The impact of economic inequality on conspiracy beliefs

High economic inequality is linked to greater moralization

Throughout the 21st century, economic inequality is predicted to increase as we face new challenges, from changes in the technological landscape to the growing climate crisis. It is crucial we understand how these changes in inequality may affect how people think and behave. We propose that economic inequality threatens the social fabric of society, in turn increasing moralization-that is, the greater tendency to employ or emphasize morality in everyday life-as an attempt to restore order and control. Using longitudinal data from X, formerly known as Twitter, our first study demonstrates that high economic inequality is associated with greater use of moral language online (e.g. the use of words such as "disgust", "hurt", and "respect'). Study 2 then examined data from 41 regions around the world, generally showing that higher inequality has a small association with harsher moral judgments of people's everyday actions. Together these findings demonstrate that economic inequality is linked to the tendency to see the world through a moral lens.

The mediating effect of institutional trust in the relationship between precarity and conspiracy beliefs: A conceptual replication of Adam-Troian et al. (2023)

The paper reports the results of registered conceptual replications of the indirect effect of institutional trust in the relationship between precarity and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (CB). The original study of Adam-Troian et al. (2023; British Journal of Social Psychology, 62(S1), 136-159) indicated that subjective appraisals of economic hardship are associated with lower trust in governments and institutions, which in turn is associated with stronger endorsement of CB. Our Studies 1 to 3 report a series of replications using Slovak panel data. Study 4 reports a replication of the mediation model using data from the European Social Survey Round 10 collected in 17 countries. To provide a quantitative synthesis of these and previous results, we conducted mini meta-analysis (N = 50,340). Although the strength of the observed relationships differed across the studies to some degree, the original patterns of relations remained robust, supporting the original model. The study corroborates the view that to curb the spread of CB, it is necessary to address structural issues, such as growing financial insecurity, socioeconomic inequalities, and the deficit of institutional trust. Finally, we discuss the role of cultural and political settings in conditioning the mechanisms through which precarity enhances the endorsement of CB.

Anti-establishment sentiments: realistic and symbolic threat appraisals predict populist attitudes and conspiracy mentality

Previous research has found that populist attitudes and conspiracy mentality - here summarised as anti-establishment attitudes - increase when people feel threatened. Two types of intergroup threat have been distinguished, namely realistic threats (pertaining to socio-economic resources, climate, or health), and symbolic threats (pertaining to cultural values). However, there is no agreement on which types of threat and corresponding appraisals would be most important in predicting anti-establishment attitudes. We hypothesise that it is the threat itself, irrespective of its cause, that predicts anti-establishment attitudes. In the current paper, we conducted new (multilevel) regression analyses on previously collected data from four high-powered studies with multiple time points (Study 1) or collected in multiple nations (Studies 2-4). All studies included a populist attitudes scale, a conspiracy mentality scale, and different types of threat and emotion measures, reflecting both realistic and symbolic threats. Across studies, both realistic and symbolic threats positively predicted anti-establishment attitudes. The results support an emotional appraisal approach to anti-establishment attitudes, which highlights the importance of anxiety and feeling threatened regardless of what type of event elicits the threat.

Supersharers of fake news on Twitter

Governments may have the capacity to flood social media with fake news, but little is known about the use of flooding by ordinary voters. In this work, we identify 2107 registered US voters who account for 80% of the fake news shared on Twitter during the 2020 US presidential election by an entire panel of 664,391 voters. We found that supersharers were important members of the network, reaching a sizable 5.2% of registered voters on the platform. Supersharers had a significant overrepresentation of women, older adults, and registered Republicans. Supersharers' massive volume did not seem automated but was rather generated through manual and persistent retweeting. These findings highlight a vulnerability of social media for democracy, where a small group of people distort the political reality for many.

