Suspicious binds: Conspiracy thinking and tenuous perceptions of causal connections between co-occurring and spuriously correlated events

Conspiracy Theory as Individual and Group Behavior: Observations from the Flat Earth International Conference

Conspiratorial thinking has been with humanity for a long time but has recently grown as a source of societal concern and as a subject of research in the cognitive and social sciences. We propose a three-tiered framework for the study of conspiracy theories: (1) cognitive processes, (2) the individual, and (3) social processes and communities of knowledge. At the level of cognitive processes, we identify explanatory coherence and faulty belief updating as critical ideas. At the level of the community of knowledge, we explore how conspiracy communities facilitate false belief by promoting a contagious sense of understanding, and how community norms catalyze the biased assimilation of evidence. We review recent research on conspiracy theories and explain how conspiratorial thinking emerges from the interaction of individual and group processes. As a case study, we describe observations the first author made while attending the Flat Earth International Conference, a meeting of conspiracy theorists who believe the Earth is flat. Rather than treating conspiracy belief as pathological, we take the perspective that is an extreme outcome of common cognitive processes.

Contemporary trends in psychological research on conspiracy beliefs. A systematic review

Background

The number of psychological studies on conspiracy beliefs has been systematically growing for about a dozen years, but in recent years, the trend has intensified. We provided a review covering the psychological literature on conspiracy beliefs from 2018 to 2021. Halfway through this period, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, accompanied by an explosion of movements based on conspiracy theories, intensifying researchers' interest in this issue.

Methods

Adhering to PRISMA guidelines, the review systematically searched for relevant journal articles published between 2018 and 2021. A search was done on Scopus and Web of Science (only peer-reviewed journals). A study was included if it contained primary empirical data, if specific or general conspiracy belief(s) were measured and if its correlation with at least one other psychological variable was reported. All the studies were grouped for the descriptive analysis according to the methodology used, the participants' characteristics, the continent of origin, the sample size, and the conspiracy beliefs measurement tools. Due to substantial methodological heterogeneity of the studies, narrative synthesis was performed. The five researchers were assigned specific roles at each stage of the analysis to ensure the highest quality of the research.

Results

Following the proposed methodology, 308 full-text articles were assessed for eligibility and 274 articles (417 studies) meeting the inclusion criteria were identified and included in the review. Almost half of the studies (49.6%) were conducted in European countries. The vast majority of the studies (85.7%) were carried out on samples of adult respondents. The research presents antecedents as well as (potential) consequences of conspiracy beliefs. We grouped the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs into six categories: cognitive (e.g., thinking style) motivational (e.g., uncertainty avoidance), personality (e.g., collective narcissism), psychopathology (e.g., Dark Triad traits), political (e.g., ideological orientation), and sociocultural factors (e.g., collectivism).

Conclusion and limitations

The research presents evidence on the links between conspiracy beliefs and a range of attitudes and behaviors considered unfavorable from the point of view of individuals and of the society at large. It turned out that different constructs of conspiracy thinking interact with each other. The limitations of the study are discussed in the last part of the article.

Do conspiracy theorists think too much or too little?

Conspiracy theories explain distressing events as malevolent actions by powerful groups. Why do people believe in secret plots when other explanations are more probable? On the one hand, conspiracy theorists seem to disregard accuracy; they tend to endorse mutually incompatible conspiracies, think intuitively, use heuristics, and hold other irrational beliefs. But by definition, conspiracy theorists reject the mainstream explanation for an event, often in favor of a more complex account. They exhibit a general distrust of others and expend considerable effort to find 'evidence' supporting their beliefs. In searching for answers, conspiracy theorists likely expose themselves to misleading information online and overestimate their own knowledge. Understanding when elaboration and cognitive effort might backfire is crucial, as conspiracy beliefs lead to political disengagement, environmental inaction, prejudice, and support for violence.

