Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy

Listeners with congenital amusia are sensitive to context uncertainty in melodic sequences

In typical listeners, the perceptual salience of a surprising auditory event depends on the uncertainty of its context. For example, in melodies, pitch deviants are more easily detected and generate larger neural responses when the context is highly predictable than when it is less so. However, it is not known whether amusic listeners with abnormal pitch processing are sensitive to the degree of uncertainty of pitch sequences and, if so, whether they are to a different extent than typical non-musician listeners. To answer this question, we manipulated the uncertainty of short melodies while participants with and without congenital amusia underwent EEG recordings in a passive listening task. Uncertainty was manipulated by presenting melodies with different levels of complexity and familiarity, under the assumption that simpler and more familiar patterns would enhance pitch predictability. We recorded mismatch negativity (MMN) responses to pitch, intensity, timbre, location, and rhythm deviants as a measure of auditory surprise. In both participant groups, we observed reduced MMN amplitudes and longer peak latencies for all sound features with increasing levels of complexity, and putative familiarity effects only for intensity deviants. No significant group-by-complexity or group-by-familiarity interactions were detected. However, in contrast to previous studies, pitch MMN responses in amusics were disrupted in high complexity and unfamiliar melodies. The present results thus indicate that amusics are sensitive to the uncertainty of melodic sequences and that preattentive auditory change detection is greatly spared in this population across sound features and levels of predictability. However, our findings also hint at pitch-specific impairments in this population when uncertainty is high, thus suggesting that pitch processing under high uncertainty conditions requires an intact frontotemporal loop.

Enacting Media. An Embodied Account of Enculturation Between Neuromediality and New Cognitive Media Theory

This paper argues that the still-emerging paradigm of situated cognition requires a more systematic perspective on media to capture the enculturation of the human mind. By virtue of being media, cultural artifacts present central experiential models of the world for our embodied minds to latch onto. The paper identifies references to external media within embodied, extended, enactive, and predictive approaches to cognition, which remain underdeveloped in terms of the profound impact that media have on our mind. To grasp this impact, I propose an enactive account of media that is based on expansive habits as media-structured, embodied ways of bringing forth meaning and new domains of values. We apply such habits, for instance, when seeing a picture or perceiving a movie. They become established through a process of reciprocal adaptation between media artifacts and organisms and define the range of viable actions within such a media ecology. Within an artifactual habit, we then become attuned to a specific media work (e.g., a TV series, a picture, a text, or even a city) that engages us. Both the plurality of habits and the dynamical adjustments within a habit require a more flexible neural architecture than is addressed by classical cognitive neuroscience. To detail how neural and media processes interlock, I will introduce the concept of neuromediality and discuss radical predictive processing accounts that could contribute to the externalization of the mind by treating media themselves as generative models of the world. After a short primer on general media theory, I discuss media examples in three domains: pictures and moving images; digital media; architecture and the built environment. This discussion demonstrates the need for a new cognitive media theory based on enactive artifactual habits-one that will help us gain perspective on the continuous re-mediation of our mind.

Updating beliefs beyond the here-and-now: the counter-factual self in anosognosia for hemiplegia

The syndrome of anosognosia for hemiplegia, or the lack of awareness for one’s paralysis following right hemisphere stroke, can provide unique insights into the neurocognitive mechanisms of self-awareness. Yet it remains unclear whether anosognosia for hemiplegia is a modality-specific deficit of sensorimotor monitoring, or whether domain-general processes of attention and belief-updating converge to cause anosognosia for hemiplegia. Using a Bayesian learning framework, we formalized and empirically investigated the hypothesis that failures to update anosognosic beliefs can be explained by abnormalities in the relative uncertainty (i.e. precision) ascribed to prior beliefs versus sensory information in different contexts. We designed a new motor belief-updating task that manipulated both the temporal (prospective and retrospective) and spatial (hemispace most affected by inattention and hemispace less affected by inattention) conditions in which beliefs had to be updated, and we validated its sensitivity to anosognosia for hemiplegia in 26 patients with right hemisphere stroke. We then computed and empirically tested two different Bayesian predictors of prospective beliefs using two proxies for precision in anosognosia for hemiplegia patients: (i) standardized, neuropsychological measures of objective attention abilities, i.e. visuospatial neglect scores and (ii) subjective uncertainty reports, i.e. confidence ratings. Our results suggest that while neglect does not affect local, sensorimotor error monitoring, it does seem to affect the degree to which observed errors are used to update more general, prospective beliefs about counterfactual motor abilities in anosognosia for hemiplegia. Difficulties in such ‘counterfactual’ belief-updating were associated with disruptions in tracts of the ventral attentional network (i.e. superior longitudinal fasciculus connecting the temporo-parietal junction and ventral frontal cortex) and associated lesions to the insula, inferior parietal cortex and superior temporal regions. These results suggest that self-awareness extends beyond local, retrospective monitoring, requiring also salience-based, convergence of beliefs about the self that go beyond the ‘here-and-now’ of sensorimotor experience.

Useful misrepresentation: perception as embodied proactive inference

According to the predictive processing framework, perception is geared to represent the environment in terms of embodied action opportunities as opposed to objective truth. Here, we argue that such an optimisation is reflected by biases in expectations (i.e., prior predictive information) that facilitate 'useful' inferences of external sensory causes. To support this, we highlight a body of literature suggesting that perception is systematically biased away from accurate estimates under conditions where utility and accuracy conflict with one another. We interpret this to reflect the brain's attempt to adjudicate between conflicting sources of prediction error, as external accuracy is sacrificed to facilitate actions that proactively avoid physiologically surprising outcomes. This carries important theoretical implications and offers new insights into psychopathology.

Visual Predictions Operate on Different Timescales

Humans live in a volatile environment, subject to changes occurring at different timescales. The ability to adjust internal predictions accordingly is critical for perception and action. We studied this ability with two EEG experiments in which participants were presented with sequences of four Gabor patches, simulating a rotation, and instructed to respond to the last stimulus (target) to indicate whether or not it continued the direction of the first three stimuli. Each experiment included a short-term learning phase in which the probabilities of these two options were very different (p = .2 vs. p = .8, Rules A and B, respectively), followed by a neutral test phase in which both probabilities were equal. In addition, in one of the experiments, prior to the short-term phase, participants performed a much longer long-term learning phase where the relative probabilities of the rules predicting targets were opposite to those of the short-term phase. Analyses of the RTs and P3 amplitudes showed that, in the neutral test phase, participants initially predicted targets according to the probabilities learned in the short-term phase. However, whereas participants not pre-exposed to the long-term learning phase gradually adjusted their predictions to the neutral probabilities, for those who performed the long-term phase, the short-term associations were spontaneously replaced by those learned in that phase. This indicates that the long-term associations remained intact whereas the short-term associations were learned, transiently used, and abandoned when the context changed. The spontaneous recovery suggests independent storage and control of long-term and short-term associations.

