Synaesthetic perception of colour and visual space in a blind subject: an fMRI case study

How the Blind Hear Colour

Crossmodal correspondences between seemingly independent sensory modalities are often observed in normal participants. For instance, colours commonly map consistently onto pure tones. In this study, we investigated colour-tone mapping in both normal trichromats and in people with congenital blindness. Participants were asked to match tones of differing pitch to named colours. In both cases, the tones selected varied consistently with the colour. The blind responses were similar to those of the trichromats, except in the case of red and green; the blind did not differentiate these colours, whereas the trichromats associated red with a higher tone and green with a lower tone. Otherwise, the results are consistent with a well-established association between pitch and lightness, with lighter colours associated with higher tones, and darker colours with lower tones. Because the blind never had any sensory experience of colour, their matching of colour to pitch is most likely based on semantic understanding.

Synesthetic hallucinations induced by psychedelic drugs in a congenitally blind man

This case report offers rare insights into crossmodal responses to psychedelic drug use in a congenitally blind (CB) individual as a form of synthetic synesthesia. BP's personal experience provides us with a unique report on the psychological and sensory alterations induced by hallucinogenic drugs, including an account of the absence of visual hallucinations, and a compelling look at the relationship between LSD induced synesthesia and crossmodal correspondences. The hallucinatory experiences reported by BP are of particular interest in light of the observation that rates of psychosis within the CB population are extremely low. The phenomenology of the induced hallucinations suggests that experiences acquired through other means, might not give rise to "visual" experiences in the phenomenological sense, but instead gives rise to novel experiences in the other functioning senses.

Color Processing in Synesthesia: What Synesthesia Can and Cannot Tell Us About Mechanisms of Color Processing

Synesthetic experiences of color have been traditionally conceptualized as a perceptual phenomenon. However, recent evidence suggests a role of higher order cognition in the formation of synesthetic experiences. Here, we discuss how synesthetic experiences of color differ from and influence veridical color processing, and how non-perceptual processes such as imagery and color memory might play a role in eliciting synesthetic color experience.

A critical review of the neuroimaging literature on synesthesia

Synesthesia refers to additional sensations experienced by some people for specific stimulations, such as the systematic arbitrary association of colors to letters for the most studied type. Here, we review all the studies (based mostly on functional and structural magnetic resonance imaging) that have searched for the neural correlates of this subjective experience, as well as structural differences related to synesthesia. Most differences claimed for synesthetes are unsupported, due mainly to low statistical power, statistical errors, and methodological limitations. Our critical review therefore casts some doubts on whether any neural correlate of the synesthetic experience has been established yet. Rather than being a neurological condition (i.e., a structural or functional brain anomaly), synesthesia could be reconsidered as a special kind of childhood memory, whose signature in the brain may be out of reach with present brain imaging techniques.

Color synesthesia. Insight into perception, emotion, and consciousness

Purpose of review

Synesthesia is an extraordinary perceptual phenomenon, in which individuals experience unusual percepts elicited by the activation of an unrelated sensory modality or by a cognitive process. Emotional reactions are commonly associated. The condition prompted philosophical debates on the nature of perception and impacted the course of art history. It recently generated a considerable interest among neuroscientists, but its clinical significance apparently remains underevaluated. This review focuses on the recent studies regarding variants of color synesthesia, the commonest form of the condition.

Recent findings

Synesthesia is commonly classified as developmental and acquired. Developmental forms predispose to changes in primary sensory processing and cognitive functions, usually with better performances in certain aspects and worse in others, and to heightened creativity. Acquired forms of synesthesia commonly arise from drug ingestion or neurological disorders, including thalamic lesions and sensory deprivation (e.g., blindness). Cerebral exploration using structural and functional imaging has demonstrated distinct patterns in cortical activation and brain connectivity for controls and synesthetes. Artworks of affected painters are most illustrative of the nature of synesthetic experiences.

Summary

Results of the recent investigations on synesthesia offered a remarkable insight into the mechanisms of perception, emotion and consciousness, and deserve attention both from neuroscientists and from clinicians.

Achromatic synesthesias - a functional magnetic resonance imaging study

Grapheme-color synesthetes experience consistent, automatic and idiosyncratic colors associated with specific letters and numbers. Frequently, these specific associations exhibit achromatic synesthetic qualities (e.g. white, black or gray). In this study, we have investigated for the first time the neural basis of achromatic synesthesias, their relationship to chromatic synesthesias and the achromatic congruency effect in order to understand not only synesthetic color but also other components of the synesthetic experience. To achieve this aim, functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments were performed in a group of associator grapheme-color synesthetes and matched controls who were stimulated with real chromatic and achromatic stimuli (Mondrians), and with letters and numbers that elicited different types of grapheme-color synesthesias (i.e. chromatic and achromatic inducers which elicited chromatic but also achromatic synesthesias, as well as congruent and incongruent ones). The information derived from the analysis of Mondrians and chromatic/achromatic synesthesias suggests that real and synesthetic colors/achromaticity do not fully share neural mechanisms. The whole-brain analysis of BOLD signals in response to the complete set of synesthetic inducers revealed that the functional peculiarities of the synesthetic brain are distributed, and reflect different components of the synesthetic experience: a perceptual component, an (attentional) feature binding component, and an emotional component. Additionally, the inclusion of achromatic experiences has provided new evidence in favor of the emotional binding theory, a line of interpretation which constitutes a bridge between grapheme-color synesthesia and other developmental modalities of the phenomenon.

Training, hypnosis, and drugs: artificial synaesthesia, or artificial paradises?

The last few years have seen the publication of a number of studies by researchers claiming to have induced "synaesthesia," "pseudo-synaesthesia," or "synaesthesia-like" phenomena in non-synaesthetic participants. Although the intention of these studies has been to try and shed light on the way in which synaesthesia might have been acquired in developmental synaesthestes, we argue that they may only have documented a phenomenon that has elsewhere been accounted for in terms of the acquisition of sensory associations and is not evidently linked to synaesthesia. As synaesthesia remains largely defined in terms of the involuntary elicitation of conscious concurrents, we suggest that the theoretical rapprochement with synaesthesia (in any of its guises) is unnecessary, and potentially distracting. It might therefore, be less confusing if researchers were to avoid referring to synaesthesia when characterizing cases that lack robust evidence of a conscious manifestation. Even in the case of those other conditions for which conscious experiences are better evidenced, when training has been occurred during hypnotic suggestion, or when it has been combined with drugs, we argue that not every conscious manifestation should necessarily be counted as synaesthetic. Finally, we stress that cases of associative learning are unlikely to shed light on two highly specific characteristic of the majority of cases of developmental synaesthesia in terms of learning patterns: First, their resistance to change through exposure once the synaesthetic repertoire has been fixed; Second, the transfer of conditioned responses between concurrents and inducers after training. We conclude by questioning whether, in adulthood, it is ever possible to acquire the kind of synaesthesia that is typically documented in the developmental form of the condition. The available evidence instead seems to point to there being a critical period for the development of synaesthesia, probably only in those with a genetic predisposition to develop the condition.