What Are Conspiracy Theories? A Definitional Approach to Their Correlates, Consequences, and Communication

Conspiracy theories are abundant in social and political discourse, with serious consequences for individuals, groups, and societies. However, psychological scientists have started paying close attention to them only in the past 20 years. We review the spectacular progress that has since been made and some of the limitations of research so far, and we consider the prospects for further progress. To this end, we take a step back to analyze the defining features that make conspiracy theories different in kind from other beliefs and different in degree from each other. We consider how these features determine the adoption, consequences, and transmission of belief in conspiracy theories, even though their role as causal or moderating variables has seldom been examined. We therefore advocate for a research agenda in the study of conspiracy theories that starts-as is routine in fields such as virology and toxicology-with a robust descriptive analysis of the ontology of the entity at its center.

Rabbit Hole Syndrome: Inadvertent, accelerating, and entrenched commitment to conspiracy beliefs

There is mounting anecdotal evidence that some individuals fall into conspiracy "rabbit holes" causing harms ranging from social isolation to violence. We propose a hypothetical Rabbit Hole Syndrome in which some individuals' subscription to conspiracy beliefs is initially inadvertent, accelerates recursively, then becomes difficult to escape. This proposal is distinguished by a person-centered and dynamic perspective on conspiracy beliefs. It aims to provide a theoretical foundation for research that (a) illuminates the rabbit hole phenomenon, (b) is pluralistic, spanning diverse subdisciplines (e.g., social and clinical psychology), and methods (e.g., qualitative, longitudinal, and case studies), and (c) informs theory and practice by uncovering discontinuities between committed believers and other populations in the causes, consequences, and "remedies" of conspiracy beliefs.

Individual, intergroup and nation-level influences on belief in conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories are part of mainstream public life, with the potential to undermine governments, promote racism, ignite extremism and threaten public health efforts. Psychological research on conspiracy theories is booming, with more than half of the academic articles on the topic published since 2019. In this Review, we synthesize the literature with an eye to understanding the psychological factors that shape willingness to believe conspiracy theories. We begin at the individual level, examining the cognitive, clinical, motivational, personality and developmental factors that predispose people to believe conspiracy theories. Drawing on insights from social and evolutionary psychology, we then review research examining conspiracy theories as an intergroup phenomenon that reflects and reinforces societal fault lines. Finally, we examine how conspiracy theories are shaped by the economic, political, cultural and socio-historical contexts at the national level. This multilevel approach offers a deep and broad insight into conspiracist thinking that increases understanding of the problem and offers potential solutions.

Interconnectedness and (in)coherence as a signature of conspiracy worldviews

Conspiracy theories may arise out of an overarching conspiracy worldview that identifies common elements of subterfuge across unrelated or even contradictory explanations, leading to networks of self-reinforcing beliefs. We test this conjecture by analyzing a large natural language database of conspiracy and nonconspiracy texts for the same events, thus linking theory-driven psychological research with data-driven computational approaches. We find that, relative to nonconspiracy texts, conspiracy texts are more interconnected, more topically heterogeneous, and more similar to one another, revealing lower cohesion within texts but higher cohesion between texts and providing strong empirical support for an overarching conspiracy worldview. Our results provide inroads for classification algorithms and further exploration into individual differences in belief structures.

Intuition, reason, and conspiracy beliefs

Conspiracy theories tend to involve doubt and skepticism, but are conspiracy believers really more deliberative? We review recent research that investigates the relative roles of intuition and reason in conspiracy belief and find that the preponderance of evidence indicates that conspiracy belief is linked to an overreliance on intuition and a lack of reflection. This research, in addition to work investigating the broader influence of misinformation, indicates that people may believe conspiracies partly because they fail to engage in analytic thinking and rely too much on their intuitions. However, we also note that research in this area lacks in experimental studies and that work focusing on underlying cognitive mechanisms is needed.