Why Build a Robot With Artificial Consciousness? How to Begin? A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue on the Design and Implementation of a Synthetic Model of Consciousness

Creativity is intrinsic to Humanities and STEM disciplines. In the activities of artists and engineers, for example, an attempt is made to bring something new into the world through counterfactual thinking. However, creativity in these disciplines is distinguished by differences in motivations and constraints. For example, engineers typically direct their creativity toward building solutions to practical problems, whereas the outcomes of artistic creativity, which are largely useless to practical purposes, aspire to enrich the world aesthetically and conceptually. In this essay, an artist (DHS) and a roboticist (GS) engage in a cross-disciplinary conceptual analysis of the creative problem of artificial consciousness in a robot, expressing the counterfactual thinking necessitated by the problem, as well as disciplinary differences in motivations, constraints, and applications. We especially deal with the question of why one would build an artificial consciousness and we consider how an illusionist theory of consciousness alters prominent ethical debates on synthetic consciousness. We discuss theories of consciousness and their applicability to synthetic consciousness. We discuss practical approaches to implementing artificial consciousness in a robot and conclude by considering the role of creativity in the project of developing an artificial consciousness.

Predictive Processing in Cognitive Robotics: A Review

Predictive processing has become an influential framework in cognitive sciences. This framework turns the traditional view of perception upside down, claiming that the main flow of information processing is realized in a top-down, hierarchical manner. Furthermore, it aims at unifying perception, cognition, and action as a single inferential process. However, in the related literature, the predictive processing framework and its associated schemes, such as predictive coding, active inference, perceptual inference, and free-energy principle, tend to be used interchangeably. In the field of cognitive robotics, there is no clear-cut distinction on which schemes have been implemented and under which assumptions. In this letter, working definitions are set with the main aim of analyzing the state of the art in cognitive robotics research working under the predictive processing framework as well as some related nonrobotic models. The analysis suggests that, first, research in both cognitive robotics implementations and nonrobotic models needs to be extended to the study of how multiple exteroceptive modalities can be integrated into prediction error minimization schemes. Second, a relevant distinction found here is that cognitive robotics implementations tend to emphasize the learning of a generative model, while in nonrobotics models, it is almost absent. Third, despite the relevance for active inference, few cognitive robotics implementations examine the issues around control and whether it should result from the substitution of inverse models with proprioceptive predictions. Finally, limited attention has been placed on precision weighting and the tracking of prediction error dynamics. These mechanisms should help to explore more complex behaviors and tasks in cognitive robotics research under the predictive processing framework.

Magic, Bayes and wows: A Bayesian account of magic tricks

Magic tricks have enjoyed an increasing interest by scientists. However, most research in magic focused on isolated aspects of it and a conceptual understanding of magic, encompassing its distinct components and varieties, is missing. Here, we present an account of magic within the theory of Bayesian predictive coding. We present the "wow" effect of magic as an increase in surprise evoked by the prediction error between expected and observed data. We take into account prior knowledge of the observer, attention, and (mis-)direction of perception and beliefs by the magician to bias the observer's predictions and present a simple example for the modelling of the evoked surprise. The role of misdirection is described as everything that aims to maximize the surprise a trick evokes by the generation of novel beliefs, the exploitation of background knowledge and attentional control of the incoming information. Understanding magic within Bayesian predictive coding allows unifying all aspects of magic tricks within one framework, making it tractable, comparable and unifiable with other models in psychology and neuroscience.

Evaluating the evidence for expectation suppression in the visual system

Reports of expectation suppression have shaped the development of influential predictive coding-based theories of visual perception. However recent work has highlighted confounding factors that may mimic or inflate expectation suppression effects. In this review, we describe four confounds that are prevalent across experiments that tested for expectation suppression: effects of surprise, attention, stimulus repetition and adaptation, and stimulus novelty. With these confounds in mind we then critically review the evidence for expectation suppression across probabilistic cueing, statistical learning, oddball, action-outcome learning and apparent motion designs. We found evidence for expectation suppression within a specific subset of statistical learning designs that involved weeks of sequence learning prior to neural activity measurement. Across other experimental contexts, whereby stimulus appearance probabilities were learned within one or two testing sessions, there was inconsistent evidence for genuine expectation suppression. We discuss how an absence of expectation suppression could inform models of predictive processing, repetition suppression and perceptual decision-making. We also provide suggestions for designing experiments that may better test for expectation suppression in future work.

MEG reveals preference specific increases of sexual-image-evoked responses in paedophilic sexual offenders and healthy controls

OBJECTIVES

Paedophilic disorder is characterised by sexual attraction towards children. Classification of a counterpart as sexually attractive likely occurs rapidly, and involves both conscious and unconscious attentional and cognitive processes. Magnetoencephalography (MEG) is an imaging method especially well-suited to examine visual and attentional processes triggered by sexual images within the range of milliseconds.

METHODS

We investigated brain responses to sexual images depicting adults (frequent) and children (infrequent stimulus) in seventeen paedophilic patients with a history of child sexual offending (P + CSO) and twenty healthy controls (HC) during a passive visual oddball paradigm. Event-related fields (ERF) were measured to extract the magnetic visual mismatch negativity (vMMNm), and how it relates to the processing of different classes of sexual stimuli.

RESULTS

P + CSO exhibited significantly longer vMMNm latencies (100-180 ms post-stimulus) than HC. Moreover, P + CSO showed widespread increased amplitudes in response to child images starting from P3a and P3b components and lasting up to 400 ms post-stimulus presentation localised in frontal and temporal brain regions.

CONCLUSIONS

This study uncovers the first MEG differences in automatic change detection between P + CSO and HC during the presentation of subliminal sexual images of adults and children, contributing towards a better understanding of the neurobiological processes of P + CSO.

