Illusory Visual Completion of an Object’s Invisible Backside Can Make Your Finger Feel Shorter

Amodal completion across the brain: The impact of structure and knowledge

This study investigates the phenomenon of amodal completion within the context of naturalistic objects, employing a repetition suppression paradigm to disentangle the influence of structure and knowledge cues on how objects are completed. The research focuses on early visual cortex (EVC) and lateral occipital complex (LOC), shedding light on how these brain regions respond to different completion scenarios. In LOC, we observed suppressed responses to structure and knowledge-compatible stimuli, providing evidence that both cues influence neural processing in higher-level visual areas. However, in EVC, we did not find evidence for differential responses to completions compatible or incompatible with either structural or knowledge-based expectations. Together, our findings suggest that the interplay between structure and knowledge cues in amodal completion predominantly impacts higher-level visual processing, with less pronounced effects on the early visual cortex. This study contributes to our understanding of the complex mechanisms underlying visual perception and highlights the distinct roles played by different brain regions in amodal completion.

Underestimation of the number of hidden objects

The perceptual representation of our environment does not only involve what we actually can see, but also inferences about what is hidden from our sight. For example, in amodal completion, simple contours or surfaces are filled-in behind occluding objects allowing for a complete representation. This is important for many everyday tasks, such as visual search, foraging, and object handling. Although there is support for completion of simple patterns from behavioral and neurophysiological studies, it is unclear if these mechanisms extend to complex, irregular patterns. Here, we show that the number of hidden objects on partially occluded surfaces is underestimated. Observers did not consider accurately the number of visible objects and the proportion of occlusion to infer the number of hidden objects, although these quantities were perceived accurately and reliably. However, visible objects were not simply ignored: estimations of hidden objects increased when the visible objects formed a line across the occluder and decreased when the visible objects formed a line outside of the occluder. Confidence ratings for numerosity estimation were similar for fully visible and partially occluded surfaces. These results suggest that perceptual inferences about what is hidden in our environment can be very inaccurate und underestimate the complexity of the environment.

A balanced view of impossible aesthetics: An empirical investigation of how impossibility relates to our enjoyment of magic tricks

The performance art of magic allows us to experience the impossible, and this study used a balancing magic trick to investigate the relationship between participants' enjoyment and perceived impossibility. Participants watched a live performance of a magic trick in which the magician balanced objects in progressively more impossible configurations. At seven different time points observers rated their enjoyment, and the extent to which they believed what they saw was impossible. Regression analysis revealed that participants' enjoyment of the magical effect relates to their perceived impossibility of the magic trick, and this relationship was independent of how much they enjoyed magic in general. Moreover, a one-way within-subjects analysis of variance showed that participants enjoyed the performance More as the trick became more impossible. However, once the magical effect was anticipated, enjoyment began to plateau while perceived impossibility continued to increase. These results are discussed in the context of people's aesthetic appreciation of magic and current arts appreciation models.

Amodal completion and relationalism

Amodal completion is usually characterized as the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. In the case of the visual sense modality, for example, amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of objects we see. I argue that relationalism about perception, the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the relation to the perceived object, cannot give a coherent account of amodal completion. The relationalist has two options: construe the perceptual relation as the relation to the entire perceived object or as the relation to the unoccluded parts of the perceived object. I argue that neither of these options are viable.

Experience-Dependent Modulation of Rubber Hand Illusion in Badminton Players

Badminton players have a plastic modification of their arm representation in the brain due to the prolonged use of their racket. However, it is not known whether their arm representation can be altered through short-term visuotactile integration. The neural representation of the body is easily altered when multiple sensory signals are integrated in the brain. One of the most popular experimental paradigms for investigating this phenomenon is the "rubber hand illusion." This study was designed to investigate the effect of prolonged use of a racket on the modulation of arm representation during the rubber hand illusion in badminton players. When badminton players hold the racket, their badminton experience in years is negatively correlated with the magnitude of the rubber hand illusion. This finding suggests that tool embodiment obtained by the prolonged use of the badminton racket is less likely to be disturbed when holding the racket.