Paranormal beliefs and cognitive function: A systematic review and assessment of study quality across four decades of research

BACKGROUND

Research into paranormal beliefs and cognitive functioning has expanded considerably since the last review almost 30 years ago, prompting the need for a comprehensive review. The current systematic review aims to identify the reported associations between paranormal beliefs and cognitive functioning, and to assess study quality.

METHOD

We searched four databases (Scopus, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink, and OpenGrey) from inception until May 2021. Inclusion criteria comprised papers published in English that contained original data assessing paranormal beliefs and cognitive function in healthy adult samples. Study quality and risk of bias was assessed using the Appraisal tool for Cross-Sectional Studies (AXIS) and results were synthesised through narrative review. The review adhered to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines and was preregistered as part of a larger registration on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/uzm5v).

RESULTS

From 475 identified studies, 71 (n = 20,993) met our inclusion criteria. Studies were subsequently divided into the following six categories: perceptual and cognitive biases (k = 19, n = 3,397), reasoning (k = 17, n = 9,661), intelligence, critical thinking, and academic ability (k = 12, n = 2,657), thinking style (k = 13, n = 4,100), executive function and memory (k = 6, n = 810), and other cognitive functions (k = 4, n = 368). Study quality was rated as good-to-strong for 75% of studies and appears to be improving across time. Nonetheless, we identified areas of methodological weakness including: the lack of preregistration, discussion of limitations, a-priori justification of sample size, assessment of nonrespondents, and the failure to adjust for multiple testing. Over 60% of studies have recruited undergraduates and 30% exclusively psychology undergraduates, which raises doubt about external validity. Our narrative synthesis indicates high heterogeneity of study findings. The most consistent associations emerge for paranormal beliefs with increased intuitive thinking and confirmatory bias, and reduced conditional reasoning ability and perception of randomness.

CONCLUSIONS

Although study quality is good, areas of methodological weakness exist. In addressing these methodological issues, we propose that authors engage with preregistration of data collection and analysis procedures. At a conceptual level, we argue poorer cognitive performance across seemingly disparate cognitive domains might reflect the influence of an over-arching executive dysfunction.

The conspiracy of Covid-19 and 5G: Spatial analysis fallacies in the age of data democratization

In a context of mistrust in public health institutions and practices, anti-COVID/vaccination protests and the storming of Congress have illustrated that conspiracy theories are real and immanent threat to health and wellbeing, democracy, and public understanding of science. One manifestation of this is the suggested correlation of COVID-19 with 5G mobile technology. Throughout 2020, this alleged correlation was promoted and distributed widely on social media, often in the form of maps overlaying the distribution of COVID-19 cases with the instillation of 5G towers. These conspiracy theories are not fringe phenomena, and they form part of a growing repertoire for conspiracist activist groups with capacities for organised violence. In this paper, we outline how spatial data have been co-opted, and spatial correlations asserted by conspiracy theorists. We consider the basis of their claims of causal association with reference to three key areas of geographical explanation: (1) how social properties are constituted and how they exert complex causal forces, (2) the pitfalls of correlation with spatial and ecological data, and (3) the challenges of specifying and interpreting causal effects with spatial data. For each, we consider the unique theoretical and technical challenges involved in specifying meaningful correlation, and how their discarding facilitates conspiracist attribution. In doing so, we offer a basis both to interrogate conspiracists' uses and interpretation of data from elementary principles and offer some cautionary notes on the potential for their future misuse in an age of data democratization. Finally, this paper contributes to work on the basis of conspiracy theories in general, by asserting how - absent an appreciation of these key methodological principles - spatial health data may be especially prone to co-option by conspiracist groups.

Unfolding Media Source Characteristics Regarding Food Fraud Misinformation: A Comparative Study of the Health Information National Trends Survey (HINTS) in China

BACKGROUND

The ongoing rumors and fake news regarding food fraud, adulteration, and contamination are highly visible. Health risk information circulating through media and interpersonal communication channels has made health crisis an important research agenda.

