Dissociating decision strategies in free-choice tasks - A mouse tracking analysis

Variable, sometimes absent, but never negative: Applying multilevel models of variability to the backward crosstalk effect to find theoretical constraints

When performing two tasks at the same time, the congruency of the second task's features influences performance in the first task. This is called the backward crosstalk effect (BCE), a phenomenon that influences both theories of binding and of dual-task capacity limitations. The question of whether the BCE is found in all participants at all times is relevant for understanding the basis of the effect. For example, if the BCE is based on strategic choices, it can be variable, but if it is automatic and involuntary, it should never vary in whether it is present or not. Variability in observed BCE sizes was already documented and discussed when the group average effect was first reported (Hommel, 1998). Yet the theories discussed at the time did not motivate a more direct analysis of this variability, nor did the readily available statistical tools permit it. Some statistical approaches recently applied in cognitive psychology allow such a variability-focused analysis and some more recent theoretical debates would benefit from this as well. We assessed the variability of the BCE as well as a BCE-like free-choice congruency effect by applying a Bayesian multilevel modeling approach to the data from a dual-tasking experiment. Trials consisted of a two- and a four-response task. We manipulated which task was presented first and whether the response to the four-choice task was free or forced choice. RT data were best predicted by a model in which the BCE is zero in part of the population and drawn from a normal distribution truncated at zero (and thus always positive) in the rest of the population. Choice congruency bias data were best predicted by a model assuming this effect to be drawn from a normal distribution truncated at zero (but, in contrast to the RT data, without the subset of the population where it is zero). The BCE is not an inflexible and universal phenomenon that is directly linked to an inherent structural trait of human cognition. We discuss theoretical constraints implied by these results with a focus on what we can infer about the traits of the factors that influence BCE size. We suggest that future research might add further major constraints by using multi-session experiments to distinguish between-person and within-person variability. Our results show that the BCE is variable. The next step is understanding along which axes it is variable and why it varies.

Switching between different cognitive strategies induces switch costs as evidenced by switches between manual and mental object rotation

Switching between tasks entails costs when compared to repeating the same task. It is unclear whether switch costs also occur when repeating the same task but switching the underlying cognitive strategy (CS). Here, we investigated whether CS switch costs exist despite overlap in mental processing between CSs and a lack of abstract goal (always "solve task X") or answer key binding switches. Specifically, we asked participants to judge the identity of two misaligned objects by either mental or manual computer-mediated object rotation. In each trial of Block 1, to measure switch costs without choice-related cognitive processes, a cue indicated which CS (mental/manual) to use. In Block 2, the CS was freely chosen. Participants exhibited considerable CS switch costs for both cued and freely chosen switches. Moreover, Block 1 switch costs moderately predicted Block 2 switch frequency, while an overall tendency for CS repetition was observed. In sum, we found that switch costs are not confined to situations in which tasks are switched but generalize to situations in which the task stays identical and the CS is switched instead. The results have implications for modern computerized cognitive environments in which a multitude of cognitive strategies is available for the same task.

One Link to Link Them All

A conditioned response to a stimulus can be transferred to an associated stimulus, as seen in sensory preconditioning. In this research paper, we aimed to explore this phenomenon using a stimulus-response contingency learning paradigm using voluntary actions as responses. We conducted two preregistered experiments that explored whether a learned response can be indirectly activated by a stimulus (S1) that was never directly paired with the response itself. Importantly, S1 was previously associated with another stimulus (S2) that was then directly and contingently paired with a response (S2-R contingency). In Experiment 1a, an indirect activation of acquired stimulus-response contingencies was present for audiovisual stimulus pairs wherein the stimulus association resembled a vocabulary learning setup. This result was replicated in Experiment 1b. Additionally, we found that the effect is moderated by having conscious awareness of the S1-S2 association and the S2-R contingency. By demonstrating indirect activation effects for voluntary actions, our findings show that principles of Pavlovian conditioning like sensory preconditioning also apply to contingency learning of stimulus-response relations for operant behavior.

