Dimensions of Animal Consciousness

Is episodic-like memory like episodic memory?

Episodic memory involves the conscious recollection of personally experienced events and when absent, results in profound losses to the typical human conscious experience. Over the last 2.5 decades, the debate surrounding whether episodic memory is unique to humans has seen a lot of controversy and accordingly has received significant research attention. Various behavioural paradigms have been developed to test episodic-like memory; a term designed to reflect the behavioural characteristics of episodic memory in the absence of evidence for consciously experienced recall. In this review, we first outline the most influential paradigms that have been developed to assess episodic-like memory across a variety of non-human taxa (including mammals, birds and cephalopods), namely the what-where-when memory, incidental encoding and unexpected question, and source memory paradigms. Then, we examine whether various key features of human episodic memory are conceptually represented in episodic-like memory across phylogenetically and neurologically diverse taxa, identifying similarities, differences and gaps in the literature. We conclude that the evidence is mixed, and as episodic memory encompasses a variety of cognitive structures and processes, research on episodic-like memory in non-humans should follow this multifaceted approach and assess evidence across various behavioural paradigms that each target different aspects of human episodic memory.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

GoFish: a foray into open-source, aquatic behavioral automation

As the most species-rich vertebrate group, fish provide an array of opportunities to investigate the link between ecological interactions and the evolution of behavior and cognition, yet, as an animal model, they are relatively underutilized in studies of comparative cognition. To address this gap, we developed a fully automated platform for behavioral experiments in aquatic species, GoFish. GoFish includes closed-loop control of task contingencies using real-time video tracking, presentation of visual stimuli, automatic food reward dispensers, and built-in data acquisition. The hardware is relatively inexpensive and accessible, and all software components of the platform are open-source. GoFish facilitates experimental automation, allowing for customization of high-throughput protocols and the efficient acquisition of rich behavioral data. We hope this platform proves to be a useful tool for the research community, facilitating refined, reproducible behavioral experiments on aquatic species in comparative cognition, behavioral ecology, and neuroscience.

The complex affective and cognitive capacities of rats

For several decades, although studies of rat physiology and behavior have abounded, research on rat emotions has been limited in scope to fear, anxiety, and pain. Converging evidence for the capacity of many species to share others' affective states has emerged, sparking interest in the empathic capacities of rats. Recent research has demonstrated that rats are a highly cooperative species and are motivated by others' distress to prosocial actions, such as opening a door or pulling a chain to release trapped conspecifics. Studies of rat affect, cognition, and neural function provide compelling evidence that rats have some capacity to represent others' needs, to instrumentally act to improve their well-being, and are thus capable of forms of targeted helping. Rats' complex abilities raise the importance of integrating new measures of rat well-being into scientific research.

Single-dose 1cp-LSD administration for canine anxiety: a pilot study

Anxiety affects 14-20% of dogs. Pharmacological treatments often fail. Psychedelics have shown to be useful for anxiety and depression in humans, but their veterinary use remains unexplored. We aimed to determine the effects of low-dose 1-cyclopropionyl-d-lysergic acid diethylamide (1cp-LSD) administered in a single dose to a dog, to observe the effect and establish the safety of the substance. The patient was a 13-year-old female dog, weighing 13 kg, mixed breed, and spayed. A total of 5 µg was administered orally, equivalent to 0.38 µg/kg. The animal has had a history of separation related behavioral problems throughout her life. To objectively assess the degree of anxiety in the dog, a validated scale was utilized. The trial was scheduled at the house where the animal lives. The owner was present throughout the experience. Informed consent was obtained prior to the assay. The trial began at 12:15 p.m. on January 10, 2024, lasting for 5 and a half hours. The response to anxiety-inducing stimuli was equally anxious during the first two hours. From that point onwards, a significant change in the animal's behavior was observed, with no signs/mild signs of anxiety. The trial concluded without any adverse effects on the animal. The patient did not show signs of having a psychedelic experience. This is the first time that a study of this nature has been conducted and reported in the canine species. 1cp-LSD proved to be safe and exerted the desired effect on the animal's behavior, significantly reducing the patient's anxiety.

Consciousness makes sense in the light of evolution

I believe consciousness is a property of advanced nervous systems, and as such a product of evolution. Thus, to understand consciousness we need to describe the trajectory leading to its evolution and the selective advantages conferred. A deeper understanding of the neurology would be a significant contribution, but other advanced functions, such as hearing and vision, are explained with a comparable lack of detailed knowledge of the brain processes responsible. In this paper, I try to add details and credence to a previously suggested, evolution-based model of consciousness. According to this model, the feature started to evolve in early amniotes (reptiles, birds, and mammals) some 320 million years ago. The reason was the introduction of feelings as a strategy for making behavioral decisions.

The blushing brain: neural substrates of cheek temperature increase in response to self-observation

Darwin proposed that blushing-the reddening of the face owing to heightened self-awareness-is 'the most human of all expressions'. Yet, relatively little is known about the underlying mechanisms of blushing. Theories diverge on whether it is a rapid, spontaneous emotional response that does not involve reflection upon the self or whether it results from higher-order socio-cognitive processes. Investigating the neural substrates of blushing can shed light on the mental processes underlying blushing and the mechanisms involved in self-awareness. To reveal neural activity associated with blushing, 16-20 year-old participants (n = 40) watched pre-recorded videos of themselves (versus other people as a control condition) singing karaoke in a magnetic resonance imaging scanner. We measured participants' cheek temperature increase-an indicator of blushing-and their brain activity. The results showed that blushing is higher when watching oneself versus others sing. Those who blushed more while watching themselves sing had, on average, higher activation in the cerebellum (lobule V) and the left paracentral lobe and exhibited more time-locked processing of the videos in early visual cortices. These findings show that blushing is associated with the activation of brain areas involved in emotional arousal, suggesting that it may occur independently of higher-order socio-cognitive processes. Our results provide new avenues for future research on self-awareness in infants and non-human animals.