Fooling System 1 in the field of perception: Failure to intuitively detect attribute substitution in the flushtration count illusion

To facilitate our interactions with the surroundings, the human brain sometimes reshapes the situations that it faces to simplify them. This phenomenon has been widely studied in the context of reasoning, especially through the attribute substitution error. It has however been given much less attention in the field of perception. Recent research on the bat-and-ball problem suggests that reasoners are able to intuitively detect attribute substitution errors. Using a perceptual illusion drawn from the field of magic, we investigate the extent to which a perceptual form of attribute substitution depends on executive resources and can be detected. We also investigate the relationship between susceptibility to attribute substitution error in the flushtration count illusion and in a French adaptation of the bat-and-ball problem. Finally, we investigate the link between the intuitive cognitive style (assessed by the cognitive reflection test) and the susceptibility to the flushtration count illusion. Our results suggest that participants do not detect perceptual attribute substitution error, that this phenomenon could be independent of the executive resources allocated to the task, and could rest on mechanisms distinct from those that produce errors in reasoning. We discuss differences between these two phenomena, and factors that may explain them.

The long sixth finger illusion: The representation of the supernumerary finger is not a copy and can be felt with varying lengths

We can have a distorted perception of our body, instantly induced with multisensory illusions, anaesthesia or Virtual Reality, and recent studies show we can also feel extra body parts. Newport and colleagues (Newport et al., 2016) created an illusion that induces the feeling of having a sixth finger on one's hand, for a brief moment. By changing the paradigm with a double back and forth stroking, we were able to extend the duration of this illusion (Cadete & Longo, 2020), which can reflect an endured representation of a supernumerary finger. This innovation allowed us to test one specific distortion in the supernumerary finger: length. Patients with supernumerary phantom limb syndrome feel like they have an extra limb, as if one of their limbs was duplicated (Staub et al., 2006), resembling the same size and shape of the existing one. It is unclear from existing studies whether a supernumerary limb is represented as a copy of the existing limb, or if it is represented independently, with its own features. We therefore aimed to investigate whether the properties of the supernumerary sixth finger could be altered, independently of the actual little finger. Hence, we tested whether we can embody a sixth finger with double the size of the average little finger, and half its size. Participants reported feeling a long and a short sixth finger, and gave visual judgements on the felt length of the supernumerary finger, that matched the condition length. Overall, the results show that the supernumerary sixth finger is not a mere copy of the little finger but is represented independently, with distinct features from the existing finger. Moreover, the representation of the supernumerary finger is flexible, allowing the embodiment of a long or a short sixth finger.

"Impossible" Somatosensation and the (Ir)rationality of Perception

Impossible figures represent the world in ways it cannot be. From the work of M. C. Escher to any popular perception textbook, such experiences show how some principles of mental processing can be so entrenched and inflexible as to produce absurd and even incoherent outcomes that could not occur in reality. However, impossible experiences of this sort are mostly limited to visual perception; are there “impossible figures” for other sensory modalities? Here, we import a known magic trick into the laboratory to report and investigate an impossible experience for somatosensation—one that can be physically felt. We show that, even under full-cue conditions with objects that can be freely inspected, subjects can be made to experience a single object alone as feeling heavier than a group of objects that includes the single object as a member—an impossible and phenomenologically striking experience of weight. Moreover, we suggest that this phenomenon—a special case of the size-weight illusion—reflects a kind of “anti-Bayesian” perceptual updating that amplifies a challenge to rational models of perception and cognition.