Prediction in Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Systematic Review of Empirical Evidence

According to a recent influential proposal, several phenotypic features of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) may be accounted for by differences in predictive skills between individuals with ASD and neurotypical individuals. In this systematic review, we describe results from 47 studies that have empirically tested this hypothesis. We assess the results based on two observable aspects of prediction: learning a pairing between an antecedent and a consequence and responding to an antecedent in a predictive manner. Taken together, these studies suggest distinct differences in both predictive learning and predictive response. Studies documenting differences in learning predictive pairings indicate challenges in detecting such relationships especially when predictive features of an antecedent have low salience or consistency, and studies showing differences in habituation and perceptual adaptation suggest low-level predictive processing differences in ASD. These challenges may account for the observed differences in the influence of predictive priors, in spontaneous predictive movement or gaze, and in social prediction. An important goal for future research will be to better define and constrain the broad domain-general hypothesis by testing multiple types of prediction within the same individuals. Additional promising avenues include studying prediction within naturalistic contexts and assessing the effect of prediction-based intervention on supporting functional outcomes for individuals with ASD. LAY SUMMARY: Researchers have suggested that many features of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) may be explained by differences in the prediction skills of people with ASD. We review results from 47 studies. These studies suggest that ASD may be associated with differences in the learning of predictive pairings (e.g., learning cause and effect) and in low-level predictive processing in the brain (e.g., processing repeated sounds). These findings lay the groundwork for research that can improve our understanding of ASD and inform interventions. Autism Res 2021, 14: 604-630. © 2021 International Society for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals LLC.

Accounting for uncertainty: inhibition for neural inference in the cerebellum

Sensorimotor coordination is thought to rely on cerebellar-based internal models for state estimation, but the underlying neural mechanisms and specific contribution of the cerebellar components is unknown. A central aspect of any inferential process is the representation of uncertainty or conversely precision characterizing the ensuing estimates. Here, we discuss the possible contribution of inhibition to the encoding of precision of neural representations in the granular layer of the cerebellar cortex. Within this layer, Golgi cells influence excitatory granule cells, and their action is critical in shaping information transmission downstream to Purkinje cells. In this review, we equate the ensuing excitation-inhibition balance in the granular layer with the outcome of a precision-weighted inferential process, and highlight the physiological characteristics of Golgi cell inhibition that are consistent with such computations.

Temporal Binding in Multisensory and Motor-Sensory Contexts: Toward a Unified Model

Our senses receive a manifold of sensory signals at any given moment in our daily lives. For a coherent and unified representation of information and precise motor control, our brain needs to temporally bind the signals emanating from a common causal event and segregate others. Traditionally, different mechanisms were proposed for the temporal binding phenomenon in multisensory and motor-sensory contexts. This paper reviews the literature on the temporal binding phenomenon in both multisensory and motor-sensory contexts and suggests future research directions for advancing the field. Moreover, by critically evaluating the recent literature, this paper suggests that common computational principles are responsible for the temporal binding in multisensory and motor-sensory contexts. These computational principles are grounded in the Bayesian framework of uncertainty reduction rooted in the Helmholtzian idea of unconscious causal inference.

The encoding of stochastic regularities is facilitated by action-effect predictions

Our brains continuously build and update predictive models of the world, sources of prediction being drawn for example from sensory regularities and/or our own actions. Yet, recent results in the auditory system indicate that stochastic regularities may not be easily encoded when a rare medium pitch deviant is presented between frequent high and low pitch standard sounds in random order, as reflected in the lack of sensory prediction error event-related potentials [i.e., mismatch negativity (MMN)]. We wanted to test the implication of the predictive coding theory that predictions based on higher-order generative models-here, based on action intention, are fed top-down in the hierarchy to sensory levels. Participants produced random sequences of high and low pitch sounds by button presses in two conditions: In a "specific" condition, one button produced high and the other low pitch sounds; in an "unspecific" condition, both buttons randomly produced high or low-pitch sounds. Rare medium pitch deviants elicited larger MMN and N2 responses in the "specific" compared to the "unspecific" condition, despite equal sound probabilities. These results thus demonstrate that action-effect predictions can boost stochastic regularity-based predictions and engage higher-order deviance detection processes, extending previous notions on the role of action predictions at sensory levels.

Directed information exchange between cortical layers in macaque V1 and V4 and its modulation by selective attention

Achieving behavioral goals requires integration of sensory and cognitive information across cortical laminae and cortical regions. How this computation is performed remains unknown. Using local field potential recordings and spectrally resolved conditional Granger causality (cGC) analysis, we mapped visual information flow, and its attentional modulation, between cortical layers within and between macaque brain areas V1 and V4. Stimulus-induced interlaminar information flow within V1 dominated upwardly, channeling information toward supragranular corticocortical output layers. Within V4, information flow dominated from granular to supragranular layers, but interactions between supragranular and infragranular layers dominated downwardly. Low-frequency across-area communication was stronger from V4 to V1, with little layer specificity. Gamma-band communication was stronger in the feedforward V1-to-V4 direction. Attention to the receptive field of V1 decreased communication between all V1 layers, except for granular-to-supragranular layer interactions. Communication within V4, and from V1 to V4, increased with attention across all frequencies. While communication from V4 to V1 was stronger in lower-frequency bands (4 to 25 Hz), attention modulated cGCs from V4 to V1 across all investigated frequencies. Our data show that top-down cognitive processes result in reduced communication within cortical areas, increased feedforward communication across all frequency bands, and increased gamma-band feedback communication.

Sensorimotor predictions shape reported conscious visual experience in a breaking continuous flash suppression task

Accounts of predictive processing propose that conscious experience is influenced not only by passive predictions about the world, but also by predictions encompassing how the world changes in relation to our actions-that is, on predictions about sensorimotor contingencies. We tested whether valid sensorimotor predictions, in particular learned associations between stimuli and actions, shape reports about conscious visual experience. Two experiments used instrumental conditioning to build sensorimotor predictions linking different stimuli with distinct actions. Conditioning was followed by a breaking continuous flash suppression task, measuring the speed of reported breakthrough for different pairings between the stimuli and prepared actions, comparing those congruent and incongruent with the trained sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 1, counterbalancing of the response actions within the breaking continuous flash suppression task was achieved by repeating the same action within each block but having them differ across the two blocks. Experiment 2 sought to increase the predictive salience of the actions by avoiding the repetition within blocks. In Experiment 1, breakthrough times were numerically shorter for congruent than incongruent pairings, but Bayesian analysis supported the null hypothesis of no influence from the sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 2, reported conscious perception was significantly faster for congruent than for incongruent pairings. A meta-analytic Bayes factor combining the two experiments confirmed this effect. Altogether, we provide evidence for a key implication of the action-oriented predictive processing approach to conscious perception, namely that sensorimotor predictions shape our conscious experience of the world.

Mismatch Negativity and Stimulus-Preceding Negativity in Paradigms of Increasing Auditory Complexity: A Possible Role in Predictive Coding

The auditory mismatch negativity (MMN) has been considered a preattentive index of auditory processing and/or a signature of prediction error computation. This study tries to demonstrate the presence of an MMN to deviant trials included in complex auditory stimuli sequences, and its possible relationship to predictive coding. Additionally, the transfer of information between trials is expected to be represented by stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN), which would possibly fit the predictive coding framework. To accomplish these objectives, the EEG of 31 subjects was recorded during an auditory paradigm in which trials composed of stimulus sequences with increasing or decreasing frequencies were intermingled with deviant trials presenting an unexpected ending. Our results showed the presence of an MMN in response to deviant trials. An SPN appeared during the intertrial interval and its amplitude was reduced in response to deviant trials. The presence of an MMN in complex sequences of sounds and the generation of an SPN component, with different amplitudes in deviant and standard trials, would support the predictive coding framework.

