Mirror-touch synaesthesia changes representations of self-identity

Novel online enfacement illusion for investigating self-perception in mental disorders: an experimental study protocol

BACKGROUND

Remote research methods and interventions for mental health disorders have become increasingly important, particularly for conditions like eating disorders (EDs). Embodiment illusions, which induce feelings of ownership over another person?s body or body parts, offer valuable insights into the mechanisms underlying self-perception issues in EDs and potential interventions. However, existing research using these illusions has been limited to face-to-face settings. We illustrate a novel online protocol to induce the enfacement illusion (embodiment illusion principles applied to one's face) in an ED-based sample.

METHODS

Participants complete a 2-hr virtual session with a researcher. First, baseline trait/state ED psychopathology measures and a self-face recognition task occur. Second, participants experience two testing blocks of the enfacement illusion involving synchronously and asynchronously mimicking a pre-recorded actor's facial expressions. After each block, subjective and objective enfacement illusion measures occur alongside state ED psychopathology reassessment.

DISCUSSION

Successfully inducing enfacement illusions online could provide an affordable, accessible virtual approach to further elucidate the mechanistic role of self-perception disturbances across psychopathologies such as EDs. Moreover, this protocol may represent an innovative, remotely-delivered intervention strategy, as 'enfacement' over another face could update negative self-representations in a cost-effective, scalable manner.

Investigating the impact of motion visual synchrony on self face recognition using real time morphing

Face recognition is a crucial aspect of self-image and social interactions. Previous studies have focused on static images to explore the boundary of self-face recognition. Our research, however, investigates the dynamics of face recognition in contexts involving motor-visual synchrony. We first validated our morphing face metrics for self-face recognition. We then conducted an experiment using state-of-the-art video processing techniques for real-time face identity morphing during facial movement. We examined self-face recognition boundaries under three conditions: synchronous, asynchronous, and static facial movements. Our findings revealed that participants recognized a narrower self-face boundary with moving facial images compared to static ones, with no significant differences between synchronous and asynchronous movements. The direction of morphing consistently biased the recognized self-face boundary. These results suggest that while motor information of the face is vital for self-face recognition, it does not rely on movement synchronization, and the sense of agency over facial movements does not affect facial identity judgment. Our methodology offers a new approach to exploring the 'self-face boundary in action', allowing for an independent examination of motion and identity.

Visual perspective and body ownership modulate vicarious pain and touch: A systematic review

We conducted a systematic review investigating the influence of visual perspective and body ownership (BO) on vicarious brain resonance and vicarious sensations during the observation of pain and touch. Indeed, the way in which brain reactivity and the phenomenological experience can be modulated by blurring the bodily boundaries of self-other distinction is still unclear. We screened Scopus and WebOfScience, and identified 31 articles, published from 2000 to 2022. Results show that assuming an egocentric perspective enhances vicarious resonance and vicarious sensations. Studies on synaesthetes suggest that vicarious conscious experiences are associated with an increased tendency to embody fake body parts, even in the absence of congruent multisensory stimulation. Moreover, immersive virtual reality studies show that the type of embodied virtual body can affect high-order sensations such as appropriateness, unpleasantness, and erogeneity, associated with the touched body part and the toucher's social identity. We conclude that perspective plays a key role in the resonance with others' pain and touch, and full-BO over virtual avatars allows investigation of complex aspects of pain and touch perception which would not be possible in reality.

Atypical emotion sharing in individuals with mirror sensory synaesthesia

Being able to empathise with others is a crucial ability in everyday life. However, this does not usually entail feeling the pain of others in our own bodies. For individuals with mirror-sensory synaesthesia (MSS), however, this form of empathic embodiment is a common feature. Our study investigates the empathic ability of adults who experience MSS using a video-based empathy task. We found that MSS participants did not differ from controls on emotion identification and affective empathy; however, they showed higher affect sharing (degree to which their affect matches what they attribute to others) than controls. This finding indicates difficulties with self-other distinction, which our data shows results in fewer signs of prosocial behaviour. Our findings are in line with the self-other control theory of MSS and highlight how the use of appropriate empathy measures can contribute to our understanding of this important socio-affective ability, both in typical and atypical populations.

