Functionally referential signals: a promising paradigm whose time has passed

The origin of great ape gestural forms

Two views claim to account for the origins of great ape gestural forms. On the Leipzig view, gestural forms are ontogenetically ritualised from action sequences between pairs of individuals. On the St Andrews view, gestures are the product of natural selection for shared gestural forms. The Leipzig view predicts within- and between-group differences between gestural forms that arise as a product of learning in ontogeny. The St Andrews view predicts universal gestural forms comprehensible within and between species that arise because gestural forms were a target of natural selection. We reject both accounts and propose an alternative "recruitment view" of the origins of great ape gestures. According to the recruitment view, great ape gestures recruit features of their existing behavioural repertoire for communicative purposes. Their gestures inherit their communicative functions from visual (and sometimes tactile) presentations of familiar and easily recognisable action schemas and states and parts of the body. To the extent that great ape species possess similar bodies, this predicts mutual comprehensibility within and between species - but without supposing that gestural forms were themselves targets of natural selection. Additionally, we locate great ape gestural communication within a pragmatic framework that is continuous with human communication, and make testable predications for adjudicating between the three alternative views. We propose that the recruitment view best explains existing data, and does so within a mechanistic framework that emphasises continuity between human and non-human great ape communication.

African elephants address one another with individually specific name-like calls

Personal names are a universal feature of human language, yet few analogues exist in other species. While dolphins and parrots address conspecifics by imitating the calls of the addressee, human names are not imitations of the sounds typically made by the named individual. Labelling objects or individuals without relying on imitation of the sounds made by the referent radically expands the expressive power of language. Thus, if non-imitative name analogues were found in other species, this could have important implications for our understanding of language evolution. Here we present evidence that wild African elephants address one another with individually specific calls, probably without relying on imitation of the receiver. We used machine learning to demonstrate that the receiver of a call could be predicted from the call's acoustic structure, regardless of how similar the call was to the receiver's vocalizations. Moreover, elephants differentially responded to playbacks of calls originally addressed to them relative to calls addressed to a different individual. Our findings offer evidence for individual addressing of conspecifics in elephants. They further suggest that, unlike other non-human animals, elephants probably do not rely on imitation of the receiver's calls to address one another.

A multifaceted framework to establish the presence of meaning in non-human communication

Does non-human communication, like language, involve meaning? This question guides our focus through an interdisciplinary review of the theories and terminology used to study meaning across disciplines and species. Until now, it has been difficult to apply the concept of meaning to communication in non-humans. This is partly because of the varied approaches to the study of meaning. Additionally, while there is a scholarly acknowledgement of potential meaning in non-human cognition, there is also scepticism when the topic of communication arises. We organise some of the key literature into a coherent framework that can bridge disciplines and species, to ensure that aspects of meaning are accurately and fairly compared. We clarify the growing view in the literature that, rather than requiring multiple definitions or being split into different types, meaning is a multifaceted yet still unified concept. In so doing, we propose that meaning is an umbrella term. Meaning cannot be summed up with a short definition or list of features, but involves multiple complexities that are outlined in our framework. Specifically, three global facets are needed to describe meaning: a Signal Meaning Facet, an Interactant Meaning Facet, and a Resultant Meaning Facet. Most importantly, we show that such analyses are possible to apply as much to non-humans as to humans. We also emphasise that meaning nuances differ among non-human species, making a dichotomous approach to meaning questionable. Instead, we show that a multifaceted approach to meaning establishes how meaning appears within highly diverse examples of non-human communication, in ways consistent with the phenomenon's presence in human non-verbal communication and language(s). Therefore, without further recourse to 'functional' approaches that circumvent the critical question of whether any non-human meaning exists, we show that the concept of meaning is suitable for evolutionary biologists, behavioural ecologists, and others to study, to establish exactly which species exhibit meaning in their communication and in what ways.

Comprehension of own and other species' alarm calls in sooty mangabey vocal development

Abstract

Primates understand the meaning of their own and other species' alarm calls, but little is known about how they acquire such knowledge. Here, we combined direct behavioural observations with playback experiments to investigate two key processes underlying vocal development: comprehension and usage. Especifically, we studied the development of con- and heterospecific alarm call recognition in free-ranging sooty mangabeys, Cercocebus atys, across three age groups: young juveniles (1-2y), old juveniles (3-4y) and adults (> 5y). We observed that, during natural predator encounters, juveniles alarm called to a significantly wider range of species than adults, with evidence of refinement during the first four years of life. In the experiments, we exposed subjects to leopard, eagle and snake alarm calls given by other group members or sympatric Diana monkeys. We found that young juveniles' locomotor and vocal responses were least appropriate and that they engaged in more social referencing (look at adults when hearing an alarm call) than older individuals, suggesting that vocal competence is obtained via social learning. In conclusion, our results suggest that alarm call comprehension is socially learned during the juvenile stage, with comprehension preceding appropriate usage but no difference between learning their own or other species' alarm calls.

