Structure in the stream of consciousness: Evidence from a verbalized thought protocol and automated text analytic methods

Dynamics of spontaneous thoughts: Exploration, attentional profile and the segmentation of the stream of thoughts

For a long time, clinical knowledge and first-person reports have pointed to individual differences in the dynamics of spontaneous thoughts, in particular in the extreme case of psychiatric conditions (e.g. racing thoughts in Attention Deficit / Hyperactivity Disorder, ADHD; rumination in depression). We used a novel procedure to investigate this individual variability by combining verbal fluency tasks and introspective reports of thought content. Our goal was twofold. First, we tested the hypothesis that a greater segmentation of the stream of thoughts would be associated with trait inattention, in line with subjective reports of ADHD patients. Second, we tested whether the segmentation of the stream of thoughts increased with an increased tendency for exploratory behavior, following recent theoretical claims on the mechanisms underpinning the generation of spontaneous thoughts. Our results support both hypotheses, shedding light on the factors contributing to the individual variability in the dynamics of the stream of thought.

Characterizing human spontaneous thoughts and its application in major depressive disorder

BACKGROUND

Spontaneous thought is a universal, complex, and heterogeneous cognitive activity that significantly impacts mental activity and strongly correlates with mental disorders.

METHODS

Utilizing the think-aloud method, we captured spontaneous thoughts during rest from 38 diagnosed with depression, alongside 36 healthy controls and 137 healthy individuals. Through a comprehensive assessment of various dimensions of thought content, we compared thought content between individuals with depression and healthy controls, and between healthy women and men. Finally, we employed natural language processing (NLP) to develop regression models for multidimensional content assessment and a classification model to differentiate between individuals with and without depression.

RESULTS

Compared to healthy controls, individuals with depression had more internally oriented and less externally oriented spontaneous thoughts. They focused more on themselves and negative things, and less on positive things, experiencing higher levels of negative emotions and lower levels of positive emotions. Besides, we found that compared to healthy men, healthy women's spontaneous thoughts focus more on interoception, the self, past events, and negative events, and they experience higher levels of negative emotions. Meanwhile, we identified the potential application of the think-aloud method to collect spontaneous thoughts and integrate NLP in the field of depression.

CONCLUSIONS

This study offers direct insights into the stream of thought during individuals' resting state, revealing differences between individuals with depression and healthy controls, as well as sex differences in the content of spontaneous thoughts. It enhances our understanding of spontaneous thought and offers a new perspective for preventing, diagnosing, and treating depression.

Why do we think? The dynamics of spontaneous thought reveal its functions

Spontaneous thought-mind wandering, daydreaming, and creative ideation-makes up most of everyday cognition. Is this idle thought, or does it serve an adaptive function? We test two hypotheses about the functions of spontaneous thought: First, spontaneous thought improves memory efficiency. Under this hypothesis, spontaneous thought should prioritize detailed, vivid episodic simulations. Second, spontaneous thought helps us achieve our goals. Under this hypothesis, spontaneous thought should prioritize content relevant to ongoing goal pursuits, or current concerns. We use natural language processing and machine learning to quantify the dynamics of thought in a large sample (N = 3,359) of think aloud data. Results suggest that spontaneous thought both supports memory optimization and keeps us focused on current concerns.

Rumination as a Transdiagnostic Phenomenon in the 21st Century: The Flow Model of Rumination

Rumination and its related mental phenomena share associated impairments in cognition, such as executive functions and attentional processes across different clinical conditions (e.g., in psychotic disorders). In recent decades, however, the notion of rumination has been increasingly narrowed to the "self-focused" type in depressive disorders. A closer review of the literature shows that rumination may be construed as a broader process characterized by repetitive thoughts about certain mental contents that interfere with one's daily activities, not only limited to those related to "self". A further examination of the construct of rumination beyond the narrowly focused depressive rumination would help expand intervention opportunities for mental disorders in today's context. We first review the development of the clinical construct of rumination with regard to its historical roots and its roles in psychopathology. This builds the foundation for the introduction of the "Flow Model of Rumination (FMR)", which conceptualizes rumination as a disruption of a smooth flow of mental contents in conscious experience that depends on the coordinated interactions between intention, memory, affect, and external events. The conceptual review concludes with a discussion of the impact of rapid technological advances (such as smartphones) on rumination. Particularly in contemporary societies today, a broader consideration of rumination not only from a cognition viewpoint, but also incorporating a human-device interaction perspective, is necessitated. The implications of the FMR in contemporary mental health practice are discussed.

