I see what you say: Prior knowledge of other’s goals automatically biases the perception of their actions

People can reliably detect action changes and goal changes during naturalistic perception

As a part of ongoing perception, the human cognitive system segments others' activities into discrete episodes (event segmentation). Although prior research has shown that this process is likely related to changes in an actor's actions and goals, it has not yet been determined whether untrained observers can reliably identify action and goal changes as naturalistic activities unfold, or whether the changes they identify are tied to visual features of the activity (e.g., the beginnings and ends of object interactions). This study addressed these questions by examining untrained participants' identification of action changes, goal changes, and event boundaries while watching videos of everyday activities that were presented in both first-person and third-person perspectives. We found that untrained observers can identify goal changes and action changes consistently, and these changes are not explained by visual change and the onsets or offsets of contact with objects. Moreover, the action and goal changes identified by untrained observers were associated with event boundaries, even after accounting for objective visual features of the videos. These findings suggest that people can identify action and goal changes consistently and with high agreement, that they do so by using sensory information flexibly, and that the action and goal changes they identify may contribute to event segmentation.

Emotional anticipation for dynamic emotional faces is not modulated by schizotypal traits: A Representational Momentum study

Schizotypy, a personality structure that resembles schizophrenia symptoms, is often associated with abnormal facial emotion perception. Based on the prevailing sense of threat in psychotic experiences, and the immediate perceptual history of seeing others' facial expressions, individuals with high schizotypal traits may exhibit a heightened tendency to anticipate anger. To test this, we used insights from Representational Momentum (RM), a perceptual phenomenon in which the endpoint of a dynamic event is systematically displaced forward, into the immediate future. Angry-to-ambiguous and happy-to-ambiguous avatar faces were presented, each followed by a probe with the same (ambiguous) expression as the endpoint, or one slightly changed to express greater happiness/anger. Participants judged if the probe was "equal" to the endpoint and rated how confident they were. The sample was divided into high (N = 46) and low (N = 49) schizotypal traits using the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ). First, a forward bias was found in happy-to-ambiguous faces, suggesting emotional anticipation solely for dynamic faces changing towards a potential threat (anger). This may reflect an adaptative mechanism, as it is safer to anticipate any hostility from a conspecific than the opposite. Second, contrary to our hypothesis, high schizotypal traits did not heighten RM for happy-to-ambiguous faces, nor did they lead to overconfidence in biased judgements. This may suggest a typical pattern of emotional anticipation in non-clinical schizotypy, but caution is needed due to the use of self-report questionnaires, university students, and a modest sample size. Future studies should also investigate if the same holds for clinical manifestations of schizophrenia.

Forward effects from action observation: the role of attentional focus

After viewing an image representing an action on an object, we recognize the forward states of the seen action faster than the backward states. The present study exploits a variant of a new experimental paradigm to investigate cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect. Participants viewed a series of still photos of unfolding actions on objects, each followed by a photo depicting either one of three (instead of two of the original paradigm) different and temporally distant moments after the image or one moment before the image, along with photos of different actions. Experiment 1 revealed the classical forward effects in this new context: when the task was to judge whether the action in the second photo was the same as in the first photo, evaluations were faster for all forward photos than for backward photos. In Experiment 2, we examined the role of participants' attention to the object alongside the role of attention to action kinematics in triggering these "forward effects" by manipulating participants' attentional focus. As the results showed, evaluations were faster for all forward photos when the focus was on the action kinematics, but when the focus was on the object, evaluations were faster only for the last forward photo showing the final action state. These results seem to suggest that focusing on the object triggers a representation of the action goal and thus modulates the mental simulation underlying action anticipation.

Heart is deceitful above all things: Threat expectancy induces the illusory perception of increased heartrate

It has been suggested that our perception of the internal milieu, or the body's internal state, is shaped by our beliefs and previous knowledge about the body's expected state, rather than being solely based on actual interoceptive experiences. This study investigated whether heartbeat perception could be illusorily distorted towards prior subjective beliefs, such that threat expectations suffice to induce a misperception of heartbeat frequency. Participants were instructed to focus on their cardiac activity and report their heartbeat, either tapping along to it (Experiment 1) or silently counting (Experiment 2) while ECG was recorded. While completing this task, different cues provided valid predictive information about the intensity of an upcoming cutaneous stimulation (high- vs. low- pain). Results showed that participants expected a heart rate increase over the anticipation of high- vs. low-pain stimuli and that this belief was perceptually instantiated, as suggested by their interoceptive reports. Importantly, the perceived increase was not mirrored by the real heart rate. Perceptual modulations were absent when participants executed the same task but with an exteroceptive stimulus (Experiment 3). The findings reveal, for the first time, an interoceptive illusion of increased heartbeats elicited by threat expectancy and shed new light on interoceptive processes through the lenses of Bayesian predictive processes, providing tantalizing insights into how such illusory phenomena may intersect with the recognition and regulation of people's internal states.

