The Effect of Retention Interval on the Eyewitness Identification Confidence–Accuracy Relationship

Applying confidence accuracy characteristic plots to old/new recognition memory experiments

Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) plots were developed for use in eyewitness identification experiments, and previous findings show that high confidence indicates high accuracy in all studies of adults with an unbiased lineup. We apply CAC plots to standard old/new recognition memory data by calculating response-based and item-based accuracy, one using false alarms and the other using misses. We use both methods to examine the confidence-accuracy relationship for both correct old responses (hits) and new responses (correct rejections). We reanalysed three sets of published data using these methods and show that the method chosen, as well as the relation of lures to targets, determines the confidence-accuracy relation. Using response-based accuracy for hits, high confidence yields quite high accuracy, and this is generally true with the other methods, especially when lures are unrelated to targets. However, when analyzing correct rejections, the relationship between confidence and accuracy is less pronounced. When lures are semantically related to targets, the various CAC plots show different confidence-accuracy relations. The different methods of calculating CAC plots provide a useful tool in analyzing standard old/new recognition experiments. The results generally accord with unequal-variance signal detection models of recognition memory.

O Efeito de Carga Emocional e Intervalo de Retenção na Memória de Testemunhas Oculares

Resumo Presenciar um crime é uma situação de grande estresse e com forte carga emocional, fatores diretamente relacionados à qualidade do relato de testemunhas oculares. Em dois experimentos, participantes assistiram a eventos com diferentes cargas emocionais (neutro, assalto ou assassinato) e forneceram seus relatos após diferentes intervalos de retenção (teste imediato, 7 dias, 14 dias ou 21 dias). Os resultados mostraram que a carga emocional não teve efeito na memória de testemunhas para aspectos do crime e características do criminoso. O evento com maior carga emocional teve um efeito benéfico na memória após um intervalo de 7 dias, mas tal efeito não ocorreu em intervalos mais longos. Implicações teóricas e práticas relacionadas à interpretação do relato de testemunhas são discutidas.

The Truth Is Out There: Accuracy in Recall of Verifiable Real-World Events

How accurate is memory? Although people implicitly assume that their memories faithfully represent past events, the prevailing view in research is that memories are error prone and constructive. Yet little is known about the frequency of errors, particularly in memories for naturalistic experiences. Here, younger and older adults underwent complex real-world experiences that were nonetheless controlled and verifiable, freely recalling these experiences after days to years. As expected, memory quantity and the richness of episodic detail declined with increasing age and retention interval. Details that participants did recall, however, were highly accurate (93%–95%) across age and time. This level of accuracy far exceeded comparatively low estimations among memory scientists and other academics in a survey. These findings suggest that details freely recalled from one-time real-world experiences can retain high correspondence to the ground truth despite significant forgetting, with higher accuracy than expected given the emphasis on fallibility in the field of memory research.

Recognition memory: Tulving's contributions and some new findings

Endel Tulving has provided unparalleled contributions to the study of human memory. We consider here his contributions to the study of recognition memory and celebrate his first article on recognition, a nearly forgotten but (we argue) essential paper from 1968. We next consider his distinction between remembering and knowing, its relation to confidence, and the implications of high levels of false remembering in the DRM paradigm for using phenomenal experiences as measures of memory. We next pivot to newer work, the use of confidence accuracy characteristic plots in analyzing standard recognition memory experiments. We argue they are quite useful in such research, as they are in eyewitness research. For example, we report that even with hundreds of items, high confidence in a response indicates high accuracy, just as it does in one-item eyewitness research. Finally, we argue that amnesia (rapid forgetting) occurs in all people (not just amnesic patients) for some of their experiences. We provide evidence from three experiments revealing that subjects who fail to recognize recently studied items (miss responses) do so with high confidence 15-20% of the time. Such high confidence misses constitute our definition of everyday amnesia that can occur even in college student populations.

How Behavioral Economics and Nudges Could Help Diminish Irrationality in Suicide-Related Decisions

People regularly make decisions that are not aligned with their own self-interests. These irrational decisions often stem from humans having bounded rationality (e.g., limited computational power), which produces reliable cognitive biases that occur outside of people's awareness and influences the decisions people make. There are many important decisions leading up to a suicide attempt, and it is likely that these same biases exist within suicide-related decisions. This article presents an argument for the likely existence of cognitive biases within suicide-related decision making and how they may influence people to make irrational decisions. In addition, this article provides new evidence for using a behavioral economic intervention-nudges-as a potential way to combat rising suicide rates. We explore how nudges can help increase means safety, disseminate suicide prevention skills/materials, diminish well-known biases (e.g., confirmation bias), and uncover biases that may be occurring when making suicide-related decisions.

Developmental trends in lineup performance: Adolescents are more prone to innocent bystander misidentifications than children and adults

We tested developmental trends in eyewitness identification in biased and unbiased lineups. Our main interest was adolescent's lineup performance compared with children and adults. 7-10-year-olds, 11-13-year-olds, 14-16-year-olds, and adults (N = 431) watched a wallet-theft-video and subsequently identified the thief, victim, and witness from simultaneous target-present and target-absent six-person photo lineups. The thief-absent lineup included a bystander previously seen in thief proximity. Research on unconscious transference suggested a selection bias toward the bystander in adults and 11-13-year-olds, but not in younger children. Confirming our hypothesis, adolescents were more prone to bystander bias than all other age groups. This may be due to adolescents making more inferential errors than children, as predicted by fuzzy-trace theory and associative-activation theory, combined with lower inhibition control in adolescents compared with adults. We also replicated a clothing bias for all age groups and age-related performance differences in our unbiased lineups. Consistent with previous findings, participants were generally overconfident in their decisions, even though confidence was a better predictor of accuracy in older compared with younger participants. With this study, we show that adolescents have an increased tendency to misidentify an innocent bystander. Continued efforts are needed to disentangle how adolescents in comparison to other age groups perform in forensically relevant situations.

