The extrastriate body area is involved in illusory limb ownership

The neural network of sensory attenuation: A neuroimaging meta-analysis

Sensory attenuation refers to the reduction in sensory intensity resulting from self-initiated actions compared to stimuli initiated externally. A classic example is scratching oneself without feeling itchy. This phenomenon extends across various sensory modalities, including visual, auditory, somatosensory, and nociceptive stimuli. The internal forward model proposes that during voluntary actions, an efferent copy of the action command is sent out to predict sensory feedback. This predicted sensory feedback is then compared with the actual sensory feedback, leading to the suppression or reduction of sensory stimuli originating from self-initiated actions. To further elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying sensory attenuation effect, we conducted an extensive meta-analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) studies. Utilizing activation likelihood estimation (ALE) analysis, our results revealed significant activations in a prominent cluster encompassing the right superior temporal gyrus (rSTG), right middle temporal gyrus (rMTG), and right insula when comparing external-generated with self-generated conditions. Additionally, significant activation was observed in the right anterior cerebellum when comparing self-generated to external-generated conditions. Further analysis using meta-analytic connectivity modeling (MACM) unveiled distinct brain networks co-activated with the rMTG and right cerebellum, respectively. Based on these findings, we propose that sensory attenuation arises from the suppression of reflexive inputs elicited by self-initiated actions through the internal forward modeling of a cerebellum-centered action prediction network, enabling the "sensory conflict detection" regions to effectively discriminate between inputs resulting from self-induced actions and those originating externally.

The visuomotor synchronization immersive virtual reality of a depression avatar in a stigma context experience mobilizes the fronto-parietal cortex and anterior insula

Introduction

The gradual synchronization of the movement of one's real hand with a virtual one can effectively induce a sense of embodiment (SoE) with an avatar with depression. Although neuroimaging studies have explored the neural correlates of some SoE subcomponents of visuomotor synchronization, the neural correlates of individual differences in SoE and how humans acquire virtual body representations through SoE subcomponents remain to be investigated.

Methods

Here, we used the right hand of a virtual patient with depression in immersive virtual reality (IVR) to induce SoE in participants and measured whole brain activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants were instructed to listen to the audio recording of the IVR experience and visualize movements during the fMRI scan. fMRI data were acquired before and immediately after the visuomotor synchronization IVR experience (target condition) or an asynchronized video experience (control condition), followed by embodiment measures related to the two types of experiences.

Results

All five subcomponents of SoE (sense of ownership, sense of agency, sense of localization, appearance, and response to stimuli) were significantly increased during the visuomotor synchronization IVR experience compared with the asynchronized video experience. A significant negative effect of the SoE score was identified in the frontoparietal and anterior insula only for the visuomotor synchronization IVR experience of guiding the virtual right hand of the avatar with depression, implicating interoceptive and multisensory integration.

Discussion

We demonstrated that all five subcomponents of the SoE were present, and that decreased activity in the frontoparietal and anterior insula were crucial brain regions for the virtual human body to be perceived as one's own body and promote conscious feelings of embodiment.

The contribution of cutaneous thermal signals to bodily self-awareness

Thermosensory signals may contribute to the sense of body ownership, but their role remains highly debated. We test this assumption within the framework of pathological body ownership, hypothesising that skin temperature and thermoception differ between right-hemisphere stroke patients with and without Disturbed Sensation of Ownership (DSO) for the contralesional plegic upper limb. Patients with DSO exhibit lower basal hand temperatures bilaterally and impaired perception of cold and warm stimuli. Lesion mapping reveals associations in the right Rolandic Operculum and Insula, with these regions linked to lower skin temperature located posterior to those associated with thermoception deficits. Disconnections in bilateral parietal regions are associated with lower hand temperature, while disconnections in a right-lateralized thalamus-parietal hub correlate with thermoception deficits. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings in the context of the ongoing debate on the role of homeostatic signals in shaping a coherent sense of body ownership.

Neuro-cognitive effects of degraded visibility on illusory body ownership

Based on visuo-tactile stimulation, the rubber hand illusion induces a sense of ownership for a dummy hand. Manipulating the visibility of the dummy hand during the stimulation influences cognitive aspects of the illusion, suggesting that the related brain activity may be influenced too. To test this, we analyzed brain activity (fMRI), subjective ratings, and skin conductance from 45 neurotypical participants undergoing a modified rubber hand illusion protocol where we manipulated the visibility (high, medium, and low) of a virtual hand, not the brush (virtual hand illusion; VHI). To further investigate the impact of visibility manipulations on VHI-related secondary effects (i.e. vicarious somatosensation), we recorded brain activity and skin conductance during a vicarious pain protocol (observation of painful stimulations of the virtual hand) that occurred after the VHI procedure. Results showed that, during both the VHI and vicarious pain periods, the activity of distinct visual, somatosensory, and motor brain regions was modulated by (i) visibility manipulations, (ii) coherence between visual and tactile stimulation, and (iii) time of visuo-tactile stimulation. Accordingly, embodiment-related subjective ratings of the perceived illusion were specifically influenced by visibility manipulations. These findings suggest that visibility modifications can impact the neural and cognitive effects of illusory body ownership, in that when visibility decreases the illusion is perceived as weaker and the brain activity in visual, motor, and somatosensory regions is overall lower. We interpret this evidence as a sign of the weight of vision on embodiment processes, in that the cortical and subjective aspects of illusory body ownership are weakened by a degradation of visual input during the induction of the illusion.

Threatening an Illusory Limb: An Event-related Potential Study of the Rubber Hand Illusion

BACKGROUND

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a well-established method for studying body ownership: Given adequate concordance of visual, sensory, and proprioceptive stimuli, the individual experiences a rubber hand as his or her own.

OBJECTIVE

To study the effects of a threat to the rubber hand.

METHODS

We created a typical RHI paradigm but added threatening pain: Both the real hand of an individual and the rubber hand were stroked with a brush, either synchronously (RHI-inducing condition) or asynchronously (control condition), but only the rubber hand was then pricked with a needle to create a threatening pain condition. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded in a group of 23 typically-developed individuals. ERP effects were source-localized using low-resolution electromagnetic tomography.

RESULTS

The individuals consistently reported experience of the RHI during the experiment when the brush strokes were applied synchronously to both the real hand and the rubber hand. ERP analysis revealed that synchronous brush stroking gave rise to higher amplitude of frontal ERPs in the 100-200 ms range than asynchronous brush stroking, which was interpreted as reflecting the RHI. In the threatening pain condition, ERPs showed a greater positivity at frontocentral electrodes, source localized in the supplementary motor area (SMA).

CONCLUSION

SMA activation could reflect a control mechanism over reflexive motor activity, facilitating a possible threat-related response. Further studies should address ERP effects and the extent of the RHI to standard and threat stimuli in a correlative fashion to further elucidate the functional significance of the neurophysiological findings.