An evolutionary account of impairment of self in cognitive disorders

Recent research has proposed that certain aspects of psychosis, as experienced in, e.g., schizophrenia (SCZ), but also aspects of other cognitive conditions, such as autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and synesthesia, can be related to a shattered sense of the notion of self. In this paper, our goal is to show that altered processing of self can be attributed to an abnormal functioning of cortico-striatal brain networks supporting, among other, one key human distinctive cognitive ability, namely cross-modality, which plays multiple roles in human cognition and language. Specifically, our hypothesis is that this cognitive mechanism sheds light both on some basic aspects of the minimal self and on some aspects related to higher forms of self, such as the narrative self. We further link the atypical functioning in these conditions to some recent evolutionary changes in our species, specifically, an atypical presentation of human self-domestication (HSD) features. In doing so, we also lean on previous work concerning the link between cognitive disorders and language evolution under the effects of HSD. We further show that this approach can unify both linguistic and non-linguistic symptoms of these conditions through deficits in the notion of self. Our considerations provide further support for the hypothesis that SCZ and ASD are diametrically opposed cognitive conditions, as well for the hypothesis that their etiology is associated with recent human evolution, leading to a deeper understanding of the causes and symptoms of these disorders, and providing new cues, which can be used for an earlier and more accurate diagnostics.

Touching you, touching me: Higher incidence of mirror-touch synaesthesia and positive (but not negative) reactions to social touch in Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response

The characterisation of autonomous sensory meridian response (ASMR) as an audio-visual phenomenon overlooks how tactile experiences are not just perceptual concurrents of ASMR (i.e., tingling) but also commonly strong ASMR inducers. Here we systematically investigated whether ASMR-responders show altered tactile processing compared to controls. Using a screening measure of vicarious touch with a predefined cut-off for mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS; a condition where tactile sensations are experienced when viewing, but not receiving, touch), we found that ASMR-responders had more frequent and intense vicarious touch experiences, as well as a strikingly higher incidence of MTS, than non-responders. ASMR-responders also reported greater reactivity to positive, but not negative, interpersonal touch. Correlations further showed these patterns to be more prevalent in those responders with stronger ASMR. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of heightened sensory sensitivity, bodily awareness, and the underlying neuro-cognitive mechanisms driving vicarious tactile perception in ASMR and MTS.

Vicarious pain is an outcome of atypical body ownership: Evidence from the rubber hand illusion and enfacement illusion

Some people report localised pain on their body when seeing other people in pain (sensory-localised vicarious pain responders). In this study, we assess whether this is related to atypical computations of body ownership which, in paradigms such as the rubber hand illusion (RHI), can be conceptualised as a Bayesian inference as to whether multiple sources of sensory information (visual, somatosensory) belong together on a single body (one's own) or are distributed across several bodies (vision = other, somatosensory = self). According to this model, computations of body ownership depend on the degree (and precision) of sensory evidence, rather than synchrony per se. Sensory-localised vicarious pain responders exhibit the RHI following synchronous stroking and-unusually-also after asynchronous stroking. Importantly, this occurs only in asynchronous conditions in which the stroking is predictable (alternating) rather than unpredictable (random). There was no evidence that their bottom-up proprioceptive signals are less precise, suggesting individual differences in the top-down weighting of sensory evidence. Finally, the enfacement illusion (EI) was also employed as a conceptually related bodily illusion paradigm that involves a completely different response judgement (based on vision rather than proprioception). Sensory-localised responders show a comparable pattern on this task after synchronous and asynchronous stroking. This is consistent with the idea that they have top-down (prior) differences in the way body ownership is inferred that transcends the exact judgement being made (visual or proprioceptive).

Trait phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion

In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) - which are experienced as involuntary - according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. In large sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353 participants), we report substantial relationships between hypnotisability and experimental measures of experiential change in mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion comparable to relationships between hypnotisability and individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expectancies arising from perceived task requirements can account for experiential change in psychological experiments.

Enhanced self-reported affect and prosocial behaviour without differential physiological responses in mirror-sensory synaesthesia

Mirror-sensory synaesthetes mirror the pain or touch that they observe in other people on their own bodies. This type of synaesthesia has been associated with enhanced empathy. We investigated whether the enhanced empathy of people with mirror-sensory synesthesia influences the experience of situations involving touch or pain and whether it affects their prosocial decision making. Mirror-sensory synaesthetes (N = 18, all female), verified with a touch-interference paradigm, were compared with a similar number of age-matched control individuals (all female). Participants viewed arousing images depicting pain or touch; we recorded subjective valence and arousal ratings, and physiological responses, hypothesizing more extreme reactions in synaesthetes. The subjective impact of positive and negative images was stronger in synaesthetes than in control participants; the stronger the reported synaesthesia, the more extreme the picture ratings. However, there was no evidence for differential physiological or hormonal responses to arousing pictures. Prosocial decision making was assessed with an economic game assessing altruism, in which participants had to divide money between themselves and a second player. Mirror-sensory synaesthetes donated more money than non-synaesthetes, showing enhanced prosocial behaviour, and also scored higher on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index as a measure of empathy. Our study demonstrates the subjective impact of mirror-sensory synaesthesia and its stimulating influence on prosocial behaviour. This article is part of the discussion meeting issue 'Bridging senses: novel insights from synaesthesia'.