The effects of repeated lineups and delay on eyewitness identification

A significant problem in eyewitness identification occurs when witnesses view a suspect in one venue such as a mugshot and then later in a lineup where the suspect is the only previously viewed person. Prior research has documented that the witness may select the suspect from the lineup due either to misplaced familiarity from seeing the mugshot or to their prior commitment from identifying the suspect from the mugshot. Two experiments attempted to minimize these biases by using repeated identical lineups, such that both targets and fillers were repeated, to determine if such a procedure could be useful. Across two experiments, we also varied the delay between seeing the event and the first lineup, as well as the delay between lineups. Despite the use of identical lineups, we continued to observe the effects of commitment and misplaced familiarity, so our procedure did not remove these problems. In addition, we also found that both repeated lineups and increasing delays can influence people's tendency to choose and their willingness to maintain their decisions, regardless of accuracy. Most importantly, however, despite the negative effects of repeated lineups and the relatively long delays used in our experiments, we obtained strong relations between confidence and accuracy when using confidence-accuracy characteristic plots. High confidence responses were associated with high accuracy.

Confidence of Older Eyewitnesses: Is It Diagnostic of Identification Accuracy?

Since the late 1980s evidence has been accumulating that confidence recorded at the time of identification is a reliable postdictor of eyewitness identification. Nonetheless, there may be noteworthy exceptions. In a re-analysis of a field study by Sauerland and Sporer (2009; N = 720; n = 436 choosers between 15 and 83 years old) we show that the postdictive value of confidence was reduced for participants aged 40 years or older. Different calibration indices and Bayesian analyses demonstrate a progressive dissociation between identification performance and confidence across age groups. While the confidence expressed following an identification remained unchanged across the lifespan, identification accuracy decreased. Young, highly confident witnesses were much more likely to be accurate than less confident witnesses. With increasing age, witnesses were more likely to be overconfident, particularly at the medium and high levels of confidence, and the postdictive value of confidence and decision times decreased. We conclude that witness age may be an important moderator to take into account when evaluating identification evidence.

Reasons to Doubt the Reliability of Eyewitness Memory: Commentary on Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (2018)

Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (this issue) take issue with the common trope that eyewitness memory is inherently unreliable. They draw on a large body of mock-crime research and a small number of field studies, which indicate that high-confidence eyewitness reports are usually accurate, at least when memory is uncontaminated and suitable interviewing procedures are used. We agree with the thrust of Wixted et al.'s argument and welcome their invitation to confront the mass underselling of eyewitnesses' potential reliability. Nevertheless, we argue that there is a comparable risk of overselling eyewitnesses' reliability. Wixted et al.'s reasoning implies that near-pristine conditions or uncontaminated memories are normative, but there are at least two good reasons to doubt this. First, psychological science does not yet offer a good understanding of how often and when eyewitness interviews might deviate from best practice in ways that compromise the accuracy of witnesses' reports. Second, witnesses may frequently be exposed to preinterview influences that could corrupt reports obtained in best-practice interviews.

The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence and Identification Accuracy: A New Synthesis

Summary

The U.S. legal system increasingly accepts the idea that the confidence expressed by an eyewitness who identified a suspect from a lineup provides little information as to the accuracy of that identification. There was a time when this pessimistic assessment was entirely reasonable because of the questionable eyewitness-identification procedures that police commonly employed. However, after more than 30 years of eyewitness-identification research, our understanding of how to properly conduct a lineup has evolved considerably, and the time seems ripe to ask how eyewitness confidence informs accuracy under more pristine testing conditions (e.g., initial, uncontaminated memory tests using fair lineups, with no lineup administrator influence, and with an immediate confidence statement). Under those conditions, mock-crime studies and police department field studies have consistently shown that, for adults, (a) confidence and accuracy are strongly related and (b) high-confidence suspect identifications are remarkably accurate. However, when certain non-pristine testing conditions prevail (e.g., when unfair lineups are used), the accuracy of even a high-confidence suspect ID is seriously compromised. Unfortunately, some jurisdictions have not yet made reforms that would create pristine testing conditions and, hence, our conclusions about the reliability of high-confidence identifications cannot yet be applied to those jurisdictions. However, understanding the information value of eyewitness confidence under pristine testing conditions can help the criminal justice system to simultaneously achieve both of its main objectives: to exonerate the innocent (by better appreciating that initial, low-confidence suspect identifications are error prone) and to convict the guilty (by better appreciating that initial, high-confidence suspect identifications are surprisingly accurate under proper testing conditions).

To Veil or Not to Veil: Detecting Lies in The Courtroom. A Comment on Leach et al. (2016)

For the past 40 years, lie detection has predominantly been studied in the context of police-suspect and investigative interviews. In their paper, Leach et al. (2016) examined whether niqabs or hijabs interfere with the trial judges' ability to detect deception and concluded that veiling enhanced trial judges' ability to make accurate veracity judgments. In this comment, we argue that the conclusions made by Leach et al. are based upon an inaccurate experimental court paradigm and suffer from methodological and analytical issues. It is our opinion that the applicability of their research findings to real-life court proceedings alongside potential changes to court practices and policies based on Leach et al. should be regarded as naïve and misinformed.