Schizophrenia and the bodily self

Despite the historically consolidated psychopathological perspective, on the one hand, contemporary organicistic psychiatry often highlights abnormalities in neurotransmitter systems like dysregulation of dopamine transmission, neural circuitry, and genetic factors as key contributors to schizophrenia. Neuroscience, on the other, has so far almost entirely neglected the first-person experiential dimension of this syndrome, mainly focusing on high-order cognitive functions, such as executive function, working memory, theory of mind, and the like. An alternative view posits that schizophrenia is a self-disorder characterized by anomalous self-experience and awareness. This view may not only shed new light on the psychopathological features of psychosis but also inspire empirical research targeting the bodily and neurobiological changes underpinning this disorder. Cognitive neuroscience can today address classic topics of phenomenological psychopathology by adding a new level of description, finally enabling the correlation between the first-person experiential aspects of psychiatric diseases and their neurobiological roots. Recent empirical evidence on the neurobiological basis of a minimal notion of the self, the bodily self, is presented. The relationship between the body, its motor potentialities and the notion of minimal self is illustrated. Evidence on the neural mechanisms underpinning the bodily self, its plasticity, and the blurring of self-other distinction in schizophrenic patients is introduced and discussed. It is concluded that brain-body function anomalies of multisensory integration, differential processing of self- and other-related bodily information mediating self-experience, might be at the basis of the disruption of the self disorders characterizing schizophrenia.

Subcortical contributions to the sense of body ownership

The sense of body ownership (i.e. the feeling that our body or its parts belong to us) plays a key role in bodily self-consciousness and is believed to stem from multisensory integration. Experimental paradigms such as the rubber hand illusion have been developed to allow the controlled manipulation of body ownership in laboratory settings, providing effective tools for investigating malleability in the sense of body ownership and the boundaries that distinguish self from other. Neuroimaging studies of body ownership converge on the involvement of several cortical regions, including the premotor cortex and posterior parietal cortex. However, relatively less attention has been paid to subcortical structures that may also contribute to body ownership perception, such as the cerebellum and putamen. Here, on the basis of neuroimaging and neuropsychological observations, we provide an overview of relevant subcortical regions and consider their potential role in generating and maintaining a sense of ownership over the body. We also suggest novel avenues for future research targeting the role of subcortical regions in making sense of the body as our own.

Sense of own body shapes neural processes of memory encoding and reinstatement

How is the fundamental sense of one's body, a basic aspect of selfhood, incorporated into memories for events? Disrupting bodily self-awareness during encoding impairs functioning of the left posterior hippocampus during retrieval, which implies weakened encoding. However, how changes in bodily self-awareness influence neural encoding is unknown. We investigated how the sense of body ownership, a core aspect of the bodily self, impacts encoding in the left posterior hippocampus and additional core memory regions including the angular gyrus. Furthermore, we assessed the degree to which memories are reinstated according to body ownership during encoding and vividness during retrieval as a measure of memory strength. We immersed participants in naturalistic scenes where events unfolded while we manipulated feelings of body ownership with a full-body-illusion during functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning. One week later, participants retrieved memories for the videos during functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning. A whole brain analysis revealed that patterns of activity in regions including the right hippocampus and angular gyrus distinguished between events encoded with strong versus weak body ownership. A planned region-of-interest analysis showed that patterns of activity in the left posterior hippocampus specifically could predict body ownership during memory encoding. Using the wider network of regions sensitive to body ownership during encoding and the left posterior hippocampus as separate regions-of-interest, we observed that patterns of activity present at encoding were reinstated more during the retrieval of events encoded with strong body ownership and high memory vividness. Our results demonstrate how the sense of physical self is bound within an event during encoding, which facilitates reactivation of a memory trace during retrieval.

Brain-inspired bodily self-perception model for robot rubber hand illusion

The core of bodily self-consciousness involves perceiving ownership of one's body. A central question is how body illusions like the rubber hand illusion (RHI) occur. Existing theoretical models still lack satisfying computational explanations from connectionist perspectives, especially for how the brain encodes body perception and generates illusions from neuronal interactions. Moreover, the integration of disability experiments is also neglected. Here, we integrate biological findings of bodily self-consciousness to propose a brain-inspired bodily self-perception model by which perceptions of bodily self are autonomously constructed without any supervision signals. We successfully validated the model with six RHI experiments and a disability experiment on an iCub humanoid robot and simulated environments. The results show that our model can not only well-replicate the behavioral and neural data of monkeys in biological experiments but also reasonably explain the causes and results of RHI at the neuronal level, thus contributing to the revelation of mechanisms underlying RHI.

Revisiting the relationship between illusory hand ownership induced by visuotactile synchrony and cardiac interoceptive accuracy

Multisensory integration plays an important role in the experience of the bodily self. Recently, the relationship between exteroception and interoception has been actively debated. The first evidence was a report that the susceptibility of the sense of ownership over a fake hand (i.e., illusory hand ownership: IHO) in the typical rubber hand illusion is negatively modulated by the accuracy of the heartbeat perception (i.e., cardiac interoceptive accuracy: CIA). If reliable, this would suggest an antagonism between the exteroceptive and interoceptive cues underlying the bodily self. However, some inconsistent data have been reported, raising questions about the robustness of the initial evidence. To investigate this robustness, we estimated the extent of the modulatory effect of CIA on IHO susceptibility by applying Bayesian hierarchical modeling to two independent datasets. Overall, our results did not support that IHO susceptibility is modulated by CIA. The present estimates with high uncertainty cannot exclude the hypothesis that the relationship between IHO susceptibility and CIA is so weak as to be negligible. Further studies with larger sample sizes are needed to reach a conclusion about the extent of the modulatory effect. These findings highlight the lack of robustness of key evidence supporting the "antagonism hypothesis".

Cortical signatures of visual body representation develop in human infancy

Human infants cannot report their experiences, limiting what we can learn about their bodily awareness. However, visual cortical responses to the body, linked to visual awareness and selective attention in adults, can be easily measured in infants and provide a promising marker of bodily awareness in early life. We presented 4- and 8-month-old infants with a flickering (7.5 Hz) video of a hand being stroked and recorded steady-state visual evoked potentials (SSVEPs). In half of the trials, the infants also received tactile stroking synchronously with visual stroking. The 8-month-old, but not the 4-month-old infants, showed a significant enhancement of SSVEP responses when they received tactile stimulation concurrent with the visually observed stroking. Follow-up experiments showed that this enhancement did not occur when the visual hand was presented in an incompatible posture with the infant's own body or when the visual stimulus was a body-irrelevant video. Our findings provide a novel insight into the development of bodily self-awareness in the first year of life.

