Investigating investigators: how presentation order influences participant-investigators' interpretations of eyewitness identification and alibi evidence

You don't know: knowledge as supportive alibi evidence

Until now, supportive evidence for alibis has been conceptualised into two distinct types: witness and physical evidence. The present study examined whether knowledge, as a third type of supportive evidence, can contribute to the understanding of evidence for alibis. Three experiments were conducted in which police detectives, laypersons and undergraduate students were asked to evaluate four alibis with witness, physical or knowledge supportive evidence, or with no supportive evidence. The results from the three experiments show that knowledge evidence is equally believable as strong witness evidence. We also found that not all items of strong physical evidence are evaluated as equally strong and believable. We therefore suggest adjusting the criteria to determine the strength of physical evidence and conducting more research on knowledge evidence.

From Suspect Statement to Legal Decision Making

Abstract. Notwithstanding that confessions are considered the “Queen of evidence,” how judges actually weigh suspects’ statements in reaching their decision remains relatively unknown. This study sought to examine how Belgian judges determine the evidential value of a suspect’s statement, specifically how they evaluate the statement’s: (a) admissibility and validity and (b) interaction with other pieces of evidence. To shed light on this legal decision-making process, 100 Belgian burglary case files were examined, and semi-structured interviews were undertaken with ten Belgian judges. The findings suggest that: the judge’s evaluation of a suspect’s statement differs depending on the outcome of the statement; how a statement is obtained does not appear to be an essential aspect of evidence evaluation; judges expend more effort to falsify denials than confessions; and only when they fail to falsify the denial is an acquittal granted.

Investigator Sensitivity to Alibi Witness Inconsistency after a Long Delay

In two studies, mock investigators conducted a computer-based investigation of a crime involving an alibi witness who varied in the consistency of his statements taken 5 years apart. Investigators showed evidence of skepticism of alibi witness statements in which major contradictions (activity, location) were present, and some skepticism of statements in which minor (activity) details were contradictory. Entirely consistent statements were judged favorably, and reduced perceptions of suspect guilt (Study 2). The age of the alibi witness did not impact judgments of suspect guilt when children (6 years) and adults (25 years) were compared (Study 1, N = 254), or when children of different ages were compared (6, 8, 11 years; Study 2, N = 234). The present data suggest that investigators were relatively more sensitive to considerations of accuracy than honesty. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Memory Errors in Alibi Generation: How an Alibi Can Turn Against Us

Alibis play a critical role in the criminal justice system. Yet research on the process of alibi generation and evaluation is still nascent. Indeed, similar to other widely investigated psychological phenomena in the legal system - such as false confessions, historical claims of abuse, and eyewitness memory - the basic assumptions underlying alibi generation and evaluation require closer empirical scrutiny. To date, the majority of alibi research investigates the social psychological aspects of the process. We argue that applying our understanding of basic human memory is critical to a complete understanding of the alibi process. Specifically, we challenge the use of alibi inconsistency as an indication of guilt by outlining the "cascading effects" that can put innocents at risk for conviction. We discuss how normal encoding and storage processes can pose problems at retrieval, particularly for innocent suspects that can result in alibi inconsistencies over time. Those inconsistencies are typically misunderstood as intentional deception, first by law enforcement, affecting the investigation, then by prosecutors affecting prosecution decisions, and finally by juries, ultimately affecting guilt judgments. Put differently, despite the universal nature of memory inconsistencies, a single error can produce a cascading effect, rendering an innocent individual's alibi, ironically, proof of guilt. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The (Un)reliability of Alibi Corroborators: Failure to Recognize Faces of Briefly Encountered Strangers Puts Innocent Suspects at Risk

Some innocent suspects rely on the memory of strangers to corroborate their alibis. However, no research has examined whether such potential alibi corroborators can accurately recognize an innocent suspect with whom they previously interacted. We developed a novel alibi corroboration paradigm in which undergraduate students (representing innocent suspects who would later provide an alibi) interacted with naïve university employees (representing potential alibi corroborators). Each student briefly interacted with a different naïve university employee (n = 60), and were also each yoked to a different employee with whom they did not interact (n = 60). Employees were presented 24 hours later with either a single photograph of the student or a six-person array containing a photograph of the student and were asked if they recognized anyone. The majority of employees failed to make a correct recognition of the student. False recognitions, however, were rare. Students exhibited overconfidence that they would be recognized. Findings imply that innocent suspects who rely on strangers to corroborate their alibis may be at risk. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Why Errors in Alibis Are Not Necessarily Evidence of Guilt

Laypeople, police, and prosecutors tend to believe that a suspect’s alibi, if truthful, should remain consistent over time (see Burke, Turtle, & Olson, 2007 ; Culhane & Hosch 2012 ; Dysart & Strange, 2012 ). However, there is no empirical evidence to support this assumption. We investigated (a) whether some features of an alibi – such as what was happening, who with, where, and for how long – are more likely to produce errors than others; and (b) whether consistency in alibi stories is correlated with particular phenomenological characteristics of the alibi such as a person’s confidence and sense of reliving the event. We asked participants to imagine they were suspected of a crime and to provide their truthful alibi for an afternoon 3 weeks prior and to complete questions regarding the phenomenological characteristics of their memory. We also asked participants to locate evidence of their actual whereabouts for the critical period. Participants returned a week later, presented their evidence, re-told their alibi, and re-rated the phenomenological characteristics of the alibi. Our results revealed that participants were largely inconsistent across all aspects of their alibi, but there was variability across the different features. In addition, those who were inconsistent were less confident, recollected the time period in less detail and less vividly, and were less likely to claim to remember the time period. We conclude that inconsistencies are a normal byproduct of an imperfect memory system and thus should not necessarily arouse suspicion that a suspect is lying.