Action does not enhance but attenuates predicted touch

Dominant motor control theories propose that the brain predicts and attenuates the somatosensory consequences of actions, referred to as somatosensory attenuation. Support comes from psychophysical and neuroimaging studies showing that touch applied on a passive hand elicits attenuated perceptual and neural responses if it is actively generated by one's other hand, compared to an identical touch from an external origin. However, recent experimental findings have challenged this view by providing psychophysical evidence that the perceived intensity of touch on the passive hand is enhanced if the active hand does not receive touch simultaneously with the passive hand (somatosensory enhancement) and by further attributing attenuation to the double tactile stimulation of the hands upon contact. Here, we directly contrasted the hypotheses of the attenuation and enhancement models regarding how action influences somatosensory perception by manipulating whether the active hand contacts the passive hand. We further assessed somatosensory perception in the absence of any predictive cues in a condition that turned out to be essential for interpreting the experimental findings. In three pre-registered experiments, we demonstrate that action does not enhance the predicted touch (Experiment 1), that the previously reported 'enhancement' effects are driven by the reference condition used (Experiment 2), and that self-generated touch is robustly attenuated regardless of whether the two hands make contact (Experiment 3). Our results provide conclusive evidence that action does not enhance but attenuates predicted touch and prompt a reappraisal of recent experimental findings upon which theoretical frameworks proposing a perceptual enhancement by action prediction are based.

Predicting others' actions from their social contexts

Contextual cues have been shown to inform our understanding and predictions of others' actions. In this study, we tested whether observers' predictions about unfolding actions depend upon the social context in which they occur. Across five experiments, we showed participants videos of an actor walking toward a piece of furniture either with (joint context) or without (solo context) a partner standing by it. We found greater predictive bias, indicative of stronger action expectations when videos contained a second actor (Experiment 1), even when the solo condition had a perceptually-matched control object in place of the actor (Experiment 2). Critically, belief manipulations about the actions the walking actor would perform suppressed the difference between social context conditions when the manipulation specified an action possible in both contexts (Experiment 5) but not when the action was one that would be difficult without a partner (Experiment 4). Interestingly, the social context effect persisted when the belief manipulation specified an unlikely action given the depicted scene (Experiment 3). These findings provide novel evidence that kinematically-identical actions can elicit different predictions depending on the social context in which they occur.

Relationships between the magnitude of representational momentum and the spatial and temporal anticipatory judgments of opponent's kicks in taekwondo

For successful actions in a fast, dynamic environment such as sports, a quick successful anticipation of a forthcoming environmental state is essential. However, the perceptual mechanisms involved in successful anticipation are not fully understood. This study examined the relationships between the magnitude of representational momentum (RM) as a forward displacement of the memory representation of the final position of a moving object (which implies that observers perceptually "see" a near future forthcoming dynamic environmental state) and the temporal and spatial anticipatory judgments of the opponent's high or middle kicks in taekwondo. Twenty-seven participants (university taekwondo club members and non-members) observed video clips of taekwondo kicks that vanished at one of 10 frame positions prior to the kick impact and performed three tasks consecutively: anticipatory coincidence timing (CT) with the arrival of kick impact, judgment of the kick type (high and middle kicks) by forced choice, and judgment of the vanishing frame position (measuring RM). Our results showed significant group effects for the number of correct kick-type judgments and the judgment threshold for kick-type choice (kick-typeJT), which was estimated in terms of individual psychometric function curves. A significant correlation was found between the magnitude of RM (estimated at kick-typeJT) and kick-typeJT, but not between the CT errors (estimated at kick-typeJT) and kick-typeJT. This indicates that the magnitude of RM may play an influential role in quick kick-type judgments, but not in coincidence timing while observing an opponent's kick motion. These findings suggest that subjective anticipatory perception or judgment of the future spatial state is vital to anticipatory actions under severe time constraints.