Watching for a snake in the grass: Objectification increases conspiracy beliefs

Objectification, being treated as a tool to achieve someone's instrumental goals, is a common phenomenon. A workplace supervisor may view employees solely in terms of their output; likewise, friends may be seen only for their potential for personal and social advancement. We conducted five studies (N = 1209) to test whether objectification increases conspiracy beliefs through thwarted trust and whether postobjectification increases in conspiracy beliefs carry behavioural implications. While conspiracy beliefs may have evolved as a strategy for survival, they may be considered maladaptive in the modern world. Therefore, understanding the antecedents, underlying mechanisms, and implications of conspiracy beliefs is essential. We measured (Study 1) and manipulated objectification (Studies 2-5), consistently finding that objectification decreased trust, thereby increasing conspiracy beliefs (Studies 1-5). This effect remained after considering negative emotions (Study 2). Increased conspiracy beliefs following objectification positively predicted unethical tendencies, and the effect of objectification on unethical tendencies was serially mediated by trust and conspiracy beliefs (Study 4). Restoring objectified people's trust weakened their conspiracy beliefs and unethical tendencies (Study 5). We discussed the implications of our findings, proposing directions for researchers, practitioners, managers, and policymakers for theoretical advancement, healthier coping, and promotion of well-being.

Multilevel analysis of COVID-19 vaccination intention: the moderating role of economic and cultural country characteristics

BACKGROUND

Predictors of COVID-19 (coronavirus) vaccination have been extensively researched; however, the contextual factors contributing to understanding vaccination intention remain largely unexplored. The present study aimed to investigate the moderating role of economic development (Gross domestic product - GDP per capita), economic inequality (Gini index), the perceived corruption index and Hofstede's measurements of cultural values-index of individualism/collectivism and power distance index-in the relationship between determinants of satisfaction with the healthcare system, trust in political institutions, conspiracy beliefs and COVID-19 vaccination intention.

METHODS

A multilevel modelling approach was employed on a sample of approximately 51 000 individuals nested within 26 countries. Data were drawn from the European Social Survey Round 10. The model examined the effect of individual- and country-level predictors and their interaction on vaccination intention.

RESULTS

Satisfaction with the healthcare system had a stronger positive effect on intention to get vaccinated in countries with lower perceived corruption and more individualistic countries. Trust in political institutions had a stronger positive effect on vaccination intention in countries with higher economic development and lower perceived corruption, while a negative effect of conspiracy beliefs on vaccination intention was stronger in countries with lower economic development, higher perceived corruption and a more collectivistic cultural orientation.

CONCLUSION

Our findings highlight the importance of considering individual and contextual factors when addressing vaccination intention.

How does economic inequality shape conspiracy theories? Empirical evidence from China

Conspiracy theories tend to be prevalent, particularly in societies with high economic inequality. However, few studies have examined the relationship between economic inequality and belief in conspiracy theories. We propose that economic inequality leads people to believe conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups (i.e., upwards conspiracy theories) and that moral evaluations of those groups mediate this relationship. Study 1 (N = 300) found support for these ideas in a survey among Chinese residents. Study 2 (N = 160) manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in a virtual society. The manipulation shaped moral evaluations of economically advantaged groups, and conspiracy beliefs, in the predicted manner. In Study 3 (N = 191) and Study 4 (N = 210), we experimentally manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in real Chinese society and replicated the results of Study 2. In addition, in Study 4, we find that economic inequality predicts belief in conspiracy theories about economically disadvantaged groups (i.e., downward conspiracy theories), which was mediated by anomie. We conclude that perceived economic inequality predicts conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups and that moral evaluations account for this effect. Also, upward and downward conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with different psychological processes.

Subjective economic inequality evokes interpersonal objectification

Interpersonal objectification, treating people as tools and neglecting their essential humanness, is a pervasive and enduring phenomenon. Across five studies (N = 1183), we examined whether subjective economic inequality increases objectification through a calculative mindset. Study 1 revealed that the perceptions of economic inequality at the national level and in daily life were positively associated with objectification. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated a causal relationship between subjective economic inequality and objectification in a fictitious organization and society, respectively. Moreover, the effect was mediated by a calculative mindset (Studies 3-4). In addition, lowering a calculative mindset weakened the effect of subjective inequality on objectification (Study 4). Finally, increased objectification due to subjective inequality further decreased prosociality and enhanced exploitative intentions (Study 5). Taken together, our findings suggest that subjective economic inequality increases objectification, which further causes adverse interpersonal interactions.

