Aha! experiences leave a mark: facilitated recall of insight solutions

An Integrated theory of false insights and beliefs under psychedelics

Psychedelics are recognised for their potential to re-orient beliefs. We propose a model of how psychedelics can, in some cases, lead to false insights and thus false beliefs. We first review experimental work on laboratory-based false insights and false memories. We then connect this to insights and belief formation under psychedelics using the active inference framework. We propose that subjective and brain-based alterations caused by psychedelics increases the quantity and subjective intensity of insights and thence beliefs, including false ones. We offer directions for future research in minimising the risk of false and potentially harmful beliefs arising from psychedelics. Ultimately, knowing how psychedelics may facilitate false insights and beliefs is crucial if we are to optimally leverage their therapeutic potential.

Insight in the Conspiracist's Mind

Academic AbstractThe motto of the conspiracist, "Do your own research," may seem ludicrous to scientists. Indeed, it is often dismissed as a mere rhetorical device that conspiracists use to give themselves the semblance of science. In this perspective paper, we explore the information-seeking activities ("research") that conspiracists do engage in. Drawing on the experimental psychology of aha experiences, we explain how these activities, as well as the epistemic experiences that precede (curiosity) or follow (insight or "aha" experiences) them, may play a crucial role in the appeal and development of conspiracy beliefs. Aha moments have properties that can be exploited by conspiracy theories, such as the potential for false but seemingly grounded conclusions. Finally, we hypothesize that the need for autonomous epistemic agency and discovery is universal but increases as people experience more uncertainty and/or feel epistemically excluded in society, hence linking it to existing literature on explaining conspiracy theories.

The lack of Aha! experience can be dependent on the problem difficulty

Previous research on how problem-difficulty affects solution-types of insight-problems has yielded contradictory findings. Thus, we aimed to examine the impact of problem-difficulty on solution-types in both inter- and intra-problem-difficulty contexts. For this, we employed the original 8-coin, and 9-dot problems and four hinted-versions of those that were manipulated by using hints-to-remove-sources-of-difficulty to alter their difficulty level. Those manipulations were executed based on the assumptions of constraint-relaxation and chunk-decomposition as posited by representational change theory. The study involved a total of 165 participants who were tested in five groups (33 per se), with each group receiving an original or hinted problem. Following their correct solutions, problem-solvers classified their solution-types (insight or non-insight solutions) by whether they had an Aha!-experience during the solution. Across all groups, 56.1% of correctly solved insight problems were solved with Aha!-experience, based on participants' self-reports, implying that correct solutions should not be equated with insight. Subsequently, the solution-type rates were compared for both original problems (inter-problem-difficulty) and hinted versions of those at each difficulty level (intra-problem-difficulty). Inter-problem-difficulty comparisons demonstrated that the easier 8-coin problem was more likely to be solved with insight than the harder 9-dot problem. In contrast, intra-problem-difficulty comparisons revealed that harder problems were more likely to be solved with insight. These findings suggest that problem-difficulty should be considered in future studies of insight. Finally, separate analyses on the predictive values of the cognitive-affective-dimensions on solution-types revealed that, after adjusting for problem-difficulty, problem-solvers with higher suddenness scores in both problems exhibited a significantly higher probability of generating insight solutions.

Recognizing ideas generated in a creative task: the roles of the hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex in facilitating self-generated learning

Creative idea generation plays an important role in promoting successful memory formation. Yet, its underlying neural correlates remain unclear. We investigated the self-generated learning of creative ideas motivated by the schema-linked interactions between medial prefrontal and medial temporal regions framework. This was achieved by having participants generate ideas in the alternative uses task, self-evaluating their ideas based on novelty and source (i.e. new or old), and then later being tested on the recognition performance of the generated ideas. At the behavioral level, our results indicated superior performances in discriminating novel ideas, highlighting the novelty effect on memory. At the neural level, the regions-of-interest analyses revealed that successful recognition of novel ideas was associated with greater activations in the hippocampus (HPC) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) during ideation. However, only activation in the right HPC was positively related to the successful recognition of novel ideas. Importantly, the weaker the connection between the right HPC and left mPFC, the higher the recognition accuracy of novel ideas. Moreover, activations in the right HPC and left mPFC were both effective predictors of successful recognition of novel ideas. These findings uniquely highlight the role of novelty in promoting self-generated learning of creative ideas.

Impasse-Driven problem solving: The multidimensional nature of feeling stuck

This study reports findings across four preregistered experiments (total N = 856) that establish the multidimensional nature of impasse and resolve two paradoxes implicit in the problem-solving literature: how a state of impasse can be at once necessary to solve a problem with insight yet also have appear to have a catastrophic effect on solution rates, and why individuals such as problem-solving and gaming enthusiasts seem to seek out this apparently aversive state. We introduce a new way of measuring impasse based on qualitative reports and subsequently confirmed through quantitative analysis that exploits two aspects of impasse: its dynamic and unstable nature (it can be resolved or unresolved) and its multidimensionality in terms of feelings of cognitive speediness, motivation, and affect. The feeling of being stuck varies between resolved and unresolved impasse in terms of feelings of speediness and positive affect, but not motivation, which remains constant. We demonstrate that the feeling of insight can be reliably elicited by experiencing and resolving impasse but also in the absence of impasse, which suggests that there is more than one path to an insight experience. This adds depths to current proposals of the cognitive mechanisms underlying both insight problem-solving and impasse. Our findings are robust across a range of problem types. The novel conception of impasse in this paper as dynamic and multidimensional has implications for theories of insight problem solving, and also wider implications for understanding how impasse can be resolved across different domains such as education and design.