Significance statement

Under natural conditions, animals do not just interact with members of their own species, but usually operate in a network of associated species. However, ontogenetic research on primate communication frequently ignores this significant element. We studied the development of con- and heterospecific alarm call recognition in wild sooty mangabeys. We found that communicative competence was acquired during the juvenile stages, with alarm call comprehension learning preceding appropriate vocal usage and with no clear difference in learning of con- and heterospecific signals. We also found that, during early stages of life, social referencing, a proactive form of social learning, was key in the acquisition of competent alarm call behaviour. Our results show that primates equally learn to interpret alarm calls from their own and other species during their early stages of life and that this learning process is refined as the animals mature.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s00265-023-03318-6.

Metarepresentation, trust, and "unleashed expression"

Heintz & Scott-Phillips's account of human expression leaves a number of central issues unclear - not least, whether the lack of expression in nonhuman species is attributable to their lack of the relevant metarepresentational abilities, an absence of trust, or a consequence of other factors. In place of their view, we propose a gradualistic account of the origins of human expression.

Optionality in animal communication: a novel framework for examining the evolution of arbitrariness

A critical feature of language is that the form of words need not bear any perceptual similarity to their function - these relationships can be 'arbitrary'. The capacity to process these arbitrary form-function associations facilitates the enormous expressive power of language. However, the evolutionary roots of our capacity for arbitrariness, i.e. the extent to which related abilities may be shared with animals, is largely unexamined. We argue this is due to the challenges of applying such an intrinsically linguistic concept to animal communication, and address this by proposing a novel conceptual framework highlighting a key underpinning of linguistic arbitrariness, which is nevertheless applicable to non-human species. Specifically, we focus on the capacity to associate alternative functions with a signal, or alternative signals with a function, a feature we refer to as optionality. We apply this framework to a broad survey of findings from animal communication studies and identify five key dimensions of communicative optionality: signal production, signal adjustment, signal usage, signal combinatoriality and signal perception. We find that optionality is widespread in non-human animals across each of these dimensions, although only humans demonstrate it in all five. Finally, we discuss the relevance of optionality to behavioural and cognitive domains outside of communication. This investigation provides a powerful new conceptual framework for the cross-species investigation of the origins of arbitrariness, and promises to generate original insights into animal communication and language evolution more generally.

Innovative multi-material tool use in the pant-hoot display of a chimpanzee

'Pant-hoot displays' are a species-typical, multi-modal communicative behaviour in chimpanzees in which pant-hoot vocalisations are combined with varied behavioural displays. In both captivity and the wild, individuals commonly incorporate striking or throwing elements of their environment into these displays. In this case study, we present five videos of an unenculturated, captive, adult male chimpanzee combining a large rubber feeding tub with excelsior (wood wool) in a multi-step process, which was then integrated into the subject's pant-hoot displays as a percussive tool or 'instrument'. During the construction process, the subject demonstrated an understanding of the relevant properties of these materials, 'repairing' the tub to be a more functional drum when necessary. We supplement these videos with a survey of care staff from the study site for additional detail and context. Although care must be taken in generalising data from a single individual, the behaviour reported here hints at three intriguing features of chimpanzee communicative cognition: (1) it suggests a degree of voluntary control over vocal production, (2) it is a so-far unique example of compound tool innovation and use in communicative behaviour and (3) it may represent an example of forward planning in communicative behaviour. Each of these would represent hitherto undocumented dimensions of flexibility in chimpanzee communication, mapping fertile ground for future research.

Great ape communication as contextual social inference: a computational modelling perspective

Human communication has been described as a contextual social inference process. Research into great ape communication has been inspired by this view to look for the evolutionary roots of the social, cognitive and interactional processes involved in human communication. This approach has been highly productive, yet it is partly compromised by the widespread focus on how great apes use and understand individual signals. This paper introduces a computational model that formalizes great ape communication as a multi-faceted social inference process that integrates (a) information contained in the signals that make up an utterance, (b) the relationship between communicative partners and (c) the social context. This model makes accurate qualitative and quantitative predictions about real-world communicative interactions between semi-wild-living chimpanzees. When enriched with a pragmatic reasoning process, the model explains repeatedly reported differences between humans and great apes in the interpretation of ambiguous signals (e.g. pointing or iconic gestures). This approach has direct implications for observational and experimental studies of great ape communication and provides a new tool for theorizing about the evolution of uniquely human communication. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

Vocal expression of emotional arousal across two call types in young rhesus macaques