Disentangling the Neural Correlates of Agency, Ownership and Multisensory Processing

The experience of the self as an embodied agent in the world is an essential aspect of human consciousness. This experience arises from the feeling of control over one's bodily actions, termed the Sense of Agency, and the feeling that the body belongs to the self, Body Ownership. Despite long-standing philosophical and scientific interest in the relationship between the body and brain, the neural systems involved in Body Ownership and Sense of Agency, and especially their interactions, are not yet understood. In this preregistered study using the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion inside an MR-scanner, we aimed to uncover the relationship between Body Ownership and Sense of Agency in the human brain. Importantly, by using both visuomotor and visuotactile stimulations and measuring online trial-by-trial fluctuations in the illusion magnitude, we were able to disentangle brain systems related to objective sensory stimulation and subjective judgments of the bodily-self. Our results indicate that at both the behavioral and neural levels, Body Ownership and Sense of Agency are strongly interrelated. Multisensory regions in the occipital and fronto-parietal regions encoded convergence of sensory stimulation conditions. The subjective judgments of the bodily-self were related to BOLD fluctuations in the Somatosensory cortex and in regions not activated by the sensory conditions, such as the insular cortex and precuneus. Our results highlight the convergence of multisensory processing in specific neural systems for both Body Ownership and Sense of Agency with partially dissociable regions for subjective judgments in regions of the Default Mode Network.

Supramodal Representation of the Sense of Body Ownership in the Human Parieto-Premotor and Extrastriate Cortices

The sense of body ownership, defined as the sensation that one's body belongs to oneself, is a fundamental component of bodily self-consciousness. Several studies have shown the importance of multisensory integration for the emergence of the sense of body ownership, together with the involvement of the parieto-premotor and extrastriate cortices in bodily awareness. However, whether the sense of body ownership elicited by different sources of signal, especially visuotactile and visuomotor inputs, is represented by common neural patterns remains to be elucidated. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the existence of neural correlates of the sense of body ownership independent of the sensory modalities. Participants received tactile stimulation or executed finger movements while given synchronous and asynchronous visual feedback of their hand. We used multivoxel patterns analysis (MVPA) to decode the synchronous and asynchronous conditions with cross-classification between two modalities: the classifier was first trained in the visuotactile sessions and then tested in the visuomotor sessions, and vice versa. Regions of interest (ROIs)-based and searchlight analyses revealed significant above-chance cross-classification accuracies in the bilateral intraparietal sulcus (IPS), the bilateral ventral premotor cortex (PMv), and the left extrastriate body area (EBA). Moreover, we observed a significant positive correlation between the cross-classification accuracy in the left PMv and the difference in subjective ratings of the sense of body ownership between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Our findings revealed the neural representations of the sense of body ownership in the IPS, PMv, and EBA that is invariant to the sensory modalities.

The influence of high worry on static and dynamic insular functional connectivity

Worry is a form of repetitive negative thought. High worry-proneness is one risk factor leading to anxiety disorder. Several types of research indicated that anxiety disorder was highly associated with disrupted interoception. The insula is consistently considered to play a key role in interoception. However, the relationship between worry and the interoception network is poorly investigated in worry-prone individuals. Thus, it is essential to identify the neural characteristic of high worry-proneness subjects. A total of 32 high worry-proneness (HWP) subjects and 25 low worry-proneness (LWP) subjects were recruited and underwent magnetic resonance imaging scanning. Six subregions of insula were chosen as regions of interest. Then, seed-based static and dynamic functional connectivity were calculated. Increased static functional connectivity was observed between the ventral anterior insula and inferior parietal lobule in HWP compared to LWP. Decreased static functional connectivity was found between the left ventral anterior insula and the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex. Decreased dynamic functional connectivity was also shown between the right posterior insula and the inferior parietal lobule in HWP. Moreover, a post-hoc test exploring the effect of changed function within the insular region confirmed that a significant positive relationship between static functional connectivity (ventral anterior insula-inferior parietal lobule) and dynamic functional connectivity (posterior insula-inferior parietal lobule) in LWP but not in HWP. Our results might suggest that deficient insular function may be an essential factor related to high worry in healthy subjects.

Knowing what you feel: Inferior frontal gyrus-based structural and functional neural patterns underpinning adaptive body awareness

BACKGROUND

Heightened body awareness (BA) is conducive for increasing understanding of bodily state and improves individuals' health and well-being. Although there has been cumulative research concentrating on the self-perceived tendency to focus on negatively valenced interoceptive sensations, the specific structural and functional neural patterns underlying BA and their role in the relationship between BA and individual well-being remain unclear.

METHODS

Voxel-based morphometry and whole brain functional connectivity analyses were conducted to examine the structural and functional neural patterns, respectively, in 686 healthy subjects. BA and subjective well-being were assessed using questionnaires.

RESULTS

BA was inversely related to gray matter volume of the right inferior frontal gyrus, opercular part (IFGoperc). Higher BA was correlated with enhanced IFGoperc-precuneus and IFGoperc-anterior supramarginal gyrus connectivities, and with decreased IFGoperc-lateral occipital cortex and IFGoperc-medial frontal cortex connectivities. The inferior frontal gyrus, triangular part (in the fronto-parietal task control network) acted as the hub that linked the sensory/somatomotor network, the default mode network, and the dorsal and ventral attention network. The IFGoperc-precuneus connectivity moderated the association between BA and subjective well-being.

LIMITATIONS

We were unable to rank all the networks by their relative importance, because the absolute weighted value in each module was not calculated.

CONCLUSION

Our findings demonstrated that BA was reflected by specific neural patterns mainly involved in cognitive-affective control, attentional and self-referential processing, as well as multisensory integration, which could offer some references for current therapies (e.g., mindfulness, yoga training) that are dedicated to solving health problems and improving individual well-being.

The salience network is activated during self-recognition from both first-person and third-person perspectives

We usually observe ourselves from two perspectives. One is the first-person perspective, which we perceive directly with our own eyes, and the other is the third-person perspective, which we observe ourselves in a mirror or a picture. However, whether the self-recognition associated with these two perspectives has a common or separate neural basis remains unclear. To address this, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine brain activity while participants viewed pretaped video clips of themselves and others engaged in meal preparation taken from first-person and third-person perspectives. We found that the first-person behavioral videos of the participants and others induced greater activation in the premotor-intraparietal region. In contrast, the third-person behavioral videos induced greater activation in the default mode network compared with the first-person videos. Regardless of the perspective, the videos of the participants induced greater activation in the salience network than the videos of others. On the other hand, the videos of others induced greater activation in the precuneus and lingual gyrus than the videos of the participants. These results suggest that the salience network is commonly involved in self-recognition from both perspectives, even though the brain regions involved in action observation for the two perspectives are distinct.

Enhanced processing of aversive stimuli on embodied artificial limbs by the human amygdala

Body perception has been extensively investigated, with one particular focus being the integration of vision and touch within a neuronal body representation. Previous studies have implicated a distributed network comprising the extrastriate body area (EBA), posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and ventral premotor cortex (PMv) during illusory self-attribution of a rubber hand. Here, we set up an fMRI paradigm in virtual reality (VR) to study whether and how the self-attribution of (artificial) body parts is altered if these body parts are somehow threatened. Participants (N = 30) saw a spider (aversive stimulus) or a toy-car (neutral stimulus) moving along a 3D-rendered virtual forearm positioned like their real forearm, while tactile stimulation was applied on the real arm in the same (congruent) or opposite (incongruent) direction. We found that the PPC was more activated during congruent stimulation; higher visual areas and the anterior insula (aIns) showed increased activation during aversive stimulus presentation; and the amygdala was more strongly activated for aversive stimuli when there was stronger multisensory integration of body-related information (interaction of aversiveness and congruency). Together, these findings suggest an enhanced processing of aversive stimuli within the amygdala when they represent a bodily threat.