The influence of insight on risky decision making and nucleus accumbens activation

During insightful problem solving, the solution appears unexpectedly and is accompanied by the feeling of an AHA!. Research suggests that this affective component of insight can have consequences beyond the solution itself by motivating future behavior, such as risky (high reward and high uncertainty) decision making. Here, we investigate the behavioral and neural support for the motivational role of AHA in decision making involving monetary choices. The positive affect of the AHA! experience has been linked to internal reward. Reward in turn has been linked to dopaminergic signal transmission in the Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc) and risky decision making. Therefore, we hypothesized that insight activates reward-related brain areas, modulating risky decision making. We tested this hypothesis in two studies. First, in a pre-registered online study (Study 1), we demonstrated the behavioral effect of insight-related increase in risky decision making using a visual Mooney identification paradigm. Participants were more likely to choose the riskier monetary payout when they had previously solved the Mooney image with high compared to low accompanied AHA!. Second, in an fMRI study (Study 2), we measured the effects of insight on NAcc activity using a similar Mooney identification paradigm to the one of Study 1. Greater NAcc activity was found when participants solved the Mooney image with high vs low AHA!. Taken together, our results link insight to enhanced NAcc activity and a preference for high but uncertain rewards, suggesting that insight enhances reward-related brain areas possibly via dopaminergic signal transmission, promoting risky decision making.

Insight and the selection of ideas

Perhaps it is no accident that insight moments accompany some of humanity's most important discoveries in science, medicine, and art. Here we propose that feelings of insight play a central role in (heuristically) selecting an idea from the stream of consciousness by capturing attention and eliciting a sense of intuitive confidence permitting fast action under uncertainty. The mechanisms underlying this Eureka heuristic are explained within an active inference framework. First, implicit restructuring via Bayesian reduction leads to a higher-order prediction error (i.e., the content of insight). Second, dopaminergic precision-weighting of the prediction error accounts for the intuitive confidence, pleasure, and attentional capture (i.e., the feeling of insight). This insight as precision account is consistent with the phenomenology, accuracy, and neural unfolding of insight, as well as its effects on belief and decision-making. We conclude by reflecting on dangers of the Eureka Heuristic, including the arising and entrenchment of false beliefs and the vulnerability of insights under psychoactive substances and misinformation.

Solving problems with an Aha! increases risk preference

Solving problems with insight culminates in an "Aha! moment": a feeling of confidence and pleasure. In daily life, insights are often followed by important decisions, such as deciding what to do with a new idea. Here, we investigated whether having an Aha! moment affects subsequent decision-making. Because Aha! moments tend to elicit positive affect, which is generally associated with an increased risk-taking tendency, we hypothesized that people would favor a monetary payout with more upside despite greater uncertainty after solving a problem with insight. Participants were asked to solve verbal puzzles and report whether they solved them with insight or without insight. After each puzzle, they chose between two bonuses: a fixed payout or a risk payout with 50% chance of receiving a high or a low payout. Participants were more likely to choose the risk payout after they solved with insight compared to without, suggesting a temporarily higher risk preference. The study provided preliminary evidence of a carryover effect - the impact of an Aha! moment on the subsequent risk choice - that can have implications in everyday decision-making.

Altered Postcentral Connectivity after Sleep Deprivation Correlates to Impaired Risk Perception: A Resting-State Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study

BACKGROUND

Previous studies revealed that sleep deprivation (SD) impairs risk perception and leads to poor decision-making efficiency. However, how risk perception is related to brain regions' communication after SD has not been elucidated. In this study, we investigated the neuropsychological mechanisms of SD-impaired risk perception.

METHODS

Nineteen healthy male adults were recruited and underwent resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging during a state of rested wakefulness and after nearly 36 h of total SD. They then completed the balloon analog risk task, which was used to measure the risk perception ability of risky decision-making. Regional homogeneity (ReHo) and voxel-wise functional connectivity were used to investigate neurobiological changes caused by SD. Correlation analysis was used to investigate the relationship between changes in ReHo, function, and risk perception.

RESULTS

At the behavioral level, risk perception decreased after 36 h of SD. At the neural level, SD induced a significant increase in ReHo in the right postcentral gyrus and was positively correlated with risk perception changes. The functional connectivity between the right postcentral gyrus, left medial temporal gyrus, and right inferior temporal gyrus was enhanced. Critically, increased right postcentral gyrus and right inferior temporal gyrus connectivity positively correlated with changes in risk perception.

CONCLUSIONS

SD impairs the risk perception associated with altered postcentral connectivity. The brain requires more energy to process and integrate sensory and perceptual information after SD, which may be one possible reason for decreased risk perception ability after SD.

Restructuring insight: An integrative review of insight in problem-solving, meditation, psychotherapy, delusions and psychedelics

Occasionally, a solution or idea arrives as a sudden understanding - an insight. Insight has been considered an "extra" ingredient of creative thinking and problem-solving. Here we propose that insight is central in seemingly distinct areas of research. Drawing on literature from a variety of fields, we show that besides being commonly studied in problem-solving literature, insight is also a core component in psychotherapy and meditation, a key process underlying the emergence of delusions in schizophrenia, and a factor in the therapeutic effects of psychedelics. In each case, we discuss the event of insight and its prerequisites and consequences. We review evidence for the commonalities and differences between the fields and discuss their relevance for capturing the essence of the insight phenomenon. The goal of this integrative review is to bridge the gap between the different views and inspire interdisciplinary research efforts for understanding this central process of human cognition.