Temporal features of goal-directed movements change with source, but not frequency, of rhythmic auditory stimuli

Music and metronomes differentially impact movement performance. The current experiment presented metronome and drum beats in simple and complex rhythms before goal-directed reaching movements, while also quantifying enjoyment. Auditory conditions were completed with and without visual feedback and were blocked and counterbalanced. There were no differences between simple and complex rhythms, indicating that rhythmic information alone is sufficient to benefit performance. The drum elicited shorter movement times and higher peak velocities, without an increase in spatial variability. Reaction times were moderately correlated with ratings of enjoyment. These data provide evidence that the source of an auditory stimulus impacts movement performance of a goal-directed reaching task. Results are contextualized within models of goal-directed reaching to elucidate mechanisms contributing to performance improvements.

Human Brain Ages With Hierarchy-Selective Attenuation of Prediction Errors

From the perspective of predictive coding, our brain embodies a hierarchical generative model to realize perception, which proactively predicts the statistical structure of sensory inputs. How are these predictive processes modified as we age? Recent research suggested that aging leads to decreased weighting of sensory inputs and increased reliance on predictions. Here we investigated whether this age-related shift from sensorium to predictions occurs at all levels of hierarchical message passing. We recorded the electroencephalography responses with an auditory local-global paradigm in a cohort of 108 healthy participants from 3 groups: seniors, adults, and adolescents. The detection of local deviancy seems largely preserved in older individuals at earlier latency (including the mismatch negativity followed by the P3a but not the reorienting negativity). In contrast, the detection of global deviancy is clearly compromised in older individuals, as they showed worse task performance and attenuated P3b. Our findings demonstrate that older brains show little decline in sensory (i.e., first-order) prediction errors but significant diminution in contextual (i.e., second-order) prediction errors. Age-related deficient maintenance of auditory information in working memory might affect whether and how lower-level prediction errors propagate to the higher level.

The Thalamus as a Blackboard for Perception and Planning

It has been suggested that the thalamus acts as a blackboard, on which the computations of different cortical modules are composed, coordinated, and integrated. This article asks what blackboard role the thalamus might play, and whether that role is consistent with the neuroanatomy of the thalamus. It does so in a context of Bayesian belief updating, expressed as a Free Energy Principle. We suggest that the thalamus-as-a-blackboard offers important questions for research in spatial cognition. Several prominent features of the thalamus-including its lack of olfactory relay function, its lack of internal excitatory connections, its regular and conserved shape, its inhibitory interneurons, triadic synapses, and diffuse cortical connectivity-are consistent with a blackboard role.Different thalamic nuclei may play different blackboard roles: (1) the Pulvinar, through its reciprocal connections to posterior cortical regions, coordinates perceptual inference about "what is where" from multi-sense-data. (2) The Mediodorsal (MD) nucleus, through its connections to the prefrontal cortex, and the other thalamic nuclei linked to the motor cortex, uses the same generative model for planning and learning novel spatial movements. (3) The paraventricular nucleus may compute risk-reward trade-offs. We also propose that as any new movement is practiced a few times, cortico-thalamocortical (CTC) links entrain the corresponding cortico-cortical links, through a process akin to supervised learning. Subsequently, the movement becomes a fast unconscious habit, not requiring the MD nucleus or other thalamic nuclei, and bypassing the thalamic bottleneck.

Modulatory Effects of Prediction Accuracy on Electroencephalographic Brain Activity During Prediction

Prediction is essential for the efficiency of many cognitive processes; however, this process is not always perfect. Predictive coding theory suggests that the brain generates and updates a prediction to respond to an upcoming event. Although an electrophysiological index of prediction, the stimulus preceding negativity (SPN), has been reported, it remains unknown whether the SPN reflects the prediction accuracy, or whether it is associated with the prediction error, which corresponds to a mismatch between a prediction and an actual input. Thus, the present study aimed to investigate this question using electroencephalography (EEG). Participants were asked to predict the original pictures from pictures that had undergone different levels of pixelation. The SPN amplitude was affected by the level of pixelation and correlated with the subjective evaluation of the prediction accuracy. Furthermore, late positive components (LPC) were negatively correlated with SPN. These results suggest that the amplitude of SPN reflects the prediction accuracy; more accurate prediction increases the SPN and reduces the prediction error, resulting in reduced LPC amplitudes.

Can expectation suppression be explained by reduced attention to predictable stimuli?

The expectation-suppression effect - reduced stimulus-evoked responses to expected stimuli - is widely considered to be an empirical hallmark of reduced prediction errors in the framework of predictive coding. Here we challenge this notion by proposing that that expectation suppression could be explained by a reduced attention effect. Specifically, we argue that reduced responses to predictable stimuli can also be explained by a reduced saliency-driven allocation of attention. We base our discussion mainly on findings in the visual cortex and propose that resolving this controversy requires the assessment of qualitative differences between the ways in which attention and surprise enhance brain responses.

Reconciling competing mechanisms posited to underlie auditory verbal hallucinations

Perception is not the passive registration of incoming sensory data. Rather, it involves some analysis by synthesis, based on past experiences and context. One adaptive consequence of this arrangement is imagination-the ability to richly simulate sensory experiences, interrogate and manipulate those simulations, in service of action and decision making. In this paper, we will discuss one possible cost of this adaptation, namely hallucinations-perceptions without sensory stimulation, which characterize serious mental illnesses like schizophrenia, but which also occur in neurological illnesses, and-crucially for the present piece-are common also in the non-treatment-seeking population. We will draw upon a framework for imagination that distinguishes voluntary from non-voluntary experiences and explore the extent to which the varieties and features of hallucinations map onto this distinction, with a focus on auditory-verbal hallucinations (AVHs)-colloquially, hearing voices. We will propose that sense of agency for the act of imagining is key to meaningfully dissecting different forms and features of AVHs, and we will outline the neural, cognitive and phenomenological sequelae of this sense. We will conclude that a compelling unifying framework for action, perception and belief-predictive processing-can incorporate observations regarding sense of agency, imagination and hallucination. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

Representation Wars: Enacting an Armistice Through Active Inference

Over the last 30 years, representationalist and dynamicist positions in the philosophy of cognitive science have argued over whether neurocognitive processes should be viewed as representational or not. Major scientific and technological developments over the years have furnished both parties with ever more sophisticated conceptual weaponry. In recent years, an enactive generalization of predictive processing – known as active inference – has been proposed as a unifying theory of brain functions. Since then, active inference has fueled both representationalist and dynamicist campaigns. However, we believe that when diving into the formal details of active inference, one should be able to find a solution to the war; if not a peace treaty, surely an armistice of a sort. Based on an analysis of these formal details, this paper shows how both representationalist and dynamicist sensibilities can peacefully coexist within the new territory of active inference.

