Cognitive consistency and the formation of interpersonal attitudes: Cognitive balance affects the encoding of social information

Two social minds in one brain? error-related negativity provides evidence for parallel processing pathways during social evaluation

Several authors assume that evaluative conditioning (EC) relies on high-level propositional thinking. In contrast, the dual-process perspective proposes two processing pathways, one associative and the other propositional, contributing to EC. Dual-process theorists argue that attitudinal ambiguity resulting from these two pathways' conflicting evaluations demonstrate the involvement of both automatic and controlled processes in EC. Previously, we suggested that amplitude variations of error-related negativity and error-positivity, two well-researched event-related potentials of performance monitoring, allow for the detection of attitudinal ambiguity at the neural level. The present study utilises self-reported evaluation, categorisation performance, and neural correlates of performance monitoring to explore associative-propositional ambiguity during social attitude formation. Our results show that compared to associative-propositional harmony, attitudinal ambiguity correlates with more neutral subjective evaluations, longer response times, increased error commission, and diminished error-related negativity amplitudes. While our findings align with dual-process models, we aim to offer a propositional interpretation. We discuss dual-process theories in the context of evolutionary psychology, suggesting that associative processes may only represent a small piece of the EC puzzle.

A cognitive balance approach to understanding intergroup attitudes in post-Brexit Northern Ireland

Cognitive balance theory posits that a drive for cognitively consistent thoughts modulates interpersonal relations. We extended cognitive balance theory to intergroup relations and tested it in a real-life setting where intergroup relations are under strain: Northern Ireland in the wake of the UK's withdrawal from the EU. We predicted that when the groups of Irish people and British people in Northern Ireland are perceived as more compatible, intergroup bias would be lower than when groups are perceived as less compatible. We collected data of residents of Northern Ireland before the UK's official withdrawal from the EU (N = 604) and after (N = 350). As hypothesized, attitudes towards British people positively related to attitudes towards Irish people when participants perceived the groups as more compatible. We found the opposite relationship at low levels of perceived compatibility. Exploratory cross-lagged panel analyses did not show that these effects occurred longitudinally, suggesting that cognitive balance does not drive judgements over time possibly because people are less likely to notice inconsistent responses across different time points. The present research demonstrates that intergroup attitudes assessed at a certain point in time follow cognitive balance principles.

Social Verification Theory: A New Way to Conceptualize Validation, Dissonance, and Belonging

ACADEMIC ABSTRACT

In the present review, we propose a theory that seeks to recontextualize various existing theories as functions of people's perceptions of their consistency with those around them. This theory posits that people seek social consistency for both epistemic and relational needs and that social inconsistency is both negative and aversive, similar to the experience of cognitive dissonance. We further posit that the aversive nature of perceiving social inconsistency leads people to engage in various behaviors to mitigate or avoid these inconsistencies. When these behaviors fail, however, people experience chronic social inconsistency, which, much like chronic rejection, is associated with physical and mental health and well-being outcomes. Finally, we describe how mitigation and avoidance of social inconsistency underlie many seemingly unrelated theories, and we provide directions for how future research may expand on this theory.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

In the present review, we propose that people find inconsistency with those around them to be an unpleasant experience, as it threatens people's core need to belong. Because the threat of reduced belongingness evokes negative feelings, people are motivated to avoid inconsistency with others and to mitigate the negative feelings that are produced when it inevitably does arise. We outline several types of behaviors that can be implemented to avoid or mitigate these inconsistencies (e.g., validation, affirmation, distancing, etc.). When these behaviors cannot be implemented successfully, people experience chronic invalidation, which is associated with reduced physical and mental health and well-being outcomes. We discuss how invalidation may disproportionately affect individuals with minoritized identities. Furthermore, we discuss how belongingness could play a key role in radicalization into extremist groups.