As Darwin first recognized, the study of emotional communication has the potential to improve scientific understanding of the mechanisms of signal production as well as how signals evolve. We examined the relationships between emotional arousal and selected acoustic characteristics of coo and scream vocalizations produced by female rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, during development. For coos, arousal was assessed through measures of stress-induced elevations of plasma cortisol exhibited in response to the human intruder test. In the analysis of screams, arousal was evaluated from the intensity of aggression experienced by the vocalizer during natural social interactions. Both call types showed a positive relationship between arousal and overall fundamental frequency (F0, perceived as pitch in humans). In coos, this association was dampened over development from infancy (6 months) to the juvenile, prepubertal period (16 months) and further to menarche (21.3-31.3 months), perhaps reflecting developmental changes in physiology, anatomy and/or call function. Heightened arousal was also associated in coos with increases in an acoustic dimension related to F0 modulation and noisiness. As monkeys matured, coos showed decreases in overall F0 as well as increased noisiness and F0 modulation, likely reflecting growth of the vocal apparatus and changes in vocal fold oscillation. Within screams, only one acoustic dimension (related to F0 modulation) showed developmental change, and only within one subclass of screams within one behavioural context. Our results regarding the acoustic correlates of arousal in both call types are broadly consistent with findings in other species, supporting the hypothesis of evolutionary continuity in emotion expression. We discuss implications for broader theories of how vocal acoustics respond to selection pressures.

Bonobos assign meaning to food calls based on caller food preferences

Human communication relies heavily on pragmatic competence. Speech utterances are often ambiguous requiring listeners to use interaction history, shared knowledge, presumed intention and other contextual variables to make inferences about a speaker’s meaning. To probe the evolutionary origins of pragmatic competence we tested whether bonobos (Pan paniscus) can make inferences about the type of food available from listening to other group members’ food calls. We trained two group members to either prefer blue or pink chow and demonstrated these preferences to observers. A third group member served as an untrained control. In playback experiments, we broadcast the food calls of a trained demonstrator and the untrained group member to investigate whether subjects were able to infer which coloured chow was most likely available, based on the callers’ trained food preferences or lack thereof. As predicted, when hearing the untrained group member’s calls, subjects did not exhibit a bias, whereas they responded with a significant foraging bias when hearing a trained group member’s calls. These findings suggest that bonobos may take into account the idiosyncratic food preferences of others, although subjects probably differed in what they remembered.

Cats learn the names of their friend cats in their daily lives

Humans communicate with each other through language, which enables us talk about things beyond time and space. Do non-human animals learn to associate human speech with specific objects in everyday life? We examined whether cats matched familiar cats' names and faces (Exp.1) and human family members' names and faces (Exp.2). Cats were presented with a photo of the familiar cat's face on a laptop monitor after hearing the same cat's name or another cat's name called by the subject cat's owner (Exp.1) or an experimenter (Exp.2). Half of the trials were in a congruent condition where the name and face matched, and half were in an incongruent (mismatch) condition. Results of Exp.1 showed that household cats paid attention to the monitor for longer in the incongruent condition, suggesting an expectancy violation effect; however, café cats did not. In Exp.2, cats living in larger human families were found to look at the monitor for increasingly longer durations in the incongruent condition. Furthermore, this tendency was stronger among cats that had lived with their human family for a longer time, although we could not rule out an effect of age. This study provides evidence that cats link a companion's name and corresponding face without explicit training.

Information in Explaining Cognition: How to Evaluate It?

The claims that “The brain processes information” or “Cognition is information processing” are accepted as truisms in cognitive science. However, it is unclear how to evaluate such claims absent a specification of “information” as it is used by neurocognitive theories. The aim of this article is, thus, to identify the key features of information that information-based neurocognitive theories posit. A systematic identification of these features can reveal the explanatory role that information plays in specific neurocognitive theories, and can, therefore, be both theoretically and practically important. These features can be used, in turn, as desiderata against which candidate theories of information may be evaluated. After discussing some characteristics of explanation in cognitive science and their implications for “information”, three notions are briefly introduced: natural, sensory, and endogenous information. Subsequently, six desiderata are identified and defended based on cognitive scientific practices. The global workspace theory of consciousness is then used as a specific case study that arguably posits either five or six corresponding features of information.

Expression unleashed: The evolutionary and cognitive foundations of human communication

Human expression is open-ended, versatile, and diverse, ranging from ordinary language use to painting, from exaggerated displays of affection to micro-movements that aid coordination. Here we present and defend the claim that this expressive diversity is united by an interrelated suite of cognitive capacities, the evolved functions of which are the expression and recognition of informative intentions. We describe how evolutionary dynamics normally leash communication to narrow domains of statistical mutual benefit, and how expression is unleashed in humans. The relevant cognitive capacities are cognitive adaptations to living in a partner choice social ecology; and they are, correspondingly, part of the ordinarily developing human cognitive phenotype, emerging early and reliably in ontogeny. In other words, we identify distinctive features of our species' social ecology to explain how and why humans, and only humans, evolved the cognitive capacities that, in turn, lead to massive diversity and open-endedness in means and modes of expression. Language use is but one of these modes of expression, albeit one of manifestly high importance. We make cross-species comparisons, describe how the relevant cognitive capacities can evolve in a gradual manner, and survey how unleashed expression facilitates not only language use, but also novel behaviour in many other domains too, focusing on the examples of joint action, teaching, punishment, and art, all of which are ubiquitous in human societies but relatively rare in other species. Much of this diversity derives from graded aspects of human expression, which can be used to satisfy informative intentions in creative and new ways. We aim to help reorient cognitive pragmatics, as a phenomenon that is not a supplement to linguistic communication and on the periphery of language science, but rather the foundation of the many of the most distinctive features of human behaviour, society, and culture.