Agency and social affordance shape visual perception

Research on the sense of agency has shown that being the author of an action changes the way we estimate the timing and the intensity of the action-effect. Yet, there is a dearth of attempts to assess the influence of agency on perception per se. The present study used the Representational Momentum paradigm to measure participants' visual anticipation of movement while manipulating their agency. In line with previous literature emphasizing the impact of social factors on visual anticipation and on the sense of agency, we additionally investigated the modulating power of social affordances on the relationship between agency and visual anticipation. We conducted two experiments where participants viewed a virtual agent directing a handshake gesture toward a second virtual agent. In a first experiment, we addressed the role of agency on visual anticipation by comparing a condition in which participants triggered the virtual agent's gesture with a condition where the computer triggered the gesture. Results showed greater forward movement anticipation when participants triggered the gesture. The second experiment investigated how altering social interaction parameters (interindividual distance and body posture) modulated the relationship between agency and visual anticipation. The outcome contrasted with the first experiment, with participants anticipating a backward movement of the hand when the computer triggered the gesture and displaying a null anticipation when participants triggered the gesture. Those two experiments highlighted how active involvement and environmental affordance interact to shape perception and allowed us to propose an updated model of agency processing.

Spatiotemporal jump detection during continuous film viewing

Prior research on film viewing has demonstrated that participants frequently fail to notice spatiotemporal disruptions, such as scene edits in the movies. Whether such insensitivity to spatiotemporal disruptions extends beyond scene edits in film viewing is not well understood. Across three experiments, we created spatiotemporal disruptions by presenting participants with minute long movie clips, and occasionally jumping the movie clips ahead or backward in time. Participants were instructed to press a button when they noticed any disruptions while watching the clips. The results from experiments 1 and 2 indicate that participants failed to notice the disruptions in continuity about 10% to 30% of the time depending on the magnitude of the jump. In addition, detection rates were lower by approximately 10% when the videos jumped ahead in time compared to the backward jumps across all jump magnitudes, suggesting a role of knowledge about the future affects jump detection. An additional analysis used optic flow similarity during these disruptions. Our findings suggest that insensitivity to spatiotemporal disruptions during film viewing is influenced by knowledge about future states.

Expectations of efficient actions bias social perception: a pre-registered online replication

Humans take a teleological stance when observing others' actions, interpreting them as intentional and goal directed. In predictive processing accounts of social perception, this teleological stance would be mediated by a perceptual prediction of an ideal energy-efficient reference trajectory with which a rational actor would achieve their goals within the current environmental constraints. Hudson and colleagues (2018 Proc. R. Soc. B 285, 20180638. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2018.0638)) tested this hypothesis in a series of experiments in which participants reported the perceived disappearance points of hands reaching for objects. They found that these judgements were biased towards the expected efficient reference trajectories. Observed straight reaches were reported higher when an obstacle needed to be overcome than if the path was clear. By contrast, unnecessarily high reaches over empty space were perceptually flattened. Moreover, these perceptual biases increased the more the environmental constraints and expected action trajectories were explicitly processed. These findings provide an important advance to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying social perception. The current replication tests the robustness of these findings and whether they uphold in an online setting.

Melting Ice With Your Mind: Representational Momentum for Physical States

When a log burns, it transforms from a block of wood into a pile of ash. Such state changes are among the most dramatic ways objects change, going beyond mere changes of position or orientation. How does the mind represent changes of state? A foundational result in visual cognition is that memory extrapolates the positions of moving objects-a distortion called representational momentum. Here, five experiments (N = 400 adults) exploited this phenomenon to investigate mental representations in state space. Participants who viewed objects undergoing state changes (e.g., ice melting, logs burning, or grapes shriveling) remembered them as more changed (e.g., more melted, burned, or shriveled) than they actually were. This pattern extended to several types of state changes, went beyond their low-level properties, and even adhered to their natural trajectories in state space. Thus, mental representations of objects actively incorporate how they change-not only in their relation to their environment, but also in their essential qualities.