Cognitive style predicts how people explain mental magic tricks

Magic tricks are deceiving, yet we can readily generate an explanation for a trick that we do not fully understand. In three experiments, we show that the way people explain a mental magic trick depends on their individual cognitive style. Analytical thinkers tend to generate explanations that appeal to rationality, such as using physical props to accomplish an effect. In contrast, intuitive thinkers are more likely to generate irrational explanations that accord with the magician's provided backstory, such as using subliminal cues to guide a spectator's choices. We observe this effect when measuring a participant's cognitive style using the Cognitive Reflection Test, and also when manipulating a participant's cognitive style using a simple narrative prompt.

Magic, Bayes and wows: A Bayesian account of magic tricks

Magic tricks have enjoyed an increasing interest by scientists. However, most research in magic focused on isolated aspects of it and a conceptual understanding of magic, encompassing its distinct components and varieties, is missing. Here, we present an account of magic within the theory of Bayesian predictive coding. We present the "wow" effect of magic as an increase in surprise evoked by the prediction error between expected and observed data. We take into account prior knowledge of the observer, attention, and (mis-)direction of perception and beliefs by the magician to bias the observer's predictions and present a simple example for the modelling of the evoked surprise. The role of misdirection is described as everything that aims to maximize the surprise a trick evokes by the generation of novel beliefs, the exploitation of background knowledge and attentional control of the incoming information. Understanding magic within Bayesian predictive coding allows unifying all aspects of magic tricks within one framework, making it tractable, comparable and unifiable with other models in psychology and neuroscience.

The illusion of absence: how a common feature of magic shows can explain a class of road accidents

The purpose of the present note is to draw attention to the potential role of a recently discovered visual illusion in creating traffic accidents. The illusion consists in a compelling and immediate experience that the space behind an occluding object in the foreground is empty. Although the illusion refers to a region of space, which is invisible due to occlusion (a blind spot), there is evidence to suggest that it is nevertheless driven by visual mechanisms and that it can be just as deceptive and powerful as ordinary visual illusions. We suggest that this novel illusion can make situations involving blind spots in a road user's field of view even more dangerous than one would expect based on the lack of visibility by itself. This could be because it erroneously makes the road user feel that (s)he has actually seen everything there is to see, and thus has verified that the blind spot is empty. This hypothesis requires further testing before definitive conclusions can be drawn, but we wish to make researchers and authorities involved in the analysis of traffic accidents and on-the-spot crash investigations aware of its potential role in order to encourage registration of relevant data and facilitate further research.

Defending subjective inflation: an inference to the best explanation

In a recent opinion piece, Abid (2019) criticizes the hypothesis that subjective inflation may partly account for apparent phenomenological richness across the visual field and outside the focus of attention. In response, we address three main issues. First, we maintain that inflation should be interpreted as an intraperceptual-and not post-perceptual-phenomenon. Second, we describe how inflation may differ from filling-in. Finally, we contend that, in general, there is sufficient evidence to tip the scales toward intraperceptual interpretations of visibility and confidence judgments.

On the cognitive bases of illusionism

Cognitive scientists have paid very little attention to magic as a distinctly human activity capable of creating situations that are considered impossible because they violate expectations and conclude with the apparent transgression of well-established cognitive and natural laws. This illusory experience of the "impossible" entails a very particular cognitive dissonance that is followed by a subjective and complex "magical experience". Here, from a perspective inspired by visual neuroscience and ecological cognition, we propose a set of seven fundamental cognitive phenomena (from attention and perception to memory and decision-making) plus a previous pre-sensory stage that magicians interfere with during the presentation of their effects. By doing so, and using as an example the deconstruction of a classic trick, we show how magic offers novel and powerful insights to study human cognition. Furthermore, live magic performances afford to do so in tasks that are more ecological and context-dependent than those usually exploited in artificial laboratory settings. We thus believe that some of the mysteries of how the brain works may be trapped in the split realities present in every magic effect.

