual touch, hence showing a referral of touch similar to those reported in phantom limb patients. Since it is known from animal studies that tactile illusions can alter early sensory processing, we were interested in the role of the primary somatosensory cortex (SI) during this kind of illusion. Thus, we manipulated the visual and tactile information in eight healthy subjects. The participants were stimulated on their fifth digit (D5) while watching a video, which showed a life-sized hand where the first digit (D1) was stimulated, hence inducing a conflict in feeling and seeing. The visual and tactile stimulation was in-phase in one condition and out-of-phase in a control condition. The video was presented in the peripersonal space of the subject at the distance where the real hand would be expected. Subjects reported a referred sensation of feeling the stimulation on D1 instead of D5 when the stimulation was in-phase with the video. Neuromagnetic source imaging of the topography of the functional organization of SI related to tactile stimulation of D1 and D5 showed that the source extent of the cortical representation of D5 increased during the illusion. The results suggest that a simple manipulation of visual and tactile information can induce referred sensations in healthy subjects in a very fast manner. Since the amount of the referred sensation was significantly correlated with the modulation in SI, we argue that SI is involved in this kind of artificially induced referred sensation.

A specific role for efferent information in self-recognition

We investigated the specific contribution of efferent information in a self-recognition task. Subjects experienced a passive extension of the right index finger, either as an effect of moving their left hand via a lever ('self-generated action'), or imposed externally by the experimenter ('externally-generated action'). The visual feedback was manipulated so that subjects saw either their own right hand ('view own hand' condition) or someone else's right hand ('view other's hand' condition) during the passive extension of the index finger. Both hands were covered with identical gloves, so that discrimination on the basis of morphological differences was not possible. Participants judged whether the right hand they saw was theirs or not. Self-recognition was significantly more accurate when subjects were themselves the authors of the action, even though visual and proprioceptive information always specified the same posture, and despite the fact that subjects judged the effect and not the action per se. When the passive displacement of the participants right index finger was externally generated, and only afferent information was available, self-recognition performance dropped to near-chance levels. Differences in performance across conditions reflect the distinctive contribution of efferent information to self-recognition, and argue against a dominant role of proprioception in self-recognition.

Visual capture of apparent limb position influences tactile temporal order judgments

Shore et al. [D.I. Shore, E. Spry, C. Spence, Spatial modulation of tactile temporal order judgments, Perception (submitted for publication)] recently demonstrated that people find it easier to judge which hand is touched first (in a tactile temporal order judgment task) when their hands are placed far apart rather than close together. In the present study, we used a mirror to manipulate the visually perceived distance between participants' hands, while holding the actual (i.e., proprioceptively-specified) distance between them constant. Participants were asked to determine which of two vibrotactile stimuli, one presented to either index finger using the method of constant stimuli, was presented first. Performance was significantly worse (i.e., the JND was larger) when the hands were perceived (due to the mirror reflection) as being close together rather than further apart. These results highlight the critical role that vision plays in influencing the conscious perception of the temporal order of tactile stimuli.

Tools for the body (schema)

What happens in our brain when we use a tool to reach for a distant object? Recent neurophysiological, psychological and neuropsychological research suggests that this extended motor capability is followed by changes in specific neural networks that hold an updated map of body shape and posture (the putative "Body Schema" of classical neurology). These changes are compatible with the notion of the inclusion of tools in the "Body Schema", as if our own effector (e.g. the hand) were elongated to the tip of the tool. In this review we present empirical support for this intriguing idea from both single-neuron recordings in the monkey brain and behavioural performance of normal and brain-damaged humans. These relatively simple neural and behavioural aspects of tool-use shed light on more complex evolutionary and cognitive aspects of body representation and multisensory space coding for action.

The parietal role in the sense of self-ownership with temporal discrepancy between visual and proprioceptive feedbacks

One hypothesis on how we recognize an image of, for example, an arm as our own is through the co-occurrence of multiple sensory feedbacks, especially visual and proprioceptive feedbacks, in this process. It has been suggested that the parietal lobe is the region where proprioceptive and visual information of one's own body is integrated. This study investigated parietal cortical activity during a visual-proprioceptive synchrony judgment task in which visual feedback of the subjects' own passively moving hand was delayed. The subjects were required to judge whether or not there was a delay between the proprioceptive and visual feedbacks. Parietal cortical activity, which was measured using a 48-channel near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) apparatus, appeared to be modulated by the length of the delay between the visual and proprioceptive feedbacks. The bilateral superior/middle parietal areas were involved in experiencing the synchrony between the visual and proprioceptive feedbacks, whereas the right inferior parietal areas were strongly activated when discrepancy between the two feedbacks was detected. We postulate that the superior portion of the parietal lobe is essential for maintaining one's own body image, while the right inferior portion is involved in detecting movements of others.

