The paradox of fiction: Emotional response toward fiction and the modulatory role of self-relevance

Self-reference and emotional reaction drive aesthetic judgment

Traditional philosophical inquiry, and more recently neuroscientific studies, have investigated the sources of artworks' aesthetic appeal. A substantial effort has been made to isolate the objective features contributing to aesthetic appreciation. While variables such as contrast or symmetry have been shown to robustly impact aesthetic judgment, they only account for a small portion of the intersubjective variability in aesthetic ratings. Recent multiprocess model of aesthetic appreciation could accommodate this finding by proposing that evaluative processes based on self-reference underpin the idiosyncrasy of aesthetic judgment. We tested this hypothesis in two behavioral studies, that were basically conceptual replications of our previous work, in which we took advantage of the self-reference effect on memory. We also tried to disentangle the role of self-reference and emotional reaction to artworks in guiding aesthetic judgments, by comparing an aesthetic judgment encoding condition to a self-reference condition (Study 1), and an emotional evaluation condition (Study 2). We show that artworks encoded in an aesthetic judgment condition exhibit a similar mnesic advantage compared to both the self-reference and the emotional evaluation encoding conditions. Moreover, retrospective emotional judgment correlates with both self-reference and aesthetic judgments ratings. These results suggest that a basic mechanism, appraisal of self-relevance, could ground aesthetic judgments.

Buffering effect of fiction on negative emotions: engagement with negatively valenced fiction decreases the intensity of negative emotions

Previous research has investigated how the context of perception affects emotional response. This study investigated how engagement with perceived fictional content vs perceived everyday-life content affects the way people experience negative emotions. Four studies with an experimental design tested how engagement with perceived fictional content vs perceived everyday life content affects the intensity of negative emotional response to negative emotional content, the motivation to decrease negative emotions, and cognitive reappraisal. Participants were presented with negatively valenced images and were asked to imagine either that they were witnessing them, or that a bystander was witnessing them, or that they were viewing a movie including these scenes. After the manipulation, all participants observed a different set of negatively valenced images or a set of negatively valenced videos and reported their emotional response. We found that the intensity of negative emotions and motivation to decrease them was lower among participants in the fiction condition compared to participants in the everyday life condition. Although perspective-taking had a similar effect on negative emotions, fiction condition was more successful in decreasing negative emotions. This might indicate that fiction plays a buffering role in decreasing the negative emotions people experience when facing negative emotional content.

Real is the new sexy: the influence of perceived realness on self-reported arousal to sexual visual stimuli

As state-of-art technology can create artificial images that are indistinguishable from real ones, it is urgent to understand whether believing that a picture is real or not has some import over affective phenomena such as sexual arousal. Thus, in two pre-registered online studies, we tested whether 60 images depicting models in underwear elicited higher self-reported sexual arousal when believed to be (N = 57) or presented as (N = 108) real photographs as opposed to artificially generated. In both cases, Realness correlated with significantly higher scores on self-reported sexual arousal. Consistently with the literature on downregulation of emotional response to fictional works, our result indicates that sexual images that are perceived to be fake are less arousing than those believed to portray real people.

Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a 'fictive pass' in understanding others' actions?

Introduction

The human capacity to engage with fictional worlds raises important psychological questions about the mechanisms that make this possible. Of particular interest is whether people respond differently to fictional stories compared to factual ones in terms of how immersed they become and how they view the characters involved and their actions. It has been suggested that fiction provides us with a 'fictive pass' that allows us to evaluate in a more balanced, detached way the morality of a character's behaviour.

Methods

We use a randomised controlled experimental design to test this.

Results and discussion

We show that, although knowing whether a substantial film clip is fact or fiction does not affect how engaged with ('transported' by) a troubling story an observer becomes, it does grant them a 'fictive pass' to empathise with a moral transgressor. However, a fictive pass does not override the capacity to judge the causes of a character's moral transgression (at least as indexed by a causal attribution task).

The update of self-identity: Importance of assessing autobiographical memory in major depressive disorder

Major depressive disorder is a leading global cause of disability. There is a growing interest for memory in mood disorders since it might constitute an original tool for prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. MDD is associated with impaired autobiographical memory characterized by a tendency to overgeneral memory, rather than vivid episodic self-defining memory, which is mandatory for problem-solving and projection in the future. This memory bias is maintained by three mechanisms: ruminations, avoidance, and impaired executive control. If we adopt a broader and comprehensive perspective, we can hypothesize that all those alterations have the potential to impair self-identity updating. We posit that this update requires a double referencing process: (1) to internalized self-representation and (2) to an externalized framework dealing with the representation of the consequence of actions. Diagnostic and therapeutic implications are discussed in the light of this model and the importance of assessing autobiographical memory in MDD is highlighted. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Psychology > Brain Function and Dysfunction Neuroscience > Clinical.