Prediction and Learning: Understanding Uncertainty

We build models of the world around us to guide perception and learning in the face of uncertainty. New evidence reveals a neurocomputational mechanism that links predictive processes across cognitive domains.

A theory of memory for binary sequences: Evidence for a mental compression algorithm in humans

Working memory capacity can be improved by recoding the memorized information in a condensed form. Here, we tested the theory that human adults encode binary sequences of stimuli in memory using an abstract internal language and a recursive compression algorithm. The theory predicts that the psychological complexity of a given sequence should be proportional to the length of its shortest description in the proposed language, which can capture any nested pattern of repetitions and alternations using a limited number of instructions. Five experiments examine the capacity of the theory to predict human adults' memory for a variety of auditory and visual sequences. We probed memory using a sequence violation paradigm in which participants attempted to detect occasional violations in an otherwise fixed sequence. Both subjective complexity ratings and objective violation detection performance were well predicted by our theoretical measure of complexity, which simply reflects a weighted sum of the number of elementary instructions and digits in the shortest formula that captures the sequence in our language. While a simpler transition probability model, when tested as a single predictor in the statistical analyses, accounted for significant variance in the data, the goodness-of-fit with the data significantly improved when the language-based complexity measure was included in the statistical model, while the variance explained by the transition probability model largely decreased. Model comparison also showed that shortest description length in a recursive language provides a better fit than six alternative previously proposed models of sequence encoding. The data support the hypothesis that, beyond the extraction of statistical knowledge, human sequence coding relies on an internal compression using language-like nested structures.

Sparse deep predictive coding captures contour integration capabilities of the early visual system

Both neurophysiological and psychophysical experiments have pointed out the crucial role of recurrent and feedback connections to process context-dependent information in the early visual cortex. While numerous models have accounted for feedback effects at either neural or representational level, none of them were able to bind those two levels of analysis. Is it possible to describe feedback effects at both levels using the same model? We answer this question by combining Predictive Coding (PC) and Sparse Coding (SC) into a hierarchical and convolutional framework applied to realistic problems. In the Sparse Deep Predictive Coding (SDPC) model, the SC component models the internal recurrent processing within each layer, and the PC component describes the interactions between layers using feedforward and feedback connections. Here, we train a 2-layered SDPC on two different databases of images, and we interpret it as a model of the early visual system (V1 & V2). We first demonstrate that once the training has converged, SDPC exhibits oriented and localized receptive fields in V1 and more complex features in V2. Second, we analyze the effects of feedback on the neural organization beyond the classical receptive field of V1 neurons using interaction maps. These maps are similar to association fields and reflect the Gestalt principle of good continuation. We demonstrate that feedback signals reorganize interaction maps and modulate neural activity to promote contour integration. Third, we demonstrate at the representational level that the SDPC feedback connections are able to overcome noise in input images. Therefore, the SDPC captures the association field principle at the neural level which results in a better reconstruction of blurred images at the representational level.

Recent advances in the application of predictive coding and active inference models within clinical neuroscience

Research in clinical neuroscience is founded on the idea that a better understanding of brain (dys)function will improve our ability to diagnose and treat neurological and psychiatric disorders. In recent years, neuroscience has converged on the notion that the brain is a 'prediction machine,' in that it actively predicts the sensory input that it will receive if one or another course of action is chosen. These predictions are used to select actions that will (most often, and in the long run) maintain the body within the narrow range of physiological states consistent with survival. This insight has given rise to an area of clinical computational neuroscience research that focuses on characterizing neural circuit architectures that can accomplish these predictive functions, and on how the associated processes may break down or become aberrant within clinical conditions. Here, we provide a brief review of examples of recent work on the application of predictive processing models of brain function to study clinical (psychiatric) disorders, with the aim of highlighting current directions and their potential clinical utility. We offer examples of recent conceptual models, formal mathematical models, and applications of such models in empirical research in clinical populations, with a focus on making this material accessible to clinicians without expertise in computational neuroscience. In doing so, we aim to highlight the potential insights and opportunities that understanding the brain as a prediction machine may offer to clinical research and practice.

Tea With Milk? A Hierarchical Generative Framework of Sequential Event Comprehension

To make sense of the world around us, we must be able to segment a continual stream of sensory inputs into discrete events. In this review, I propose that in order to comprehend events, we engage hierarchical generative models that "reverse engineer" the intentions of other agents as they produce sequential action in real time. By generating probabilistic predictions for upcoming events, generative models ensure that we are able to keep up with the rapid pace at which perceptual inputs unfold. By tracking our certainty about other agents' goals and the magnitude of prediction errors at multiple temporal scales, generative models enable us to detect event boundaries by inferring when a goal has changed. Moreover, by adapting flexibly to the broader dynamics of the environment and our own comprehension goals, generative models allow us to optimally allocate limited resources. Finally, I argue that we use generative models not only to comprehend events but also to produce events (carry out goal-relevant sequential action) and to continually learn about new events from our surroundings. Taken together, this hierarchical generative framework provides new insights into how the human brain processes events so effortlessly while highlighting the fundamental links between event comprehension, production, and learning.

Neural processing of iterated prisoner's dilemma outcomes indicates next-round choice and speed to reciprocate cooperation

The iterated prisoner's dilemma (iPD) game is a well-established model for testing how people cooperate, and the neural processes that unfold after its distinct outcomes have been partly described. Recent theoretical models suggest evolution favors intuitive cooperation, which raises questions on the behavioral but also neural timelines involved. We studied the outcome/feedback stage of iPD rounds with electroencephalography (EEG) methods. Results showed that neural signals associated with this stage also relate to future choice, in an outcome-dependent manner: (i) after zero-gain "sucker's payoffs" (unreciprocated cooperation), a participant's decision thereafter relates to changes to the feedback-related negativity (FRN); (ii) after one-sided non-cooperation (participant wins at co-player's expense), by the P3; (iii) after mutual cooperation, by late frontal delta-band modulations. Critically, faster reciprocation behavior towards a co-player's choice to cooperate was predicted, on a single-trial basis, by players' P3 and frontal delta modulations at the immediately preceding trial. Delta-band signaling is discussed in relation to homeostatic regulation processing in the literature. The findings relate the early outcome/feedback stage to subsequent decisional processes in the iPD, providing a first neural account of the brief timelines implied in heuristic modes of cooperation.