Economic Inequality Reduces Preferences for Competent Leaders

It is well-documented that economic inequality can harm political stability and social cohesion. In six experiments (total N = 1,907) conducted in China and the United Kingdom, we tested our primary hypothesis that high (vs. low) economic inequality leads to voters' reduced preferences for competent political leaders. Across studies, this prediction was consistently supported by experimental evidence, regardless of the voter's social status. We also found that high (vs. low) economic inequality indirectly diminished preferences for competent political leaders through heightened perceptions that politicians were less inclined to care about the populace in a highly (vs. lowly) unequal societal context. In essence, our findings underscore the idea that economic inequality curtails voters' preferences for competent political leaders by amplifying their concerns about politicians' indifference to the populace. It also stresses the need for policies and practices to address economic inequality and maintain the vitality of democracy.

Experimental manipulation of uncanny feeling does not increase adherence to conspiracy theories

Research over the past decade has shown that endorsement of conspiracy theories (CTs) is shaped by motivated cognition processes. Accordingly, CTs are theorized to stem from compensatory processes, as individuals attempt to cope with existential threats (i.e., uncertainty, loss of control). Based on the meaning maintenance model, we investigated whether this compensatory effect could follow from epistemic threats in domains unrelated to CTs in the form of uncanniness. Feelings of uncanniness were experimentally manipulated through exposure to absurdist art and literature in a set of five studies, followed by a mini meta-analysis (Ntotal  = 1,041). We conducted a final, preregistered sixth study (N = 266) manipulating uncanniness through autobiographical recall. No robust evidence for a compensatory effect was found. We discussed methodological and conceptual limitations of the meaning maintenance model, as well as boundary conditions under which conspiracy theories could have a compensatory function to deal with threats.

Conspiracy Mentality: How it Relates to Populism, Relative Deprivation, Mistrust of Expertise and Voting Behaviour

Background and research aims. Considering the high prevalence of conspiracy theories and misinformation, there is an urgent need to explain the tendency to adopt a conspiracy mentality and identify behavioural (including voting) outcomes of a high conspiracy mentality. The aims of the present paper are 1) the examination of populist attitudes dimensions, relative deprivation and mistrust of expertise as predictors of conspiracy mentality and 2) proposal of comprehensive models, that combine predictors of conspiracy mentality and its voting consequences.

METHODOLOGY

Studies utilised OSL regression and structural equation modelling.

RESULTS

The overall regression was statistically significant. It was found that dimensions of populist attitudes (anti-elitism, sovereignty), relative deprivation and mistrust of expertise were significant predictors of conspiracy mentality. In line with the second research aim, the fitness of models was confirmed and results suggest mistrust of expertise is also a significant predictor of far-right voting.

DISCUSSION

The contribution of the paper lies in connecting conspiracy mentality with not only attitudes but also with important behaviour outcome - voting behaviour. We propose future research should experimentally examine whether the reduction of some of the identified predictors could possibly lower levels of conspiracy mentality and whether this reduction translates into voting behaviour.

Longitudinal Changes in Chinese Prosociality

This article presents three studies using data from the World Values Survey, 128 published studies, and China Family Panel Studies to comprehensively examine the longitudinal dynamics of Chinese prosociality, encompassing prosocial attitudes, tendencies, and behaviors, with the overarching goal of shedding light on the evolving nature of prosociality in the Chinese context. These studies reveal a consistent pattern, illustrating a decline followed by a resurgence in all three aspects, with a nadir around 2014. In addition, the study investigates the intricate relationship between economic inequality, prosocial behavior, and prosocial attitudes. The findings suggest that while economic inequality significantly relates to prosocial behavior, it does not entirely explain its fluctuations. Prosocial attitudes partially mediate the connection between economic inequality and prosocial behavior. These insights suggest that addressing inequality could contribute to a more conducive social environment for societal-level prosociality. However, further research is imperative to explore additional determinants of prosociality shifts.