The body-ownership is unconsciously distorted in the brain: An event-related potential study of rubber hand illusion

Many studies have reported that bottom-up multisensory integration of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information can distort our sense of body-ownership, producing rubber hand illusion (RHI). There is less evidence about when and how the body-ownership is distorted in the brain during RHI. To examine whether this illusion effect occurs preattentively at an early stage of processing, we monitored the visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) component (the index of automatic deviant detection) and N2 (the index for conflict monitoring). Participants first performed an RHI elicitation task in a synchronous or asynchronous setting and then finished a passive visual oddball task in which the deviant stimuli were unrelated to the explicit task. A significant interaction between Deviancy (deviant hand vs. standard hand) and Group (synchronous vs. asynchronous) was found. The asynchronous group showed clear mismatch effects in both vMMN and N2, while the synchronous group had such effect only in N2. The results indicate that after the elicitation of RHI bottom-up integration could be retrieved at the early stage of sensory processing before top-down processing, providing evidence for the priority of the bottom-up processes after the generation of RHI and revealing the mechanism of how the body-ownership is unconsciously distorted in the brain.

Region-of-interest analysis approaches in neuroimaging studies of body ownership: An activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis

How do we feel that we own our body? By manipulating the integration of multisensory signals and creating the illusory experience of owning external body parts and entire bodies, researchers have investigated the neurofunctional correlates of body ownership. Recent attempts to synthesize the neuroimaging literature of body ownership through meta-analysis have shown partly inconsistent results. A large proportion of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) findings on body ownership include analyses based on regions of interest (ROIs). This approach can produce inflated findings when results are synthesized in meta-analyses. We conducted a systematic search of the fMRI literature of ownership of body parts and entire bodies. Three activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analyses were conducted, testing the impact of including ROI-based findings. When both whole-brain and ROI-based results were included, frontal and posterior parietal multisensory areas were associated with body ownership. When only ROI-based results were included, larger areas of the frontal and posterior parietal cortices and the middle occipital gyrus were associated with body ownership. A whole-brain meta-analysis, excluding ROI-based results, found no significant convergence of activation across the brain. These findings highlight the difficulty of quantitatively synthesizing a neuroimaging field where a large part of the literature is based on findings from ROI-based analyses. We discuss these findings in the light of current practices within this field of research and highlight current problems of meta-analytic approaches of body ownership. We recommend the sharing of unthresholded data as a means to facilitate future meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature of body ownership.

Precision control for a flexible body representation

Adaptive body representation requires the continuous integration of multisensory inputs within a flexible 'body model' in the brain. The present review evaluates the idea that this flexibility is augmented by the contextual modulation of sensory processing 'top-down'; which can be described as precision control within predictive coding formulations of Bayesian inference. Specifically, I focus on the proposal that an attenuation of proprioception may facilitate the integration of conflicting visual and proprioceptive bodily cues. Firstly, I review empirical work suggesting that the processing of visual vs proprioceptive body position information can be contextualised 'top-down'; for instance, by adopting specific attentional task sets. Building up on this, I review research showing a similar contextualisation of visual vs proprioceptive information processing in the rubber hand illusion and in visuomotor adaptation. Together, the reviewed literature suggests that proprioception, despite its indisputable importance for body perception and action control, can be attenuated top-down (through precision control) to facilitate the contextual adaptation of the brain's body model to novel visual feedback.

Monochannel Preference in Autism Spectrum Conditions Revealed by a Non-Visual Variant of Rubber Hand Illusion

Individuals with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) are less susceptible to multisensory delusions, such as rubber hand illusion (RHI). Here, we investigate whether a monochannel variant of RHI is more effective in inducing an illusory feeling of ownership in ASC. To this aim, we exploit a non-visual variant of the RHI that, excluding vision, leverages only on the somatosensory channel. While the visual-tactile RHI does not alter the perceived hand position in ASC individuals, the tacto-tactile RHI effectively modulates proprioception to a similar extent as that found in typical development individuals. These findings suggest a more effective integration of multiple inputs originating from the same sensory channel in ASC, revealing a monochannel preference in this population.

Illusory Body Ownership Affects the Cortical Response to Vicarious Somatosensation

Fundamental human feelings such as body ownership (“this” body is “my” body) and vicariousness (first-person-like experience of events occurring to others) are based on multisensory integration. Behavioral links between body ownership and vicariousness have been shown, but the neural underpinnings remain largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we investigated the neural effects of altered body ownership on vicarious somatosensation. While recording functional brain imaging data, first, we altered participants’ body ownership by robotically delivering tactile stimulations (“tactile” stroking) in synchrony or not with videos of a virtual hand being brushed (“visual” stroking). Then, we manipulated vicarious somatosensation by showing videos of the virtual hand being touched by a syringe’s plunger (touch) or needle (pain). Only after the alteration of body ownership (synchronous visuo-tactile stroking) and specifically during late epochs of vicarious somatosensation, vicarious pain was associated with lower activation in premotor and anterior cingulate cortices with respect to vicarious touch. At the methodological level, the present study highlights the importance of the neural response’s temporal evolution. At the theoretical level, it shows that the higher-level (cognitive) impact of a lower-level (sensory) body-related processing (visuo-tactile) is not limited to body ownership but also extends to other psychological body-related domains, such as vicarious somatosensation.

Lewis J. The structural and functional connectivity neural underpinnings of body image

How we perceive our bodies is fundamental to our self-consciousness and our experience in the world. There are two types of interrelated internal body representations-a subjective experience of the position of a limb in space (body schema) and the subjective experience of the shape and size of the limb (body image). Body schema has been extensively studied, but there is no evidence of the brain structure and network dynamics underpinning body image. Here, we provide the first evidence for the extrastriate body area (EBA), a multisensory brain area, as the structural and functional neural substrate for body shape and size. We performed a multisensory finger-stretch illusion that elongated the index finger. EBA volume and functional connectivity to the posterior parietal cortex are both related to the participants' susceptibility to the illusion. Taken together, these data suggest that EBA structure and connectivity encode body representation and body perception disturbances.