The Illusion of Absence in Magic Tricks

Recently, a curious illusion of absence has been described, where the space behind an occluder is compellingly experienced as empty. This illusion is similar to illusions based on amodal completion in the sense that it refers to occluded portions of a visual scene and informal observations suggest that it may also be largely impervious to conscious knowledge. The aim of the present experiment was to test the hypothesis that the illusion of absence is cognitively impenetrable in the same way as amodal completion. Participants viewed magic tricks based on amodal completion, the illusion of absence, or attentional and reasoning misdirection and tried to infer the secret behind the tricks after one, two, or three presentations. The results show that the tricks based on the illusion of absence are very difficult to debunk, even after repeated presentations. In this regard, they are similar to tricks based on amodal completion but different from tricks based on attentional and reasoning misdirection. The participants also rated how magical they felt the tricks were. Surprisingly, the magic ratings tended to be quite high even in trials where the participants had already discovered the secret behind the trick. This unexpected finding may be taken to suggest that there may be two magical moments in the lifetime of a magic trick: In addition to the magical experience evoked by trick itself, discovering the secret behind the trick may also evoke an experience of impossibility.

A Perceptual Illusion of Empty Space Can Create a Perceptual Illusion of Levitation

A recent analysis of magic tricks suggests the existence of a perceptual illusion where the space hidden behind an occluding object is experienced as empty in a strangely compelling way. Here, we show that this illusion of absence is not just a trivial consequence of the lack of retinal stimulation but rather the result of an active process of perceptual construction. The results of a simple experiment show that this perceptual illusion of absence can in turn trigger perceptual processes which generate an immediate perceptual impression of levitation via a percept-percept coupling. This suggests that magical illusions of levitation are partially driven by an immediate perceptual impression of floating in thin air. The perceptual mechanisms underlying the illusion of absence are hitherto unknown, but our results provide support for a potential explanation based on the generic view principle.

The Bathtub Illusion

When a person looks at the fingers of their own hand as they line up in depth, the impression may emerge that the little fingers, which are farther away, are located too far and if so they are not part of the same hand. I describe the conditions and suggest this is due to the size difference between fingers (size-distance scaling). A role of size on perceived distance here is more powerful than knowledge about our own body.

Illusions of Imagery and Magical Experiences

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the idea that we may gain new insights in cognitive science by studying the art of magic. Here, I offer a first exploratory overview and preliminary conceptual analysis of a class of magic tricks, which has been largely neglected in this pursuit, namely, a set of tricks that can be loosely defined as topological tricks. The deceptive powers of many of these tricks are difficult to understand in light of known psychological principles, which suggests that closer scientific scrutiny may raise interesting questions and challenges for cognitive science. I discuss a number of known and novel psychological principles that may explain why these tricks evoke the strong feelings of impossibility that are characteristic of magical experiences. A profound and detailed understanding of how topological tricks evoke magical experiences remains elusive, though, and more research on this topic could advance our understanding of perception, imagery and reasoning.

The Limiting Case of Amodal Completion: The Phenomenal Salience and the Role of Contrast Polarity

In this work, we demonstrated unique and relevant visual properties imparted by contrast polarity in perceptual organization and in eliciting amodal completion, which is the vivid completion of a single continuous object of the visible parts of an occluded shape despite portions of its boundary contours not actually being seen. T-junction, good continuation, and closure are considered the main principles involved according to relevant explanations of amodal completion based on the simplicity–Prägnanz principle, Helmholtz’s likelihood, and Bayesian inference. The main interest of these approaches is to explain how the occluded object is completed, what is the amodal shape, and how contours of partially visible fragments are relatable behind an occluder. Different from these perspectives, amodal completion was considered here as a visual phenomenon and not as a process, i.e., the final outcome of perceptual processes and grouping principles. Therefore, the main question we addressed through our stimuli was “What is the role of shape formation and perceptual organization in inducing amodal completion?” To answer this question, novel stimuli, similar to limiting cases and instantiae crucis, were studied through Gestalt experimental phenomenology. The results demonstrated the domination of the contrast polarity against good continuation, T-junctions, and regularity. Moreover, the limiting conditions explored revealed a new kind of junction next to the T- and Y-junctions, respectively responsible for amodal completion and tessellation. We called them I-junctions. The results were theoretically discussed in relation to the previous approaches and in the light of the phenomenal salience imparted by contrast polarity.