Far-right political ideology and COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy: Multilevel analysis of 21 European countries

BACKGROUND

Far-right political parties across the EU have downplayed the risk of COVID-19 and have expressed skepticism toward the safety of the COVID-19 vaccine. This may affect the risk perception of people who support far-right parties and may be associated with an elevated risk of vaccine hesitancy. We aimed to explore if voting far-right is associated with COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and if the association varies by individual and country-level factors.

METHODS

We used cross-sectional data from 28,057 individuals nested in 21 countries who participated in the tenth round of the European Social Survey (ESS). COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy was assessed by asking respondents whether they will get vaccinated against COVID-19. Voting behavior was measured by asking respondents which party they voted for in the last election. To test the association between far-right voting and COVID-19 hesitancy, we applied a series of multilevel regression models. We additionally ran models including interaction terms to test if the association differs by sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., institutional trust) or contextual factors (e.g., income inequality).

RESULTS

We found that far-right voters were 2.7 times more likely to be COVID-19 vaccine hesitant compared to center voters (PR: 2.69, 95% CI: 1.46-4.94). The association persisted even after controlling for institutional trust and social participation (adjusted PR: 2.15, 95% CI: 1.35-3.42). None of the tested interaction terms were significant suggesting that the association between political ideology and COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy does not differ by sociodemographic characteristics or contextual factors.

CONCLUSION

Voting for far-right parties is associated with COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. The association is similar among European countries, regardless of how stringent the public health measures were and magnitude of income inequality in each country. Our findings call for a more in-depth investigation of why, how and under which conditions political ideology affects vaccination behavior.

The role of conspiracy mindset in reducing support for child vaccination for COVID-19 in the United States

Introduction

We have previously proposed and tested a model that predicts reluctance to vaccinate against COVID-19 in the US from embrace of a conspiracy mindset that distrusts the federal health agencies of the US government and regards their intentions as malevolent. In this study, we tested the model's ability to predict adult support for COVID vaccination of children ages 5-11 after the vaccine was approved for this age group.

Methods

Relying on a national panel that was established in April 2021 (N = 1941) and followed until March of 2022, we examined the relation between conspiratorial thinking measured at baseline and belief in misinformation and conspiracies about COVID vaccines, trust in various health authorities, perceived risk of COVID to children, and belief in conspiracy theories about the pandemic's origin and impact. In addition, we tested a structural equation model (SEM) in which conspiracy mindset predicted adult support for childhood vaccination for COVID in January and March of 2022 as well as the adults own vaccination status and their willingness to recommend vaccinating children against measles, mumps and rubella (MMR).

Results

The model accounted for 76% of the variance in support for childhood vaccination for COVID-19; the relation between the mindset and support for vaccination was entirely mediated by baseline assessments of misinformation, trust, risk, and acceptance of pandemic conspiracy theories.

Discussion

The SEM replicated the prior test of the model, indicating that a conspiracy mindset present among at least 17% of the panel underlies their resistance to vaccinate both themselves and children. Efforts to counteract the mindset will likely require the intervention of trusted spokespersons who can overcome the skepticism inherent in conspiratorial thinking about the government and its health-related agencies' recommendations for a particular vaccine.

How living in economically unequal societies shapes our minds and our social lives

In recent decades, the economies of many countries have produced increasingly unequal outcomes for the rich and poor. This economic trend has attracted interest from members of the media, public and political classes as well as researchers who are interested in its societal implications. While this research has traditionally been the purview of economists and sociologists, there has been a burgeoning growth in research that has sought to understand the psychology of economic inequality. In this review, we summarize this work, focusing on two major themes: (1) how people perceive the scale of economic inequality and appraise its significance, and (2) how living in an economically unequal environment shapes people's social lives. Together, this work affirms claims that economic inequality is 'the defining issue of our time' (Obama, 2013) with a great deal of destructive potential. We identify important questions that await further research attention.

