Playing with deviance: Typicality assessments of ingroup members as a strategy of outgroup approach

Third-party intervention in intergroup reconciliation: The role of neutrality and common identity with the other conflict party

Third parties, particularly if neutral, have been found to promote instrumental conflict resolution. Using the needs-based model’s theoretical framework, we investigated whether third parties can also promote socioemotional reconciliation. Study 1 ( N = 124) revealed that in the context of fraud between universities, conciliatory messages from either the other conflict party or a third party sharing common identity with it increased group members’ willingness to reconcile more than equivalent messages from a neutral third party. Replicating and extending this pattern, Study 2 ( N = 177) exposed Israeli Jewish participants to texts which reminded them of historical transgressions conducted by Palestinians or against them. We found that compared to a control condition, messages supposedly conveyed by either Palestinians or Jordanians, but not by the UN, increased Israeli Jews’ willingness to reconcile with Palestinians. These effects were mediated by the extent to which the official conveying these messages was perceived as representing the other conflict party.

When votes depend on who's listening: Voters' intragroup status and voting procedure predict representative endorsement in intergroup contexts

Three experiments investigated whether the selection of a representative in intergroup interdependence settings can reflect group members' strategic behaviour. We tested the impact of an individual's intragroup status (normative vs. pro-out-group deviant, Experiments 1-3) and of voting procedure (Experiments 2 and 3) on the choice of an in-group representative. Experiment 1 shows that normative members prefer normative representatives, whereas pro-out-group deviant members equally like normative and pro-out-group deviant representatives. Experiment 2 extends these results and shows that voting procedure (private vs. in-group audience) moderates this effect. Pro-out-group deviant members' preferences and behaviours appear more strategic and context-sensitive than normative ones. Specifically, pro-out-group deviants vote more for normative representatives than for pro-out-group deviants when facing an in-group audience, whereas the reverse pattern emerges in private. Experiment 3 shows that this moderation effect is specific to in-group audiences compared to out-group ones, reinforcing the idea that normative members 'stick to their guns'. Implications of these findings for leader endorsement and intergroup relations are discussed.