Expert Tool Users Show Increased Differentiation between Visual Representations of Hands and Tools

The idea that when we use a tool we incorporate it into the neural representation of our body (embodiment) has been a major inspiration for philosophy, science, and engineering. While theoretically appealing, there is little direct evidence for tool embodiment at the neural level. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in male and female human subjects, we investigated whether expert tool users (London litter pickers: n = 7) represent their expert tool more like a hand (neural embodiment) or less like a hand (neural differentiation), as compared with a group of tool novices (n = 12). During fMRI scans, participants viewed first-person videos depicting grasps performed by either a hand, litter picker, or a non-expert grasping tool. Using representational similarity analysis (RSA), differences in the representational structure of hands and tools were measured within occipitotemporal cortex (OTC). Contrary to the neural embodiment theory, we find that the experts group represent their own tool less like a hand (not more) relative to novices. Using a case-study approach, we further replicated this effect, independently, in five of the seven individual expert litter pickers, as compared with the novices. An exploratory analysis in left parietal cortex, a region implicated in visuomotor representations of hands and tools, also indicated that experts do not visually represent their tool more similar to hands, compared with novices. Together, our findings suggest that extensive tool use leads to an increased neural differentiation between visual representations of hands and tools. This evidence provides an important alternative framework to the prominent tool embodiment theory.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT It is commonly thought that tool use leads to the assimilation of the tool into the neural representation of the body, a process referred to as embodiment. Here, we demonstrate that expert tool users (London litter pickers) neurally represent their own tool less like a hand (not more), compared with novices. Our findings advance our current understanding for how experience shapes functional organization in high-order visual cortex. Further, this evidence provides an alternative framework to the prominent tool embodiment theory, suggesting instead that experience with tools leads to more distinct, separable hand and tool representations.

Connectivity Analysis during Rubber Hand Illusion-A Pilot TMS-EEG Study in a Patient with SCI

Background

Bodily self-perception is an important concept for several neurological disorders, including spinal cord injury (SCI). Changing one's bodily self-perception, e.g., via rubber hand illusion (RHI), induces alterations of bottom-up and top-down pathways and with this the connectivity between involved brain areas. We aim to examine whether (1) this process can be manipulated by changing cortical excitability, (2) connectivity between relevant brain areas differ when the RHI cannot be evoked, and (3) how this projection differs in a patient with SCI.

Method

We applied RHI and facilitatory theta burst stimulation (TBS) on the right primary somatosensory cortex (S1) of 18 healthy participants and one patient with incomplete, cervical SCI. During RHI, we recorded high-density electroencephalography (HD-EEG) and extracted directed and nondirected connectivity measures.

Results

There is no difference in connectivity between sham and real TBS or in the effectivity of RHI. We observed a higher laterality in the patient, i.e., higher connectivity of the right and lower of the left hemisphere. Besides this, connectivity patterns do not differ between healthy participants and the patient.

Conclusion

This connectivity pattern might represent a neuroplastic response in the attempt to overcome the functional impairment of the patient resulting in a similar overall connectivity pattern to the healthy participants, yet with a higher sensitivity towards RHI and a higher laterality. The cortico-cortical communication was not altered depending on whether the illusion was provoked or not; hence, the perceptory illusion could not be observed in the EEG analysis.

Impact of visuomotor feedback on the embodiment of virtual hands detached from the body

It has been shown that mere observation of body discontinuity leads to diminished body ownership. However, the impact of body discontinuity has mainly been investigated in conditions where participants observe a collocated static virtual body from a first-person perspective. This study explores the influence of body discountinuity on the sense of embodiment, when rich visuomotor correlations between a real and an artificial virtual body are established. In two experiments, we evaluated body ownership and motor performance, when participants interacted in virtual reality either using virtual hands connected or disconnected from a body. We found that even under the presence of congruent visuomotor feedback, mere observation of body discontinuity resulted in diminished embodiment. Contradictory evidence was found in relation to motor performance, where further research is needed to understand the role of visual body discontinuity in motor tasks. Preliminary findings on physiological reactions to a threat were also assessed, indicating that body visual discontinuity does not differently impact threat-related skin conductance responses. The present results are in accordance with past evidence showing that body discontinuity negatively impacts embodiment. However, further research is needed to understand the influence of visuomotor feedback and body morphological congruency on motor performance and threat-related physiological reactions.

Neural divergence and convergence for attention to and detection of interoceptive and somatosensory stimuli

Body awareness is constructed by signals originating from within and outside the body. How do these apparently divergent signals converge? We developed a signal detection task to study the neural convergence and divergence of interoceptive and somatosensory signals. Participants focused on either cardiac or tactile events and reported their presence or absence. Beyond some evidence of divergence, we observed a robust overlap in the pattern of activation evoked across both conditions in frontal areas including the insular cortex, as well as parietal and occipital areas, and for both attention and detection of these signals. Psycho-physiological interaction analysis revealed that right insular cortex connectivity was modulated by the conscious detection of cardiac compared to somatosensory sensations, with greater connectivity to occipito-parietal regions when attending to cardiac signals. Our findings speak in favour of the inherent convergence of bodily-related signals and move beyond the apparent antagonism between exteroception and interoception.

Enhanced bodily states of fear facilitates bias perception of fearful faces

We investigated whether enhanced interoceptive bodily states of fear would facilitate recognition of the fearful faces. Participants performed an emotional judgment task after a bodily imagery task inside a functional magnetic resonance imaging scanner. In the bodily imagery task, participants were instructed to imagine feeling the bodily sensations of two specific somatotopic patterns: a fear-associated bodily sensation (FBS) or a disgust-associated bodily sensation (DBS). They were shown faces expressing various levels of fearfulness and disgust and instructed to classify the facial expression as fear or disgust. We found a stronger bias favoring the “fearful face” under the congruent FBS condition than under the incongruent DBS condition. The brain response to fearful versus intermediate faces increased in the fronto-insular-temporal network under the FBS condition, but not the DBS condition. The fearful face elicited activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and extrastriate body area under the FBS condition relative to the DBS condition. Furthermore, functional connectivity between the anterior cingulate cortex/extrastriate body area and the fronto-insular-temporal network was modulated according to the specific bodily sensation. Our findings suggest that somatotopic patterns of bodily sensation provide informative access to the collective visceral state in the fear processing via the fronto-insular-temporal network.

To the self and beyond: Arousal and functional connectivity of the temporo-parietal junction contributes to spontaneous sensations perception

The temporoparietal junction (TPJ), along with the anterior insula (AI) and the extrastriate body area (EBA), play a major part in embodiment and self-awareness. However, these connections also appear to be frequently engaged in arousal and attentional processing of external events. Considering that these networks may focus attention both toward and away from the self, we set to investigate how they contribute to the perception of spontaneous sensations (SPS), a common phenomenon related to self-awareness and mediated by both interoceptive and attentional processes. In Experiment 1, resting-state EEG was recorded, as well as arousal reported via a questionnaire, followed by a SPS task. Functional TPJ-AI and TPJ-EBA connectivity were computed using eLORETA. Spatial correlational analyses showed that less frequent SPS coincided with greater TPJ-AI and TPJ-EBA functional connectivity, especially in the theta and alpha frequency bands. High self-reported arousal predicted low intensity and low confidence in the location of SPS. Resting-state skin conductance level (SCL) was recorded in Experiment 2, followed by the SPS task. Less frequent SPS coincided with greater SCL. Findings are interpreted in terms of attention and self-related processes, and a discussion of the TPJ participation in self-awareness through SPS is presented.