Of precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs

Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extremism, radicalism and unconventional political events. So far, social-psychological research has extensively documented how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves along social class lines: low-income and low-education are among the most robust predictors of CB. Yet, the potential role of precarity-the subjective experience of permanent insecurity stemming from objective material strain-in shaping CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for the first time a socio-functional model of CB. We test the hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because it undermines trust in government and the broader political 'elites'. Data from the World Value Survey (n = 21,650; Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from polls conducted in France (n = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy mentality) and Italy (n = 2196, Study 2b, COVID-19 CB), corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment on income, self-reported SES and education. Considering precarity allows for a truly social-psychological understanding of CB as the by-product of structural issues (e.g. growing inequalities). Results from our socio-functional model suggest that implementing solutions at the socio-economic level could prove efficient in fighting CB.

Tax the élites! The role of economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs on attitudes towards taxes and redistribution intentions

Taxation is one of the most widely acknowledged strategies to reduce inequality, particularly if based on progressivity. In a high-powered sample study (N = 2119) we investigated economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs as two key predictors of tax attitude and support for progressive taxation. We found that participants in the high economic inequality condition had lower levels of tax compliance and higher levels of conspiracy beliefs and support for progressive taxation. Furthermore, the effect of the experimental condition on tax compliance was mediated by conspiracy beliefs. Finally, conspiracy belief scores were positively associated with support for progressive taxation. Our results provide evidence that attitudes towards taxation are not monolithic but change considering the aims and targets of specific taxes. Indeed, while the perception of economic inequality prompts the desire for equal redistribution, it also fosters conspiracy narratives that undermine compliance with taxes.

Are psychological status and trust in information related to vaccine hesitancy during COVID-19 pandemic? A latent class and mediation analyses in Italy

Despite the recognized benefits of the COVID-19 vaccination, vaccine hesitancy (VH) remains one of the biggest challenges of the mass vaccination campaign. Most studies investigating VH determinants focused on socio-demographics and direct relationships. In this study, we aimed at: 1) identifying subgroups of people differently affected by the pandemic, in terms of psychological status; 2) investigating the role of psychological status and trust in information as possible mediators of the relationship between individual characteristics and VH. To this purpose, a latent class analysis (LCA) followed by a mediation analysis were carried out on data from a survey conducted in January 2021 on 1011 Italian citizens. LCA identified four different subgroups characterized by a differential psychological impact of the pandemic: the extremely affected (21.1%), the highly affected (49.1%), the moderately affected (21.8%) and the slightly affected (8%). We found that VH decreased with the increase of psychological impact (from 59.3% to 23.9%). In the mediation analysis, past vaccination refusal, age 45-54 years and lower-than-average income, were all indirectly related to higher VH through mistrust in COVID-19 information. Differently, the psychological impact counteracted the greater VH in females, the negative effect of social media among youngest (<35 years) and the negative effect of mistrust in the lower-than-average-income subgroup. Knowledge of psychological profile of hesitant individuals, their level of trust and the sources of information they access, together with their sociodemographic characteristics provides a more comprehensive picture of VH determinants that can be used by public health stakeholders to effectively design and adapt communication campaigns.

Individual, intergroup and nation-level influences on belief in conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories are part of mainstream public life, with the potential to undermine governments, promote racism, ignite extremism and threaten public health efforts. Psychological research on conspiracy theories is booming, with more than half of the academic articles on the topic published since 2019. In this Review, we synthesize the literature with an eye to understanding the psychological factors that shape willingness to believe conspiracy theories. We begin at the individual level, examining the cognitive, clinical, motivational, personality and developmental factors that predispose people to believe conspiracy theories. Drawing on insights from social and evolutionary psychology, we then review research examining conspiracy theories as an intergroup phenomenon that reflects and reinforces societal fault lines. Finally, we examine how conspiracy theories are shaped by the economic, political, cultural and socio-historical contexts at the national level. This multilevel approach offers a deep and broad insight into conspiracist thinking that increases understanding of the problem and offers potential solutions.