Ontological Adaptation in Transition to Adulthood: A Theoretical Framework for Integrating Phenomenology and Neuroscience in Psychosis Research

In this theoretical review, the neurodevelopmental model of psychotic disorders is considered within the framework of ontological development, referring to the individual-level construction of a sense of reality regarding identity and worldview. Following Erikson's theory of development, the challenge of forging a personal and social identity is a developmental process typical of late adolescence and early adulthood. Accompanying this process is a developmentally normal increase in exploratory and risk-taking behavior, which sometimes includes challenging and defying cultural norms. Although many aspects of ontological adaptation are developmentally appropriate, we argue that psychopathology such as psychosis can be rooted in an abnormal deviation of this process, in which aberrant salience accelerates the typical drive to develop a meaningful sense of identity, leading to delusion formation. By placing psychosis onset within a broader context of normal development, this model offers a humanistic approach for understanding experiences of new onset of psychotic disorders.

Mental navigation and the neural mechanisms of insight

How do new ideas come about? The central hypothesis presented here states that insights might happen during mental navigation and correspond to rapid plasticity at the cellular level. We highlight the differences between neocortical and hippocampal mechanisms of insight. We argue that the suddenness of insight can be related to the sudden emergence of place fields in the hippocampus. According to our hypothesis, insights are supported by a state of mind-wandering that can be tied to the process of combining knowledge pieces during sharp-wave ripples (SWRs). Our framework connects the dots between research on creativity, mental navigation, and specific synaptic plasticity mechanisms in the hippocampus.

Entering into a self-regulated learning mode prevents detrimental effects of feedback removal on memory

Incentives can decrease performance by undermining intrinsic motivation. How such an interplay of external reinforcers and internal self-regulation influences memory processes, however, is less known. Here, we investigated their interaction on memory performance while learning the meaning of new-words from their context. Specifically, participants inferred congruent meanings of new-words from semantic context (congruent trials) or lack of congruence (incongruent trials), while receiving external feedback in the first or second half of trials only. Removing feedback during learning of congruent word meanings lowered subsequent recognition rates a day later, whereas recognition remained high in the group, which received feedback only in the second half. In contrast, feedback did not substantially alter recognition rates for learning that new-words had no congruent meanings. Our findings suggest that external reinforcers can selectively impair memories if internal self-regulated processes are not already established, but whether they do so depends on what is being learned (specific word-meanings vs. unspecific incongruence). This highlights the relevance of self-regulated learning in education to support stable memory formation.

The Neural Mechanisms of the Effect of Spontaneous Insight on Re-Solution: An ERP Study

The insight memory advantage refers to the situation in which memory performance could be improved by solving a problem with an Aha experience. In re-solution tests and recognition tests, studies demonstrate an insight memory advantage by spontaneous insight or induced insight. For the re-solution test, the neural mechanisms of the effect of induced insight were studied by the fMRI technique. However, the neural mechanisms of the effect of insight on re-solution in the temporal dimension were not known. The neural mechanisms of the effect of spontaneous insight on re-solution were not known. In the present study, we use the compound remote-associated (CRA) task to reveal the neural mechanisms of the effect of spontaneous insight on re-solution by the event-related potentials (ERPs) technique. The 25 participants were asked to solve a series of Chinese verbal CRA tasks and then perform a re-solution test 1 day later. Our results indicated that the solution with the Aha experience evoked a larger N400 in the early solution phase and a more negative wave in the late solution phase than the solution with no Aha experience. In the re-solution phase, items with an Aha during the solution phase were re-solved better with higher Aha rates than items with no Aha. In the re-solution phase, compared with items with no Aha, items with an Aha during the solution phase evoked a larger positive ERP in the 250 to 350 ms time window in the early phase, and a more negative deflection before the response (-900 to -800 ms) in the later phase. In one word, spontaneous insight during the solution phase could promote re-solution and elicit ERP deflection in the re-solution phase.

Search and insight processes in card sorting games

Insight problems are particularly interesting, because problems which require restructuring allow researchers to investigate the underpinnings of the Aha-experience, creativity and out of the box thinking. There is a need for new insight tasks to probe and extend the limits of existing theories and cognitive frameworks. To shed more light on this fascinating issue, we addressed the question: Is it possible to convey a well-known card sorting game into an insight task? We introduced different conditions and tested them via two online experiments (N = 546). Between the conditions we systematically varied the available perceptual features, and the existence of non-obvious rules. We found that our card sorting game elicited insight experience. In the first experiment, our data revealed that solution strategies and insight experience varied by the availability and saliency of perceptual features. The discovery of a non-obvious rule, which is not hinted at by perceptual features, was most difficult. With our new paradigm, we were able to construe ambiguous problems which allowed participants to find more than one solution strategy. Interestingly, we realized interindividual preferences for different strategies. The same problem drove strategies which either relied on feature integration or on more deliberate strategies. The second experiment varied the degree of independence of a sorting rule from the standard rules which were in accordance with prior knowledge. It was shown that the more independent the hidden rule was, the more difficult the task became. In sum, we demonstrated a new insight task which extended the available task domains and shed light on sequential and multi-step rule learning problems. Finally, we provided a first sketch of a cognitive model that should help to integrate the data within the existing literature on cognitive models and speculated about the generalizability of the interplay of prior knowledge modification and variation for problem solving.