Both contextual regularity and selective attention affect the reduction of precision-weighted prediction errors but in distinct manners

Predictive coding model of perception postulates that the primary objective of the brain is to infer the causes of sensory inputs by reducing prediction errors (i.e., the discrepancy between expected and actual information). Moreover, prediction errors are weighted by their precision (i.e., inverse variance), which quantifies the degree of certainty about the variables. There is accumulating evidence that the reduction of precision-weighted prediction errors can be affected by contextual regularity (as an external factor) and selective attention (as an internal factor). However, it is unclear whether the two factors function together or separately. Here we used electroencephalography (EEG) to examine the putative interaction of contextual regularity and selective attention on this reduction process. Participants were presented with pairs of regular and irregular quartets in attended and unattended conditions. We found that contextual regularity and selective attention independently modulated the N1/MMN where the repetition effect was absent. On the P2, the two factors respectively interacted with the repetition effect without interacting with each other. The results showed that contextual regularity and selective attention likely affect the reduction of precision-weighted prediction errors in distinct manners. While contextual regularity finetunes our efficiency at reducing precision-weighted prediction errors, selective attention seems to modulate the reduction process following the Matthew effect of accumulated advantage.

Prior expectations evoke stimulus-specific activity in the deep layers of the primary visual cortex

The way we perceive the world is strongly influenced by our expectations. In line with this, much recent research has revealed that prior expectations strongly modulate sensory processing. However, the neural circuitry through which the brain integrates external sensory inputs with internal expectation signals remains unknown. In order to understand the computational architecture of the cortex, we need to investigate the way these signals flow through the cortical layers. This is crucial because the different cortical layers have distinct intra- and interregional connectivity patterns, and therefore determining which layers are involved in a cortical computation can inform us on the sources and targets of these signals. Here, we used ultra-high field (7T) functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to reveal that prior expectations evoke stimulus-specific activity selectively in the deep layers of the primary visual cortex (V1). These findings are in line with predictive processing theories proposing that neurons in the deep cortical layers represent perceptual hypotheses and thereby shed light on the computational architecture of cortex.

The way we perceive the world is strongly influenced by our expectations, but the neural circuitry through which the brain achieves this remains unknown. A study using ultra-high field fMRI reveals that prior expectations evoke stimulus-specific signals in the deep layers of the primary visual cortex.

Timing of repetition suppression of event-related potentials to unattended objects

Current theories of object perception emphasize the automatic nature of perceptual inference. Repetition suppression (RS), the successive decrease of brain responses to repeated stimuli, is thought to reflect the optimization of perceptual inference through neural plasticity. While functional imaging studies revealed brain regions that show suppressed responses to the repeated presentation of an object, little is known about the intra-trial time course of repetition effects to everyday objects. Here, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to task-irrelevant line-drawn objects, while participants engaged in a distractor task. We quantified changes in ERPs over repetitions using three general linear models that modeled RS by an exponential, linear, or categorical "change detection" function in each subject. Our aim was to select the model with highest evidence and determine the within-trial time-course and scalp distribution of repetition effects using that model. Model comparison revealed the superiority of the exponential model indicating that repetition effects are observable for trials beyond the first repetition. Model parameter estimates revealed a sequence of RS effects in three time windows (86-140, 322-360, and 400-446 ms) and with occipital, temporoparietal, and frontotemporal distribution, respectively. An interval of repetition enhancement (RE) was also observed (320-340 ms) over occipitotemporal sensors. Our results show that automatic processing of task-irrelevant objects involves multiple intervals of RS with distinct scalp topographies. These sequential intervals of RS and RE might reflect the short-term plasticity required for optimization of perceptual inference and the associated changes in prediction errors and predictions, respectively, over stimulus repetitions during automatic object processing.

A Bayesian brain model of adaptive behavior: an application to the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task

Adaptive behavior emerges through a dynamic interaction between cognitive agents and changing environmental demands. The investigation of information processing underlying adaptive behavior relies on controlled experimental settings in which individuals are asked to accomplish demanding tasks whereby a hidden regularity or an abstract rule has to be learned dynamically. Although performance in such tasks is considered as a proxy for measuring high-level cognitive processes, the standard approach consists in summarizing observed response patterns by simple heuristic scoring measures. With this work, we propose and validate a new computational Bayesian model accounting for individual performance in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), a renowned clinical tool to measure set-shifting and deficient inhibitory processes on the basis of environmental feedback. We formalize the interaction between the task's structure, the received feedback, and the agent's behavior by building a model of the information processing mechanisms used to infer the hidden rules of the task environment. Furthermore, we embed the new model within the mathematical framework of the Bayesian Brain Theory (BBT), according to which beliefs about hidden environmental states are dynamically updated following the logic of Bayesian inference. Our computational model maps distinct cognitive processes into separable, neurobiologically plausible, information-theoretic constructs underlying observed response patterns. We assess model identification and expressiveness in accounting for meaningful human performance through extensive simulation studies. We then validate the model on real behavioral data in order to highlight the utility of the proposed model in recovering cognitive dynamics at an individual level. We highlight the potentials of our model in decomposing adaptive behavior in the WCST into several information-theoretic metrics revealing the trial-by-trial unfolding of information processing by focusing on two exemplary individuals whose behavior is examined in depth. Finally, we focus on the theoretical implications of our computational model by discussing the mapping between BBT constructs and functional neuroanatomical correlates of task performance. We further discuss the empirical benefit of recovering the assumed dynamics of information processing for both clinical and research practices, such as neurological assessment and model-based neuroscience.

Attention neglects a stare-in-the-crowd: Unanticipated consequences of prediction-error coding

Direct gaze - someone looking at you - is an important and subjectively-salient stimulus. Its processing is thought to be enhanced by the brain's internalised predictions - priors - that effectively specify it as the most likely gaze direction. Current consensus holds that, befitting its presumed importance, direct gaze attracts attention more powerfully than other gazes. Conversely, some Predictive Coding (PC) models, in which exogenous attention is drawn to stimuli that violate predictions, may be construed as making the opposite claim - i.e., exogenous attention should be biased away from direct gaze (which conforms to internal predictions), toward averted gaze (which does not). Here, searching displays with salient, 'odd-one-out' gazes, we observed attentional bias (in rapid, initial saccades) toward averted gaze, as would be expected by PC models. However, this pattern obtained only when conditions highlighted gaze-uniqueness. We speculate that, in our experiments, task requirements determined how prediction influenced perception.

