Thinking about the thoughts of others; temporal and spatial neural activation during false belief reasoning

Attachment, Mentalizing and Trauma: Then (1992) and Now (2022)

This article reviews the current status of research on the relationship between attachment and trauma in developmental psychopathology. Beginning with a review of the major issues and the state-of-the-art in relation to current thinking in the field of attachment about the impact of trauma and the inter-generational transmission of trauma, the review then considers recent neurobiological work on mentalizing and trauma and suggests areas of new development and implications for clinical practice.

Characterising the spatial and oscillatory unfolding of Theory of Mind in adults using fMRI and MEG

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a core social cognitive skill that refers to the ability to attribute mental states to others. ToM involves understanding that others have beliefs, thoughts and desires that may be different from one's own and from reality. ToM is crucial to predict behaviour and navigate social interactions. This study employed the complementary methodological advantages of both functional MRI (fMRI) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) to examine the neural underpinnings of ToM in adults. Twenty healthy adults were first recruited to rate and describe 28 videos (15s long), each containing three moving shapes designed to depict either social interactions or random motion (control condition). The first sample of adults produced consistent narratives for 6 of those social videos and of those, 4 social videos and 4 control videos were chosen to include in the neuroimaging study. Another sample of twenty-five adults were then recruited to complete the neuroimaging in MEG and fMRI. In fMRI, we found increased activation in frontal-parietal regions in the social compared to the control condition corroborating previous fMRI findings. In MEG, we found recruitment of ToM networks in the social condition in theta, beta and gamma bands. The right supramarginal and angular gyri (right temporal parietal junction), right inferior parietal lobe and right temporal pole were recruited in the first 5s of the videos. Frontal regions such as the superior frontal gyrus were recruited in the second time window (5–10s). Brain regions such as the bilateral amygdalae were also recruited (5–10s), indicating that various social processes were integrated in understanding the social videos. Our study is one of the first to combine multi-modal neuroimaging to examine the neural networks underlying social cognitive processes, combining the strengths of the spatial resolution of fMRI and temporal resolution of MEG. Understanding this information from both modalities helped delineate the mechanism by which ToM processing unfolds over time in healthy adults. This allows us to determine a benchmark against which clinical populations can be compared.

Electrocorticographic evidence of a common neurocognitive sequence for mentalizing about the self and others

Neuroimaging studies of mentalizing (i.e., theory of mind) consistently implicate the default mode network (DMN). Nevertheless, the social cognitive functions of individual DMN regions remain unclear, perhaps due to limited spatiotemporal resolution in neuroimaging. Here we use electrocorticography (ECoG) to directly record neuronal population activity while 16 human participants judge the psychological traits of themselves and others. Self- and other-mentalizing recruit near-identical cortical sites in a common spatiotemporal sequence. Activations begin in the visual cortex, followed by temporoparietal DMN regions, then finally in medial prefrontal regions. Moreover, regions with later activations exhibit stronger functional specificity for mentalizing, stronger associations with behavioral responses, and stronger self/other differentiation. Specifically, other-mentalizing evokes slower and longer activations than self-mentalizing across successive DMN regions, implying lengthier processing at higher levels of representation. Our results suggest a common neurocognitive pathway for self- and other-mentalizing that follows a complex spatiotemporal gradient of functional specialization across DMN and beyond.

Are We Right about the Right TPJ? A Review of Brain Stimulation and Social Cognition in the Right Temporal Parietal Junction

In the past decade, the functional role of the TPJ (Temporal Parietal Junction) has become more evident in terms of its contribution to social cognition. Studies have revealed the TPJ as a ‘distinguisher’ of self and other with research focused on non-clinical populations as well as in individuals with Autism and Type I Schizophrenia. Further research has focused on the integration of self-other distinctions with proprioception. Much of what we now know about the causal role of the right TPJ derives from TMS (Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation), rTMS repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation), and tDCS (transcranial Direct Cortical Stimulation). In this review, we focus on the role of the right TPJ as a moderator of self, which is integrated and distinct from ‘other’ and how brain stimulation has established the causal relationship between the underlying cortex and agency.