Orangutans have larger gestural repertoires in captivity than in the wild-A case of weak innovation?

Whether nonhuman species can change their communicative repertoire in response to socio-ecological environments has critical implications for communicative innovativeness prior to the emergence of human language, with its unparalleled productivity. Here, we use a comparative sample of wild and zoo-housed orangutans of two species (Pongo abelii, Pongo pygmaeus) to assess the effect of the wild-captive contrast on repertoires of gestures and facial expressions. We find that repertoires on both the individual and population levels are larger in captive than in wild settings, regardless of species, age class, or sampling effort. In the more sociable Sumatran species, dominant use of signals toward single outcomes was also higher in captive settings. We thus conclude that orangutans exposed to more sociable and terrestrial conditions evince behavioral plasticity, in that they produce additional innate or innovated signals that are highly functionally specific. These findings suggest a latent capacity for innovativeness in these apes' communicative repertoires.

Nonhuman and Nonhuman-Human Communication: Some Issues and Questions

Deciphering nonhuman communication – particularly nonhuman vocal communication – has been a longstanding human quest. We are, for example, fascinated by the songs of birds and whales, the grunts of apes, the barks of dogs, and the croaks of frogs; we wonder about their potential meaning and their relationship to human language. Do these utterances express little more than emotional states, or do they convey actual bits and bytes of concrete information? Humans’ numerous attempts to decipher nonhuman systems have, however, progressed slowly. We still wonder why only a small number of species are capable of vocal learning, a trait that, because it allows for innovation and adaptation, would seem to be a prerequisite for most language-like abilities. Humans have also attempted to teach nonhumans elements of our system, using both vocal and nonvocal systems. The rationale for such training is that the extent of success in instilling symbolic reference provides some evidence for, at the very least, the cognitive underpinnings of parallels between human and nonhuman communication systems. However, separating acquisition of reference from simple object-label association is not a simple matter, as reference begins with such associations, and the point at which true reference emerges is not always obvious. I begin by discussing these points and questions, predominantly from the viewpoint of someone studying avian abilities. I end by examining the question posed by Premack: do nonhumans that have achieved some level of symbolic reference then process information differently from those that have not? I suggest the answer is likely “yes,” giving examples from my research on Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus).

Aping Language: Historical Perspectives on the Quest for Semantics, Syntax, and Other Rarefied Properties of Human Language in the Communication of Primates and Other Animals

In 1980, Robert Seyfarth, Dorothy Cheney and Peter Marler published a landmark paper in Science claiming language-like semantic communication in the alarm calls of vervet monkeys. This article and the career research program it spawned for its authors catalyzed countless other studies searching for semantics, and then also syntax and other rarefied properties of language, in the communication systems of non-human primates and other animals. It also helped bolster a parallel tradition of teaching symbolism and syntax in artificial language systems to great apes. Although the search for language rudiments in the communications of primates long predates the vervet alarm call story, it is difficult to overstate the impact of the vervet research, for it fueled field and laboratory research programs for several generations of primatologists and kept busy an equal number of philosophers, linguists, and cognitive scientists debating possible implications for the origins and evolution of language and other vaunted elements of the human condition. Now 40-years on, the original vervet alarm call findings have been revised and claims of semanticity recanted; while other evidence for semantics and syntax in the natural communications of non-humans is sparse and weak. Ultimately, we are forced to conclude that there are simply few substantive precedents in the natural communications of animals for the high-level informational and representational properties of language, nor its complex syntax. This conclusion does not mean primates cannot be taught some version of these elements of language in artificial language systems - in fact, they can. Nor does it mean there is no continuity between the natural communications of animals and humans that could inform the evolution of language - in fact, there is such continuity. It just does not lie in the specialized semantic and syntactic properties of language. In reviewing these matters, I consider why it is that primates do not evince high-level properties of language in their natural communications but why we so readily accepted that they did or should; and what lessons we might draw from that experience. In the process, I also consider why accounts of human-like characteristics in animals can be so irresistibly appealing.

Songbirds can learn flexible contextual control over syllable sequencing

The flexible control of sequential behavior is a fundamental aspect of speech, enabling endless reordering of a limited set of learned vocal elements (syllables or words). Songbirds are phylogenetically distant from humans but share both the capacity for vocal learning and neural circuitry for vocal control that includes direct pallial-brainstem projections. Based on these similarities, we hypothesized that songbirds might likewise be able to learn flexible, moment-by-moment control over vocalizations. Here, we demonstrate that Bengalese finches (Lonchura striata domestica), which sing variable syllable sequences, can learn to rapidly modify the probability of specific sequences (e.g. ‘ab-c’ versus ‘ab-d’) in response to arbitrary visual cues. Moreover, once learned, this modulation of sequencing occurs immediately following changes in contextual cues and persists without external reinforcement. Our findings reveal a capacity in songbirds for learned contextual control over syllable sequencing that parallels human cognitive control over syllable sequencing in speech.