Surprise! Why Insightful Solution Is Pleasurable

Insight problems-as a type of ill-defined problems-are often solved without an articulate plan, and finding their solution is accompanied by the Aha! experience (positive feeling from suddenly finding a solution). However, the solution of such problems can also be guided, for example, by expectations in terms of criteria for achieving the goal. We hypothesize that adjusting the expectation accuracy based on the reward prediction error (discrepancy between the reward and its prediction) affects the strength of affective components of the Aha! experience (pleasure and surprise), allowing to learn how to solve similar problems. We manipulated expectation accuracy by varying the similarity in problem solution principle and structure in a short learning set. Each set was followed by a critical problem where both the structure and solution principle were changed (except for control set). Subjective feelings, solution time, and expectation were measured after each problem. The results revealed that problems with similarities become more expected at the end of the set and their solution time is decreased. However, the critical problem featured a rapid increase in pleasure and surprise and decrease in expectedness only in the condition where both the solution principle and structure were expected, suggesting that problem structure is a key feature determining expectedness in insight problem solving. The Aha! experience is not an epiphenomenon; it plays a role in learning of problem solving through adjusting expectations.

Alone or together: The role of gender and social context prior to Aha‐experiences

Prior research indicates that boys show more interest in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) than girls do. Given that Aha-experiences yield positive affect and increase interest, the question arises whether there are gender differences in Aha-experiences that could help explain the gender differences in interest. Derived from social role theory, we hypothesized that men report having Aha-experiences alone, whereas women report having Aha-experiences together with others. In a retrospective survey study comprising three independent samples (N = 899), we conducted chi-square analyses to explore the relationship of gender, social context (alone; not alone), domain, and situational interest. Across all participants, we found that men were more probably alone and women more probably together with others when they had an Aha-experience. More fine-grained analyses revealed that the effect was especially pronounced when the Aha-experience increased situational interest within STEM or the personal domain. The study suggests that social context played a different role in the occurrence of Aha-experiences in men and women. We discuss the implications of our findings for STEM instruction at school.

Culturo-Scientific Storytelling

In this article, we reflect on the functions of outreach in developing the modern scientific mind, and discuss its essential importance in the modern society of rapid technological development. We embed our approach to outreach in culturo-scientific thinking. This is constituted by embracing disciplinary thinking (in particular creativity) whilst appreciating the epistemology of science as an evolving dialogue of ideas, with numerous alternative perspectives and uncertain futures to be managed. Structuring scientific knowledge as an assemblage of interacting and evolving discipline-cultures, we conceive of a culturo-scientific storytelling to bring about positive transformations for the public in these thinking skills and ground our approach in quantum science and technologies (QST). This field has the potential to generate significant changes for the life of every citizen, and so a skills-oriented approach to its education, both formal and non-formal, is essential. Finally, we present examples of such storytelling in the case of QST, the classification and evaluation of which correspond to future work in which this narrative approach is studied in action.

How Difficult Was It? Metacognitive Judgments About Problems and Their Solutions After the Aha Moment

The insight phenomenon is thought to comprise two components: cognitive and affective (the Aha! experience). The exact nature of the Aha! experience remains unclear; however, several explanations have been put forward. Based on the processing fluency account, the source of the Aha! experience is a sudden increase in processing fluency, associated with emerging of a solution. We hypothesized that in a situation which the Aha! experience accompanies the solution in, the problem would be judged as less difficult, regardless of the objective difficulty. We also planned to confirm previously discovered associations between the Aha! experience and accuracy, confidence, and pleasure. To test the proposed hypothesis, during the preliminary stage of the study, we developed a set of 100 remote associate problems in Russian (RAT-RUS) and asked 125 participants to solve problems and indicate the Aha! moment (after solution generation or solution presentation), confidence, difficulty, and likability of each problem. As expected, the Aha! experience often accompanied correct solutions and correlated with confidence judgments. We also found a positive correlation between the Aha! experience and problem likability. As for the main hypothesis, we confirmed that the Aha! experience after the presentation of the solution was associated with a decrease in subjective difficulty. When participants could not solve a problem but experienced the Aha! moment after the solution was presented to them, the problem was perceived as easier than one without the Aha! experience. We didn’t find the same effect for the Aha! after solution generation. Thus, our study partially supports the processing fluency account and demonstrates the association between the Aha! experience and metacognitive judgments about the accuracy and difficulty of problems.

Irrelevant insights make worldviews ring true

Our basic beliefs about reality can be impossible to prove and yet we can feel a strong intuitive conviction about them, as exemplified by insights that imbue an idea with immediate certainty. Here we presented participants with worldview beliefs such as "people's core qualities are fixed" and simultaneously elicited an aha moment. In the first experiment (N = 3000, which included a direct replication), participants rated worldview beliefs as truer when they solved anagrams and also experienced aha moments. A second experiment (N = 1564) showed that the worldview statement and the aha moment must be perceived simultaneously for this 'insight misattribution' effect to occur. These results demonstrate that artificially induced aha moments can make worldview beliefs seem truer, possibly because humans partially rely on feelings of insight to appraise an idea's veracity. Feelings of insight are therefore not epiphenomenal and should be investigated for their effects on decisions, beliefs, and delusions.