Contemplative neuroscience, self-awareness, and education

Accumulating research in education shows that contemplative practices contribute to and foster well-being of individuals in sustainable ways. This bears special importance for teachers, as it affects not only them but also their students. Based on accumulating behavioral and neuroscientific findings, it has been suggested that a key process by which mindfulness meditation enhances self-regulation is the altering of self-awareness. Indeed, accumulated work shows that the underlying networks supporting various types of self-awareness are malleable following meditative practice. However, the field of education has developed independently from the study of the self and its relation to contemplative neuroscience thus far, and to date there is no systematic account linking this accumulating body of knowledge to the field of education or discussing how it might be relevant to teachers. Here we show how incorporating insights from contemplative neuroscience-which are built on the conceptualization and neuroscience of the self-into contemplative pedagogy can inform the field and might even serve as a core underlying mechanism tying together different empirical evidence. This review points to potential neural mechanisms by which mindfulness meditation helps teachers manage stress and promote supportive learning environments, resulting in improved educational outcomes, and thus it has significant implications for educational policy regarding teachers.

Aproximación Neurodinámica a la Cognición Social

En las últimas décadas ha crecido el estudio los mecanismos involucrados en el comportamiento social, gran parte de estas indagaciones se han realizado desde una aproximación de la neurociencia social cognitiva, la cual se basa en un modelo representacional del procesamiento de información. No obstante, esta aproximación ha sido ampliamente criticada por desconocer la participación del cuerpo, la dinámica afectiva, el contexto social, el cambio durante el desarrollo y suponer un procesamiento modular endógeno. En este sentido, este artículo presenta un modelo neurodinámico de la cognición social, comprendiéndola desde una aproximación enactiva, situada, relacional y sistémica. Desde este modelo se describen los principales cambios en esperados la actividad cerebral durante las interacciones sociales en tiempo real y durante la ontogenia. Se concluye resaltando los desafíos y oportunidades que este tipo de aproximaciones puede proporcionar a la neurociencia y psicología social del futuro.

Inter-Individual Differences in Vicarious Tactile Perception: a View Across the Lifespan in Typical and Atypical Populations

Touch is our most interpersonal sense, and so it stands to reason that we represent not only our own bodily experiences, but also those felt by others. This review will summarise brain and behavioural research on vicarious tactile perception (mirror touch). Specifically, we will focus on vicarious touch across the lifespan in typical and atypical groups, and will identify the knowledge gaps that are in urgent need of filling by examining what is known about how individuals differ within and between typical and atypical groups.

Identifying Oneself with the Face of Someone Else Impairs the Egocentered Visuo-spatial Mechanisms: A New Double Mirror Paradigm to Study Self-other Distinction and Interaction

Looking at our face in a mirror is one of the strongest phenomenological experiences of the Self in which we need to identify the face as reflected in the mirror as belonging to us. Recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies reported that self-face identification not only relies upon visual-mnemonic representation of one’s own face but also upon continuous updating and integration of visuo-tactile signals. Therefore, bodily self-consciousness plays a major role in self-face identification, with respect to interplay between unisensory and multisensory processing. However, if previous studies demonstrated that the integration of multisensory body-related signals contributes to the visual processing of one’s own face, there is so far no data regarding how self-face identification, inversely, contributes to bodily self-consciousness. In the present study, we tested whether self–other face identification impacts either the egocentered or heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms that are core processes of bodily self-consciousness and sustain self–other distinction. For that, we developed a new paradigm, named “Double Mirror.” This paradigm, consisting of a semi-transparent double mirror and computer-controlled Light Emitting Diodes, elicits self–other face merging illusory effect in ecologically more valid conditions, i.e., when participants are physically facing each other and interacting. Self-face identification was manipulated by exposing pairs of participants to an Interpersonal Visual Stimulation in which the reflection of their faces merged in the mirror. Participants simultaneously performed visuo-spatial and mental own-body transformation tasks centered on their own face (egocentered) or the face of their partner (heterocentered) in the pre- and post-stimulation phase. We show that self–other face identification altered the egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms. Heterocentered coding was preserved. Our data suggest that changes in self-face identification induced a bottom-up conflict between the current visual representation and the stored mnemonic representation of one’s own face which, in turn, top-down impacted bodily self-consciousness.