How We Tell Apart Fiction from Reality

The human ability to tell apart reality from fiction is intriguing. Through a range of media, such as novels and movies, we are able to readily engage in fictional worlds and experience alternative realities. Yet even when we are completely immersed and emotionally engaged within these worlds, we have little difficulty in leaving the fictional landscapes and getting back to the day-to-day of our own world. How are we able to do this? How do we acquire our understanding of our real world? How is this similar to and different from the development of our knowledge of fictional worlds? In exploring these questions, this article makes the case for a novel multilevel explanation (called BLINCS) of our implicit understanding of the reality–fiction distinction, namely that it is derived from the fact that the worlds of fiction, relative to reality, are bounded, inference-light, curated, and sparse.

The Paradox of Fiction Revisited-Improvised Fictional and Real-Life Social Rejections Evoke Associated and Relatively Similar Psychophysiological Responses

Theatre-based practices, such as improvisation, are frequently applied to simulate everyday social interactions. Although the improvisational context is acknowledged as fictional, realistic emotions may emerge, a phenomenon labelled the 'paradox of fiction'. This study investigated how manipulating the context (real-life versus fictional) modulates psychophysiological reactivity to social rejection during dyadic interactions. We measured psychophysiological responses elicited during real-life (interview) and fictional (improvisation exercises) social rejections. We analysed the heart rate (HR), skin conductance, facial muscle activity, and electrocortical activity (electroencephalographic (EEG) alpha asymmetry) of student teachers (N = 39) during various social rejections (devaluing, interrupting, nonverbal rejection). All social rejections evoked negative EEG alpha asymmetry, a measure reflecting behavioural withdrawal motivation. Psychophysiological responses during real-life and fictional rejections correlated, and rejection type modified the responses. When comparing responses across all rejection types, facial muscle activity and EEG alpha asymmetry did not differ between real-life and fictional rejections, whereas HR decelerated and skin conductance increased during fictional rejections. These findings demonstrate that regardless of cognitive awareness of fictionality, relatively subtle social rejections elicited psychophysiological reactivity indicating emotional arousal and negative valence. These findings provide novel, biological evidence for the application of theatre-based improvisation to studying experientially everyday social encounters.

Presence, flow, and narrative absorption: an interdisciplinary theoretical exploration with a new spatiotemporal integrated model based on predictive processing

Presence, flow, narrative absorption, immersion, transportation, and similar subjective phenomena are studied in many different disciplines, mostly in relation to mediated experiences (books, film, VR, games). Moreover, since real, virtual, or fictional agents are often involved, concepts like identification and state empathy are often linked to engaging media use. Based on a scoping review that identified similarities in the wording of various questionnaire items conceived to measure different phenomena, we categorize items into the most relevant psychological aspects and use this categorization to propose an interdisciplinary systematization. Then, based on a framework of embodied predictive processing, we present a new cognitive model of presence-related phenomena for mediated and non-mediated experiences, integrating spatial and temporal aspects and also considering the role of fiction and media design. Key processes described within the model are: selective attention, enactment of intentions, and interoception. We claim that presence is the state of perceived successful agency of an embodied mind able to correctly enact its predictions. The difference between real-life and simulated experiences ("book problem," "paradox of fiction") lays in the different precision weighting of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals.

The virtual and the physical: two frames of mind

Virtual and physical embodiments of interactive artificial agents utilize similar core technologies for perception, planning, and interaction and engage with people in similar ways. Thus, designers have typically considered these embodiments to be broadly interchangeable, and the choice of embodiment primarily depends on the practical demands of an application. This paper makes the case that virtual and physical embodiments elicit fundamentally different "frames of mind" in the users of the technology and follow different metaphors for interaction, resulting in diverging expectations, forms of engagement, and eventually interaction outcomes. It illustrates these differences through the lens of five key mechanisms: "situativity, interactivity, agency, proxemics, and believability". It also outlines the design implications of the two frames of mind, arguing for different domains of interaction serving as appropriate context for virtual and physical embodiments.