Creative minds at rest: Creative individuals are more associative and engaged with their idle thoughts

Despite an established body of research characterizing how creative individuals explore their external world, relatively little is known about how such individuals navigate their inner mental life, especially in unstructured contexts such as periods of awake rest. Across two studies, the present manuscript tested the hypothesis that creative individuals are more engaged with their idle thoughts and more associative in the dynamic transitions between them. Study 1 captured the real-time conscious experiences of 81 adults as they voiced aloud the content of their mind moment-by-moment across a 10-minute unconstrained baseline period. Higher originality scores on a divergent thinking task were associated with less perceived boredom, more words spoken overall, more freely moving thoughts, and more loosely-associative (as opposed to sharp) transitions during the baseline rest period. In Study 2, across 2,612 participants, those who reported higher self-rated creativity also reported less perceived boredom during the COVID-19 pandemic, a time during which many people experienced unusually extended periods of unstructured free time. Overall, these results suggest a tendency for creative individuals to be more engaged and explorative with their thoughts when task demands are relaxed, raising implications for resting state functional MRI and societal trends to devalue idle time.

A generalized cortical activity pattern at internally generated mental context boundaries during unguided narrative recall

Current theory and empirical studies suggest that humans segment continuous experiences into events based on the mismatch between predicted and actual sensory inputs; detection of these 'event boundaries' evokes transient neural responses. However, boundaries can also occur at transitions between internal mental states, without relevant external input changes. To what extent do such 'internal boundaries' share neural response properties with externally driven boundaries? We conducted an fMRI experiment where subjects watched a series of short movies and then verbally recalled the movies, unprompted, in the order of their choosing. During recall, transitions between movies thus constituted major boundaries between internal mental contexts, generated purely by subjects' unguided thoughts. Following the offset of each recalled movie, we observed stereotyped spatial activation patterns in the default mode network, especially the posterior medial cortex, consistent across different movie contents and even across the different tasks of movie watching and recall. Surprisingly, the between-movie boundary patterns did not resemble patterns at boundaries between events within a movie. Thus, major transitions between mental contexts elicit neural phenomena shared across internal and external modes and distinct from within-context event boundary detection, potentially reflecting a cognitive state related to the flushing and reconfiguration of situation models.

Impaired control in addiction involves cognitive distortions and unreliable self-control, not compulsive desires and overwhelmed self-control

Impaired control in addiction involves a characteristic but obscure kind of partial control. Certain aspects of control over drug use are clearly reduced, reflected in difficulty cutting back and relapse. However, other aspects of control are clearly preserved, as reflected in substantial sensitivity to situational incentives-for example, the ability to defer use when needed. This juxtaposition is puzzling, and a clear mechanistically precise understanding of impaired control has yet to emerge. In this article, a Distortion model of impaired control is put forward. The key insight of the model is that the puzzling pattern of partial control seen in addiction can be understood in terms of unreliable control. The model posits large populations of distorted automatic thoughts (e.g., about drugs, one's self, one's circumstances, and one's abilities to cope), coupled with unreliable control over these distorted thoughts. These distorted thoughts, typically gradually and cumulatively, lead to illusion-like misvaluation of costs and benefits of drug use, in turn eventually leading to decisions to use. The model captures an elusive middle ground in addiction in which substantially preserved control over drug use for briefer intervals coexists with difficulty maintaining sobriety over the long-term. Moreover, the model explains a range of clinical findings in addiction that are not easily accommodated on leading alternative views.

Exploring self-generated thoughts in a resting state with natural language processing

The present study seeks to examine individuals' stream of thought in real time. Specifically, we asked participants to speak their thoughts freely out loud during a typical resting-state condition. We first examined the feasibility and reliability of the method and found that the oral reporting method did not significantly change the frequency or content characteristics of self-generated thoughts; moreover, its test-retest reliability was high. Based on methodological feasibility, we combined natural language processing (NLP) with the Bidirectional Encoder Representation from Transformers (BERT) model to directly quantify thought content. We analyzed the divergence of self-generated thought content and expressions of sadness and empirically verified the validity and behavioral significance of the metrics calculated by BERT. Furthermore, we found that reflection and brooding could be differentiated by detecting the divergence of self-generated thought content and expressions of sadness, thus deepening our understanding of rumination and depression and providing a way to distinguish adaptive from maladaptive rumination. Finally, this study provides a new framework to examine self-generated thoughts in a resting state with NLP, extending research on the continuous content of instant self-generated thoughts with applicability to resting-state functional brain imaging.

