The neuroethics and neurolaw of brain injury

Neuroethics and neurolaw in forensic neuropsychiatry: A guide for clinicians

As neuroscience technologies develop, ethical and legal questions arise regarding their use and societal impact. Neuroethics and neurolaw are growing interdisciplinary fields that address these questions. This review article presents the research agenda of both areas, examines the use and admissibility of neuroscience in expert testimony and legal settings, and discusses ethical issues related to forensic neuropsychiatrists claiming expertise in neuroscience, formulating medical opinions based on neuroscience, and considering its relevance to criminal responsibility. Forensic neuropsychiatrists should be aware of emerging neuroscientific evidence, its utility and limits in rendering diagnoses and explaining behavior, and, before seeking such evidence for legal purposes, its availability and admissibility. When testifying in matters involving neuroscientific evidence, ensuring truthfulness and balance, having sufficient and validated knowledge (including openness with confirming and disconfirming evidence), understanding standards of practice, and drawing relevant and appropriate conclusions remain important.

Causality in criminal forensic and in civil disability cases: Legal and psychological comparison

Causality (or causation) is central to every legal case, yet its underlying philosophical, legal, and psychological definitions and conceptions vary. In the criminal context, it refers to establishing the responsibility of the perpetrator of the criminal act at issue in terms of the person's mental state (mens rea), and whether the insanity defense applies. In the forensic disability and related context, it refers to whether the index event is a material or contributing cause in the multifactorial array that led to the psychological condition at issue. In both the criminal and tort contexts, the legal test is a counterfactual one. For the former, it refers to whether the outcome involved would have resulted absent the act (e.g., in cases of simultaneous criminal lethal action, which one is the but-for responsible one). For the latter, it concerns whether the claimed psychological condition would be present only because of the incident at issue. The latter event at issue is distinguished from the criminal one by its negligence compared to the voluntary intent in the criminal case. The psychological state of the perpetrator of criminal conduct can be analyzed from a biopsychosocial perspective as much as the civil one. In this regard, in the civil case, such as in forensic disability and related assessments, pre-existing, precipitating, and perpetuating factors need to be considered causally, with personal and social resilience and protective factors added, as well. In the criminal context, the same biopsychosocial model applies, but with mental competence and voluntariness added as a critical factor. The advent of neurolaw has led to use of neuroscience in court, but it risks reducing the complexity of criminal cases to unifactorial, biological models.