Visuo-tactile representation of near-the-body space

Here we report findings from neuropsychological investigations showing the existence, in humans, of intersensory integrative systems representing space through the multisensory coding of visual and tactile events. In addition, these findings show that visuo-tactile integration may take place in a privileged manner within a limited sector of space closely surrounding the body surface, i.e., the near-peripersonal space. They also demonstrate that the representation of near-peripersonal space is not static, as objects in the out-of-reach space can be processed as nearer, depending upon the (illusory) visual information about hand position in space, and the use of tools as physical extensions of the reachable space. Finally, new evidence is provided suggesting the multisensory coding of peripersonal space can be achieved through bottom-up processing that, at least in some instances, is not necessarily modulated by more "cognitive" top-down processing, such as the expectation regarding the possibility of being touched. These findings are entirely consistent with the functional properties of multisensory neuronal structures coding near-peripersonal space in monkeys, as well as with behavioral, and neuroimaging evidence for the cross-modal coding of space in normal subjects. This high level of convergence ultimately favors the idea that multisensory space coding is achieved through similar multimodal structures in both humans and non-human primates.

Multisensory contributions to the 3-D representation of visuotactile peripersonal space in humans: evidence from the crossmodal congruency task

In order to determine precisely the location of a tactile stimulus presented to the hand it is necessary to know not only which part of the body has been stimulated, but also where that part of the body lies in space. This involves the multisensory integration of visual, tactile, proprioceptive, and even auditory cues regarding limb position. In recent years, researchers have become increasingly interested in the question of how these various sensory cues are weighted and integrated in order to enable people to localize tactile stimuli, as well as to give rise to the 'felt' position of our limbs, and ultimately the multisensory representation of 3-D peripersonal space. We highlight recent research on this topic using the crossmodal congruency task, in which participants make speeded elevation discrimination responses to vibrotactile targets presented to the thumb or index finger, while simultaneously trying to ignore irrelevant visual distractors presented from either the same (i.e., congruent) or a different (i.e., incongruent) elevation. Crossmodal congruency effects (calculated as performance on incongruent-congruent trials) are greatest when visual and vibrotactile stimuli are presented from the same azimuthal location, thus providing an index of common position across different sensory modalities. The crossmodal congruency task has been used to investigate a number of questions related to the representation of space in both normal participants and brain-damaged patients. In this review, we detail the major findings from this research, and highlight areas of convergence with other cognitive neuroscience disciplines.

Illusion of sense of self-agency: discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency, but not the sense of self-ownership

It is proposed that knowledge of motor commands is used to distinguish self-generated sensation from externally generated sensation. In this paper, we show that the sense of self-agency, that is the sense that I am the one who is generating an action, largely depends on the degree of discrepancy resulting from comparison between the predicted and actual sensory feedback. In Experiment 1, the sense of self-agency was reduced when the presentation of the tone was unpredictable in terms of timing and its frequency, although in fact the tone was self-produced. In Experiment 2, the opposite case was found to occur. That is, participants experienced illusionary sense of self-agency when the externally generated sensations happened to match the prediction made by forward model. In Experiment 3, the sense of self-agency was reduced when there was a discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences, regardless of presence or absence of a discrepancy between the intended and actual consequences of actions. In all the experiments, a discrepancy between the predicted and actual feedback had no effects on sense of self-ownership, that is the sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience. These results may suggest that both senses of self are mutually independent.

The Rubber Hand Illusion Revisited: Visuotactile Integration and Self-Attribution

Watching a rubber hand being stroked, while one's own unseen hand is synchronously stroked, may cause the rubber hand to be attributed to one's own body, to "feel like it's my hand." A behavioral measure of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a drift of the perceived position of one's own hand toward the rubber hand. The authors investigated (a) the influence of general body scheme representations on the RHI in Experiments 1 and 2 and (b) the necessary conditions of visuotactile stimulation underlying the RHI in Experiments 3 and 4. Overall, the results suggest that at the level of the process underlying the build up of the RHI, bottom-up processes of visuotactile correlation drive the illusion as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. Conversely, at the level of the phenomenological content, the illusion is modulated by top-down influences originating from the representation of one's own body.

Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness

We suggest that within a skill-based, sensorimotor approach to sensory consciousness, two measurable properties of perceivers' interaction with the environment, "corporality" and "alerting capacity", explain why sensory stimulation is experienced as having a "sensory feel", unlike thoughts or memories. We propose that the notions of "corporality" and "alerting capacity" make possible the construction of a "phenomenality plot", which charts in a principled way the degree to which conscious phenomena are experienced as having a sensory quality.

On the inability to ignore touch when responding to vision in the crossmodal congruency task

We investigated the extent to which people can selectively ignore distracting vibrotactile information when performing a visual task. In Experiment 1, participants made speeded elevation discrimination responses (up vs. down) to a series of visual targets presented from one of two eccentricities on either side of central fixation, while simultaneously trying to ignore task-irrelevant vibrotactile distractors presented independently to the finger (up) vs. thumb (down) of either hand. Participants responded significantly more slowly, and somewhat less accurately, when the elevation of the vibrotactile distractor was incongruent with that of the visual target than when they were presented from the same (i.e., congruent) elevation. This crossmodal congruency effect was significantly larger when the visual and tactile stimuli appeared on the same side of space than when they appeared on different sides, although the relative eccentricity of the two stimuli within the hemifield (i.e., same vs. different) had little effect on performance. In Experiment 2, participants who crossed their hands over the midline showed a very different pattern of crossmodal congruency effects to participants who adopted an uncrossed hands posture. Our results suggest that both the relative external location and the initial hemispheric projection of the target and distractor stimuli contribute jointly to determining the magnitude of the crossmodal congruency effect when participants have to respond to vision and ignore touch.