Eliciting false insights with semantic priming

The insight experience (or ‘Aha moment’) generally evokes strong feelings of certainty and confidence. An ‘Aha’ experience for a false idea could underlie many false beliefs and delusions. However, for as long as insight experiences have been studied, false insights have remained difficult to elicit experimentally. That difficulty, in turn, highlights the fact that we know little about what causes people to experience a false insight. Across two experiments (total N = 300), we developed and tested a new paradigm to elicit false insights. In Experiment 1 we used a combination of semantic priming and visual similarity to elicit feelings of insight for incorrect solutions to anagrams. These false insights were relatively common but were experienced as weaker than correct ones. In Experiment 2 we replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and found that semantic priming and visual similarity interacted to produce false insights. These studies highlight the importance of misleading semantic processing and the feasibility of the solution in the generation of false insights.

Current Understanding of the "Insight" Phenomenon Across Disciplines

Despite countless anecdotes and the historical significance of insight as a problem solving mechanism, its nature has long remained elusive. The conscious experience of insight is notoriously difficult to trace in non-verbal animals. Although studying insight has presented a significant challenge even to neurobiology and psychology, human neuroimaging studies have cleared the theoretical landscape, as they have begun to reveal the underlying mechanisms. The study of insight in non-human animals has, in contrast, remained limited to innovative adjustments to experimental designs within the classical approach of judging cognitive processes in animals, based on task performance. This leaves no apparent possibility of ending debates from different interpretations emerging from conflicting schools of thought. We believe that comparative cognition has thus much to gain by embracing advances from neuroscience and human cognitive psychology. We will review literature on insight (mainly human) and discuss the consequences of these findings to comparative cognition.

Learning by Insight-Like Sudden Comprehension as a Potential Strategy to Improve Memory Encoding in Older Adults

Several cognitive functions show a decline with advanced age, most prominently episodic memory. Problem-solving by insight represents a special associative form of problem-solving that has previously been shown to facilitate long-term memory formation. Recent neuroimaging evidence suggests that the encoding network involved in insight-based memory formation is largely hippocampus-independent. This may represent a potential advantage in older adults, as the hippocampus is one of the earliest brain structures to show age-related volume loss and functional impairment. Here, we investigated the potential beneficial effects of learning by insight in healthy older (60-79 years) compared to young adults (19-28 years). To this end, we compared later memory performance for verbal riddles encoded incidentally via induced insight-like sudden comprehension in both age groups. We employed a variant of the Compound Remote Associate Task (CRAT) for incidental encoding, during which participants were instructed to judge the solvability of items. In a 24-h delayed surprise memory test, participants attempted to solve previously encountered items and additionally performed a recognition memory test. During this test, older adults correctly solved an equal proportion of new CRA items compared to young adults and both age groups reported a similar frequency of Aha! experiences. While overall memory performance was better in young participants (higher proportion of correctly solved and correctly recognized old CRA items), older participants exhibited a stronger beneficial effect of insight-like sudden comprehension on later recognition memory for CRA items. Our results suggest that learning via insight might constitute a promising approach to improve memory function in old age.

The mnemonic effects of insight on false memory in the DRM paradigm

Insight accompanied by an 'aha!' experience has a mnemonic effect. Previous studies of insight have often focused on the mnemonic effect of insight on veridical memories, while the effect of insight on false memories is not known. More understanding of the mnemonic effect of insight on false memories could have implications for the mechanism of insightful mnemonic effects. The present research examined whether insight has a mnemonic effect on false memories. Participants were asked to perform Chinese verbal compound remote associate (CRA) tasks and then complete the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task, the critical lure of which was also the solution to the Chinese CRA problem. Compared to non-insight, insight was associated with a lower critical lures rate in Experiment 1 and with lower critical lures and unrelated words rates in Experiment 2 when the presentation of DRM list words was random. Giving a warning before DRM tasks could reduce the critical lures rate of non-insight but had little effect on insightful solutions in Experiment 3. These findings indicate that insight can reduce false memories.

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.

What makes creative advertisements memorable? The role of insight

Sudden insight is often observed during creative problem solving and studies have suggested that advertisements can likewise evoke an insight experience. To date, however, there is limited empirical evidence on whether advertisements can trigger ideational insight, and, if so, whether such insight plays a role in advertising memorability. This study aimed to explore the insight experience evoked by advertisements and to examine the role of such experimentally-induced insight in predicted memory and metamemory performance. Participants viewed standardized advertising images sequentially, with each image presentation being followed immediately by a second presentation either with or without a brief description of the advertising idea. Next, participants were asked to recall the three most impressive advertisements. Finally, participants were randomly divided to complete either immediate (5 min later) or delayed (3 days later) recognition tests and to provide retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs). Recall of creative advertisements was better than standard advertisements and most of them evoked insight. In addition, recognition accuracy was greater for creative advertisements relative to standard advertisements and metamemory performance as elicited through RCJs was enhanced. Further analyses confirmed the documented importance of insight for memory consolidation. The findings suggest that insight makes advertisements more memorable, especially those that are creative.