Is that me in the mirror? Depersonalisation modulates tactile mirroring mechanisms

Our sense of self is thought to develop through sensory-motor contingencies provided, not only by observing one's own body, but also by mirroring interactions with others. This suggests that there is a strong link between mirroring mechanisms and the bodily self. The present study tested whether this link is expressed at early, implicit stages of the mirroring process or at later, more cognitive stages. We also provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first demonstration of how inter-individual differences in our sense of bodily self may affect mirroring mechanisms. We used somatosensory event-related potentials (SEPs) to investigate the temporal dynamics of mirroring highly self-related information (viewed touch on one's own face) compared to other-related information (viewed touch on a stranger's face), in individuals with low and high levels of depersonalisation, a mental condition characterised by feeling detached or estranged from one's self and body. For the low-depersonalisation group, mirroring for self-related events (P45) preceded mirroring for other-related events (N80). At later stages (P200), mirroring was stronger for other-related than self-related events. This shows that early, implicit and later, more cognitive processes play different relative roles in mirroring self- and other-related bodily events. Critically, mirroring differed in the high-depersonalisation group, specifically for self-related events. An absence of early, implicit mirroring for self-related events over P45 suggests that the associated processes may be the neural correlates of the disembodiment experienced in depersonalisation. A lack of differential mirroring for self- and other-related events over P200 may reflect compensatory mechanisms that redress deficiencies in mirroring at earlier stages, which may break down to give rise to symptoms of depersonalisation. Alternatively, or in addition, they may represent an attenuation of processes related to self-other distinction. Our study thus shows that mirroring, especially for events on one's own face, can be strongly affected by how connected the observer feels to their own bodily self.

Can the self become another? Investigating the effects of self-association with a new facial identity

The mental representation of the self is a complex construct, comprising both conceptual information and perceptual information regarding the body. Evidence suggests that both the conceptual self-representation and the bodily self-representation are malleable, and that these different aspects of the self are linked. Changes in bodily self-representation appear to affect how the self is conceptualized, but it is unclear whether the opposite relationship is also true: Do changes to the conceptual self-representation affect how the physical self is perceived? First, we adopted a perceptual matching paradigm to establish an association between the self and an unfamiliar face (Experiment 1). Robust attentional and perceptual biases in the processing of this newly self-associated object suggested that the conceptual self-representation was extended to include it. Next, we measured whether the bodily self-representation had correspondingly changed to incorporate the new face (Experiment 2). Participants rated morphs between their own and the newly-associated according to how similar they were to the self, before and after performing the perceptual matching task. Changes to the conceptual self did not have an effect on the bodily self-representation. These results suggest that modulatory links between aspects of the mental self-representation, when focused on the non-social self, are unidirectional and flow in a bottom-up manner.

'Am I moving?' An illusion of agency and ownership in mirror-touch synaesthesia

Mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS) is a condition that leads people to experience tactile sensations on their own body when watching at someone else being touched. Recent accounts postulate that MTS is linked with atypical self-other representations. It has been suggested that this may be associated with disturbances in two main components of self-awareness: sense of agency and sense of ownership. This study investigates changes in sense of agency and sense of ownership in MTS. Using a paradigm that deliberately blurs the boundaries between the self and the other, we not only found that MTS affects sense of agency and sense of ownership, but that these aspects of self-awareness are affected differently. We suggest that alterations in sense of agency can be linked to more profound disturbances in sense of ownership in MTS, and that MTS may be characterised by underlying difficulties in self-other processing.

Conversations between self and self as Sigmund Freud--A virtual body ownership paradigm for self counselling

When people see a life-sized virtual body (VB) from first person perspective in virtual reality they are likely to have the perceptual illusion that it is their body. Additionally such virtual embodiment can lead to changes in perception, implicit attitudes and behaviour based on attributes of the VB. To date the changes that have been studied are as a result of being embodied in a body representative of particular social groups (e.g., children and other race). In our experiment participants alternately switched between a VB closely resembling themselves where they described a personal problem, and a VB representing Dr Sigmund Freud, from which they offered themselves counselling. Here we show that when the counsellor resembles Freud participants improve their mood, compared to the counsellor being a self-representation. The improvement was greater when the Freud VB moved synchronously with the participant, compared to asynchronously. Synchronous VB movement was associated with a much stronger illusion of ownership over the Freud body. This suggests that this form of embodied perspective taking can lead to sufficient detachment from habitual ways of thinking about personal problems, so as to improve the outcome, and demonstrates the power of virtual body ownership to effect cognitive changes.