OBJECTIVE

This study explores the issue of food fraud and the effect of rumors, incidents, and misinformation. Further, it studies whether and how these issues have provided evidence-based interventions for food handlers and regulators to mitigate food fraud misinformation.

METHODS

The Health Information National Trends Survey (HINTS) was adopted for collaborative study in China, after which a cross-sectional survey with door-to-door interviews was performed. Participants from Beijing and Hefei were selected using multistage sampling of adults during May, 2017. Based on four government surveillance reports on food rumors and safety incidents, a descriptive, correlation, and multivariate variance analysis was applied to the data.

RESULTS

A total of 3,090 results were gathered and analyzed. An average of 83.6% (n = 2,584) respondents heard at least one food rumor. Learning about food fraud is correlated with interpersonal connections (e.g., doctors or health specialists) for accessing food health information. Overall, Chinese citizens with a higher level of interpersonal connection were more likely to be concerned about food incidents with the statistical difference (P< .001). The Interpersonal connection was the highest frequency of communication sources (n = 698, 55.7%), followed by traditional media (n = 325, 25.9%) and Internet portal (n = 144, 11.5%). There was a significant relationship between media use and media category in Beijing (P<.001) and in Hefei (P<.001). Overall, Beijing's responses to the food fraud and incidents risks were lower than in Hefei (P < .01). The respondents in Beijing were confronted more frequently by food rumors (range 346-1253) than those in Hefei (range 155-946). The urban dwellers in Beijing and their rural counterparts in Hefei also differ in terms of perceiving different levels of food risk from different media sources. The food rumor narratives examined the conspiracy belie finds that social media play a more important role in influencing attitude against misinformation for users in Hefei, rather than in Beijing.

CONCLUSIONS

A media complementarity and food fraud information acquisition examined food fraud rumors and incidents with intent to harm, mainly done for economic gain. The HINTS China reports that around 73.6% out of 2,584 Chinese respondents prefer to go to their physicians for quarrying food health information first; however, when asked where they actually went and got access to food rumors, up to 36.6% of out of 1,462 Beijing respondents and 55.6% out of 1,122 Hefei respondents reported going online first. This study extends beyond local food products to foreign countries that import conspiracy beliefs with fake food. Nonetheless, consumers have to be on guard not just against fake food, but also spreading fake information and rumors about food. The aim of this study is to focus on characterizing media sources, types of food fraud misinformation, and risk perception of food safety, which mixes urgency and suspicions, and to provide evidence-based interventions for risk management guidance, with the hypotheses of the significant correlations between media types and sources and consumers' exposing and perceiving levels of food rumors and risks.

CLINICALTRIAL

Conspiratorial Beliefs and Cognitive Styles: An Integrated Look on Analytic Thinking, Critical Thinking, and Scientific Reasoning in Relation to (Dis)trust in Conspiracy Theories

The tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (implying secret and malevolent plots by scheming groups or individuals), incites growing decennial interest among psychological researchers (exploring the associated personality traits, worldviews and cognitive styles of people). The link between the conspiratorial beliefs and the cognitive styles remains of particular interest to scholars, requiring integrated theoretical considerations. This perspective article will focus on the relationship between the propensity to (dis)trust conspiracy theories and three cognitive styles: analytic thinking, critical thinking, and scientific reasoning. Analytic thinking (inclination toward slow and deliberate processing of information in a conscious effort to mitigate biases and reach objective understanding of facts), is a well-studied concept in the context of conspiratorial beliefs, while the negative mutual relationship seems well-evidenced. On the other hand, the evidence on the link with the critical thinking (readiness to consider, reason, appraise, review, and interpret facts to update existing beliefs) has only started to emerge in the last years. Finally, scientific reasoning (ability to apply principles of scientific inquiry to formulate, test, revise and update knowledge in accordance with new evidence), is the least studied of the three cognitive styles in relation to conspiracy theories. The present article will: (a) revise the (lack of) scientific consensus on the definitional and conceptual aspects (by providing theoretical framework); (b) summarize the state of the art on the subject (by providing overview of empirical evidence); (c) discuss directions for future research (especially in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic). An integrated perspective on the relationship between conspiratorial beliefs and cognitive styles of people, may serve to inspire future behavioral interventions.

