Introspection about backward crosstalk in dual-task performance

Variable, sometimes absent, but never negative: Applying multilevel models of variability to the backward crosstalk effect to find theoretical constraints

When performing two tasks at the same time, the congruency of the second task's features influences performance in the first task. This is called the backward crosstalk effect (BCE), a phenomenon that influences both theories of binding and of dual-task capacity limitations. The question of whether the BCE is found in all participants at all times is relevant for understanding the basis of the effect. For example, if the BCE is based on strategic choices, it can be variable, but if it is automatic and involuntary, it should never vary in whether it is present or not. Variability in observed BCE sizes was already documented and discussed when the group average effect was first reported (Hommel, 1998). Yet the theories discussed at the time did not motivate a more direct analysis of this variability, nor did the readily available statistical tools permit it. Some statistical approaches recently applied in cognitive psychology allow such a variability-focused analysis and some more recent theoretical debates would benefit from this as well. We assessed the variability of the BCE as well as a BCE-like free-choice congruency effect by applying a Bayesian multilevel modeling approach to the data from a dual-tasking experiment. Trials consisted of a two- and a four-response task. We manipulated which task was presented first and whether the response to the four-choice task was free or forced choice. RT data were best predicted by a model in which the BCE is zero in part of the population and drawn from a normal distribution truncated at zero (and thus always positive) in the rest of the population. Choice congruency bias data were best predicted by a model assuming this effect to be drawn from a normal distribution truncated at zero (but, in contrast to the RT data, without the subset of the population where it is zero). The BCE is not an inflexible and universal phenomenon that is directly linked to an inherent structural trait of human cognition. We discuss theoretical constraints implied by these results with a focus on what we can infer about the traits of the factors that influence BCE size. We suggest that future research might add further major constraints by using multi-session experiments to distinguish between-person and within-person variability. Our results show that the BCE is variable. The next step is understanding along which axes it is variable and why it varies.

How does it feel? Passage of time judgments in speeded RT performance

The relationship between duration perception and the feeling of time passing (passage of time) is not yet understood. In the present study, we assessed introspective reaction times (RT) and passage of time judgments in a speeded RT task. Task difficulty was manipulated in a numerical comparison task by numerical distance (distance from the number 45) and notation (digit vs. word). The results showed that both effects were reflected in introspective RTs, replicating previous results. Moreover, passage of time judgments showed a very similar pattern, with slower passage of time for more difficult comparisons. These results suggest that in the millisecond range judgments of duration and passage of time largely mirror each other when participants introspect about their own RT performance.

Cognitive control mechanisms in language processing: are there both within- and across-task conflict adaptation effects?

Cognitive conflict is regarded as a crucial factor in triggering subsequent adjustments in cognitive control. Recent studies have suggested that the implementation of control following conflict detection might be domain-general in that conflict experienced in the language domain recruits control processes that deal with conflict experienced in non-linguistic domains. During language comprehension, humans often have to recover from conflicting interpretations as quickly and accurately as possible. In this study, we investigate how people adapt to conflict experienced during processing semantically ambiguous sentences. Experiments 1 to 3 investigated whether such semantic conflict produces the congruency sequence effect (CSE) within a subsequent manual Stroop task and whether Stroop conflict leads to adjustments in semantic processing. Experiments 4 to 6 investigated whether semantic conflict results in conflict adaptation in subsequent sentence processing. Although processing conflict was consistently experienced during sentence reading and in the Stroop task, we did not observe any within-task or cross-task adaptation effects. Specifically, there were no cross-task CSEs from the linguistic task to the Stroop task and vice versa (experiments 1-3)-speaking against the assumption of domain-general control mechanisms. Moreover, experiencing conflict within a semantically ambiguous sentence did not ease the processing of a subsequent ambiguous sentence (experiments 4-6). Implications of these findings will be discussed.