Is an artificial limb embodied as a hand? Brain decoding in prosthetic limb users

The potential ability of the human brain to represent an artificial limb as a body part (embodiment) has been inspiring engineers, clinicians, and scientists as a means to optimise human-machine interfaces. Using functional MRI (fMRI), we studied whether neural embodiment actually occurs in prosthesis users' occipitotemporal cortex (OTC). Compared with controls, different prostheses types were visually represented more similarly to each other, relative to hands and tools, indicating the emergence of a dissociated prosthesis categorisation. Greater daily life prosthesis usage correlated positively with greater prosthesis categorisation. Moreover, when comparing prosthesis users' representation of their own prosthesis to controls' representation of a similar looking prosthesis, prosthesis users represented their own prosthesis more dissimilarly to hands, challenging current views of visual prosthesis embodiment. Our results reveal a use-dependent neural correlate for wearable technology adoption, demonstrating adaptive use-related plasticity within the OTC. Because these neural correlates were independent of the prostheses' appearance and control, our findings offer new opportunities for prosthesis design by lifting restrictions imposed by the embodiment theory for artificial limbs.

Scrambled body differentiates body part ownership from the full body illusion

Illusory body ownership can be induced in a body part or a full body by visual-motor synchronisation. A previous study indicated that an invisible full body illusion can be induced by the synchronous movement of only the hands and feet. The difference between body part ownership and the full body illusion has not been explained in detail because there is no method for separating these two illusions. To develop a method to do so, we scrambled or randomised the positions of the hands and feet and compared it with the normal layout stimulus by manipulating visual-motor synchronisation. In Experiment 1, participants observed the stimuli from a third-person perspective, and the questionnaire results showed that the scrambled body stimulus induced only body part ownership, while the normal layout stimulus induced both body part ownership and full body ownership when the stimuli were synchronous with participants' actions. In Experiment 2, we found similar results as with the first-person perspective stimuli in a questionnaire. We did not find significant skin conductance response difference between any conditions in either Experiment 2 or 3. These results suggest that a spatial relationship is necessary for the full body illusion, but not for body part ownership.

Interactions between emotion and action in the brain

A growing literature supports the existence of interactions between emotion and action in the brain, and the central participation of the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC) in this regard. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we sought to investigate the role of self-relevance during such interactions by varying the context in which threating pictures were presented (with guns pointed towards or away from the observer). Participants performed a simple visual detection task following exposure to such stimuli. Except for voxelwise tests, we adopted a Bayesian analysis framework which evaluated evidence for the hypotheses of interest, given the data, in a continuous fashion. Behaviorally, our results demonstrated a valence by context interaction such that there was a tendency of speeding up responses to targets after viewing threat pictures directed towards the participant. In the brain, interaction patterns that paralleled those observed behaviorally were observed most notably in the middle temporal gyrus, supplementary motor area, precentral gyrus, and anterior insula. In these regions, activity was overall greater during threat conditions relative to neutral ones, and this effect was enhanced in the directed towards context. A valence by context interaction was observed in the aMCC too, where we also observed a correlation (across participants) of evoked responses and reaction time data. Taken together, our study revealed the context-sensitive engagement of motor-related areas during emotional perception, thus supporting the idea that emotion and action interact in important ways in the brain.

Relationships Between Personality Features and the Rubber Hand Illusion: An Exploratory Study

The rubber hand illusion paradigm allows investigating human body ownership by inducing an illusion of owning a life-sized fake hand. Despite the wide consensus on the fact that integration of multisensory signals is the main interpretative framework of the rubber hand illusion, increasing amount of data show that additional factors might contribute to the emergence of the illusion and, in turn, explain the strong inter-individual differences of the illusory patterns. Here, we explored whether and how personality features contribute to the emergence of the illusion by administering to healthy participants the rubber hand illusion paradigm along with two well-known personality tests, i.e., the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) and the Rorschach test. Results showed that two Rorschach domains (i.e., "Perception and Thinking Problems" and "Self and Other Representation") were positively correlated with the illusory mislocalization of the own left hand toward the fake hand. Further analyses suggested that while the tendency to perceive unconventionally is related to mislocalizing the own hand toward the fake hand, the association of the RHI index and other personality features measured by the Rorschach remain uncertain. However, our findings in general suggest that personality features might have a role in the emergence of the rubber hand illusion. This, in turn, could explain the high inter-individual variability of the illusory effects.

Cortical Regions Encoding Hardness Perception Modulated by Visual Information Identified by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging With Multivoxel Pattern Analysis

Recent studies have revealed that hardness perception is determined by visual information along with the haptic input. This study investigated the cortical regions involved in hardness perception modulated by visual information using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA). Twenty-two healthy participants were enrolled. They were required to place their left and right hands at the front and back, respectively, of a mirror attached to a platform placed above them while lying in a magnetic resonance scanner. In conditions SFT, MED, and HRD, one of three polyurethane foam pads of varying hardness (soft, medium, and hard, respectively) was presented to the left hand in a given trial, while only the medium pad was presented to the right hand in all trials. MED was defined as the control condition, because the visual and haptic information was congruent. During the scan, the participants were required to push the pad with the both hands while observing the reflection of the left hand and estimate the hardness of the pad perceived by the right (hidden) hand based on magnitude estimation. Behavioral results showed that the perceived hardness was significantly biased toward softer or harder in >73% of the trials in conditions SFT and HRD; we designated these trials as visually modulated (SFTvm and HRDvm, respectively). The accuracy map was calculated individually for each of the pair-wise comparisons of (SFTvm vs. MED), (HRDvm vs. MED), and (SFTvm vs. HRDvm) by a searchlight MVPA, and the cortical regions encoding the perceived hardness with visual modulation were identified by conjunction of the three accuracy maps in group analysis. The cluster was observed in the right sensory motor cortex, left anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS), bilateral parietal operculum (PO), and occipito-temporal cortex (OTC). Together with previous findings on such cortical regions, we conclude that the visual information of finger movements processed in the OTC may be integrated with haptic input in the left aIPS, and the subjective hardness perceived by the right hand with visual modulation may be processed in the cortical network between the left PO and aIPS.