A large-scale structural and functional connectome of social mentalizing

Humans have a remarkable ability to infer the mind of others. This mentalizing skill relies on a distributed network of brain regions but how these regions connect and interact is not well understood. Here we leveraged large-scale multimodal neuroimaging data to elucidate the brain-wide organization and mechanisms of mentalizing processing. Key connectomic features of the mentalizing network (MTN) have been delineated in exquisite detail. We found the structural architecture of MTN is organized by two parallel subsystems and constructed redundantly by local and long-range white matter fibers. We uncovered an intrinsic functional architecture that is synchronized according to the degree of mentalizing, and its hierarchy reflects the inherent information integration order. We also examined the correspondence between the structural and functional connectivity in the network and revealed their differences in network topology, individual variance, spatial specificity, and functional specificity. Finally, we scrutinized the connectome resemblance between the default mode network and MTN and elaborated their inherent differences in dynamic patterns, laterality, and homogeneity. Overall, our study demonstrates that mentalizing processing unfolds across functionally heterogeneous regions with highly structured fiber tracts and unique hierarchical functional architecture, which make it distinguishable from the default mode network and other vicinity brain networks supporting autobiographical memory, semantic memory, self-referential, moral reasoning, and mental time travel.

The preterm social brain: altered functional networks for Theory of Mind in very preterm children

Neurodevelopmental difficulties emerge in very preterm born children (<32-week gestation) in infancy and continue to early adulthood but little is known about their social-cognitive development. This study utilized the complementary methodological advantages of both functional MRI and magnetoencephalography to examine the neural underpinnings of Theory of Mind in very preterm birth. Theory of Mind, one of the core social-cognitive skills, is the ability to attribute mental states to others, and is crucial for predicting others’ behaviours in social interactions. Eighty-three children (40 very preterm born, 24 boys, age = 8.7 ± 0.5 years, and 43 full-term born, 22 boys, age = 8.6 ± 0.5 years) completed the study. In functional MRI, both groups recruited classic Theory of Mind areas, without significant group differences. However, reduced Theory of Mind connectivity in the very preterm born group was found in magnetoencephalography in distinct theta, alpha and beta-band networks anchored in a set of brain regions that comprise the social brain. These networks included regions such as the angular gyrus, the medial pre-frontal cortex, the superior temporal gyrus and the temporal poles. Very preterm born children showed increased connectivity compared to controls in a network anchored in the occipital gyri rather than classical social-processing regions. Very preterm born children made significantly more attribution errors and mis-construed the social scenarios. Findings offer novel insight into the neural networks, supporting social cognition in very preterm born children and highlight the importance of multimodal neuroimaging to interrogate the social brain in clinical populations.

A Brain-Inspired Model of Theory of Mind

Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, and to understand that others have beliefs that are different from one's own. Although functional neuroimaging techniques have been widely used to establish the neural correlates implicated in ToM, the specific mechanisms are still not clear. We make our efforts to integrate and adopt existing biological findings of ToM, bridging the gap through computational modeling, to build a brain-inspired computational model for ToM. We propose a Brain-inspired Model of Theory of Mind (Brain-ToM model), and the model is applied to a humanoid robot to challenge the false belief tasks, two classical tasks designed to understand the mechanisms of ToM from Cognitive Psychology. With this model, the robot can learn to understand object permanence and visual access from self-experience, then uses these learned experience to reason about other's belief. We computationally validated that the self-experience, maturation of correlate brain areas (e.g., calculation capability) and their connections (e.g., inhibitory control) are essential for ToM, and they have shown their influences on the performance of the participant robot in false-belief task. The theoretic modeling and experimental validations indicate that the model is biologically plausible, and computationally feasible as a foundation for robot theory of mind.

Altered Connectivity During a False-Belief Task in Adults With Autism Spectrum Disorder

BACKGROUND

Deficits in social communication are one of the main features of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Adults with ASD show atypical brain activity during false-belief understanding, an aspect of social communication involving the ability to infer that an individual can have an incorrect belief about a situation. Our study is the first to investigate whether adults with ASD exhibit differences in frequency-specific functional connectivity patterns during false-belief reasoning.

METHODS

We used magnetoencephalography to contrast functional connectivity underlying false-belief understanding between 40 adults with ASD and 39 control adults. We examined whole-brain phase synchrony measures during a false-belief task in 3 frequency bands: theta (4-7 Hz), alpha (8-14 Hz), and beta (15-30 Hz).

RESULTS

Adults with ASD demonstrated reduced theta-band connectivity compared with control adults between several right-lateralized and midline regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex, right temporoparietal junction, right inferior frontal gyrus, and right superior temporal gyrus. During false-belief trials, they also recruited a network in the beta band that included primary visual regions such as the bilateral inferior occipital gyri and the left anterior temporoparietal junction.

CONCLUSIONS

Reduced theta-band synchrony between areas associated with mentalizing, inhibition, and visual processing implies some difficulty in communication among these functions in ASD. This impairment in top-down control in the theta band may be counterbalanced by their engagement of a beta-band network because both the left anterior temporoparietal junction and beta-band oscillations are associated with attentional processes. Thus, adults with ASD demonstrate alternative neural mechanisms for successful false-belief reasoning.