Cognitive conflict and restructuring: The neural basis of two core components of insight

Sometimes, the solution to a difficult problem simply pops into mind. Such a moment of sudden comprehension is known as "insight". This fundamental cognitive process is crucial for problem solving, creativity and innovation, yet its true nature remains elusive, despite one century of psychological research. Typically, insight is investigated by using spatial puzzles or verbal riddles. Broadening the traditional approach, we propose to tackle this question by presenting magic tricks to participants and asking them to find out the secret method used by the magician. Combining this approach with cueing in an fMRI experiment, we were able to break down the insight process into two underlying components: cognitive conflict and restructuring. During cognitive conflict, problem solvers identify incongruent information that does not match their current mental representation. In a second step this information is restructured, thereby allowing them to correctly determine how the magic trick was done. We manipulated the occurrence of cognitive conflict by presenting two types of cues that lead participants to either maintain their perceptual belief (congruent cue) or to change their perceptual belief (incongruent cue) for the mechanism behind the magic trick. We found that partially overlapping but distinct networks of brain activity were recruited for cognitive conflict and restructuring. Posterior, predominantly visual brain activity during cognitive conflict reflected processes related to prediction error, attention to the relevant cue-specific sensory domain, and the default brain state. Restructuring on the other hand, showed a highly distributed pattern of brain activity in regions of the default mode, executive control networks, and salience networks. The angular gyrus and middle temporal gyrus were active in both cognitive conflict and restructuring, suggesting that these regions are important throughout the insight problem solving process. We believe this type of approach towards understanding insight will give lead to a better understanding of this complex process and the specific role that different brain regions play in creative thought.

Never Repeat the Same Trick Twice-Unless it is Cognitively Impenetrable

In their quest for creating magical experiences, magicians rely on a host of psychological factors. Here, we compare tricks based on attentional misdirection with tricks based on amodal completion. Based on the notion that amodal completion is a cognitively impenetrable perceptual phenomenon, we predicted that the tricks based on this perceptual effect should-to a much larger extent than tricks based on attentional misdirection-retain their deceptive power when the tricks are repeated. The results of an experiment with four magic tricks involving attentional misdirection and four magic tricks based on amodal completion lend strong support to this prediction. Asking subjects to try to figure out the secret behind these tricks after one, two, or three presentations of each trick, we found that the observed solution rates for tricks based on attentional misdirection increased much more with repeated viewing than those for tricks based on amodal completion, which remained very low throughout. Thus, the results lend further support to the idea that amodal completion is based on cognitively impenetrable perceptual mechanisms.

Dissociation of feeling and belief in the rubber hand illusion

The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) has been widely used to investigate the perception of the bodily self. Commonly used measures of the illusion are self-report questionnaires and proprioceptive drift of the participants' hands towards the rubber hand. Recent studies have shown that these measures can be dissociated, suggesting they may arise from distinct mechanisms. In previous studies using questionnaires, participants were asked to base responses on their subjective feelings of body ownership, rather than their beliefs. This makes sense given the obvious fact that whereas participants may feel like the rubber hand is part of their body, they do not believe that it is. It is not clear, however, whether a similar dissociation between feelings and beliefs also exists for proprioceptive drift. Here, we investigated the presence of a dissociation between feeling and belief in the context of the RHI. When participants reported their feelings there was an increase both in the sense of body ownership over the fake hand as well as in the proprioceptive drift, compared to when they reported their beliefs. Strikingly, unlike the sense of ownership, proprioceptive drift was unaffected by the synchrony of stimulation. This may be an important way in which the two measures of the RHI differ.