Event-related potentials support the mnemonic effect of spontaneous insight solution

The mnemonic effect of insight refers to the situation in which experiencing an "aha" moment when solving problems could improve memory performance for both the question and its solution. The aha experience can be triggered either by external stimuli or by internal solution attempts, namely "induced" or "spontaneous" insight, respectively. Tests of the neural correlates of the insightful memory effect are typically conducted in induced insight paradigms. The neural mechanism of the mnemonic effect of spontaneous insight is unclear. In the present study, the mnemonic effect for spontaneous insight was examined by the event-related potentials (ERPs) technique and behavioral measures. Subjects were required to solve a set of Chinese verbal compound remote-associated tasks (CRA), and performed a recognition test 10 min later. The results showed that the spontaneous insight solution elicited a more negative deflection than did the non-insight solution before the button reaction (- 800 to - 400 ms) in the study phase. In the recognition test phase, items which elicited insight during study were recognized faster, compared with non-insight study items. And spontaneous insight solution elicited a more positive deflection than did non-insight solution in the time window from 400 to 700 ms after onset of the answer. Moreover, brain-behavior correlations revealed a relationship between N400 amplitude during study and later memory performance which revealed a double-dissociation between items solved with and without insight during study. The different predictions for recognition indicate that the encoding of spontaneous insight may differ from that of non-insight, suggesting that different encoding mechanisms may mediate the encoding of items and solutions found by insight versus non-insight.

On the cognitive bases of illusionism

Cognitive scientists have paid very little attention to magic as a distinctly human activity capable of creating situations that are considered impossible because they violate expectations and conclude with the apparent transgression of well-established cognitive and natural laws. This illusory experience of the "impossible" entails a very particular cognitive dissonance that is followed by a subjective and complex "magical experience". Here, from a perspective inspired by visual neuroscience and ecological cognition, we propose a set of seven fundamental cognitive phenomena (from attention and perception to memory and decision-making) plus a previous pre-sensory stage that magicians interfere with during the presentation of their effects. By doing so, and using as an example the deconstruction of a classic trick, we show how magic offers novel and powerful insights to study human cognition. Furthermore, live magic performances afford to do so in tasks that are more ecological and context-dependent than those usually exploited in artificial laboratory settings. We thus believe that some of the mysteries of how the brain works may be trapped in the split realities present in every magic effect.

What causes the insight memory advantage?

Prior research indicates that solutions accompanied by an Aha! experience are remembered better than those missing this feeling of epiphany. The question for the present studies was whether this insight memory advantage for problem solutions is modulated by the affective component of insight (the strong feelings that typically accompany the Aha! experience), or by the cognitive component (the restructuring or representational change that occurs during insightful problem solving). In both studies, participants viewed a set of magic trick videos to generate solutions for how each trick was done, and memory for the generated solutions was tested after a week delay. They also indicated the extent to which they experienced an Aha! moment at solution along with other perceptions of their experience. In the second study, they additionally rated the relevance of five action verbs for each trick (including one that implied the correct solution) multiple times during solution as a measure of restructuring the problem representation. The explanation for the insight memory advantage that was best supported by the results is that it is the joint consequence of finding correct solutions, the subjective feeling that one has found a correct solution (certainty), and experiencing an emotional pleasurable reaction during the problem solving process that all contribute to better memory for the solution. However, it did not seem to rely on having reached the solution via a sudden restructuring process.

Feeling the Insight: Uncovering Somatic Markers of the "aha" Experience

Whether internal insight can be recognized by experiencing (somatic feeling) remains an unexplored problem. This study investigated the issue by examining potential somatic markers of the "aha" experience occurring at the moment of sudden insight. Participants were required to solve a set of compound remote associates (CRA) problems and were simultaneously monitored via electrodermal and cardiovascular recordings. The "aha"-related psychological components and somatic markers were determined by contrasting insightful solutions with non-insightful solutions. Results showed that the "aha" experience was an amalgam entailing positive affects and approached cognition accompanied by a greater mean skin conductance response (mSCR) amplitude and a marginally accelerated heart rate than the "no-aha" one. These results confirm and extend findings of the multidimensionality of the "aha" feeling and offer the first direct evidence of somatic markers, particularly an electrodermal signature of an "aha" feeling, which suggests a sudden insight could likely be experienced by individuals' external soma.

How and When? Metacognition and Solution Timing Characterize an "Aha" Experience of Object Recognition in Hidden Figures

The metacognitive feelings of an "aha!" experience are key to comprehending human subjective experience. However, behavioral characteristics of this introspective cognition are not well known. An aha experience sometimes occurs when one gains a solution abruptly in problem solving, a subjective experience that subserves the conscious perception of an insight. We experimentally induced an aha experience in a hidden object recognition task, and analyzed whether this aha experience was associated with metacognitive judgments and behavioral features. We used an adaptation of Mooney images, i.e., morphing between a grayscale image and its binarised image in 100 steps, to investigate the phenomenology associated with insight: aha experience, confidence, suddenness, and pleasure. Here we show that insight solutions are more accurate than non-insight solutions. As metacognitive judgments, participants' confidence in the correctness of their solution is higher in insight than non-insight problem solving. Intensities of the aha feeling are positively correlated with subjective rating scores of both suddenness and pleasure, features that show marked signs of unexpected positive emotions. The strength of the aha experience is also positively correlated with response times from the onset of presentation until finding the solution, or with task difficulty only if the solution confidence is high enough. Our findings provide metacognitive and temporal conditions for an aha experience, characterizing features distinct from those supporting non-aha experience.