Human speech and birdsong share numerous parallels. Both humans and birds learn their vocalizations during critical phases early in life, and both learn by imitating adults. Moreover, both humans and songbirds possess specific circuits in the brain that connect the forebrain to midbrain vocal centers.

Humans can flexibly control what they say and how by reordering a fixed set of syllables into endless combinations, an ability critical to human speech and language. Birdsongs also vary depending on their context, and melodies to seduce a mate will be different from aggressive songs to warn other males to stay away. However, so far it was unclear whether songbirds are also capable of modifying songs independent of social or other naturally relevant contexts.

To test whether birds can control their songs in a purposeful way, Veit et al. trained adult male Bengalese finches to change the sequence of their songs in response to random colored lights that had no natural meaning to the birds. A specific computer program was used to detect different variations on a theme that the bird naturally produced (for example, “ab-c” versus “ab-d”), and rewarded birds for singing one sequence when the light was yellow, and the other when it was green. Gradually, the finches learned to modify their songs and were able to switch between the appropriate sequences as soon as the light cues changed. This ability persisted for days, even without any further training.

This suggests that songbirds can learn to flexibly and purposefully modify the way in which they sequence the notes in their songs, in a manner that parallels how humans control syllable sequencing in speech. Moreover, birds can learn to do this ‘on command’ in response to an arbitrarily chosen signal, even if it is not something that would impact their song in nature.

Songbirds are an important model to study brain circuits involved in vocal learning. They are one of the few animals that, like humans, learn their vocalizations by imitating conspecifics. The finding that they can also flexibly control vocalizations may help shed light on the interactions between cognitive processing and sophisticated vocal learning abilities.

Intentional communication: solving methodological issues to assigning first-order intentional signalling

Intentional signalling plays a fundamental role in human communication. Mapping the taxonomic distribution of comparable capacities may thus shed light on the selective pressures that enabled the evolution of human communication. Nonetheless, severe methodological issues undermine comparisons among studies, species and communicative modalities. Here, we discuss three main obstacles that hinder comparative research of 'first-order' intentional signalling (i.e. voluntary signalling in pursuit of a cognitively represented goal): (i) inconsistency in how behavioural hallmarks are defined and operationalised, (ii) testing of behavioural hallmarks without statistical comparison to control conditions, and (iii) bias against the publication of negative results. To address these obstacles, we present a four-step scheme with 20 statistical operational criteria to distinguish between non-intentional and first-order intentional signalling. Our unified scheme applies to visual and audible signals, thereby validating comparison across communicative modalities and species. This, in turn, promotes the generation and testing of hypotheses about the evolution of intentional communication.

Understanding Human Cognitive Uniqueness

Humanity has regarded itself as intellectually superior to other species for millennia, yet human cognitive uniqueness remains poorly understood. Here, we evaluate candidate traits plausibly underlying our distinctive cognition (including mental time travel, tool use, problem solving, social cognition, and communication) as well as domain generality, and we consider how human cognitive uniqueness may have evolved. We conclude that there are no traits present in humans and absent in other animals that in isolation explain our species' superior cognitive performance; rather, there are many cognitive domains in which humans possess unusually potent capabilities compared to those found in other species. Humans are flexible cognitive all-rounders, whose proficiency arises through interactions and reinforcement between cognitive domains at multiple scales.

Do nonlinear vocal phenomena signal negative valence or high emotion intensity?

Nonlinear vocal phenomena (NLPs) are commonly reported in animal calls and, increasingly, in human vocalizations. These perceptually harsh and chaotic voice features function to attract attention and convey urgency, but they may also signal aversive states. To test whether NLPs enhance the perception of negative affect or only signal high arousal, we added subharmonics, sidebands or deterministic chaos to 48 synthetic human nonverbal vocalizations of ambiguous valence: gasps of fright/surprise, moans of pain/pleasure, roars of frustration/achievement and screams of fear/delight. In playback experiments (N = 900 listeners), we compared their perceived valence and emotion intensity in positive or negative contexts or in the absence of any contextual cues. Primarily, NLPs increased the perceived aversiveness of vocalizations regardless of context. To a smaller extent, they also increased the perceived emotion intensity, particularly when the context was negative or absent. However, NLPs also enhanced the perceived intensity of roars of achievement, indicating that their effects can generalize to positive emotions. In sum, a harsh voice with NLPs strongly tips the balance towards negative emotions when a vocalization is ambiguous, but with sufficiently informative contextual cues, NLPs may be re-evaluated as expressions of intense positive affect, underlining the importance of context in nonverbal communication.

