Active Inference, Novelty and Neglect

Bridging the gap between believing and memory functions

Believing has recently been recognized as a fundamental brain function linking a person’s experience with his or her attitude, actions and predictions. In general, believing results from the integration of ambient information with emotions and can be reinforced or modulated in a probabilistic fashion by new experiences. Although these processes occur in the subliminal realm, humans can become aware of what they believe and express it verbally. We explain how believing is interwoven with memory functions in a multifaceted fashion. Linking the typically rapid and adequate reactions of a subject to what he/she believes is enabled by working memory. Perceptions are stored in episodic memory as beneficial or aversive events, while the corresponding verbal descriptions of what somebody believes are stored in semantic memory. After recall from memory of what someone believes, personally relevant information can be communicated to other people. Thus, memory is essential for maintaining what people believe.

Left and right temporal-parietal junctions (TPJs) as "match/mismatch" hedonic machines: A unifying account of TPJ function

Experimental and theoretical studies have tried to gain insights into the involvement of the Temporal Parietal Junction (TPJ) in a broad range of cognitive functions like memory, attention, language, self-agency and theory of mind. Recent investigations have demonstrated the partition of the TPJ in discrete subsectors. Nonetheless, whether these subsectors play different roles or implement an overarching function remains debated. Here, based on a review of available evidence, we propose that the left TPJ codes both matches and mismatches between expected and actual sensory, motor, or cognitive events while the right TPJ codes mismatches. These operations help keeping track of statistical contingencies in personal, environmental, and conceptual space. We show that this hypothesis can account for the participation of the TPJ in disparate cognitive functions, including "humour", and explain: a) the higher incidence of spatial neglect in right brain damage; b) the different emotional reactions that follow left and right brain damage; c) the hemispheric lateralisation of optimistic bias mechanisms; d) the lateralisation of mechanisms that regulate routine and novelty behaviours. We propose that match and mismatch operations are aimed at approximating "free energy", in terms of the free energy principle of decision-making. By approximating "free energy", the match/mismatch TPJ system supports both information seeking to update one's own beliefs and the pleasure of being right in one's own' current choices. This renewed view of the TPJ has relevant clinical implications because the misfunctioning of TPJ-related "match" and "mismatch" circuits in unilateral brain damage can produce low-dimensional deficits of active-inference and predictive coding that can be associated with different neuropsychological disorders.

Deficits of hierarchical predictive coding in left spatial neglect

Right brain-damaged patients with unilateral spatial neglect fail to explore the left side of space. Recent EEG and clinical evidence suggests that neglect patients might suffer deficits in predictive coding, i.e. in identifying and exploiting probabilistic associations among sensory stimuli in the environment. To gain direct insights on this issue, we focussed on the hierarchical components of predictive coding. We recorded EEG responses evoked by central, left-side or right-side tones that were presented at the end of sequences of four central tones. Left-side and right-side deviant tones produce a pre-attentive Mismatch Negativity that reflects a lower-order prediction error for the 'Local' deviation of the tone at the end of the sequence. Higher-order prediction errors for the frequency of these deviations in the acoustic environment, i.e. 'Global' deviation, are marked by the P3 response. We show that when neglect patients are immersed in an acoustic environment characterized by frequent left-side deviant tones, they display no pre-attentive Mismatch Negativity both for left-side deviant tones and infrequent omissions of the last tone, while they have Mismatch Negativity for infrequent right-side deviant tones. In the same condition, neglect patients show no P300 response to 'Global' prediction errors for deviant tones, including those in the non-neglected right-side, and omissions. In contrast to this, when right-side deviant tones are predominant in the acoustic environment, neglect patients have pre-attentive Mismatch Negativity both for right-side deviant tones and infrequent omissions, while they display no Mismatch Negativity for infrequent left-side deviant tones. Most importantly, in the same condition neglect patients show enhanced P300 response to infrequent left-side deviant tones, notwithstanding that these tones evoked no pre-attentive Mismatch Negativity. This latter finding indicates that 'Global' predictions are independent of 'Local' error signals provided by the Mismatch Negativity. These results qualify deficits of predictive coding in the spatial neglect syndrome and show that neglect patients base their predictive behaviour only on statistical regularities that are related to the frequent occurrence of sensory events on the right side of space.

Symptom Perception From a Predictive Processing Perspective

Bodily symptoms are highly prevalent in psychopathology, and in some specific disorders, such as somatic symptom disorder, they are a central feature. In general, the mechanisms underlying these symptoms are poorly understood. However, also in well-known physical diseases there seems to be a variable relationship between physiological dysfunction and self-reported symptoms challenging traditional assumptions of a biomedical disease model.

Recently, a new, predictive processing conceptualization of how the brain works has been used to understand this variable relationship. According to this predictive processing view, the experience of a symptom results from an integration of both interoceptive sensations as well as from predictions about these sensations from the brain.

In the present paper, we introduce the predictive processing perspective on perception (predictive coding) and action (active inference), and apply it to asthma in order to understand when and why asthma symptoms are sometimes strongly, moderately or weakly related to physiological disease parameters.

Our predictive processing view of symptom perception contributes to understanding under which conditions misperceptions and maladaptive action selection may arise.

There is a variable relationship between physiological dysfunction and self-reported symptoms.

We conceptualize symptom perception (and misperception) within a predictive processing perspective.

In this view, symptom perception integrates sensations and predictions about these sensations.

Failures of such integration can produce misperceptions and maladaptive action selection.

We use the perception (and misperception) of asthma symptoms as an example.