Cognitive conflict and restructuring: The neural basis of two core components of insight

Sometimes, the solution to a difficult problem simply pops into mind. Such a moment of sudden comprehension is known as "insight". This fundamental cognitive process is crucial for problem solving, creativity and innovation, yet its true nature remains elusive, despite one century of psychological research. Typically, insight is investigated by using spatial puzzles or verbal riddles. Broadening the traditional approach, we propose to tackle this question by presenting magic tricks to participants and asking them to find out the secret method used by the magician. Combining this approach with cueing in an fMRI experiment, we were able to break down the insight process into two underlying components: cognitive conflict and restructuring. During cognitive conflict, problem solvers identify incongruent information that does not match their current mental representation. In a second step this information is restructured, thereby allowing them to correctly determine how the magic trick was done. We manipulated the occurrence of cognitive conflict by presenting two types of cues that lead participants to either maintain their perceptual belief (congruent cue) or to change their perceptual belief (incongruent cue) for the mechanism behind the magic trick. We found that partially overlapping but distinct networks of brain activity were recruited for cognitive conflict and restructuring. Posterior, predominantly visual brain activity during cognitive conflict reflected processes related to prediction error, attention to the relevant cue-specific sensory domain, and the default brain state. Restructuring on the other hand, showed a highly distributed pattern of brain activity in regions of the default mode, executive control networks, and salience networks. The angular gyrus and middle temporal gyrus were active in both cognitive conflict and restructuring, suggesting that these regions are important throughout the insight problem solving process. We believe this type of approach towards understanding insight will give lead to a better understanding of this complex process and the specific role that different brain regions play in creative thought.

Once more with feeling: Normative data for the aha experience in insight and noninsight problems

Despite the presumed ability of insight problems to elicit the subjective feeling of insight, as well as the use of so-called insight problems to investigate this phenomenon for over 100 years, no research has collected normative data regarding the ability of insight problems to actually elicit the feeling of insight in a given individual. The work described in this article provides an overview of both classic and contemporary problems used to examine the construct of insight and presents normative data on the success rate, mean time to solution, and mean rating of aha experience for each problem and task type. We suggest using these data in future work as a reference for selecting problems on the basis of their ability to elicit an aha experience.

Feelings-of-Warmth Increase More Abruptly for Verbal Riddles Solved With in Contrast to Without Aha! Experience

When we are confronted with a new problem, we typically try to apply strategies that have worked in the past and which usually lead closer to the solution incrementally. However, sometimes, either during a problem-solving attempt that does not seem to lead closer to the solution, or when we have given up on problem-solving for the moment, the solution seems to appear out of nowhere. This is often called a moment of insight. Whereas the cognitive processes of getting closer to the solution are still unknown for insight problem-solving, there are two diverging theories on the subjective feeling of getting closer to the solution: (1) One that states that an intuitive feeling of closeness to the solution increases slowly, but incrementally, before it surpasses the threshold to consciousness and becomes verbalizable (=insight) (continuous approach), and (2) another that proposes that the feeling of closeness to the solution does not increase before it exceeds the threshold to consciousness (discontinuous approach). Here, we investigated the subjective feeling of closeness to the solution, assessed as feeling-of-warmth (FoW), its relationship to solving the problem versus being presented with it and whether a feeling of Aha! was experienced. Additionally, we tested whether Aha! experiences are more likely when the problem is solved actively by the participant or presented to the participant after an unsuccessful problem-solving attempt, and whether the frequency of Aha! experiences correlates with problem difficulty. To our knowledge, this is the first study combining the CRAT with FoW assessments for the named conditions (solved/unsolved, three difficulty levels, Aha!/no Aha!). We used a verbal problem-solving task, the Compound Remote Associates Task (CRAT). Our data revealed that Aha! experiences were more often reported for solutions generated by the participant compared to solutions presented after unsuccessful problem-solving. Moreover, FoW curves showed a steeper increase for the last two FoW ratings when problems were solved with Aha! in contrast to without Aha!. Based on this observation, we provide a preliminary explanation for the underlying cognitive process of solving CRA problems via insight.

"The Penny Drops": Investigating Insight Through the Medium of Cryptic Crosswords

A new protocol for eliciting insight (“Aha!”/Eureka) moments is proposed, involving the solving of British-style cryptic crosswords. The mechanics of cryptic crossword clues are briefly explained, and the process is set into the insight literature, with parallels being drawn between several different types of cryptic crossword clues and other insight-triggering problems such as magic, jokes, anagrams, rebus, and remote association puzzles (RAT), as well as “classic” thematic or spatial challenges. We have evidence from a previous survey of cryptic crossword solvers that the “Aha!” moment is the most important driver of continued participation in this hobby, suggesting that the positive emotional “payback” has an energizing effect on a participant's motivation to continue solving. Given the success with which a good quality cryptic crossword elicits “Aha!” moments, cryptics should prove highly valuable in exploring insight under lab conditions. We argue that the crossword paradigm overcomes many of the issues which beset other insight problems: for example, solution rates of cryptic crossword clues are high; new material can easily be commissioned, leading to a limitless pool of test items; and each puzzle contains clues resembling a wide variety of insight problem types, permitting a comparison of heterogeneous solving mechanisms within the same medium. Uniquely among insight problems, considerations of expertise also come into play, allowing us to explore how crossword solving experts handle the deliberate misdirection of the cryptic clue more effectively than non-expert, but equally experienced, peers. Many have debated whether there is such a thing as an “insight problem” per se: typically, problems can be solved with or without insight, depending on the context. We argue that the same is true for cryptic crosswords, and that the key to the successful triggering of insight may lie in both the difficulty of the challenge and the degree to which misdirection has been used. Future research is outlined which explores the specific mechanisms of clue difficulty. This opens the way to an exploration of potential links between solving constraints and the experiencing of the “Aha!” moment, which may shed light on the cognitive processes involved in insight solution.