Mirror-touch synaesthesia: Difficulties inhibiting the other

Individuals with mirror touch synaesthesia (MTS) experience touch on their own body when observing others being touched. A recent account proposes that such rare experiences could be linked to impairment in self-other representations. Here we tested participants with MTS on a battery of social cognition tests and found that compared to non-synaesthete controls, the MTS group showed impairment in imitation-inhibition but not in visual perspective taking or theory of mind. Although all of these socio-cognitive abilities rely on the control of self-other representations, they differ as to whether the self, or the other, should be preferentially represented. For imitation-inhibition, representations of the other should be inhibited and self-representations should be enhanced, whereas the opposite is true for visual perspective taking and theory of mind. These findings suggest that MTS is associated with a specific deficit in inhibiting representation of other individuals and shed light on the fractionability of processes underlying typical social cognition.

Common coding and dynamic interactions between observed, imagined, and experienced motor and somatosensory activity

Motor imagery and perception - considered generally as forms of motor simulation - share overlapping neural representations with motor production. While much research has focused on the extent of this "common coding," less attention has been paid to how these overlapping representations interact. How do imagined, observed, or produced actions influence one another, and how do we maintain control over our perception and behavior? In the first part of this review we describe interactions between motor production and motor simulation, and explore apparent regulatory mechanisms that balance these processes. Next, we consider the somatosensory system. Numerous studies now support a "sensory mirror system" comprised of neural representations activated by either afferent sensation or vicarious sensation. In the second part of this review we summarize evidence for shared representations of sensation and sensory simulation (including imagery and observed sensation), and suggest that similar interactions and regulation of simulation occur in the somatosensory domain as in the motor domain. We suggest that both motor and somatosensory simulations are flexibly regulated to support simulations congruent with our sensorimotor experience and goals and suppress or separate the influence of those that are not. These regulatory mechanisms are frequently revealed by cases of brain injury but can also be employed to facilitate sensorimotor rehabilitation.

Body ownership causes illusory self-attribution of speaking and influences subsequent real speaking

When we carry out an act, we typically attribute the action to ourselves, the sense of agency. Explanations for agency include conscious prior intention to act, followed by observation of the sensory consequences; brain activity that involves the feed-forward prediction of the consequences combined with rapid inverse motor prediction to fine-tune the action in real time; priming where there is, e.g., a prior command to perform the act; a cause (the intention to act) preceding the effect (the results of the action); and common-sense rules of attribution of physical causality satisfied. We describe an experiment where participants falsely attributed an act to themselves under conditions that apparently cannot be explained by these theories. A life-sized virtual body (VB) seen from the first-person perspective in 3D stereo, as if substituting the real body, was used to induce the illusion of ownership over the VB. Half of the 44 experimental participants experienced VB movements that were synchronous with their own movements (sync), and the other half asynchronous (async). The VB, seen in a mirror, spoke with corresponding lip movements, and for half of the participants this was accompanied by synchronous vibrotactile stimulation on the thyroid cartilage (Von) but this was not so for the other half. Participants experiencing sync misattributed the speaking to themselves and also shifted the fundamental frequency of their later utterances toward the stimulus voice. Von also contributed to these results. We show that these findings can be explained by current theories of agency, provided that the critical role of ownership over the VB is taken into account.

Predictive coding accounts of shared representations in parieto-insular networks

The discovery of mirror neurons in the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) and inferior parietal cortex (area PFG) in the macaque monkey brain has provided the physiological evidence for direct matching of the intrinsic motor representations of the self and the visual image of the actions of others. The existence of mirror neurons implies that the brain has mechanisms reflecting shared self and other action representations. This may further imply that the neural basis self-body representations may also incorporate components that are shared with other-body representations. It is likely that such a mechanism is also involved in predicting other's touch sensations and emotions. However, the neural basis of shared body representations has remained unclear. Here, we propose a neural basis of body representation of the self and of others in both human and non-human primates. We review a series of behavioral and physiological findings which together paint a picture that the systems underlying such shared representations require integration of conscious exteroception and interoception subserved by a cortical sensory-motor network involving parieto-inner perisylvian circuits (the ventral intraparietal area [VIP]/inferior parietal area [PFG]-secondary somatosensory cortex [SII]/posterior insular cortex [pIC]/anterior insular cortex [aIC]). Based on these findings, we propose a computational mechanism of the shared body representation in the predictive coding (PC) framework. Our mechanism proposes that processes emerging from generative models embedded in these specific neuronal circuits play a pivotal role in distinguishing a self-specific body representation from a shared one. The model successfully accounts for normal and abnormal shared body phenomena such as mirror-touch synesthesia and somatoparaphrenia. In addition, it generates a set of testable experimental predictions.