Canine perspective-taking

Domestic dogs as a comparative model for social neuroscience: Advances and challenges

Dogs and humans have lived together for thousands of years and share many analogous socio-cognitive skills. Dog neuroimaging now provides insight into the neural bases of these shared social abilities. Here, we summarize key findings from dog fMRI identifying neocortical brain areas implicated in visual social cognition, such as face, body, and emotion perception, as well as action observation in dogs. These findings provide converging evidence that the temporal cortex plays a significant role in visual social cognition in dogs. We further briefly review investigations into the neural base of the dog-human relationship, mainly involving limbic brain regions. We then discuss current challenges in the field, such as statistical power and lack of common template spaces, and how to overcome them. Finally, we argue that the foundation has now been built to investigate and compare the neural bases of more complex socio-cognitive phenomena shared by dogs and humans. This will strengthen and expand the role of the domestic dog as a powerful comparative model species and provide novel insights into the evolutionary roots of social cognition.

Dogs do not use their own experience with novel barriers to infer others' visual access

Despite extensive research into the Theory of Mind abilities in non-human animals, it remains controversial whether they can attribute mental states to other individuals or whether they merely predict future behaviour based on previous behavioural cues. In the present study, we tested pet dogs (in total, N = 92) on adaptations of the 'goggles test' previously used with human infants and great apes. In both a cooperative and a competitive task, dogs were given direct experience with the properties of novel screens (one opaque, the other transparent) inserted into identical, but differently coloured, tunnels. Dogs learned and remembered the properties of the screens even when, later on, these were no longer directly visible to them. Nevertheless, they were not more likely to follow the experimenter's gaze to a target object when the experimenter could see it through the transparent screen. Further, they did not prefer to steal a forbidden treat first in a location obstructed from the experimenter's view by the opaque screen. Therefore, dogs did not show perspective-taking abilities in this study in which the only available cue to infer others' visual access consisted of the subjects' own previous experience with novel visual barriers. We conclude that the behaviour of our dogs, unlike that of infants and apes in previous studies, does not show evidence of experience-projection abilities.

Exploring the use of projected videos to test action matching from different perspectives in dogs

Dogs trained with the Do as I Do method can imitate human actions upon request, but their ability to match actions observed from different perspectives remains unknown. The use of 2D video stimuli may enable researchers to systematically manipulate the perspective from which demonstrations are observed, thereby widening the range of methods available to study cognitive skills related to imitation. In this study, we explore the possibility of using 2D stimuli to test action matching in dogs, including when demonstrations are seen from different perspectives. We examined two dogs' imitative performance using videos projected on a screen; while, the owner interacted with the dog remotely through an online meeting software. The dogs were first trained to match human actions seen on a screen frontally, and then were tested when the projected demonstrations were seen frontally, from the side, and from above. Results revealed that both dogs matched the demonstrated actions from frontal and, notably, also from side perspectives, at least to some extent, consistent with familiarity of their daily interactions with humans. However, action matching from an above perspective presented challenges, indicating the potential influence of observational experience and highlighting the importance of perspective manipulation when investigating imitation abilities. These findings show that it is possible to use 2D videos to test imitation in dogs, thereby expanding the potential methodologies to study imitation and other related cognitive skills.

Investigating belief understanding in children in a nonverbal ambiguous displacement and communication setting

Finding ways to investigate false belief understanding nonverbally is not just important for preverbal children but also is the only way to assess theory of mind (ToM)-like abilities in nonhuman animals. In this preregistered study, we adapted the design from a previous study on pet dogs to investigate false belief understanding in children and to compare it with belief understanding of those previously tested dogs. A total of 32 preschool children (aged 5-6 years) saw the displacement of a reward and obtained nonverbal cueing of the empty container from an adult communicator holding either a true or false belief. In the false belief condition, when the communicator did not know the location of the reward, children picked the baited container, but not the cued container, more often than the empty one. In the true belief condition, when the communicator witnessed the displacement yet still cued the wrong container, children performed randomly. The children's behavior pattern was at odds with that of the dogs tested in a previous study, which picked the cued container more often when the human communicator held a false belief. In addition to species comparisons, because our task does not require verbal responses or relational sentence understanding, it can also be used in preverbal children. The children in our study behaved in line with the existing ToM literature, whereas most (but not all) dogs from the previously collected sample, although sensitive to differences between the belief conditions, deviated from the children. This difference suggests that using closely matched paradigms and experimental procedures can reveal decisive differences in belief processing between species. It also demonstrates the need for a more comprehensive exploration and direct comparison of the various aspects of false belief processing and ToM in different species to understand the evolution of social cognition.

Zhuangzi and collaboration in animals: a critical conceptual analysis of shared intentionality

Shared intentionality is a specific form of shared agency where a group can be understood to have an intention. It has been conjectured that humans are better equipped for collaboration than other animals because humans but not other great apes share intentions. However, exporting shared intentionality from a debate about the ontology of mental state attributions like intentions to groups does not seamlessly lend itself to evolutionary science. To explore and de-center the implicit assumptions of Western conceptions of cooperation, I look at Zhuangzi's philosophy of (in)action. This philosophy treats the actions of individuals as always a form of co-action alongside other agencies to whom one must adapt. Thinking of collaboration as a product of skillful co-action, not shared intention, sidesteps asking about cooperation in "kinds" or levels. Instead, it directs attention to the know-how and behavioral flexibility needed to make our constant coordination adaptive.