Neural correlates of performance monitoring vary as a function of competition between automatic and controlled processes: An ERP study

Dual process theories of attitude formation propose that an evolutionary old associative system automatically generates subjective judgments by processing mere spatiotemporal contiguity between paired objects, subjects, or events. These judgments can potentially contradict our well-reasoned evaluations and highjack decisional or behavioral outcomes. Contrary to this perspective, other models stress the exclusive work of a single propositional system that consciously process co-occurrences between environmental cues and produce propositions, i.e., mental statements that capture the specific manner through which stimuli are linked. We constructed an experiment on the premise that it would be possible, if the associative system does produce attitudes in a parallel non-conscious fashion, to condition two mutually exclusive attitudes (one implicit, the other explicit) toward a same stimulus. Through explicit ratings, inhibition performance, and neural correlates of performance monitoring, we assessed whether there was a discrepancy between stimuli that were conditioned with (1) the two systems working in harmony (i.e., producing congruent attitudes), or (2) the two systems working in competition (i.e., producing incongruent attitudes). Compared with congruent stimuli, incongruent stimuli consistently elicited more neutral liking scores, higher response times and error rates, as well as a diminished amplitudes in two well-studied neural correlates of automatic error detection (i.e., error-related negativity) and conscious appraisal of error commission (i.e., error-related positivity). Our findings are discussed in the light of evolutionary psychology, dual-process theories of attitude formation and theoretical frameworks on the functional significance of error-related neural markers.

Attribution Impacts Implicit (And Explicit) Evaluations

Two studies examined whether the attributional framing of negative events affected explicit evaluations, as measured by differences in liking, and implicit evaluations, as measured by the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). In Study 1, participants read negative information about a novel target ordered to elicit internal or external attributions. Participants in the internal attribution condition evaluated the target more negatively than did those in the external attribution condition on both implicit and explicit measures. Study 2 replicated these results and tested the effects of attribution on recently formed negative evaluations. Participants who evaluated targets before and after receiving additional negative information about them demonstrated implicit and explicit evaluative change consistent with the attributional framing of that information. This research provides clear evidence that attribution influences the formation and change of implicit evaluations; however, these effects were weaker than those on explicit measures of evaluation.

Our Grandmothers' Legacy: Challenges Faced by Female Ancestors Leave Traces in Modern Women's Same-Sex Relationships

Investigations of women's same-sex relationships present a paradoxical pattern, with women generally disliking competition, yet also exhibiting signs of intrasexual rivalry. The current article leverages the historical challenges faced by female ancestors to understand modern women's same-sex relationships. Across history, women were largely denied independent access to resources, often depending on male partners' provisioning to support themselves and their children. Same-sex peers thus became women's primary romantic rivals in competing to attract and retain relationships with the limited partners able and willing to invest. Modern women show signs of this competition, disliking and aggressing against those who threaten their romantic prospects, targeting especially physically attractive and sexually uninhibited peers. However, women also rely on one another for aid, information, and support. As most social groups were patrilocal across history, upon marriage, women left their families to reside with their husbands. Female ancestors likely used reciprocal altruism or mutualism to facilitate cooperative relationships with nearby unrelated women. To sustain these mutually beneficial cooperative exchange relationships, women may avoid competitive and status-striving peers, instead preferring kind, humble, and loyal allies. Ancestral women who managed to simultaneously compete for romantic partners while forming cooperative female friendships would have been especially successful. Women may therefore have developed strategies to achieve both competitive and cooperative goals, such as guising their intrasexual competition as prosociality or vulnerability. These historical challenges make sense of the seemingly paradoxical pattern of female aversion to competition, relational aggression, and valuation of loyal friends, offering insight into possible opportunities for intervention.

Attitudinal Effects of Stimulus Co-occurrence and Stimulus Relations: Paradoxical Effects of Cognitive Load

Research suggests that evaluations of an object can be jointly influenced by (a) the mere co-occurrence of the object with a pleasant or unpleasant stimulus (e.g., mere co-occurrence of object A and negative event B) and (b) the object's specific relation to the co-occurring stimulus (e.g., object A starts vs. stops negative event B). Three experiments investigated the impact of cognitive load during learning on the effects of stimulus co-occurrence and stimulus relations. Counter to the shared prediction of competing theories suggesting that effects of stimulus relations should be reduced by cognitive load during learning, effects of stimulus relations were greater (rather than smaller) under high-load compared with low-load conditions. Effects of stimulus co-occurrence were not significantly affected by cognitive load. The results are discussed in terms of theories suggesting that cognitive load can influence behavioral outcomes via strategic shifts in resource allocation in response to task-specific affordances.