Cognitive and metacognitive, motivational, and resource considerations for learning new skills across the lifespan

Across the lifespan, learners have to tackle the challenges of learning new skills. These skills can range from abilities needed for survival, such as learning languages, learning to walk during infancy, and learning new software for a job in adulthood, to abilities related to leisure and hobbies. As the learner progresses through novice to expert stages, there are cognitive and metacognitive, motivational, and resource considerations for learning new skills. In terms of cognitive considerations, fluid and crystallized abilities as well as executive functions interact to help the learner process and retain information related to the skills. In terms of metacognitive considerations, knowing what to learn and how to learn are important for novel skill learning. In terms of motivational considerations, changes in individuals' intrinsic and extrinsic motivation throughout the lifespan impact their pursuit of novel skill learning, and declines in motivation can be buffered through the cultivation of grit, growth mindset, self-efficacy, and other personal factors. In terms of resource considerations, there are many tools that learners can use to acquire new skills, but allocation and availability of these resources differ based on life stage and socioeconomic status. Taken together, these considerations may provide learners with the best chance at acquiring new skills across the lifespan. Further research investigating these three factors, particularly among older adult learners, and their interactive effects could help increase our understanding of their impacts on skill learning and inform future cognitive interventions that can be tailored to learners' unique needs. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Development and Aging Psychology > Learning.

The implicit sense of agency is not a perceptual effect but is a judgment effect

The sense of agency (SoA) is characterized as the sense of being the causal agent of one's own actions, and it is measured in two forms: explicit and implicit. In the explicit SoA experiments, the participants explicitly report whether they have a sense of control over their actions or whether they or somebody else is the causal agent of seen actions; the implicit SoA experiments study how do participants' agentive or voluntary actions modify perceptual processes (like time, vision, tactility, and audition) without directly asking the participants to explicitly think about their causal agency or sense of control. However, recent implicit SoA literature reported contradictory findings of the relationship between implicit SoA reports and agency states. Thus, I argue that the purported implicit SoA reports are not agency-driven perceptual effects per se but are judgment effects, by showing that (a) the typical operationalizations in implicit SoA domain lead to perceptual uncertainty on the part of the participants, (b) under uncertainty, participants' implicit SoA reports are due to heuristic judgments which are independent of agency states, and (c) under perceptual certainty, the typical implicit SoA reports might not have occurred at all. Thus, I conclude that the instances of implicit SoA are judgments (or response biases)-under uncertainty-rather than perceptual effects.

Angry facial expressions bias towards aversive actions

Social interaction requires fast and efficient processing of another person's intentions. In face-to-face interactions, aversive or appetitive actions typically co-occur with emotional expressions, allowing an observer to anticipate action intentions. In the present study, we investigated the influence of facial emotions on the processing of action intentions. Thirty-two participants were presented with video clips showing virtual agents displaying a facial emotion (angry vs. happy) while performing an action (punch vs. fist-bump) directed towards the observer. During each trial, video clips stopped at varying durations of the unfolding action, and participants had to recognize the presented action. Naturally, participants' recognition accuracy improved with increasing duration of the unfolding actions. Interestingly, while facial emotions did not influence accuracy, there was a significant influence on participants' action judgements. Participants were more likely to judge a presented action as a punch when agents showed an angry compared to a happy facial emotion. This effect was more pronounced in short video clips, showing only the beginning of an unfolding action, than in long video clips, showing near-complete actions. These results suggest that facial emotions influence anticipatory processing of action intentions allowing for fast and adaptive responses in social interactions.

Contextual Priors Guide Perception and Motor Responses to Observed Actions

In everyday-life scenarios, prior expectations provided by the context in which actions are embedded support action prediction. However, it is still unclear how newly learned action-context associations can drive our perception and motor responses. To fill this gap, we measured behavioral (Experiment 1) and motor responses (Experiment 2) during two tasks requiring the prediction of occluded actions or geometrical shapes. Each task consisted of an implicit probabilistic learning and a test phase. During learning, we exposed participants to videos showing specific associations between a contextual cue and a particular action or shape. During the test phase, videos were earlier occluded to reduce the amount of sensorial information and induce participants to use the implicitly learned action/shape-context associations for disambiguation. Results showed that reliable contextual cues made participants more accurate in identifying the unfolding action or shape. Importantly, motor responses were modulated by contextual probability during action, but not shape prediction. Particularly, in conditions of perceptual uncertainty the motor system coded for the most probable action based on contextual informativeness, regardless of action kinematics. These findings suggest that contextual priors can shape motor responses to action observation beyond mere kinematics mapping.