The Cognitive Philosophy of Communication

Numerous species use different forms of communication in order to successfully interact in their respective environment. This article seeks to elucidate limitations of the classical conduit metaphor by investigating communication from the perspectives of biology and artificial neural networks. First, communication is a biological natural phenomenon, found to be fruitfully grounded in an organism’s embodied structures and memory system, where specific abilities are tied to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory as well as to working memory. Second, the account explicates differences between non-verbal and verbal communication and shows how artificial neural networks can communicate by means of ontologically non-committal modelling. This approach enables new perspectives of communication to emerge regarding both sender and receiver. It is further shown that communication features gradient properties that are plausibly divided into a reflexive and a reflective form, parallel to knowledge and reflection.

Emotional Voice Intonation: A Communication Code at the Origins of Speech Processing and Word-Meaning Associations?

The aim of the present work is to investigate the facilitating effect of vocal emotional intonation on the evolution of the following processes involved in language: (a) identifying and producing phonemes, (b) processing compositional rules underlying vocal utterances, and (c) associating vocal utterances with meanings. To this end, firstly, I examine research on the presence of these abilities in animals, and the biologically ancient nature of emotional vocalizations. Secondly, I review research attesting to the facilitating effect of emotional voice intonation on these abilities in humans. Thirdly, building on these studies in animals and humans, and through taking an evolutionary perspective, I provide insights for future empirical work on the facilitating effect of emotional intonation on these three processes in animals and preverbal humans. In this work, I highlight the importance of a comparative approach to investigate language evolution empirically. This review supports Darwin’s hypothesis, according to which the ability to express emotions through voice modulation was a key step in the evolution of spoken language.

Other Species' Alarm Calls Evoke a Predator-Specific Search Image in Birds

Many animals produce vocal alarm signals when they detect a predator, and heterospecific species sharing predators often eavesdrop on and respond to these calls [1]. Despite the widespread occurrence of interspecific eavesdropping in animals, its underlying cognitive process remains to be elucidated. If alarm calls, like human referential words, denote a specific predator type (e.g., "snake!"), then receivers may retrieve a mental image of the predator when hearing these calls [2-4]. Here, using a recently developed experimental paradigm [5], I test whether heterospecific alarm calls evoke a predator-specific visual search image in wild birds. During playback of snake-specific alarm calls produced by Japanese tits (Parus minor), coal tits (Periparus ater) approach a wooden stick being moved in a snake-like manner. However, coal tits do not approach the same stick when hearing other call types or if the stick's movement is dissimilar to that of a snake. Thus, Japanese tit snake alarms cause coal tits to specifically enhance visual attention to snakelike objects. These results provide experimental evidence for the evocation of visual search images by heterospecific alarm calls, highlighting the importance of integrating cross-modal information in interspecific eavesdropping.

Towards a new taxonomy of primate vocal production learning

The extent to which vocal learning can be found in nonhuman primates is key to reconstructing the evolution of speech. Regarding the adjustment of vocal output in relation to auditory experience (vocal production learning in the narrow sense), effects on the ontogenetic trajectory of vocal development as well as adjustment to group-specific call features have been found. Yet, a comparison of the vocalizations of different primate genera revealed striking similarities in the structure of calls and repertoires in different species of the same genus, indicating that the structure of nonhuman primate vocalizations is highly conserved. Thus, modifications in relation to experience only appear to be possible within relatively tight species-specific constraints. By contrast, comprehension learning may be extremely rapid and open-ended. In conjunction, these findings corroborate the idea of an ancestral independence of vocal production and auditory comprehension learning. To overcome the futile debate about whether or not vocal production learning can be found in nonhuman primates, we suggest putting the focus on the different mechanisms that may mediate the adjustment of vocal output in response to experience; these mechanisms may include auditory facilitation and learning from success. This article is part of the theme issue 'What can animal communication teach us about human language?'

A stepping stone to compositionality in chimpanzee communication

Compositionality refers to a structural property of human language, according to which the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meaning of its parts and the way they are combined. Compositionality is a defining characteristic of all human language, spoken and signed. Comparative research into the emergence of human language aims at identifying precursors to such key features of human language in the communication of other primates. While it is known that chimpanzees, our closest relatives, produce a variety of gestures, facial expressions and vocalizations in interactions with their group members, little is known about how these signals combine simultaneously. Therefore, the aim of the current study is to investigate whether there is evidence for compositional structures in the communication of chimpanzees. We investigated two semi-wild groups of chimpanzees, with focus on their manual gestures and their combinations with facial expressions across different social contexts. If there are compositional structures in chimpanzee communication, adding a facial expression to a gesture should convey a different message than the gesture alone, a difference that we expect to be measurable by the recipient's response. Furthermore, we expect context-dependent usage of these combinations. Based on a form-based coding procedure of the collected video footage, we identified two frequently used manual gestures (stretched arm gesture and bent arm gesture) and two facial expression (bared teeth face and funneled lip face). We analyzed whether the recipients' response varied depending on the signaler's usage of a given gesture + face combination and the context in which these were used. Overall, our results suggest that, in positive contexts, such as play or grooming, specific combinations had an impact on the likelihood of the occurrence of particular responses. Specifically, adding a bared teeth face to a gesture either increased the likelihood of affiliative behavior (for stretched arm gesture) or eliminated the bias toward an affiliative response (for bent arm gesture). We show for the first time that the components under study are recombinable, and that different combinations elicit different responses, a property that we refer to as componentiality. Yet our data do not suggest that the components have consistent meanings in each combination-a defining property of compositionality. We propose that the componentiality exhibited in this study represents a necessary stepping stone toward a fully evolved compositional system.