Attitudinal Effects of Stimulus Co-Occurrence and Stimulus Relations: Range and Limits of Intentional Control

Research suggests that evaluations of an object can be simultaneously influenced by (a) the mere co-occurrence of the object with a pleasant or unpleasant stimulus (e.g., mere co-occurrence of object A and negative event B) and (b) the object’s particular relation to the co-occurring stimulus (e.g., object A starts vs. stops negative event B). Using a multinomial modeling approach to disentangle the two kinds of influences on choice decisions, three experiments investigated whether learners can intentionally control the relative impact of stimulus co-occurrence and stimulus relations. An integrative analysis of the data from the three experiments ( N = 1,154) indicate that incentivized instructions to counteract effects of stimulus co-occurrence by focusing on stimulus relations increased the impact of stimulus relations without affecting the impact of stimulus co-occurrence. Implications for evaluative learning, intentional control, and public policy are discussed.

Propositional Accounts of Implicit Evaluation: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

Associative accounts suggest that implicit (indirectly measured) evaluations are sensitive primarily to co-occurrence information (e.g., pairings of gorges with positive experiences) and are represented associatively (e.g., Gorge–Nice). By contrast, recent propositional accounts have argued that implicit evaluations are also responsive to relational information (e.g., gorges causing vs. preventing ennui) and are represented propositionally (e.g., “I find gorges fascinating”). In a review of 30 empirical papers involving exposure to contradictory co-occurrence information and relational information, we found overwhelming evidence for the latter dominating the updating of implicit evaluations, supporting the propositional perspective. However, unlike explicit evaluations, implicit evaluations seem recalcitrant in the face of relational information that requires retrospective revaluation of already encoded co-occurrence information. These findings may be jointly explained by a “common currency” hypothesis under which implicit evaluations emerge from compressed summary representations, which are sensitive to relational information but are not fully propositional.

Biased by our imaginings

I propose a new model of implicit bias, according to which implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. I argue that my model accommodates characteristic features of implicit bias, does not face the problems of the doxastic model, and is uniquely placed to accommodate the structural heterogeneity in the category of implicit bias. Finally I turn to how my view relates to holding people accountable for their biases and what we know about intervention strategies.

The implicit soul: Factors between the representation of death and dehumanization of patients

Spiritual approaches in healthcare settings proved effective in reducing the negative outcomes of dehumanization processes impacting health professionals and patients. Although previous literature focused on explicit measures of spirituality, the present research explored the role of implicit components of spirituality and their effects on the humanization of patients in two healthcare contexts. Professionals from hospices and nursing homes completed an implicit task to assess whether the diverse representation of death as physical or spiritual led to perceive patients with more uniquely human traits. Results showed that only for hospice participants, implicit and explicit spirituality predicts more humanness attribution to patients. This article discusses palliative care models and death education as a resource for reducing dehumanization.

Saying Good and Bad Things Behind Someone’s Back or to Their Face: Perceived Source Selflessness and Trust in Information Matter When the Information Is Positive

This study explores the consequences of gossiping on impression formation as compared to the consequences of direct communication in the presence of the target individual. Specifically, we focus on perceived source selflessness and trust in the information conveyed about the target individual as important factors for impression formation. In an internet-based study, participants (N = 155) evaluated descriptions of target individuals presented as gossip (spoken outside the target individual’s presence), as direct communication (spoken in the presence of the target individual) or without any information about the source. Analyses yielded no significant differences between experimental conditions on the impression of the target individual. However, we found that trust in information mediated the relation between perceived source selflessness and the general impression of the target individual, yet only when the information about the target individual is positive.

What do implicit measures measure?

We identify several ongoing debates related to implicit measures, surveying prominent views and considerations in each. First, we summarize the debate regarding whether performance on implicit measures is explained by conscious or unconscious representations. Second, we discuss the cognitive structure of the operative constructs: are they associatively or propositionally structured? Third, we review debates about whether performance on implicit measures reflects traits or states. Fourth, we discuss the question of whether a person's performance on an implicit measure reflects characteristics of the person who is taking the test or characteristics of the situation in which the person is taking the test. Finally, we survey the debate about the relationship between implicit measures and (other kinds of) behavior. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Representation Psychology > Theory and Methods Psychology > Prediction Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.