Predictive action perception from explicit intention information in autism

Social difficulties in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) may originate from a reduced top-down modulation of sensory information that prevents the spontaneous attribution of intentions to observed behaviour. However, although people with autism are able to explicitly reason about others' mental states, the effect of abstract intention information on perceptual processes has remained untested. ASD participants (n = 23) and a neurotypical (NT) control group (n = 23) observed a hand either reaching for an object or withdrawing from it. Prior to action onset, the participant either instructed the actor to "Take it" or "Leave it", or heard the actor state "I'll take it" or "I'll leave it", which provided an explicit intention that was equally likely to be congruent or incongruent with the subsequent action. The hand disappeared before completion of the action, and participants reported the last seen position of the tip of the index finger by touching the screen. NT participants exhibited a predictive bias in response to action direction (reaches perceived nearer the object, withdrawals perceived farther away), and in response to prior knowledge of the actor's intentions (nearer the object after "Take it", farther away after "Leave it"). However, ASD participants exhibited a predictive perceptual bias only in response to the explicit intentions, but not in response to the motion of the action itself. Perception in ASD is not immune from top-down modulation. However, the information must be explicitly presented independently from the stimulus itself, and not inferred from cues inherent in the stimulus.

People accurately predict the transition probabilities between actions

Social life is a complex dance. To coordinate gracefully with one's partners, one must predict their actions. Here, we investigated how people predict others' actions. We hypothesized that people can accurately predict others' future actions based on knowledge of their current actions, coupled with knowledge of action transitions. To test whether people have accurate knowledge of the transition probabilities between actions, we compared actual rates of action transitions-calculated from four large naturalistic datasets-to participants' ratings of the transition probabilities between corresponding sets of actions. In five preregistered studies, participants demonstrated accurate mental models of action transitions. Furthermore, we found that people drew upon conceptual knowledge of actions-described by the six-dimensional ACT-FASTaxonomy-to guide their accurate predictions. Together, these results indicate that people can accurately anticipate other people's moves in the dance of social life and that the structure of action knowledge may be tailored to making these predictions.

Affordance matching predictively shapes the perceptual representation of others' ongoing actions

Predictive processing accounts of social perception argue that action observation is a predictive process, in which inferences about others' goals are tested against the perceptual input, inducing a subtle perceptual confirmation bias that distorts observed action kinematics toward the inferred goals. Here we test whether such biases are induced even when goals are not explicitly given but have to be derived from the unfolding action kinematics. In 2 experiments, participants briefly saw an actor reach ambiguously toward a large object and a small object, with either a whole-hand power grip or an index-finger and thumb precision grip. During its course, the hand suddenly disappeared, and participants reported its last seen position on a touch-screen. As predicted, judgments were consistently biased toward apparent action targets, such that power grips were perceived closer to large objects and precision grips closer to small objects, even if the reach kinematics were identical. Strikingly, these biases were independent of participants' explicit goal judgments. They were of equal size when action goals had to be explicitly derived in each trial (Experiment 1) or not (Experiment 2) and, across trials and across participants, explicit judgments and perceptual biases were uncorrelated. This provides evidence, for the first time, that people make online adjustments of observed actions based on the match between hand grip and object goals, distorting their perceptual representation toward implied goals. These distortions may not reflect high-level goal assumptions, but emerge from relatively low-level processing of kinematic features within the perceptual system. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

What first drives visual attention during the recognition of object-directed actions? The role of kinematics and goal information

The recognition of others' object-directed actions is known to involve the decoding of both the visual kinematics of the action and the action goal. Yet whether action recognition is first guided by the processing of visual kinematics or by a prediction about the goal of the actor remains debated. In order to provide experimental evidence to this issue, the present study aimed at investigating whether visual attention would be preferentially captured by visual kinematics or by action goal information when processing others' actions. In a visual search task, participants were asked to find correct actions (e.g., drinking from glass) among distractor actions. Distractors actions contained grip and/or goal violations and could therefore share the correct goal and/or the correct grip with the target. The time course of fixation proportion on each distractor action has been taken as an indicator of visual attention allocation. Results show that visual attention is first captured by the distractor action with similar goal. Then the withdrawal of visual attention from the action distractor with similar goal suggests a later attentional capture by the action distractor with similar grip. Overall, results are in line with predictive approaches of action understanding, which assume that observers first make a prediction about the actor's goal before verifying this prediction using the visual kinematics of the action.