Perception and action as viewed from the Theory of Event Coding: a multi-lab replication and effect size estimation of common experimental designs

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) has influenced research on action and perception across the past two decades. It integrates several seminal empirical phenomena and it has continued to stimulate novel experimental approaches on the representational foundations of action control and perceptual experience. Yet, many of the most notable results surrounding TEC originate from an era of psychological research that relied on rather small sample sizes as judged by today's standards. This state hampers future research aiming to build on previous phenomena. We, therefore, provide a multi-lab re-assessment of the following six classical observations: response-effect compatibility, action-induced blindness, response-effect learning, stimulus-response binding, code occupation, and short-term response-effect binding. Our major goal is to provide precise estimates of corresponding effect sizes to facilitate future scientific endeavors. These effect sizes turned out to be considerably smaller than in the original reports, thus allowing for informed decisions on how to address each phenomenon in future work. Of note, the most relevant results of the original observations were consistently obtained in the present experiments as well.

Is there hierarchical generalization in response-effect learning?

Ideomotor theory is an influential approach to understand goal-directed behavior. In this framework, response-effect (R-E) learning is assumed as a prerequisite for voluntary action: Once associations between motor actions and their effects in the environment have been formed, the anticipation of these effects will automatically activate the associated motor pattern. R-E learning is typically investigated with (induction) experiments that comprise an acquisition phase, where R-E associations are presumably learned, and a subsequent test phase, where the previous effects serve as stimuli for a response. While most studies used stimuli in the test phase that were identical to the effects in the acquisition phase, one study reported generalization from exemplars to their superordinate category (Hommel et al., Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003, Exp. 1). However, studies on so-called R-E compatibility did not report such generalization. We aimed to conceptually replicate Experiment 1 of Hommel et al. (Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003) with a free-choice test phase. While we did observe effects consistent with R-E learning when the effects in the acquisition phase were identical to the stimuli in the test phase, we did not observe evidence for generalization. We discuss this with regard to recent studies suggesting that individual response biases might rather reflect rapidly inferred propositional knowledge instead of learned R-E associations.

Selective binding of stimulus, response, and effect features

Responding to a stimulus leads to the integration of the stimulus, the response, and any sensory effect triggered by the response in a mental representation that has been called "event-file" or "instance." Most theoretical models assume that event files are composed of sets of binary bindings between individual stimulus, response, and effect features. Repeating any of the integrated features on a subsequent occasion would then retrieve the entire episode. However, previous studies mainly focused on either stimulus-response (SR) binding or response-effect (RE) binding while not assessing S-R-E episodes in their entirety. Here we analyzed for the first time bindings within entire action episodes including stimulus, response, and effect. We found clear evidence for SR- and RE-binding, but no indication of integration between stimulus and effect. We conclude that representations of actions are structured according to the current task, possibly providing a base for learning mechanisms to draw on.

Connecting action control and agency: Does action-effect binding affect temporal binding?

The sense of agency, i.e., the notion that we, as agents, are in control of our own actions and can affect our environment by acting, is an integral part of human volition. Recent work has attempted to ground agency in basic mechanisms of human action control. Along these lines, action-effect binding has been shown to affect explicit judgments of agency. Here, we investigate if such action-effect bindings are also related to temporal binding which is often used as an implicit measure of agency. In two experiments, we found evidence for the establishment of short-term action-effect bindings as well as temporal binding effects. However, the two phenomena were not associated with each other. This finding suggests that the relation of action control and agency is not a simple one, and it adds to the evidence in favor of a dissociation between subjective agency and perceptual biases such as temporal binding.

Lost to translation: How design factors of the mouse-tracking procedure impact the inference from action to cognition

From an embodiment perspective, action and cognition influence each other constantly. This interaction has been utilized in mouse-tracking studies to infer cognitive states from movements, assuming a continuous manifestation of cognitive processing into movement. However, it is mostly unknown how this manifestation is affected by the variety of possible design choices in mouse-tracking paradigms. Here we studied how three design factors impact the manifestation of cognition into movement in a Simon task with mouse tracking. We varied the response selection (i.e., with or without clicking), the ratio between hand and mouse cursor movement, and the location of the response boxes. The results show that all design factors can blur or even prevent the manifestation of cognition into movement, as reflected by a reduction in movement consistency and action dynamics, as well as by the adoption of unsuitable movement strategies. We conclude that deliberate and careful design choices in mouse-tracking experiments are crucial to ensuring a continuous manifestation of cognition in movement. We discuss the importance of developing a standard practice in the design of mouse-tracking experiments.