Is the more psychopathic more concerned with human beings overall? A data reanalysis exploration

Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

Dissociating the Multiple Psychological Processes in Everyday Moral Decision-Making with the CAN Algorithm

In previous research frameworks, researchers used an everyday dilemma to test people's altruistic versus egoistic inclination. However, there are at least three different psychological processes that could induce altruistic over egoistic decisions, i.e., stronger altruistic sensitivity, weaker egoistic sensitivity, and stronger overall action versus inaction preference. To dissociate these different psychological processes, we developed new materials and applied the CAN algorithm from traditional moral dilemma research in two studies. In Study 1, we designed scenarios varying with a 2 (egoistic/non-egoistic) × 2 (non-altruistic/altruistic) structure. Then, we recruited 209 participants to validate the scenarios and filtered six scene frameworks with 24 scenarios in total. In Study 2, we recruited 747 participants to judge whether they would conduct behavior that is simultaneously altruistic (or non-altruistic) and egoistic (or non-egoistic) in the filtered scenarios obtained from Study 1. They also filled in the Social Isolation Scale, Distress Disclosure Scale, and some other demographic information. As we dissociated the psychological processes using the CAN algorithm, significant correlations between social isolation and distress disclosure and three parameters (i.e., altruistic tendency, egoistic tendency, and overall action/inaction preference) underlying the altruistic choice were revealed to varying degrees. Other individual differences in the psychological processes in everyday moral decision-making were further demonstrated. Our study provided materials and methodological protocols to dissociate the multiple psychological processes in everyday moral decision-making. It promotes our insights on everyday moral decisions from a differential psychological processes perspective.

Anticipatory Stress Increases Deontological Inclinations: The Mediating Role of Emotional Valence

Previous studies have explored the differences in moral judgments under normal situations and acute stress using the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST). The present study examined whether anticipatory stress (i.e., induced by an anticipated speech) could elicit similar effects and further explored the mediation of emotional responses between acute stress and moral judgments with a process-dissociation approach. Fifty-three undergraduate students (20 males and 33 females) were randomly assigned to the stress and control groups. In the first stage, they were instructed to prepare a public speech (the stress group) or just recall events during the previous vacation (the control group). In the second stage, they reported emotional valence and arousal for each moral dilemma in a set of 12 moral dilemmas, followed by judgments on moral acceptability of the agent's action. The manipulation check confirmed that anticipatory stress was reliably induced, as indicated in both self-reported and physiological data. The traditional dilemma analysis revealed that participants in the stress group would make fewer utilitarian judgments than those in the control group. The process dissociation (PD) analyses further revealed that the stress group exhibited higher deontological inclinations than the control group, but no significant differences in utilitarian inclinations. Emotional valence played a mediating role in the association between stress and deontological inclinations. To sum up, our study extended the investigation of the relationship between acute stress and moral judgment to anticipatory stress, clarified its distinct impact on deontological and utilitarian inclinations, and revealed the mediating effect of emotional valence.

Resolving the Limitations of the CNI Model in Moral Decision Making Using the CAN Algorithm: A Methodological Contrast

The CNI model generates C, N, and I parameters to measure people’s mental processes—consequence sensitivity (C), norm sensitivity (N), and generalized inaction/action preferences (I)—in moral decision making. Given the limitations of the CNI model, the CAN algorithm was developed to depict the consequence sensitivity (C), overall action versus inaction preferences (A), norm sensitivity (N), and perverse responses with the other three parameters. However, no studies have clarified whether and how the CAN algorithm can solve the limitations of the CNI model. The present study systematically uncovers the limitations of the CNI model and the solutions provided by the CAN algorithm: (a) the CNI model does not consider negative values of the parameters, but the CAN algorithm does; (b) the sequential processing assumption of the CNI model is biased, the CAN algorithm proposes a parallel calculation strategy to fix this problem; (c) the calculation of the I parameter of the CNI model is inaccurate, so the CAN algorithm proposes the A parameter to replace it; (d) the CNI model has a problem measuring perverse responses, while the CAN algorithm develops three parameters to measure these. We examined some of our points on the basis of a reanalysis of the foreign language effect (FLE) by comparing the parameters from the CAN algorithm with those from the CNI model. We found that consequence and norm sensitivity were estimated to be greater using the CNI model than with the CAN algorithm. Consequently, these overestimations significantly (consequence sensitivity) and marginally (norm sensitivity) interfered with the FLE, making the FLE more likely to return a false positive result. In addition, the CAN algorithm was able to measure the extent of perverse responses, indicating that foreign language (compared to a native language) leads to more perverse responses. The present study demonstrates that the CNI model magnifies the Type I error of conclusions and that the CAN algorithm (compared to the CNI model) provides more insights regarding moral decision making.