Cues to intention bias action perception toward the most efficient trajectory

Humans interpret others' behaviour as intentional and expect them to take the most energy-efficient path to achieve their goals. Recent studies show that these expectations of efficient action take the form of a prediction of an ideal "reference" trajectory, against which observed actions are evaluated, distorting their perceptual representation towards this expected path. Here we tested whether these predictions depend upon the implied intentionality of the stimulus. Participants saw videos of an actor reaching either efficiently (straight towards an object or arched over an obstacle) or inefficiently (straight towards obstacle or arched over empty space). The hand disappeared mid-trajectory and participants reported the last seen position on a touch-screen. As in prior research, judgments of inefficient actions were biased toward efficiency expectations (straight trajectories upwards to avoid obstacles, arched trajectories downward towards goals). In two further experimental groups, intentionality cues were removed by replacing the hand with a non-agentive ball (group 2), and by removing the action's biological motion profile (group 3). Removing these cues substantially reduced perceptual biases. Our results therefore confirm that the perception of others' actions is guided by expectations of efficient actions, which are triggered by the perception of semantic and motion cues to intentionality.

Uncertainty in contextual and kinematic cues jointly modulates motor resonance in primary motor cortex

Contextual information accompanying others' actions modulates "motor resonance", i.e., neural activity within motor areas that is elicited by movement observation. One possibility is that we weigh and combine such information in a Bayesian manner according to their relative uncertainty. Therefore, contextual information becomes particularly useful when others' actions are difficult to discriminate. It is unclear, however, whether this uncertainty modulates the neural activity in primary motor cortex (M1) during movement observation. Here, we applied single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) while subjects watched different grasping actions. We operationalized motor resonance as grip-specific modulation of corticomotor excitability measured in the index (FDI) versus the little finger abductor (ADM). We experimentally modulated either the availability of kinematic information ( experiment 1) or the reliability of contextual cues ( experiment 2). Our results indicate that even in the absence of movement kinematics, reliable contextual information is enough to trigger significant muscle-specific corticomotor excitability changes in M1, which are strongest when both kinematics and contextual information are available. These findings suggest that bottom-up mechanisms that activate motor representations as a function of the observed kinematics and top-down mechanisms that activate motor representations associated with arbitrary cues converge in M1. NEW & NOTEWORTHY Our study reveals new neurophysiological insights in support of the Bayesian account of action observation by showing that "motor resonance", i.e., neural activity evoked by observing others' actions, incorporates the uncertainty related to both contextual (prior beliefs) and kinematic (sensory evidence) cues. Notably, we show that muscle-specific modulation of M1 is strongest when context and movement kinematics are available, and it can be elicited even in the absence of movement kinematics.

Filling the gap despite full attention: the role of fast backward inferences for event completion

The comprehension of dynamic naturalistic events poses at least two challenges to the cognitive system: filtering relevant information with attention and dealing with information that was missing or missed. With four experiments, we studied the completion of missing information despite full attention. Participants watched short soccer video clips and we informed participants that we removed a critical moment of ball contact in half of the clips. We asked participants to detect whether these moments of ball contact were present or absent. In Experiment 1, participants gave their detection responses either directly during an event or delayed after an event. Although participants directed their full attention toward the critical contact moment, they were more likely to indicate seeing the missing ball contact if it was followed by a causally matching scene than if it was followed by an unrelated scene, both for the immediate and delayed responses. Thus, event completion occurs quickly. In Experiment 2, only a causally matching scene but neither a white mask nor an irrelevant scene caused the completion of missing information. This indicates that the completion of missing information is caused by backward inferences rather than predictive perception. In Experiment 3, we showed that event completion occurs directly during a trial and does not depend on expectations built up after seeing the same causality condition multiple times. In Experiment 4, we linked our findings to event cognition by asking participants to perform a natural segmentation task. We conclude that observers complete missing information during coherent events based on a fast backward inference mechanism even when directing their attention toward the missing information.

Perceptual teleology: expectations of action efficiency bias social perception

Primates interpret conspecific behaviour as goal-directed and expect others to achieve goals by the most efficient means possible. While this teleological stance is prominent in evolutionary and developmental theories of social cognition, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. In predictive models of social cognition, a perceptual prediction of an ideal efficient trajectory would be generated from prior knowledge against which the observed action is evaluated, distorting the perception of unexpected inefficient actions. To test this, participants observed an actor reach for an object with a straight or arched trajectory on a touch screen. The actions were made efficient or inefficient by adding or removing an obstructing object. The action disappeared mid-trajectory and participants touched the last seen screen position of the hand. Judgements of inefficient actions were biased towards the efficient prediction (straight trajectories upward to avoid the obstruction, arched trajectories downward towards the target). These corrections increased when the obstruction's presence/absence was explicitly acknowledged, and when the efficient trajectory was explicitly predicted. Additional supplementary experiments demonstrated that these biases occur during ongoing visual perception and/or immediately after motion offset. The teleological stance is at least partly perceptual, providing an ideal reference trajectory against which actual behaviour is evaluated.