Are COVID-19 conspiracies a threat to public health? Psychological characteristics and health protective behaviours of believers

We tested the link between COVID-19 conspiracy theories and health protective behaviours in three studies: one at the onset of the pandemic in the United Kingdom (UK), a second just before the first national lockdown, and a third during that lockdown (N = 302, 404 and 399). We focused on conspiracy theories that did not deny the existence of COVID-19 and evaluated the extent to which they predicted a range of health protective behaviours, before and after controlling for psychological and sociodemographic characteristics associated with conspiracy theory belief. COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs were positively correlated with beliefs in other unrelated conspiracies and a general conspiracy mind-set, and negatively correlated with trust in government and a tendency towards analytical thinking (vs. intuitive thinking). Unexpectedly, COVID-19 conspiracy believers adhered to basic health guidelines and advanced health protective measures as strictly as non-believers. Conspiracy believers were, however, less willing to install the contact-tracing app, get tested for and vaccinated against COVID-19, and were more likely to share COVID-19 misinformation-all of which might undermine public health initiatives. Study 3 showed conspiracy theory believers were less willing to undertake health protective behaviours that were outside of their personal control, perceiving these as having a negative balance of risks and benefits. We discuss models explaining conspiracy beliefs and health protective behaviours, and suggest practical recommendations for public health initiatives.

Injustice Without Evidence: The Unique Role of Conspiracy Theories in Social Justice Research

Conspiracy theories are widespread and have a profound impact on society. The present contribution proposes that conspiracy theories are explanatory narratives that necessarily contain justice judgments, as they include attributions of blame and accusations of unethical or criminal conduct. Conspiratorial narratives also are mental simulations, however, and may elicit genuine feelings of injustice also without evidence of actual malpractice. Indeed, conspiracy theories sometimes describe unfair events that are unlikely to have occurred, unethical authorities that might not actually exist, and so on. Here I propose two complementary processes that stimulate belief in evidence-free conspiracy theories: (1) Existential threats instigate biased mental processing and motivated reasoning, that jointly promote an alternative perception of reality; and (2) group allegiances shape how people perceive, interpret, and remember facts to highlight the immoral qualities of competing outgroups. Due to these processes, conspiracy theories elicit a set of distinct reactions such as poor health choices and rejection of science. Moreover, evidence-free conspiracy theories require interventions beyond traditional approaches to install justice principles, such as debunking falsehoods and reducing polarized intergroup distinctions. I conclude that the scientific study of conspiracy theories is part of, and has a unique place in, social justice research.

An Existential Threat Model of Conspiracy Theories

Abstract. People endorse conspiracy theories particularly when they experience existential threat, that is, feelings of anxiety or uncertainty often because of distressing societal events. At the same time, such feelings also often lead people to support groups frequently implicated in conspiracy theories (e.g., the government). The present contribution aims to resolve this paradox by proposing an Existential Threat Model of Conspiracy Theories, which stipulates under what conditions existential threat does versus does not stimulate conspiracy theories. The model specifically illuminates that feelings of existential threat increase epistemic sense-making processes, which in turn stimulate conspiracy theories only when antagonistic outgroups are salient. Moreover, once formed conspiracy theories are not functional to reduce feelings of existential threat; instead, conspiracy theories can be a source of existential threat in itself, stimulating further conspiracy theorizing and contributing to a generalized conspiracist mindset. In the discussion, I discuss implications of the model, and illuminate how one may base interventions on the model to breaks this cyclical process and reduce conspiracy beliefs.