The think aloud paradigm reveals differences in the content, dynamics and conceptual scope of resting state thought in trait brooding

Although central to well-being, functional and dysfunctional thoughts arise and unfold over time in ways that remain poorly understood. To shed light on these mechanisms, we adapted a "think aloud" paradigm to quantify the content and dynamics of individuals' thoughts at rest. Across two studies, external raters hand coded the content of each thought and computed dynamic metrics spanning duration, transition probabilities between affective states, and conceptual similarity over time. Study 1 highlighted the paradigm's high ecological validity and revealed a narrowing of conceptual scope following more negative content. Study 2 replicated Study 1's findings and examined individual difference predictors of trait brooding, a maladaptive form of rumination. Across individuals, increased trait brooding was linked to thoughts rated as more negative, past-oriented and self-focused. Longer negative and shorter positive thoughts were also apparent as brooding increased, as well as a tendency to shift away from positive conceptual states, and a stronger narrowing of conceptual scope following negative thoughts. Importantly, content and dynamics explained independent variance, accounting for a third of the variance in brooding. These results uncover a real-time cognitive signature of rumination and highlight the predictive and ecological validity of the think aloud paradigm applied to resting state cognition.

Testing the construct validity of competing measurement approaches to probed mind-wandering reports

Psychology faces a measurement crisis, and mind-wandering research is not immune. The present study explored the construct validity of probed mind-wandering reports (i.e., reports of task-unrelated thought [TUT]) with a combined experimental and individual-differences approach. We examined laboratory data from over 1000 undergraduates at two U.S. institutions, who responded to one of four different thought-probe types across two cognitive tasks. We asked a fundamental measurement question: Do different probe types yield different results, either in terms of average reports (average TUT rates, TUT-report confidence ratings), or in terms of TUT-report associations, such as TUT rate or confidence stability across tasks, or between TUT reports and other consciousness-related constructs (retrospective mind-wandering ratings, executive-control performance, and broad questionnaire trait assessments of distractibility–restlessness and positive-constructive daydreaming)? Our primary analyses compared probes that asked subjects to report on different dimensions of experience: TUT-content probes asked about what they’d been mind-wandering about, TUT-intentionality probes asked about why they were mind-wandering, and TUT-depth probes asked about the extent (on a rating scale) of their mind-wandering. Our secondary analyses compared thought-content probes that did versus didn’t offer an option to report performance-evaluative thoughts. Our findings provide some “good news”—that some mind-wandering findings are robust across probing methods—and some “bad news”—that some findings are not robust across methods and that some commonly used probing methods may not tell us what we think they do. Our results lead us to provisionally recommend content-report probes rather than intentionality- or depth-report probes for most mind-wandering research.

How deep is the rift between conscious states in sleep and wakefulness? Spontaneous experience over the sleep-wake cycle

Whether we are awake or asleep is believed to mark a sharp divide between the types of conscious states we undergo in either behavioural state. Consciousness in sleep is often equated with dreaming and thought to be characteristically different from waking consciousness. Conversely, recent research shows that we spend a substantial amount of our waking lives mind wandering, or lost in spontaneous thoughts. Dreaming has been described as intensified mind wandering, suggesting that there is a continuum of spontaneous experience that reaches from waking into sleep. This challenges how we conceive of the behavioural states of sleep and wakefulness in relation to conscious states. I propose a conceptual framework that distinguishes different subtypes of spontaneous thoughts and experiences independently of their occurrence in sleep or waking. I apply this framework to selected findings from dream and mind-wandering research. I argue that to assess the relationship between spontaneous thoughts and experiences and the behavioural states of sleep and wakefulness, we need to look beyond dreams to consider kinds of sleep-related experience that qualify as dreamless. I conclude that if we consider the entire range of spontaneous thoughts and experiences, there appears to be variation in subtypes both within as well as across behavioural states. Whether we are sleeping or waking does not appear to strongly constrain which subtypes of spontaneous thoughts and experiences we undergo in those states. This challenges the conventional and coarse-grained distinction between sleep and waking and their putative relation to conscious states. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.