The Importance of Amodal Completion in Everyday Perception

Amodal completion is the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. In the case of vision, it is the representation of occluded parts of objects we see: When we see a cat behind a picket fence, our perceptual system represents those parts of the cat that are occluded by the picket fence. The aim of this piece is to argue that amodal completion plays a constitutive role in our everyday perception and trace the theoretical consequences of this claim.

Amodal Volume Completion and the Thin Building Illusion

We report results from an experiment showing that a tall pillar with a triangular base evokes radically different three-dimensional (3D) percepts depending on the vantage point from which it is observed. The base of the pillar is an isosceles right triangle, but the pillar is perceived as just a thin plane when viewed from some vantage points. Viewed from other vantage points, the perceived 3D shape of the pillar corresponds to a square or rectangular base. In general, our results suggest that the visual system uses a preference for rectangularity (or symmetry) to determine the 3D shape of objects. The amodal impressions of the invisible backside of the pillar are often quite compelling, and the corresponding illusions persist even when the observers know the true shape of the pillar. Interestingly, though, the compellingness and definiteness of the amodal impression of the pillar's backside depends on the vantage point. This is reflected in corresponding differences in the interobserver variability of the 3D shape judgments. We also discuss how variants of this illusion are used as a powerful tool in the art of magic.

Dynamic Volume Completion and Deformation

A new class of dynamic volume completion is introduced, where image elements (e.g., occluding semi-ellipses placed at the edge of an object) can link across a gap between two or more objects, leading to the perception of illusory volumes that deform as those image elements are set into relative motion. These new demonstrations provide further evidence that volume completion is not dictated solely by contour relatability constraints, but is instead a dynamic process of 3D shape construction that also takes into account dynamic cues to object shape, even in the absence of any contour relatability whatsoever.

Volume Completion Between Contour Fragments at Discrete Depths

Building on the modal and amodal completion work of Kanizsa, Carman and Welch showed that binocular stereo viewing of two disparate images can give rise to a percept of 3D curved, nonclosed illusory contours and surfaces. Here, it is shown that binocular presentation can also give rise to the percept of closed curved surfaces or volumes that appear to vary smoothly across discrete depths in binocularly fused images, although in fact only two binocular disparities are discretely defined between corresponding contour elements of the inducing elements. Surfaces are filled in from one depth layer's visible contours to another layer's visible contours within virtual contours that are interpolated on the basis of good contour continuation between the visible portions of contour. These single depth contour segments are taken not to arise from surface edges, as in Kanizsa's or Carman and Welch's examples, but from segments of "rim" where the line of sight just grazes a surface that continues behind and beyond the rim smoothly. When there are two or more surface-propagating contour segments, the propagated surfaces can continue away from the inferred rim, merge, and then close behind the self-occluding visible surface into an everywhere differentiable closed surface or volume. Illusory surfaces can possess a depth and perceived surface curvature that is consistent with all visible contour segments, despite the absence of local disparity cues at interpolated 3D surface locations far from any visible contour. These demonstrations cannot be easily explained by existing models of visual processing. They place constraints on the surface and volume generation processes that construct our 3D world under normal viewing conditions.

The Other Side of Magic

When magicians perform spectacles that seem to defy the laws of nature, they do so by manipulating psychological reality. Hence, the principles underlying the art of conjuring are potentially of interest to psychological science. Here, we argue that perceptual and cognitive principles governing how humans experience hidden things and reason about them play a central role in many magic tricks. Different from tricks based on many other forms of misdirection, which require considerable skill on the part of the magician, many elements of these tricks are essentially self-working because they rely on automatic perceptual and cognitive processes. Since these processes are not directly observable, even experienced magicians may be oblivious to their central role in creating strong magical experiences and tricks that are almost impossible to debunk, even after repeated presentations. We delineate how insights from perceptual psychology provide a framework for understanding why these tricks work so well. Conversely, we argue that studying magic tricks that work much better than one intuitively would believe provides a promising heuristic for charting unexplored aspects of perception and cognition.