Experimental evidence for heterospecific alarm signal recognition via associative learning in wild capuchin monkeys

Many vertebrate taxa respond to heterospecific alarm calls with anti-predator behaviours. While it is unclear how apparent recognition is achieved, learned associations between the occurrence of the call and the presence of a predator are considered the most likely explanation. Conclusive evidence that this behaviour is indeed underpinned by learning, however, is scarce. This study tested whether wild black capuchin monkeys (Sapajus nigritus) learn to associate novel sounds with predators through a two-phase field experiment. During an initial training phase, three study groups were each presented with a playback of one of the three novel sounds together with a simulated felid predator on four occasions over an 8- to 12-week period. This was followed by a test phase, wherein each of the three sounds was played back to individuals in all three groups, allowing each sound to serve as both a test stimulus for individuals trained with that sound, and a control stimulus for individuals trained with another sound. Antipredator responses were significantly stronger in response to test sounds than to controls. Limited observations suggest that antipredator responses persisted for at least 2 years without reinforcement of the predator-sound link. Additionally, responses to noisier sounds were typically stronger than were those to more tonal sounds, although the effect of sound type cannot be disentangled from potential effects of group. This study provides the strongest evidence to date that learning affects the responses of primates to sounds such as heterospecific alarm calls, and supports the contention that signals provide receivers with information.

Animals Have No Language, and Humans Are Animals Too

Language is a cornerstone of human culture, yet the evolution of this cognitive-demanding ability is shrouded in mystery. Studying how different species demonstrate this trait can provide clues for its evolutionary route. Indeed, recent decades saw ample scientific attempts to compare human speech, the prominent behavioral manifestation of language, with other animals' vocalizations. Diligent studies have found only elementary parallels to speech in other animals, fortifying the belief that language is uniquely human. But have we really tested this uniqueness claim? Surprisingly, a true impartial comparison between human speech and other animals' vocalizations has hardly ever been conducted. Here, I illustrate how treating humans as an equal species in vocal-communication research is expected to provide us with no evidence for human superiority in this realm. Thus, novel balanced and unbiased comparative studies are vital for identifying any unique component of human speech and language.

Multimodal communication and language origins: integrating gestures and vocalizations

The presence of divergent and independent research traditions in the gestural and vocal domains of primate communication has resulted in major discrepancies in the definition and operationalization of cognitive concepts. However, in recent years, accumulating evidence from behavioural and neurobiological research has shown that both human and non-human primate communication is inherently multimodal. It is therefore timely to integrate the study of gestural and vocal communication. Herein, we review evidence demonstrating that there is no clear difference between primate gestures and vocalizations in the extent to which they show evidence for the presence of key language properties: intentionality, reference, iconicity and turn-taking. We also find high overlap in the neurobiological mechanisms producing primate gestures and vocalizations, as well as in ontogenetic flexibility. These findings confirm that human language had multimodal origins. Nonetheless, we note that in great apes, gestures seem to fulfil a carrying (i.e. predominantly informative) role in close-range communication, whereas the opposite holds for face-to-face interactions of humans. This suggests an evolutionary shift in the carrying role from the gestural to the vocal stream, and we explore this transition in the carrying modality. Finally, we suggest that future studies should focus on the links between complex communication, sociality and cooperative tendency to strengthen the study of language origins.

Acoustic variation of spider monkey (Ateles geoffroyi) contact calls is related to caller isolation and affects listeners' responses

Group living animals produce vocalizations denominated "contact calls" to maintain contact with out-of-sight group members. These calls have been shown to vary with caller identity and distance to potential listeners. However, it is not clear whether the acoustic variation of contact calls is related to caller social isolation (e.g., inside or outside a subgroup) and listeners' responses that can be helpful to maintain contact. Here, we addressed these questions in spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi), a Neotropical primate that exchanges contact calls denominated "whinnies", which show graded variation related to caller immediate behavior and distance between callers. Using 566 whinnies produced by 35 free-ranging adult spider monkeys recorded at ≤ 20 m from microphones, we first analyzed whether the acoustic variation of spontaneous whinnies (i.e., whinnies that are not responses to previous whinnies) is related to caller social isolation or whether acoustic variation is related to the likelihood of eliciting a response whinny from another individual. Secondly, we assessed whether listeners' responses (i.e., time to respond vocally, acoustic characteristics of response whinnies, orienting behaviors) were related to the acoustic variation of previous whinnies. Our study revealed that callers that were outside a subgroup produced whinnies with a lower fundamental frequency (F0), which travels longer distances, and increases the likelihood of producing a response whinny. Moreover, listeners (i.e., responders) responded faster to lower F0 whinnies. However, the acoustic variation (i.e., F0 variation) in response whinnies was better explained by the separation distance between callers, than by the acoustic variation of the previous whinny. Overall, our results suggest that whinny variation facilitates vocal contact to callers that are outside a subgroup, and that context and whinny variation affect listeners' responses.