Neurofunctional correlates of body-ownership and sense of agency: A meta-analytical account of self-consciousness

Self-consciousness consists of several dissociable experiences, including the sense of ownership of one's body and the sense of agency over one's action consequences. The relationship between body-ownership and the sense of agency has been described by different neurocognitive models, each providing specific neurofunctional predictions. According to an "additive" model, the sense of agency entails body-ownership, while an alternative "independence" hypothesis suggests that they represent two qualitatively different processes, underpinned by distinct brain systems. We propose a third "interactive" model, arguing the interdependence between body-ownership and the sense of agency: these constructs might represent different experiences with specific and exclusive brain correlates, but they also could partly overlap at the neurofunctional level. Here we test these three neurocognitive models by reviewing the available neurofunctional literature of body-ownership and the sense of agency, with a quantitative meta-analytical approach that allowed us to compare their neural correlates statistically. We identified (i) a body-ownership-specific network including the left inferior parietal lobule and the left extra-striate body area, (ii) a sense-of-agency-specific network including the left SMA, the left posterior insula, the right postcentral gyrus, and the right superior temporal lobe and (iii) a shared network in the left middle insula. These results provide support for the interactive neurocognitive model of body-ownership and the sense of agency. Body-ownership involves a sensory network in which multisensory inputs are integrated to be self-attributed. On the other hand, the sense of agency is specifically associated with premotor and sensory-motor areas, typically involved in generating motor predictions and in action monitoring. Finally, body-ownership and the sense of agency interact at the level of the left middle insula, a high-level multisensory hub engaged in body and action awareness in general.

Rubber Hand Illusion survives Ventral Premotor area inhibition: A rTMS study

The sense of body ownership is a fundamental feature that refers to the ability to recognize our body as our own, allowing us to interact properly with the outside world. Usually, it is explored by means of the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) during which a dummy hand is incorporated in the mental representation of one's own body throughout a multisensory (visuo-tactile) integration mechanism. Particular attention has been paid to the neurofunctional counterparts of this mechanism highlighting the pivotal role of an occipito-parieto-frontal network involving the Ventral Premotor area (PMv). To date, the specific role of the PMv in generating the sense of ownership is still unknown. In this study, we aimed at exploring the role of PMv in generating and experiencing the RHI. Off-line repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) was applied to a group of 24 healthy participants whilst changes in proprioceptive judgment and self-reported illusion sensations were collected and analysed separately. The PMv was not directly implicated in generating the sense of ownership. Indeed, its inhibition affected the explicit detection of the visuo-tactile congruence without interfering with the illusion experience itself. We hypothesized that the conscious visuo-tactile congruence detection may be independent from the conscious illusion experience. Also, our results support the view that the RHI grounds on a complex interaction between bottom-up and top-down processes, as the visuo-tactile integration per se may be not sufficient to trigger the subjective illusion.

Distinct sensitivities of the lateral prefrontal cortex and extrastriate body area to contingency between executed and observed actions

Detecting relationships between our own actions and the subsequent actions of others is critical for our social behavior. Self-actions differ from those of others in terms of action kinematics, body identity, and feedback timing. Thus, the detection of social contingency between self-actions and those of others requires comparison and integration of these three dimensions. Neuroimaging studies have highlighted the role of the frontotemporal network in action representation, but the role of each node and their relationships are still controversial. Here, we conducted a functional MRI experiment to test the hypothesis that the lateral prefrontal cortex and lateral occipito-temporal cortex are critical for the integration processes for social contingency. Twenty-four adults performed right finger gestures and then observed them as feedback. We manipulated three parameters of visual feedback: action kinematics (same or different gestures), body identity (self or other), and feedback timing (simultaneous or delayed). Three-way interactions of these factors were observed in the left inferior and middle frontal gyrus (IFG/MFG). These areas were active when self-actions were directly fed back in real-time (i.e., the condition causing a sense of agency), and when participants observed gestures performed by others after a short delay (i.e., the condition causing social contingency). In contrast, the left extrastriate body area (EBA) was sensitive to the concordance of action kinematics regardless of body identity or feedback timing. Body identity × feedback timing interactions were observed in regions including the superior parietal lobule (SPL). An effective connectivity analysis supported the model wherein experimental parameters modulated connections from the occipital cortex to the IFG/MFG via the EBA and SPL. These results suggest that both social contingency and the sense of agency are achieved by hierarchical processing that begins with simple concordance coding in the left EBA, leading to the complex coding of social relevance in the left IFG/MFG.

Altered perspective-dependent brain activation while viewing hands and associated imitation difficulties in individuals with autism spectrum disorder

Background

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) appear to have a unique awareness of their own body, which may be associated with difficulties of gestural interaction. In typically developing (TD) individuals, the perception of body parts is processed in various brain regions. For instance, activation of the lateral occipito-temporal cortex (LOTC) is known to depend on perspective (i.e., first- or third-person perspective) and identity (i.e., own vs. another person's body). In the present study, we examined how perspective and identity affect brain activation in individuals with ASD, and how perspective- and identity-dependent brain activation is associated with gestural imitation abilities.

Methods

Eighteen young adults with ASD and 18 TD individuals participated in an fMRI study in which the participants observed their own or another person's hands from the first- and third-person perspectives. We examined whether the brain activation associated with perspective and identity was altered in individuals with ASD. Furthermore, we identified the brain regions the activity of which correlated with gestural imitation difficulties in individuals with ASD.

Results

In the TD group, the left LOTC was more strongly activated by viewing a hand from the third-person perspective compared with the first-person perspective. This perspective effect in the left LOTC was significantly attenuated in the ASD group. We also observed significant group differences in the perspective effect in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Correlation analysis revealed that the perspective effect in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and cerebellum was associated with the gestural imitation ability in individuals with ASD.

Conclusions

Our study suggests that atypical visual self-body recognition in individuals with ASD is associated with an altered perspective effect in the LOTC and mPFC, which are thought to be involved in the physical and core selves, respectively. Furthermore, the gestural imitation difficulty in individuals with ASD might be associated with the altered activation in the IPL and cerebellum, but not in the LOTC. These findings shed light on common and divergent neural mechanisms underlying atypical visual self-body awareness and gestural interaction in ASD.

The Senses of Agency and Ownership: A Review

Usually, we do not question that we possess a body and act upon the world. This pre-reflective awareness of being a bodily and agentive self can, however, be disrupted by different clinical conditions. Whereas sense of ownership (SoO) describes the feeling of mineness toward one's own body parts, feelings or thoughts, sense of agency (SoA) refers to the experience of initiating and controlling an action. Although SoA and SoO naturally coincide, both experiences can also be made in isolation. By using many different experimental paradigms, both experiences have been extensively studied over the last years. This review introduces both concepts, with a special focus also onto their interplay. First, current experimental paradigms, results and neurocognitive theories about both concepts will be presented and then their clinical and therapeutic relevance is discussed.

The neuronal network involved in self-attribution of an artificial hand: A lesion network-symptom-mapping study

The feeling of body-ownership can be experimentally manipulated using the rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm. Participants experience a sense of ownership over an artificial hand when their hidden real hand and the visible artificial hand are synchronously stroked. Using lesion masks and behavioral data from a previous study on RHI failure in acute stroke patients, we here employed lesion network-symptom-mapping (LNSM) based on normative functional connectome data to identify lesion-dependent network connectivity related to the experience of self-attribution of an artificial hand in the RHI paradigm. We found that failure to experience the RHI was associated with higher normative lesion-dependent network connectivity to the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), right anterior Insula (raI) and right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). Since these areas were spared by the infarction in most patients with RHI failure (89% for rTPJ and 94% for raI/rIFG), the analysis suggests that remote dysfunction in rTPJ, raI, and rIFG accounted for RHI failure. These results highlight the potential role of rTPJ, raI, and rIFG in bodily self-consciousness. LNSM is a powerful tool capable of delineating the architecture of functional networks underlying complex cognitive function.