The Mnemonic Effects of Novelty and Appropriateness in Creative Chunk Decomposition Tasks

Creativeness has been widely recognized as the ability to generate thoughts that are both novel (new) and appropriate (useful) (Barron, 1955). In this paper, we investigated the mnemonic effects of novelty and appropriateness in chunk decomposition tasks. Studies 1 and 2 utilized classical recognition tasks (explicit memory) and ambiguous word identification tasks (implicit memory) to reveal whether novelty and appropriateness are involved in different mnemonic systems. A 2 (familiarity) × 2 (appropriateness) experimental design was utilized in our experiments, and the four conditions were familiar-appropriate, familiar-inappropriate, novel-appropriate and novel-inappropriate. The results indicated that insight induced by novelty (novel-appropriate condition) has a better performance than other conditions; and further, found an interesting phenomenon of Zeigarnik-like effect which referred to remembering uncompleted tasks better than completed tasks (Zeigarnik, 1927). We further conducted Study 3 to ask participants to recall the encoding process (how the characters had been decomposed in the learning stage), which was more sensitive to Zeigarnik effect and indicated that performance of familiar-appropriate condition (uncompleted tasks) was better than other conditions.

Pleasures of the Mind: What Makes Jokes and Insight Problems Enjoyable

In this paper, a parallel analysis of the enjoyment derived from humor and insight problem solving is presented with reference to a “general” Theory of the Pleasures of the Mind (TPM) (Kubovy, 1999) rather than to “local” theories regarding what makes humor and insight problem solving enjoyable. The similarity of these two cognitive activities has already been discussed in previous literature in terms of the cognitive mechanisms which underpin getting a joke or having an insight experience in a problem solving task. The paper explores whether we can learn something new about the similarities and differences between humor and problem solving by means of an investigation of what makes them pleasurable. In the first part of the paper, the framework for this joint analysis is set. Two descriptive studies are then presented in which the participants were asked to report on their experiences relating to solving visuo-spatial insight problems (Study 1) or understanding cartoons (Study 2) in terms of whether they were enjoyable or otherwise. In both studies, the responses were analyzed with reference to a set of categories inspired by the TPM. The results of Study 1 demonstrate that finding the solution to a problem is associated with a positive evaluation, and the most frequent explanations for this were reported as being Curiosity, Virtuosity and Violation of expectations. The results of Study 2 suggest that understanding a joke (Joy of verification) and being surprised by it (Feeling of surprise) were two essential conditions: when they were not present, the cartoons were perceived as not enjoyable. However, this was not enough to explain the motivations for the choice of the most enjoyable cartoons. Recognizing a Violation of expectations and experiencing a Diminishment in the cleverness or awareness initially attributed to the characters in the cartoon were the aspects which were most frequently indicated by the participants to explain why they enjoyed the joke. These findings are evaluated in the final discussion, together with their limitations and potential future developments.

Cognitive mechanisms for inferring the meaning of novel signals during symbolisation

As participants repeatedly interact using graphical signals (as in a game of Pictionary), the signals gradually shift from being iconic (or motivated) to being symbolic (or arbitrary). The aim here is to test experimentally whether this change in the form of the signal implies a concomitant shift in the inferential mechanisms needed to understand it. The results show that, during early, iconic stages, there is more reliance on creative inferential processes associated with insight problem solving, and that the recruitment of these cognitive mechanisms decreases over time. The variation in inferential mechanism is not predicted by the sign’s visual complexity or iconicity, but by its familiarity, and by the complexity of the relevant mental representations. The discussion explores implications for pragmatics, language evolution, and iconicity research.

It is magic! How impossible solutions prevent the discovery of obvious ones?

When confronted with an insight problem, some factors limit our capacity to discover the optimal solution. Previous research on problem solving has shown that the first idea that comes to participants’ minds can inhibit them from finding better alternative solutions. We used a magic trick to demonstrate that this mind fixing effect is more general than previously thought: a solution that participants knew to be incorrect and impossible inhibited the discovery of an easy alternative. We show that a simple exposure to an obvious false solution (e.g., the magician hides the card in the palm of his hand to secretly transfer it to his back pocket) can inhibit participants from finding the real secret of the trick (e.g., he used a duplicate card), even if the magician proves that this false solution is impossible (e.g., he shows his hand is empty). We discuss the psychological processes underlying this robust fixing effect.

Search and Coherence-Building in Intuition and Insight Problem Solving

Coherence-building is a key concept for a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of intuition and insight problem solving. There are several accounts that address certain aspects of coherence-building. However, there is still no proper framework defining the general principles of coherence-building. We propose a four-stage model of coherence-building. The first stage starts with spreading activation restricted by constraints. This dynamic is a well-defined rule based process. The second stage is characterized by detecting a coherent state. We adopted a fluency account assuming that the ease of information processing indicates the realization of a coherent state. The third stage is designated to evaluate the result of the coherence-building process and assess whether the given problem is solved or not. If the coherent state does not fit the requirements of the task, the process re-enters at stage 1. These three stages characterize intuition. For insight problem solving a fourth stage is necessary, which restructures the given representation after repeated failure, so that a new search space results. The new search space enables new coherent states. We provide a review of the most important findings, outline our model, present a large number of examples, deduce potential new paradigms and measures that might help to decipher the underlying cognitive processes.