The effect of co-occurrence and relational information on speeded evaluation

After co-occurrence of a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) with an affective unconditioned stimulus (US), the evaluation of the CS acquires the US valence. This effect disappears when information about the CS-US relation indicates that they are opposite in valence. In that case, people often show a contrastive effect, evaluating the CS with valence opposite of the US. We investigated whether the assimilative effect of co-occurrence persists and is only obscured by a stronger counteracting contrast effect of the inference from the CS-US opposition relation. Participants evaluated CSs that had opposite relations with the USs under time pressure, a condition that restricts inference processes more than it restricts the associative processes that might underlie the assimilative effect of co-occurrence. Evidence supporting the persistence of the assimilative effect emerged only in Experiment 2 (N = 79): Under time pressure, people evaluated creatures that ended positive sounds more favourably than creatures that ended negative sounds. However, no difference between the creatures' evaluations occurred under time pressure in Experiments 1 and 3 (Ns = 78, 460). These results are inconclusive because they might reflect equal contrastive and assimilative effects or no effects at all. We discuss further research directions to test our question.

Simple First: A Skeleton for an Evaluative Learning Model

Simple firstis our name for a set of hypotheses that we have found useful in our research on evaluative learning. The hypotheses are: (1) It is easier to encode and retrieve information that two concepts are linked than information about how they are linked; (2) It is easier to store and retrieve information than to make an inference based on that information; (3) When people encounter an object and memory activates valence that is mentally linked to that object, they consider the activation valid evidence that the activated valence characterizes the object. We demonstrate how these hypotheses generate useful assumptions about Evaluative Conditioning, and open paths for further research on evaluative learning and evaluation.

Evaluative Conditioning From the Perspective of the Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a positive or negative unconditioned stimulus (US). According to the associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model, EC effects can be the result of two functionally distinct learning mechanisms: associative and propositional learning. The current article reviews the core assumptions of the APE model regarding (1) the defining features of associative and propositional learning, (2) the mental representations resulting from the two learning mechanisms, (3) the processes involved in the behavioral expression of these representations, and (4) the automatic versus controlled nature of the processes underlying EC effects. In addition to reviewing the core assumptions of the APE model, the article reviews relevant evidence to illustrate the theory’s main hypotheses, its explanatory and predictive power, as well as empirical challenges for the theory.

Associative Attitude Learning: A Closer Look at Evidence and How It Relates to Attitude Models

Associative attitude learning is typically viewed as a low-level process that automatically registers mere co-occurrences between stimuli, independent of their validity and relational meaning. This view invites to critically examine how attitude formation conforms to four operating conditions (i.e., unawareness, efficiency, goal independence, and uncontrollability) and two operating principles (i.e., unqualified registration of mere co-occurrences between stimuli and formation of direct stimulus–response links), which is the main purpose of the present contribution. The general discussion examines how contemporary attitude models endorse these conditions and principles. Overall, this contribution calls for (a) a nuanced understanding of the nature and scope of associative attitude learning, (b) a fine-grained understanding of how contemporary attitude models endorse conditions and principles reviewed here and find them relevant to their theorization of attitude formation, (c) a clarification of how direct and indirect evaluative measures relate to these conditions and principles, and (d) enhanced efforts in specifying contemporary attitude formation models.

A Patchier Picture Still: Biases, Beliefs and Overlap on the Inferential Continuum

It has been proposed that, whilst implicit attitudes, alike beliefs, are propositionally structured (Mandelbaum Noûs, 50(3), 629-658, 2016), the former respond to evidence and modulate other attitudes in a fragmented manner, and so constitute a sui generis class, the "patchy endorsements" (Levy Noûs, 49(4), 800-823, 2015). In the following, I demonstrate that the patchy endorsements theorist is committed to the truth of two claims: (i) no implicit attitude is responsive to content to the same extent as any belief; and (ii) there is a significant gap between the most responsive implicit attitude and the least responsive belief. I argue that both (i) and (ii) fail to hold. Many implicit attitudes respond to evidence and modulate other attitudes. Meanwhile, at least some ordinary beliefs exhibit lower evidence-responsiveness and inferential efficacy than at least some implicit attitudes, defeating (i) and (ii). A better interpretation is that attitudes may be ordered along a continuum according to their responsiveness to content. At one extreme end, we find attitudes usually identified as implicit, and at the other, attitudes usually identified as beliefs, but in the middle, there is an area of overlap. I consider the consequences of the continuum view for existing folk psychological concepts.