Toward a general theory of momentum-like effects

The future actions, behaviors, and outcomes of objects, individuals, and processes can often be anticipated, and some of these anticipations have been hypothesized to result from momentum-like effects. Five types of momentum-like effects (representational momentum, operational momentum, attentional momentum, behavioral momentum, psychological momentum) are briefly described. Potential similarities involving properties of momentum-like effects (continuation, coherence, role of chance or guessing, role of sensory processing, imperviousness to practice or error feedback, shifts in memory for position, effects of changes in velocity, rapid occurrence, effects of retention interval, attachment to an object rather than an abstract frame of reference, nonrigid transformation) are described, and potential constraints on a future theory of momentum-like effects (dynamic representation, nature of extrapolation, sensitivity to environmental contingencies, bridging gaps between stimulus and response, increasing adaptiveness to the environment, serving as a heuristic for perception and action, insensitivity to stimulus format, importance of subjective consequences, role of knowledge and belief, automaticity of occurrence, properties of functional architecture) are discussed. The similarity and ubiquity of momentum-like effects suggests such effects might result from a single or small number of mechanisms that operate over different dimensions, modalities, and time-scales and provide a fundamental adaptation for perception and action.

Joint Action: Mental Representations, Shared Information and General Mechanisms for Coordinating with Others

In joint action, multiple people coordinate their actions to perform a task together. This often requires precise temporal and spatial coordination. How do co-actors achieve this? How do they coordinate their actions toward a shared task goal? Here, we provide an overview of the mental representations involved in joint action, discuss how co-actors share sensorimotor information and what general mechanisms support coordination with others. By deliberately extending the review to aspects such as the cultural context in which a joint action takes place, we pay tribute to the complex and variable nature of this social phenomenon.

The Things You Do: Internal Models of Others' Expected Behaviour Guide Action Observation

Predictions allow humans to manage uncertainties within social interactions. Here, we investigate how explicit and implicit person models-how different people behave in different situations-shape these predictions. In a novel action identification task, participants judged whether actors interacted with or withdrew from objects. In two experiments, we manipulated, unbeknownst to participants, the two actors action likelihoods across situations, such that one actor typically interacted with one object and withdrew from the other, while the other actor showed the opposite behaviour. In Experiment 2, participants additionally received explicit information about the two individuals that either matched or mismatched their actual behaviours. The data revealed direct but dissociable effects of both kinds of person information on action identification. Implicit action likelihoods affected response times, speeding up the identification of typical relative to atypical actions, irrespective of the explicit knowledge about the individual's behaviour. Explicit person knowledge, in contrast, affected error rates, causing participants to respond according to expectations instead of observed behaviour, even when they were aware that the explicit information might not be valid. Together, the data show that internal models of others' behaviour are routinely re-activated during action observation. They provide first evidence of a person-specific social anticipation system, which predicts forthcoming actions from both explicit information and an individuals' prior behaviour in a situation. These data link action observation to recent models of predictive coding in the non-social domain where similar dissociations between implicit effects on stimulus identification and explicit behavioural wagers have been reported.

One step ahead: The perceived kinematics of others' actions are biased toward expected goals

Action observation is often conceptualized in a bottom-up manner, where sensory information activates conceptual (or motor) representations. In contrast, here we show that expectations about an actor's goal have a top-down predictive effect on action perception, biasing it toward these goals. In 3 experiments, participants observed hands reach for or withdraw from objects and judged whether a probe stimulus corresponded to the hand's final position. Before action onset, participants generated action expectations on the basis of either object types (safe or painful, Experiments 1 and 2) or abstract color cues (Experiment 3). Participants more readily mistook probes displaced in a predicted position (relative to unpredicted positions) for the hand's final position, and this predictive bias was larger when the movement and expectation were aligned. These effects were evident for low-level movement and high-level goal expectancies. Expectations bias action observation toward the predicted goals. These results challenge current bottom-up views and support recent predictive models of action observation.