The mentalizing network and theory of mind mediate adjustment after childhood traumatic brain injury

Childhood traumatic brain injury (TBI) affects over 600 000 children per year in the United States. Following TBI, children are vulnerable to deficits in psychosocial adjustment and neurocognition, including social cognition, which persist long-term. They are also susceptible to direct and secondary damage to related brain networks. In this study, we examine whether brain morphometry of the mentalizing network (MN) and theory of mind (ToM; one component of social cognition) mediates the effects of TBI on adjustment. Children with severe TBI (n = 15, M_age = 10.32), complicated mild/moderate TBI (n = 30, M_age = 10.81) and orthopedic injury (OI; n = 42, M_age = 10.65) completed measures of ToM and executive function and underwent MRI; parents rated children’s psychosocial adjustment. Children with severe TBI demonstrated reduced right-hemisphere MN volume, and poorer ToM, vs children with OI. Ordinary least-squares path analysis indicated that right-hemisphere MN volume and ToM mediated the association between severe TBI and adjustment. Parallel analyses substituting the central executive network and executive function were not significant, suggesting some model specificity. Children at greatest risk of poor adjustment after TBI could be identified based in part on neuroimaging of social brain networks and assessment of social cognition and thereby more effectively allocate limited intervention resources.

Do you know what I'm thinking? Temporal and spatial brain activity during a theory-of-mind task in children with autism

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First MEG study of neural underpinnings of theory of mind differences in autism.

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Children with autism show decreased LTPJ activity from 300 to 375 and 425 to 500 ms.

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Children with autism also show increased RIFG activity from 325 to 375 ms.

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Co-incident lower LTPJ and higher RIFG activity implies compensatory use of RIFG.

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Executive functions may augment impaired theory of mind in autism.

The social impairments observed in children with autism spectrum disorder are thought to arise in part from deficits in theory of mind, the ability to understand other people’s thoughts and feelings. To determine the temporal-spatial dynamics of brain activity underlying these atypical theory-of-mind processes, we used magnetoencephalography to characterize the sequence of functional brain patterns (i.e. when and where) related to theory-of-mind reasoning in 19 high-functioning children with autism compared to 22 age- and sex-matched typically-developing children aged 8–12 during a false-belief (theory-of-mind) task. While task performance did not differ between the two groups, children with autism showed reduced activation in the left temporoparietal junction between 300–375 and 425–500 ms, as well as increased activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus from 325 to 375 ms compared to controls. The overlap in decreased temporoparietal junction activity and increased right inferior frontal gyrus activation from 325 to 375 ms suggests that in children with autism, the right inferior frontal gyrus may compensate for deficits in the temporoparietal junction, a neural theory-of-mind network hub. As the right inferior frontal gyrus is involved in inhibitory control, this finding suggests that children with autism rely on executive functions to bolster their false-belief understanding.

Agent-specific learning signals for self-other distinction during mentalising

Humans have a remarkable ability to simulate the minds of others. How the brain distinguishes between mental states attributed to self and mental states attributed to someone else is unknown. Here, we investigated how fundamental neural learning signals are selectively attributed to different agents. Specifically, we asked whether learning signals are encoded in agent-specific neural patterns or whether a self–other distinction depends on encoding agent identity separately from this learning signal. To examine this, we tasked subjects to learn continuously 2 models of the same environment, such that one was selectively attributed to self and the other was selectively attributed to another agent. Combining computational modelling with magnetoencephalography (MEG) enabled us to track neural representations of prediction errors (PEs) and beliefs attributed to self, and of simulated PEs and beliefs attributed to another agent. We found that the representational pattern of a PE reliably predicts the identity of the agent to whom the signal is attributed, consistent with a neural self–other distinction implemented via agent-specific learning signals. Strikingly, subjects exhibiting a weaker neural self–other distinction also had a reduced behavioural capacity for self–other distinction and displayed more marked subclinical psychopathological traits. The neural self–other distinction was also modulated by social context, evidenced in a significantly reduced decoding of agent identity in a nonsocial control task. Thus, we show that self–other distinction is realised through an encoding of agent identity intrinsic to fundamental learning signals. The observation that the fidelity of this encoding predicts psychopathological traits is of interest as a potential neurocomputational psychiatric biomarker.

In order for people to have meaningful social interactions, they need to infer each other’s beliefs. Converging evidence from humans and nonhuman primates suggests that a person’s brain can represent a second person’s beliefs by simulating that second person’s brain activity. However, it is not known how the outputs of those simulations are identified as ‘yours and not mine’. This ability to distinguish self from other is required for social cognition, and it may be impaired in mental health disorders with social cognitive deficits. We investigated self–other distinction in healthy adults learning about an environment both from their own point of view and the point of view of another person. We used computationally identified learning variables and then detected how these variables are represented by measuring magnetic fields in the brain. We found that the human brain can distinguish self from other by expressing these signals in dissociable activity patterns. Subjects who showed the largest difference between self signals and other signals were better at distinguishing self from other in the task and also showed fewer traits of mental health disorders.