Propositional Versus Dual-Process Accounts of Evaluative Conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US). According to propositional accounts, EC effects should be qualified by the relation between the CS and the US. Dual-process accounts suggest that relational information should qualify EC effects on explicit evaluations, whereas implicit evaluations should reflect the frequency of CS–US co-occurrences. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that, when relational information was provided before the encoding of CS–US pairings, it moderated EC effects on explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. In Experiment 3, relational information moderated EC effects on both explicit and implicit evaluations when it was provided simultaneously with CS–US pairings. Frequency of CS–US pairings had no effect on implicit evaluations. Although the results can be reconciled with both propositional and dual-process accounts, they are more parsimoniously explained by propositional accounts.

What Do Implicit Measures Tell Us?: Scrutinizing the Validity of Three Common Assumptions

Experimental paradigms designed to assess “implicit” representations are currently very popular in many areas of psychology. The present article addresses the validity of three widespread assumptions in research using these paradigms: that (a) implicit measures reflect unconscious or introspectively inaccessible representations; (b) the major difference between implicit measures and self-reports is that implicit measures are resistant or less susceptible to social desirability; and (c) implicit measures reflect highly stable, older representations that have their roots in long-term socialization experiences. Drawing on a review of the available evidence, we conclude that the validity of all three assumptions is equivocal and that theoretical interpretations should be adjusted accordingly. We discuss an alternative conceptualization that distinguishes between activation and validation processes.

Cue competition in evaluative conditioning as a function of the learning process

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is the change in the valence of a stimulus resulting from pairings with an affective (unconditioned) stimulus (US). With some exceptions, previous work has indicated that this form of conditioning might be insensitive to cue competition effects such as blocking and overshadowing. Here we assessed whether the extent of cue competition in EC depends upon the type of contingency learning during conditioning. Specifically, we contrasted a learning task that biased participants toward cognitive/inferential learning (i.e., predicting the US) with a learning task that prevented prolonged introspection (i.e., a rapid response made to the US). In all cases, standard EC effects were observed, with the subjective liking of stimuli changed in the direction of the valence of the US. More importantly, when inferential learning was likely, larger EC effects occurred for isolated stimuli than for compounds (indicating overshadowing). No blocking effects on explicit evaluations were observed for either learning task. Contingency judgments and implicit evaluations, however, were sensitive to blocking, indicating that the absence of a blocking effect on explicit evaluations might be due to inferences that occur during testing.

Context-dependent social evaluation in 4.5-month-old human infants: the role of domain-general versus domain-specific processes in the development of social evaluation

The ability to distinguish friends from foes allows humans to engage in mutually beneficial cooperative acts while avoiding the costs associated with cooperating with the wrong individuals. One way to do so effectively is to observe how unknown individuals behave toward third parties, and to selectively cooperate with those who help others while avoiding those who harm others. Recent research suggests that a preference for prosocial over antisocial individuals emerges by the time that infants are 3 months of age, and by 8 months, but not before, infants evaluate others' actions in context: they prefer those who harm, rather than help, individuals who have previously harmed others. Currently there are at least two reasons for younger infants' failure to show context-dependent social evaluations. First, this failure may reflect fundamental change in infants' social evaluation system over the first year of life, in which infants first prefer helpers in any situation and only later evaluate prosocial and antisocial actors in context. On the other hand, it is possible that this developmental change actually reflects domain-general limitations of younger infants, such as limited memory and processing capacities. To distinguish between these possibilities, 4.5-month-olds in the current studies were habituated, rather than familiarized as in previous work, to one individual helping and another harming a third party, greatly increasing infants' exposure to the characters' actions. Following habituation, 4.5-month-olds displayed context-dependent social preferences, selectively reaching for helpers of prosocial and hinderers of antisocial others. Such results suggest that younger infants' failure to display global social evaluation in previous work reflected domain-general rather than domain-specific limitations.

How infants and toddlers react to antisocial others

Although adults generally prefer helpful behaviors and those who perform them, there are situations (in particular, when the target of an action is disliked) in which overt antisocial acts are seen as appropriate, and those who perform them are viewed positively. The current studies explore the developmental origins of this capacity for selective social evaluation. We find that although 5-mo-old infants uniformly prefer individuals who act positively toward others regardless of the status of the target, 8-mo-old infants selectively prefer characters who act positively toward prosocial individuals and characters who act negatively toward antisocial individuals. Additionally, young toddlers direct positive behaviors toward prosocial others and negative behaviors toward antisocial others. These findings constitute evidence that the nuanced social judgments and actions readily observable in human adults have their foundations in early developing cognitive mechanisms.