Hierarchical Predictive Coding-Based JND Estimation for Image Compression

The human visual system (HVS) is a hierarchical system, in which visual signals are processed hierarchically. In this paper, the HVS is modeled as a three-level communication system and visual perception is divided into three stages according to the hierarchical predictive coding theory. Then, a novel just noticeable distortion (JND) estimation scheme is proposed. In visual perception, the input signals are predicted constantly and spontaneously in each hierarchy, and neural response is evoked by the central residue and inhibited by surrounding residues. These two types' residues are regarded as the positive and negative visual incentives which cause positive and negative perception effects, respectively. In neuroscience, the effect of incentive on observer is measured by the surprise of this incentive. Thus, we propose a surprise-based measurement method to measure both perception effects. Specifically, considering the biased competition of visual attention, we define the product of the residue self-information (i.e., surprise) and the competition biases as the perceptual surprise to measure the positive perception effect. As for the negative perception effect, it is measured by the average surprise (i.e., the local Shannon entropy). The JND threshold of each stage is estimated individually by considering both perception effects. The total JND threshold is finally obtained by non-linear superposition of three stage thresholds. Furthermore, the proposed JND estimation scheme is incorporated into the codec of Versatile Video Coding for image compression. Experimental results show that the proposed JND model outperforms the relevant existing ones, and over 16% of bit rate can be reduced without jeopardizing the perceptual quality.

The amygdala instructs insular feedback for affective learning

Affective responses depend on assigning value to environmental predictors of threat or reward. Neuroanatomically, this affective value is encoded at both cortical and subcortical levels. However, the purpose of this distributed representation across functional hierarchies remains unclear. Using fMRI in mice, we mapped a discrete cortico-limbic loop between insular cortex (IC), central amygdala (CE), and nucleus basalis of Meynert (NBM), which decomposes the affective value of a conditioned stimulus (CS) into its salience and valence components. In IC, learning integrated unconditioned stimulus (US)-evoked bodily states into CS valence. In turn, CS salience in the CE recruited these CS representations bottom-up via the cholinergic NBM. This way, the CE incorporated interoceptive feedback from IC to improve discrimination of CS valence. Consequently, opto-/chemogenetic uncoupling of hierarchical information flow disrupted affective learning and conditioned responding. Dysfunctional interactions in the IC↔CE/NBM network may underlie intolerance to uncertainty, observed in autism and related psychiatric conditions.

Sensitivity to temporal structure facilitates perceptual analysis of complex auditory scenes

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Perception relies on sensitivity to predictable structure in the environment.

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We used artificial acoustic scenes to investigate this in the auditory modality.

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Listeners track the temporal structure of multiple concurrent acoustic streams.

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Sensitivity to predictable structure supports auditory scene analysis, even when scenes are complex.

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Benefit of regularity observed even when listeners are unaware of the predictable structure.

The notion that sensitivity to the statistical structure of the environment is pivotal to perception has recently garnered considerable attention. Here we investigated this issue in the context of hearing. Building on previous work (Sohoglu and Chait, 2016a; elife), stimuli were artificial ‘soundscapes’ populated by multiple (up to 14) simultaneous streams (‘auditory objects’) comprised of tone-pip sequences, each with a distinct frequency and pattern of amplitude modulation. Sequences were either temporally regular or random.

We show that listeners’ ability to detect abrupt appearance or disappearance of a stream is facilitated when scene streams were characterized by a temporally regular fluctuation pattern. The regularity of the changing stream as well as that of the background (non-changing) streams contribute independently to this effect. Remarkably, listeners benefit from regularity even when they are not consciously aware of it. These findings establish that perception of complex acoustic scenes relies on the availability of detailed representations of the regularities automatically extracted from multiple concurrent streams.

Minds and Brains, Sleep and Psychiatry

Objective

This article offers a philosophical thesis for psychiatric disorders that rests upon some simple truths about the mind and brain. Specifically, it asks whether the dual aspect monism—that emerges from sleep research and theoretical neurobiology—can be applied to pathophysiology and psychopathology in psychiatry.

Methods

Our starting point is that the mind and brain are emergent aspects of the same (neuronal) dynamics; namely, the brain–mind. Our endpoint is that synaptic dysconnection syndromes inherit the same dual aspect; namely, aberrant inference or belief updating on the one hand, and a failure of neuromodulatory synaptic gain control on the other. We start with some basic considerations from sleep research that integrate the phenomenology of dreaming with the neurophysiology of sleep.

Results

We then leverage this treatment by treating the brain as an organ of inference. Our particular focus is on the role of precision (i.e., the representation of uncertainty) in belief updating and the accompanying synaptic mechanisms.

Conclusions

Finally, we suggest a dual aspect approach—based upon belief updating (i.e., mind processes) and its neurophysiological implementation (i.e., brain processes)—has a wide explanatory compass for psychiatry and various movement disorders. This approach identifies the kind of pathophysiology that underwrites psychopathology—and points to certain psychotherapeutic and psychopharmacological targets, which may stand in mechanistic relation to each other.

The ‘mind’ emerges from Bayesian belief updating in the ‘brain’

Psychopathology can be read as aberrant belief updating.

Aberrant belief updating follows from any neuromodulatory synaptopathy

Perceptual learning of tone patterns changes the effective connectivity between Heschl's gyrus and planum temporale

Learning of complex auditory sequences such as music can be thought of as optimizing an internal model of regularities through unpredicted events (or “prediction errors”). We used dynamic causal modeling (DCM) and parametric empirical Bayes on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data to identify modulation of effective brain connectivity that takes place during perceptual learning of complex tone patterns. Our approach differs from previous studies in two aspects. First, we used a complex oddball paradigm based on tone patterns as opposed to simple deviant tones. Second, the use of fMRI allowed us to identify cortical regions with high spatial accuracy. These regions served as empirical regions‐of‐interest for the analysis of effective connectivity. Deviant patterns induced an increased blood oxygenation level‐dependent response, compared to standards, in early auditory (Heschl's gyrus [HG]) and association auditory areas (planum temporale [PT]) bilaterally. Within this network, we found a left‐lateralized increase in feedforward connectivity from HG to PT during deviant responses and an increase in excitation within left HG. In contrast to previous findings, we did not find frontal activity, nor did we find modulations of backward connections in response to oddball sounds. Our results suggest that complex auditory prediction errors are encoded by changes in feedforward and intrinsic connections, confined to superior temporal gyrus.