Corticostriatal signatures of schadenfreude: evidence from Huntington's disease

Schadenfreude-pleasure at others' misfortunes-is a multidetermined social emotion which involves reward processing, mentalising and perspective-taking abilities. Patients with Huntington's disease (HD) exhibit reductions of this experience, suggesting a role of striatal degeneration in such impairment. However, no study has directly assessed the relationship between regional brain atrophy in HD and reduced schadenfreude. Here, we assessed whether grey matter (GM) atrophy in patients with HD correlates with ratings of schadenfreude. First, we compared the performance of 20 patients with HD and 23 controls on an experimental task designed to trigger schadenfreude and envy (another social emotion acting as a control condition). Second, we compared GM volume between groups. Third, we examined brain regions where atrophy might be associated with specific impairments in the patients. While both groups showed similar ratings of envy, patients with HD reported lower schadenfreude. The latter pattern was related to atrophy in regions of the reward system (ventral striatum) and the mentalising network (precuneus and superior parietal lobule). Our results shed light on the intertwining of reward and socioemotional processes in schadenfreude, while offering novel evidence about their neural correlates.

Gender Differences in Behavioral and Neural Responses to Unfairness Under Social Pressure

Numerous studies have revealed the key role of social pressure on individuals' decision-making processes. However, the impact of social pressure on unfairness-related decision-making processes remains unclear. In the present study, we investigated how social pressure modulated men's and women's responses in an ultimatum game. Twenty women and eighteen men played the ultimatum game as responders in the scanner, where fair and unfair offers were tendered by proposers acting alone (low pressure) or by proposers endorsed by three supporters (high pressure). Results showed that men rejected more, whereas women accepted more unfair offers in the high versus low pressure context. Neurally, pregenual anterior cingulate cortex activation in women positively predicted their acceptance rate difference between contexts. In men, stronger right anterior insula activation and increased connectivity between right anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex were observed when they receiving unfair offers in the high than low pressure context. Furthermore, more bilateral anterior insula and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activations were found when men rejected (relative to accepted) unfair offers in the high than low pressure context. These findings highlighted gender differences in the modulation of behavioral and neural responses to unfairness by social pressure.

Neural correlates of "Theory of Mind" in very preterm born children

Very preterm (VPT) birth (<32 weeks' gestational age) has been implicated in social-cognitive deficits including Theory of Mind (ToM); the ability to attribute mental states to others and understand that those beliefs can differ from one's own or reality. The neural bases for ToM deficits in VPT born children have not been examined. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) for its excellent spatial and temporal resolution to determine the neural underpinnings of ToM in 24 VPT and 24 full-term born (FT) children (7-13 years). VPT children performed more poorly on neuropsychological measures of ToM but not inhibition. In the MEG task, both FT children and VPT children recruited regions involved in false belief processing such as the rIFG (VPT: 275-350 ms, FT: 250-375 ms) and left inferior temporal gyrus (VPT: 375-450 ms, FT: 325-375 ms) and right fusiform gyrus (VPT: 150-200 ms, FT: 175-250 ms). The rIPL (included in the temporal-parietal junction) was recruited in FT children (475-575 ms) and the lTPJ in VPT children (500-575 ms). However, activations in all regions were reduced in the VPT compared to the FT group. We suggest that with increasing social-cognitive demands such as varying the type of scenarios in the standardized measure of ToM, reduced activations in the rIFG and TPJ in the VPT group may reflect the decreased performance. With access to both spatial and temporal information, we discuss the role of domain general and specific regions of the ToM network in both groups. Hum Brain Mapp 38:5577-5589, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Neuroanatomical correlates of forgiving unintentional harms

Mature moral judgments rely on the consideration of a perpetrator’s mental state as well as harmfulness of the outcomes produced. Prior work has focused primarily on the functional correlates of how intent information is neurally represented for moral judgments, but few studies have investigated whether individual differences in neuroanatomy can also explain variation in moral judgments. In the current study, we conducted voxel-based morphometry analyses to address this question. We found that local grey matter volume in the left anterior superior temporal sulcus, a region in the functionally defined theory of mind or mentalizing network, was associated with the degree to which participants relied on information about innocent intentions to forgive accidental harms. Our findings provide further support for the key role of mentalizing in the forgiveness of accidental harms and contribute preliminary evidence for the neuroanatomical basis of individual differences in moral judgments.