Subjective estimates of total processing time in dual-tasking: (some) good news for bad introspection

Previous studies have shown severe distortions of introspection about dual-task interference in the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm. The present study investigated participants’ ability to introspect about the total trial time in this paradigm, as this temporal information may arguably be more relevant for strategic task scheduling than subjective estimates of each task within the dual task. To this end, participants provided estimates of their reaction times (IRTs) for the two subtasks in one half of the experiment, and estimates of the total trial time (ITTs) in the other half of the experiment. Although the IRT results showed the typical unawareness of the PRP effect, ITTs reflected the effects of SOA and Task 2 difficulty on objective total trial time. Additional analyses showed that IRTs were influenced by the introspective task order; that is, the ITT pattern carried over to IRTs when IRTs were assessed in the second half of the experiment. Overall, the present results show that people are able to accurately introspect about total trial time in the PRP paradigm and thus provide some good news for bad introspection in the PRP paradigm.

Timing of internal processes: Investigating introspection about the costs of task switching and memory search

During the last two decades, there has been new interest in introspection about multitasking performance. In this field, subjective timing of one’s own reaction times (introspective RTs) has proven a useful measure to assess introspection. However, whether timing our own cognitive processing makes use of the same timing mechanisms as timing external intervals has been called into question. Here we take a novel approach to this question and build on the previously observed dissociation between the interference of task switching and memory search with a concurrent time production task whereby temporal productions increased with increasing memory set size but were not affected by switch costs. We tested whether a similar dissociation could be observed in this paradigm when participants provide introspective RTs instead of concurrent temporal productions. The results showed no such dissociation as switch costs and the effect of memory set size on RTs were both reflected in introspective RTs. These findings indicate that the underlying timing mechanisms differ between temporal productions and introspective RTs in this multitasking context, and that introspective RTs are still strikingly accurate estimates of objective RTs.

The surprising role of stimulus modality in the dual-task introspective blind spot: a memory account

Being able to accumulate accurate information about one's own performance is important in everyday contexts, and arguably particularly so in complex multitasking contexts. Thus, the observation of a glaring gap in participants' introspection regarding their own reaction time costs in a concurrent dual-task context is deserving of closer examination. This so-called introspective blind spot has been explained by a 'consciousness bottleneck' which states that while attention is occupied by one task, participants cannot consciously perceive another stimulus presented in that time. In the current study, a series of introspective Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) experiments were conducted to identify the determinants of an introspective blind spot; to our surprise, in half of the experiments participants appeared to be aware of their dual-task costs. A single trial analysis highlighted the sensory modality of the two stimuli within the trial as an important predictor of introspective accuracy, along with temporal gaps in the trial. The current findings call into question the claim that attention is required for conscious awareness. We propose a memory-based account of introspective processes in this context, whereby introspective accuracy is determined by the memory systems involved in encoding and rehearsing memory traces. This model of the conditions required to build up accurate representations of our performance may have far-reaching consequences for monitoring and introspection across a range of tasks.

The Backward Crosstalk Effect Does Not Depend on the Degree of a Preceding Response Conflict

A common observation in dual tasking is a performance decrement in one or both tasks compared with single tasking. Besides, more specific interference occurs depending on certain characteristics of the two tasks. In particular, even Task 1 performance is often improved when responses in both tasks are compatible (e.g., both require left responses) compared to when they are incompatible: the compatibility-based backward crosstalk effect (BCE). Similar to what is observed for conflict tasks, the BCE is sequentially modulated: It is larger following compatible than following incompatible trials. Previous work has attributed this observation to adaptation effects triggered by response conflict arising during incompatible trials. In two experiments, we assessed sequential modulations following trials with different degrees of such a response conflict. In contrast to our expectations, a clear and sizeable sequential modulation was observed even under conditions where no BCE, and thus no empirical sign of an objective response conflict, was present in the previous trial. Therefore, our results show sequential modulations even without prior response conflict, which is not the (sole) trigger of sequential modulations accordingly. We discuss these results with regard to other potential triggers such as the subjective experience of conflict or difficulty, episodic retrieval, and repetitions of response combinations.