Counterconditioning: an effective technique for changing conditioned preferences

The evidence for the effectiveness of counterconditioning as a strategy for changing conditioned preferences is rather scarce and inconclusive. The present experiment reinvestigated this issue and compared the effect of further conditioning, extinction, and a counterconditioning procedure on recently acquired conditioned preferences in a picture-taste paradigm. Self-report and affective priming data indicated that whereas further conditioning and extinction trials were ineffective in fully eliminating the previously acquired evaluations, the counterconditioning treatment did succeed in doing this. A follow-up valence assessment revealed that all these effects persisted after a 7-day delay period.

The Role of Evaluative Conditioning in Attitude Formation

In this article, we address how attitudes are acquired. We present evaluative conditioning (EC) as an explanation for attitude formation and attitude change. EC refers to changes in liking due to pairings of affectively meaningful and neutral stimuli. We discuss four different theoretical accounts of EC and outline current issues and avenues for future research.

Are We Puppets on a String? Comparing the Impact of Contingency and Validity on Implicit and Explicit Evaluations

Research has demonstrated that implicit and explicit evaluations of the same object can diverge. Explanations of such dissociations frequently appeal to dual-process theories, such that implicit evaluations are assumed to reflect object-valence contingencies independent of their perceived validity, whereas explicit evaluations reflect the perceived validity of object-valence contingencies. Although there is evidence supporting these assumptions, it remains unclear if dissociations can arise in situations in which object-valence contingencies are judged to be true or false during the learning of these contingencies. Challenging dual-process accounts that propose a simultaneous operation of two parallel learning mechanisms, results from three experiments showed that the perceived validity of evaluative information about social targets qualified both explicit and implicit evaluations when validity information was available immediately after the encoding of the valence information; however, delaying the presentation of validity information reduced its qualifying impact for implicit, but not explicit, evaluations.

The TAR effect: when the ones who dislike become the ones who are disliked

Four studies tested whether a source's evaluations of other individuals can recursively transfer to the source, such that people who like others acquire a positive valence, whereas people who dislike others acquire a negative valence (Transfer of Attitudes Recursively; TAR). Experiment 1 provides first evidence for TAR effects, showing recursive transfers of evaluations regardless of whether participants did or did not have prior knowledge about the (dis)liking source. Experiment 2 shows that previously but not subsequently acquired knowledge about targets that were (dis)liked by a source overrode TAR effects in a manner consistent with cognitive balance. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that TAR effects are mediated by higher order propositional inferences (in contrast to lower order associative processes), in that TAR effects on implicit attitude measures were fully mediated by TAR effects on explicit attitude measures. Commonalities and differences between the TAR effect and previously established phenomena are discussed.

Spontaneous Inferences, Implicit Impressions, and Implicit Theories

People make social inferences without intentions, awareness, or effort, i.e., spontaneously. We review recent findings on spontaneous social inferences (especially traits, goals, and causes) and closely related phenomena. We then describe current thinking on some of the most relevant processes, implicit knowledge, and theories. These include automatic and controlled processes and their interplay; embodied cognition, including mimicry; and associative versus rule-based processes. Implicit knowledge includes adult folk theories, conditions of personhood, self-knowledge to simulate others, and cultural and social class differences. Implicit theories concern Bayesian networks, recent attribution research, and questions about the utility of the disposition-situation dichotomy. Developmental research provides new insights. Spontaneous social inferences include a growing array of phenomena, but they have been insufficiently linked to other phenomena and theories. We hope the links suggested in this review begin to remedy this.

Are “implicit” attitudes unconscious?

A widespread assumption in recent research on attitudes is that self-reported (explicit) evaluations reflect conscious attitudes, whereas indirectly assessed (implicit) evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes. The present article reviews the available evidence regarding unconscious features of indirectly assessed "implicit" attitudes. Distinguishing between three different aspects of attitudes, we conclude that (a) people sometimes lack conscious awareness of the origin of their attitudes, but that lack of source awareness is not a distinguishing feature of indirectly assessed versus self-reported attitudes, (b) there is no evidence that people lack conscious awareness of indirectly assessed attitudes per se, and (c) there is evidence showing that, under some conditions, indirectly assessed (but not self-reported) attitudes influence other psychological processes outside of conscious awareness. Implications for the concept of "implicit attitudes" are discussed.