Phenomenal, bodily and brain correlates of fictional reappraisal as an implicit emotion regulation strategy

The ability to modulate our emotional experience, depending on our current goal and context, is of critical importance for adaptive behavior. This ability encompasses various emotion regulation strategies, such as fictional reappraisal, at stake whenever one engages in fictional works (e.g., movies, books, video games, virtual environments). Neuroscientific studies investigating the distinction between the processing of real and fictional entities have reported the involvement of brain structures related to self-relevance and emotion regulation, suggesting a threefold interaction between the appraisal of reality, aspects of the Self, and emotions. The main aim of this study is to investigate the effect of implicit fictional reappraisal on different components of emotion, as well as on the modulatory role of autobiographical and conceptual self-relevance. While recording electrodermal, cardiac, and brain activity (EEG), we presented negative and neutral pictures to 33 participants, describing them as either real or fictional. After each stimulus, the participants reported their subjective emotional experience, self-relevance of the stimuli, as well as their agreement with their description. Using the Bayesian mixed-modeling framework, we showed that stimuli presented as fictional, compared with real, were subjectively appraised as less intense and less negative, and elicited lower skin conductance response, stronger heart-rate deceleration, and lower late positive potential amplitudes. Finally, these phenomenal and physiological changes did, to a moderate extent, rely on variations of specific aspects of self-relevance. Implications for the neuroscientific study of implicit emotion regulation are discussed.

When Fiction Is Just as Real as Fact: No Differences in Reading Behavior between Stories Believed to be Based on True or Fictional Events

Experiments have shown that compared to fictional texts, readers read factual texts faster and have better memory for described situations. Reading fictional texts on the other hand seems to improve memory for exact wordings and expressions. Most of these studies used a “newspaper” vs. “literature” comparison. In the present study, we investigated the effect of reader's expectation to whether information is true or fictional with a subtler manipulation by labeling short stories as either based on true or fictional events. In addition, we tested whether narrative perspective or individual preference in perspective taking affects reading true or fictional stories differently. In an online experiment, participants (final N = 1,742) read one story which was introduced as based on true events or as fictional (factor fictionality). The story could be narrated in either 1st or 3rd person perspective (factor perspective). We measured immersion in and appreciation of the story, perspective taking, as well as memory for events. We found no evidence that knowing a story is fictional or based on true events influences reading behavior or experiential aspects of reading. We suggest that it is not whether a story is true or fictional, but rather expectations toward certain reading situations (e.g., reading newspaper or literature) which affect behavior by activating appropriate reading goals. Results further confirm that narrative perspective partially influences perspective taking and experiential aspects of reading.

"Being there" and remembering it: Presence improves memory encoding

Few studies have investigated the link between episodic memory and presence: the feeling of "being there" and reacting to a stimulus as if it were real. We collected data from 244 participants after they had watched the movie Avengers: Age of Ultron. They answered questions about factual (details of the movie) and temporal memory (order of the scenes) about the movie, as well as their emotion experience and their sense of presence during the projection. Both higher emotion experience and sense of presence were related to better factual memory, but not to temporal order memory. Crucially, the link between emotion and factual memory was mediated by the sense of presence. We interpreted the role of presence as an external absorption of the attentional focus toward the stimulus, thus enhancing memory encoding. Our findings could shed light on the cognitive processes underlying memory impairments in psychiatric conditions characterized by an altered sense of reality.

The distinctive role of executive functions in implicit emotion regulation

Several theoretical models stress the role of executive functions in emotion regulation (ER). However, most of the previous studies on ER employed explicit regulatory strategies that could have engaged executive functions, beyond regulatory processes per se. Recently, there has been renewed interest in implicit forms of ER, believed to be closer to daily-life requirements. While various studies have shown that implicit and explicit ER engage partially overlapping neurocognitive processes, the contribution of different executive functions in implicit ER has not been investigated. In the present study, we presented participants with negatively valenced pictures of varying emotional intensity preceded by short texts describing them as either fictional or real. This manipulation was meant to induce a spontaneous emotional down-regulation. We recorded electrodermal activity (EDA) and subjective reports of emotion arousal. Executive functions (updating, switching, and inhibition) were also assessed. No difference was found between the fictional and real condition on EDA. A diminished self-reported arousal was observed, however, when pictures were described as fictional for high- and mild-intensity material, but not for neutral material. The amount of down-regulation in the fictional condition was found to be predicted by interindividual variability in updating performances, but not by the other measures of executive functions, suggesting its implication even in implicit forms of ER. The relationship between down-regulation and updating was significant only for high-intensity material. We discuss the role of updating in relation to the consciousness of one's emotional state.

Ventromedial prefrontal cortex, adding value to autobiographical memories

The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) has been consistently implicated in autobiographical memory recall and decision making. Its function in decision making tasks is believed to relate to value representation, but its function in autobiographical memory recall is not yet clear. We hypothesised that the mPFC represents the subjective value of elements during autobiographical memory retrieval. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging during an autobiographical memory recall task, we found that the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was parametrically modulated by the affective values of items in participants’ memories when they were recalling and evaluating these items. An unrelated modulation by the participant’s familiarity with the items was also observed. During retrieval of the event, the BOLD signal in the same region was modulated by the personal significance and emotional intensity of the memory, which was correlated with the values of the items within them. These results support the idea that vmPFC processes self-relevant information, and suggest that it is involved in representing the personal emotional values of the elements comprising autobiographical memories.