Imagery in wild birds: Retrieval of visual information from referential alarm calls

Japanese tits (Parus minor) produce specific alarm calls when they encounter a predatory snake. A recent field experiment showed that receiver tits became visually perceptive to an object resembling a snake when hearing these calls. However, the tits did not respond to the same object when hearing other call types or when the object was dissimilar to a snake. These findings provide the first experimental evidence for the retrieval of a visual search image from specific alarm calls, offering a novel approach for investigating the cognitive mechanisms underlying referential communication in wild animals.

Combinatoriality in the vocal systems of nonhuman animals

A key challenge in the field of human language evolution is the identification of the selective conditions that gave rise to language's generative nature. Comparative data on nonhuman animals provides a powerful tool to investigate similarities and differences among nonhuman and human communication systems and to reveal convergent evolutionary mechanisms. In this article, we provide an overview of the current evidence for combinatorial structures found in the vocal system of diverse species. We show that considerable structural diversity exits across and within species in the forms of combinatorial structures used. Based on this we suggest that a fine-grained classification and differentiation of combinatoriality is a useful approach permitting systematic comparisons across animals. Specifically, this will help to identify factors that might promote the emergence of combinatoriality and, crucially, whether differences in combinatorial mechanisms might be driven by variations in social and ecological conditions or cognitive capacities. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Linguistics > Evolution of Language.

Content in Simple Signalling Systems

Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly through the study of simple models involving interacting senders and receivers of signals. Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory are all that are needed to capture the meaning or content that is being communicated in these systems. However, the way theorists routinely talk about the models implicitly draws on a conception of content that is richer than bare informational content, especially in contexts where false content is important. This article shows that this concept can be made precise by defining a notion of functional content that captures the degree to which different states of the world are involved in stabilizing senders' and receivers' use of a signal at equilibrium. A series of case studies is used to contrast functional content with informational content, and to illustrate the explanatory role and limitations of this definition of functional content. 1 Introduction 2 Modelling Framework 3 Two Kinds of Content  3.1 Informational content  3.2 Functional content 4 Cases  4.1 Case 1: Simplest case  4.2 Case 2: Partial pooling  4.3 Case 3: Bottleneck  4.4 Case 4: Partial common interest  4.5 Case 5: Deception  4.6 Case 6: A further problem arising from divergent interests 5 Discussion Appendix .

Functional Networks for Social Communication in the Macaque Monkey

All primates communicate. To dissect the neural circuits of social communication, we used fMRI to map non-human primate brain regions for social perception, second-person (interactive) social cognition, and orofacial movement generation. Face perception, second-person cognition, and face motor networks were largely non-overlapping and acted as distinct functional units rather than an integrated feedforward-processing pipeline. Whereas second-person context selectively engaged a region of medial prefrontal cortex, production of orofacial movements recruited distributed subcortical and cortical areas in medial and lateral frontal and insular cortex. These areas exhibited some specialization, but not dissociation, of function along the medio-lateral axis. Production of lipsmack movements recruited areas including putative homologs of Broca's area. These findings provide a new view of the neural architecture for social communication and suggest expressive orofacial movements generated by lateral premotor cortex as a putative evolutionary precursor to human speech.

Call type signals caller goal: a new take on ultimate and proximate influences in vocal production

After 40 years of debate it remains unclear whether signallers produce vocalizations in order to provide receivers with information about call context or external stimuli. This has led some researchers to propose that call production is arousal- or affect-based. Although arousal influences certain acoustic parameters within a call type, we argue that it cannot explain why individuals across vertebrates produce different call types. Given emerging evidence that calls are goal-based, we argue that call type is a signal of a caller's goal to elicit a change in receiver behaviour. Using chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) as case studies, we demonstrate the two benefits of viewing call production as signalling both caller goal (which determines call type) and caller arousal (which affects within-call-type variation). Such a framework can explain first, why a single class of calls is apparently given in multiple contexts, and, second, why some species have larger call repertoires than others. Previous studies have noted links between sociality and repertoire size, but have not specified exactly why animals living in societies that are more complex might require a greater number of differentiated signals. The caller-goal framework potentially clarifies how social complexity might favour call diversification. As social complexity increases, callers may need to elicit a larger number of distinct behaviours from a wider range of distinct audiences.