Neural correlates of interoception: Effects of interoceptive focus and relationship to dimensional measures of body awareness

Interoception has been defined as the sensing of the physiological condition of the body, with interoceptive sensibility (IS) characterizing an individual's self-reported awareness of internal sensation. IS is a multidimensional construct including not only the tendency to be aware of sensation but also how sensations are interpreted, regulated, and used to inform behavior, with different dimensions relating to different aspects of health and disease. Here we investigated neural mechanisms of interoception when healthy individuals attended to their heartbeat and skin temperature, and examined the relationship between neural activity during interoception and individual differences in self-reported IS using the Multidimensional Scale of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA). Consistent with prior work, interoception activated a network involving insula and sensorimotor regions but also including occipital, temporal, and prefrontal cortex. Differences based on interoceptive focus (heartbeat vs skin temperature) were found in insula, sensorimotor regions, occipital cortex, and limbic areas. Factor analysis of MAIA dimensions revealed 3 dissociable components of IS in our dataset, only one of which was related to neural activity during interoception. Reduced scores on the third factor, which reflected reduced ability to control attention to body sensation and increased tendency to distract from and worry about aversive sensations, was associated with greater activation in many of the same regions as those involved in interoception, including insula, sensorimotor, anterior cingulate, and temporal cortex. These data suggest that self-rated interoceptive sensibility is related to altered activation in regions involved in monitoring body state, which has implications for disorders associated with abnormality of interoception. Hum Brain Mapp 38:6068-6082, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Body ownership promotes visual awareness

The sense of ownership of one’s body is important for survival, e.g., in defending the body against a threat. However, in addition to affecting behavior, it also affects perception of the world. In the case of visuospatial perception, it has been shown that the sense of ownership causes external space to be perceptually scaled according to the size of the body. Here, we investigated the effect of ownership on another fundamental aspect of visual perception: visual awareness. In two binocular rivalry experiments, we manipulated the sense of ownership of a stranger’s hand through visuotactile stimulation while that hand was one of the rival stimuli. The results show that ownership, but not mere visuotactile stimulation, increases the dominance of the hand percept. This effect is due to a combination of longer perceptual dominance durations and shorter suppression durations. Together, these results suggest that the sense of body ownership promotes visual awareness.

Neurophysiological Correlates of the Rubber Hand Illusion in Late Evoked and Alpha/Beta Band Activity

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) allows insights into how the brain resolves conflicting multisensory information regarding body position and ownership. Previous neuroimaging studies have reported a variety of neurophysiological correlates of illusory hand ownership, with conflicting results likely originating from differences in experimental parameters and control conditions. Here, we overcome these limitations by using a fully automated and precisely-timed visuo-tactile stimulation setup to record evoked responses and oscillatory responses in participants who felt the RHI. Importantly, we relied on a combination of experimental conditions to rule out confounds of attention, body-stimulus position and stimulus duration and on the combination of two control conditions to identify neurophysiological correlates of illusory hand ownership. In two separate experiments we observed a consistent illusion-related attenuation of ERPs around 330 ms over frontocentral electrodes, as well as decreases of frontal alpha and beta power during the illusion that could not be attributed to changes in attention, body-stimulus position or stimulus duration. Our results reveal neural correlates of illusory hand ownership in late and likely higher-order rather than early sensory processes, and support a role of premotor and possibly intraparietal areas in mediating illusory body ownership.

Is the extrastriate body area part of the dorsal visuomotor stream?

The extrastriate body area (EBA) processes visual information about body parts, and it is considered one among a series of category-specific perceptual modules distributed across the occipito-temporal cortex. However, recent evidence raises the possibility that EBA might also provide an interface between perception and action, linking the ventral and dorsal streams of visual information processing. Here, we assess anatomical evidence supporting this possibility. We localise EBA in individual subjects using a perceptual task and compare the characteristics of its functional and structural connectivity to those of two perceptual areas, the lateral occipital complex (LOC) and the fusiform body area (FBA), separately for each hemisphere. We apply complementary analyses of resting-state fMRI and diffusion-weighted MRI data in a group of healthy right-handed human subjects (N = 31). Functional and structural connectivity profiles indicate that EBA interacts more strongly with dorsal-stream regions compared to other portions of the occipito-temporal cortex involved in processing body parts (FBA) and object identification (LOC). These findings provide anatomical ground for a revision of the functional role of EBA. Building on a number of recent observations, we suggest that EBA contributes to planning goal-directed actions, possibly by specifying a desired postural configuration to parieto-frontal areas involved in computing movement parameters.

BDNF as a possible modulator of EEG oscillatory response at the parietal cortex during visuo-tactile integration processes using a rubber hand

Multisensory integration of visuo-tactile information presented on the body or a dummy body has a strong impact on body image. Previous researches show that alteration of body image induced by visuo-tactile integration is closely related to the activation of the parietal cortex, a sensory association area. The expression of brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) in the parietal area of macaque monkeys is thought to modulate the activation of the parietal cortex and alter the extension of body image during tool-use learning. However, the relationship between parietal cortex activation related to body image alterations and BDNF levels in humans remains unclear. We investigated the relationship between human serum BDNF levels and electroencephalography responses during a visuo-tactile integration task involving a rubber hand. We found cortical oscillatory components in the high frequency (gamma) band in the left parietal cortex. Moreover, the power values of these oscillations were positively correlated (p<0.05) with serum BDNF levels. Our results suggest that serum BDNF could play a role in modulating the cortical activity in response to visuo-tactile integration processes related to body image alteration in humans.

Subjectivity of the Anomalous Sense of Self Is Represented in Gray Matter Volume in the Brain

The self includes complicated and heterogeneous functions. Researchers have divided the self into three distinct functions called “agency,” “ownership,” and “narrative self”. These correspond to psychiatric symptoms, behavioral characteristics and neural responses, but their relationship with brain structure is unclear. This study examined the relationship between the subjectivity of self-related malfunctions and brain structure in terms of gray matter (GM) volume in 96 healthy people. They completed a recently developed self-reported questionnaire called the Embodied Sense of Self Scale (ESSS) that measures self-related malfunctions. The ESSS has three subscales reflecting the three distinct functions of the self. We also determined the participants’ brain structures using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and voxel-based morphometry (VBM). Multiple regression analysis revealed a significant negative correlation between ownership malfunction and the insular cortex GM volume. A relationship with brain structure could thus only be confirmed for the ESSS “ownership” subscale. This finding suggests that distinct brain structures feel ownership and that the ESSS could partly screen for distinct brain structures.