Cross-national differences in willingness to believe conspiracy theories

Conspiracy beliefs are not just generated by "under-the-skull" individual factors, but are shaped also by cultural, economic, and institutional realities. A scan of the literature-complemented by our own secondary data analyses-suggests a reasonable convergence of evidence that conspiracy beliefs are higher in nations that are more corrupt, more collectivist, and lower in GDP per capita. There is some evidence that conspiracy beliefs may also be shaped by economic inequality, power distance, and authoritarianism, although the evidence base is thin. We also review literature that examines how individual correlates of conspiracy beliefs vary across nations. We discuss challenges associated with conducting international research on conspiracy beliefs and chart a future research agenda for creating truly global insights into conspiracist thinking.

Suspecting Foul Play When It Is Objectively There: The Association of Political Orientation With General and Partisan Conspiracy Beliefs as a Function of Corruption Levels

Recent research has showed that people with right-wing political orientations and political extremists are more likely to harbor conspiracy beliefs. Utilizing a multisite data set (23 countries, N > 20,000), we show that corruption moderates how political orientation predicts conspiracy beliefs. We found that (1) the difference between left- and right-wingers in terms of adopting a conspiracy mind-set is attenuated in countries with high corruption; and (2) left-wingers are more likely to believe left-wing conspiracy theories, and right-wingers are more likely to believe right-wing conspiracy theories in high corruption countries. Including quadratic effects of political orientation yielded the same results. We argue that this is because corruption increases perceived plausibility of conspiracies, and everyone across the political spectrum becomes similarly likely to adopt a conspiracy mentality. This heightened suspicion, however, is reflected on partisan conspiracy theories differently for left- and right-wingers, depending on their different understandings of outgroup.

The role of conspiracy beliefs for COVID-19 health responses: A meta-analysis

While conspiracy theories about COVID-19 are proliferating, their impact on health-related responses during the present pandemic is not yet fully understood. We meta-analyzed correlational and longitudinal evidence from 53 studies (N = 78,625) conducted in 2020 and 2021. Conspiracy beliefs were weakly associated with more reluctance toward prevention measures both cross-sectionally and over time. They explained lower vaccination and social distancing responses but were unrelated to mask wearing and hygiene responses. Conspiracy beliefs showed an increasing association with prevention responses as the pandemic progressed and explained support for alternative treatments lacking scientific bases (e.g., chloroquine treatment, complementary medicine). Despite small and heterogenous effects, at a large scale, conspiracy beliefs are a non-negligible threat to public health.

Defining and explaining conspiracy theories: Comparing the lay representations of conspiracy believers and non-believers

Despite a growing literature on the topic, little is known about how individuals perceive the label “conspiracy theory”. In two studies, we compare social representations of conspiracy theories, and how these are influenced by individuals’ own conspiracy beliefs. In addition, we examine how these representations relate to how scholars define and explain conspiracy theories. In Study 1, we used lexicometric analysis to explore the vocabulary that French participants (n = 939) spontaneously associated with the notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ and the personal definitions they provided. The representation of participants scoring high on the generic conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the content of conspiracy theories (e.g., “lies” or “government”). By contrast, the representation of participants scoring low on the conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the believer (e.g., “paranoia” or “cognitive biases”). They proposed definitions of conspiracy theories centred on the function(s) conspiracy theories supposedly fulfil for the believer (e.g., simplify complex realities). To make sure that these results did not merely express participants’ endorsement or rejection of conspiracy theories, we carried out a second study. In Study 2 (n = 272), we found that the more participants endorsed generic conspiracist beliefs, the less they mobilised intra-individual causes (e.g., reasoning biases) to explain why some people believe in conspiracy theories that they did not endorse themselves. This research shows that people’s representations of conspiracy theories differ depending on their conspiracy beliefs.

Economic inequality and conspiracy theories

Can perceptions of economic inequalities trigger conspiratorial thinking? We provide evidence that high economic inequality may enhance conspiratorial thinking because, as a form of collective-level crisis, it undermines the social fabric of society and engenders anomie. We focus on the mechanism through which inequality should affect conspiratorial thinking by outlining how inequality enhances perceptions of anomie that, in turn, increase conspiratorial thinking. We end our contribution with the observation that it is by focusing on the socio-structural contexts that trigger conspiracy beliefs that we can more fully understand them. Specifically, conspiracy beliefs are not merely a product of individual irrationality, but are grounded in, and reflective of, the times that collectives live in.