Visual mismatch responses index surprise signalling but not expectation suppression

The ability to distinguish between commonplace and unusual sensory events is critical for efficient learning and adaptive behaviour. This has been investigated using oddball designs in which sequences of often-appearing (i.e., expected) stimuli are interspersed with rare (i.e., surprising) deviants. Resulting differences in electrophysiological responses following surprising compared to expected stimuli are known as visual mismatch responses (VMRs). VMRs are thought to index co-occurring contributions of stimulus repetition effects, expectation suppression (that occurs when one's expectations are fulfilled), and expectation violation (i.e., surprise) responses; however, these different effects have been conflated in existing oddball designs. To better isolate and quantify effects of expectation suppression and surprise, we adapted an oddball design based on Fast Periodic Visual Stimulation (FPVS) that controls for stimulus repetition effects. We recorded electroencephalography (EEG) while participants (N = 48) viewed stimulation sequences in which a single face identity was periodically presented at 6 Hz. Critically, one of two different face identities (termed oddballs) appeared as every 7th image throughout the sequence. The presentation probabilities of each oddball image within a sequence varied between 10 and 90%, such that participants could form expectations about which oddball face identity was more likely to appear within each sequence. We also included 'expectation neutral' 50% probability sequences, whereby consistently biased expectations would not be formed for either oddball face identity. We found that VMRs indexed surprise responses, and effects of expectation suppression were absent. That is, ERPs were more negative-going at occipitoparietal electrodes for surprising compared to neutral oddballs, but did not differ between expected and neutral oddballs. Surprising oddball-evoked ERPs were also highly similar across the 10-40% appearance probability conditions. Our findings indicate that VMRs which are not accounted for by repetition effects are best described as an all-or-none surprise response, rather than a minimisation of prediction error responses associated with expectation suppression.

Early cortical processing of pitch height and the role of adaptation and musicality

Pitch is an important perceptual feature; however, it is poorly understood how its cortical correlates are shaped by absolute vs relative fundamental frequency (f₀), and by neural adaptation. In this study, we assessed transient and sustained auditory evoked fields (AEFs) at the onset, progression, and offset of short pitch height sequences, taking into account the listener's musicality. We show that neuromagnetic activity reflects absolute f₀ at pitch onset and offset, and relative f₀ at transitions within pitch sequences; further, sequences with fixed f₀ lead to larger response suppression than sequences with variable f₀ contour, and to enhanced offset activity. Musical listeners exhibit stronger f₀-related AEFs and larger differences between their responses to fixed vs variable sequences, both within sequences and at pitch offset. The results resemble prominent psychoacoustic phenomena in the perception of pitch contours; moreover, they suggest a strong influence of adaptive mechanisms on cortical pitch processing which, in turn, might be modulated by a listener's musical expertise.

State anxiety biases estimates of uncertainty and impairs reward learning in volatile environments

Clinical and subclinical (trait) anxiety impairs decision making and interferes with learning. Less understood are the effects of temporary anxious states on learning and decision making in healthy populations, and whether these can serve as a model for clinical anxiety. Here we test whether anxious states in healthy individuals elicit a pattern of aberrant behavioural, neural, and physiological responses comparable with those found in anxiety disorders-particularly when processing uncertainty in unstable environments. In our study, both a state anxious and a control group learned probabilistic stimulus-outcome mappings in a volatile task environment while we recorded their electrophysiological (EEG) signals. By using a hierarchical Bayesian model of inference and learning, we assessed the effect of state anxiety on Bayesian belief updating with a focus on uncertainty estimates. State anxiety was associated with an underestimation of environmental uncertainty, and informational uncertainty about the reward tendency. Anxious individuals' beliefs about reward contingencies were more precise (had smaller uncertainty) and thus more resistant to updating, ultimately leading to impaired reward-based learning. State anxiety was also associated with greater uncertainty about volatility. We interpret this pattern as evidence that state anxious individuals are less tolerant to informational uncertainty about the contingencies governing their environment and more willing to be uncertain about the level of stability of the world itself. Further, we tracked the neural representation of belief update signals in the trial-by-trial EEG amplitudes. In control participants, lower-level precision-weighted prediction errors (pwPEs) about reward tendencies were represented in the ERP signals across central and parietal electrodes peaking at 496 ms, overlapping with the late P300 in classical ERP analysis. The state anxiety group did not exhibit a significant representation of low-level pwPEs, and there were no significant differences between the groups. Smaller variance in low-level pwPE about reward tendencies in state anxiety could partially account for the null results. Expanding previous computational work on trait anxiety, our findings establish that temporary anxious states in healthy individuals impair reward-based learning in volatile environments, primarily through changes in uncertainty estimates, which play a central role in current Bayesian accounts of perceptual inference and learning.

Individual differences in the tendency to see the expected

Prior knowledge has been shown to facilitate the incorporation of visual stimuli into awareness. We adopted an individual differences approach to explore whether a tendency to 'see the expected' is general or method-specific. We administered a binocular rivalry task and manipulated selective attention, as well as induced expectations via predictive context, self-generated imagery, expectancy cues, and perceptual priming. Most prior manipulations led to a facilitated awareness of the biased percept in binocular rivalry, whereas strong signal primes led to a suppressed awareness, i.e., adaptation. Correlations and factor analysis revealed that the facilitatory effect of priors on visual awareness is closely related to attentional control. We also investigated whether expectation-based biases predict perceptual abilities. Adaptation to strong primes predicted improved naturalistic change detection and the facilitatory effect of weak primes predicted the experience of perceptual anomalies. Taken together, our results indicate that the facilitatory effect of priors may be underpinned by an attentional mechanism but the tendency to 'see the expected' is method-specific.

"Stopping for knowledge": The sense of beauty in the perception-action cycle

According to a millennial-old philosophical debate, aesthetic emotions have been connected to knowledge acquisition. Recent scientific evidence, collected across different disciplinary domains, confirms this link, but also reveals that motor inhibition plays a crucial role in the process. In this review, we discuss multidisciplinary results and propose an original account of aesthetic appreciation (the stopping for knowledge hypothesis) framed within the predictive coding theory. We discuss evidence showing that aesthetic emotions emerge in correspondence with an inhibition of motor behavior (i.e., minimizing action), promoting a simultaneous perceptual processing enhancement, at the level of sensory cortices (i.e., optimizing learning). Accordingly, we suggest that aesthetic appreciation may represent a hedonic feedback over learning progresses, motivating the individual to inhibit motor routines to seek further knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, the neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies we review reveal the presence of a strong association between aesthetic appreciation and the activation of the dopaminergic reward-related circuits. Finally, we propose a number of possible applications of the stopping for knowledge hypothesis in the clinical and education domains.

Beliefs and desires in the predictive brain

Bayesian brain theories suggest that perception, action and cognition arise as animals minimise the mismatch between their expectations and reality. This principle could unify cognitive science with the broader natural sciences, but leave key elements of cognition and behaviour unexplained.