A Comparison of Rapid Rule-Learning Strategies in Humans and Monkeys

Interspecies comparisons are key to deriving an understanding of the behavioral and neural correlates of human cognition from animal models. We perform a detailed comparison of the strategies of female macaque monkeys to male and female humans on a variant of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), a widely studied and applied task that provides a multiattribute measure of cognitive function and depends on the frontal lobe. WCST performance requires the inference of a rule change given ambiguous feedback. We found that well-trained monkeys infer new rules three times more slowly than minimally instructed humans. Input-dependent hidden Markov model-generalized linear models were fit to their choices, revealing hidden states akin to feature-based attention in both species. Decision processes resembled a win-stay, lose-shift strategy with interspecies similarities as well as key differences. Monkeys and humans both test multiple rule hypotheses over a series of rule-search trials and perform inference-like computations to exclude candidate choice options. We quantitatively show that perseveration, random exploration, and poor sensitivity to negative feedback account for the slower task-switching performance in monkeys.

Biomimetic Octopus Suction Cup with Attachment Force Self-Sensing Capability for Cardiac Adhesion

This study develops a biomimetic soft octopus suction device with integrated self-sensing capabilities designed to enhance the precision and safety of cardiac surgeries. The device draws inspiration from the octopus's exceptional ability to adhere to various surfaces and its sophisticated proprioceptive system, allowing for real-time adjustment of adhesive force. The research integrates thin-film pressure sensors into the soft suction cup design, emulating the tactile capabilities of an octopus's sucker to convey information about the contact environment in real time. Signals from sensors within soft materials exhibiting complex strain characteristics are processed and interpreted using the grey wolf optimizer-back propagation (GWO-BP) algorithm. The tissue stabilizer is endowed with the self-sensing capabilities of biomimetic octopus suckers, and real-time feedback on the adhesion state is provided. The embedding location of the thin-film pressure sensors is determined through foundational experiments with flexible substrates, standard spherical tests, and biological tissue trials. The newly fabricated suction cups undergo compression pull-off tests to collect data. The GWO-BP algorithm model accurately identifies and predicts the suction cup's adhesion force in real time, with an error rate below 0.97% and a mean prediction time of 0.0027 s. Integrating this technology offers a novel approach to intelligent monitoring and attachment assurance during cardiac surgeries. Hence, the probability of potential cardiac tissue damage is reduced, with future applications for integrating intelligent biomimetic adhesive soft robotics.

Modelling developments in consciousness within a multidimensional framework

A recent advancement in consciousness science has been the introduction of a multidimensional framework of consciousness. This framework has been applied to global states of consciousness, including psychedelic states and disorders of consciousness, and the consciousness of non-human animals. The multidimensional framework enables a finer parsing of both various states of consciousness and forms of animal consciousness, paving the way for new scientific investigations into consciousness. In this paper, the multidimensional model is expanded by constructing temporal profiles. This expansion allows for the modelling of changes in consciousness across the life cycles of organisms and the progression over time of disorders of consciousness. The result of this expansion is 2-fold: (i) it enables new modes of comparison, both across stages of development and across species; (ii) it proposes that more attention be given to the various types of fluctuations that occur in patients who are suffering from disorders of consciousness.

Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective

The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.

Behavioral indicators of heterogeneous subjective experience in animals across the phylogenetic spectrum: Implications for comparative animal phenomenology

This behavioral study was undertaken to provide empirical evidence in favor of or opposed to the notion that animals across a wide breadth of the animal kingdom have subjective (personal) experience that varies with their lifestyles, ecological constraints, or phylogeny. Twelve species representing two invertebrate phyla and six vertebrate classes were observed unobtrusively in 15-min episodes, during which three modes of behavior (volitional, interactive, and egocentric) were quantified according to the frequency, variety, and dynamism of each mode. Volitional behavior was the most prevalent and dynamic mode for nearly all species, largely without regard to phylogenetic position. Interactive behavior likewise varied inconsistently across the entire evolutionary spectrum. Egocentric behavior was concentrated among the avian and mammalian species, but evidence of it were observed in the invertebrate species as well. Diagrams of the matrix constructed from the three qualitative modes and three quantitative attributes for each mode provide a metaphorical representation of the unique experiential profile of each species. To the extent that these behavioral measures correlate with the nature of the animal's subjective experience, they support the growing view that phenomenology is heterogeneous, multimodal, and non-linear in extent across the animal kingdom.

The maps of meaning consciousness theory

In simple terms, consciousness is constituted by multiple goals for action and the continuous adjudication of such goals to implement action, which is referred to as the maps of meaning (MoM) consciousness theory. The MoM theory triangulates through three parallel corollaries: action (behavior), mechanism (morphology/pathophysiology), and goals (teleology). (1) An organism's consciousness contains fluid, nested goals. These goals are not intentionality, but intersectionality, via the Darwinian byproduct of embodiment meeting the world, i.e., Darwinian inclusive fitness or randomization and then survival of the fittest. (2) These goals are formed via a gradual descent under inclusive fitness and are the abstraction of a "match" between the evolutionary environment and the organism. (3) Human consciousness implements the brain efficiency hypothesis, genetics, epigenetics, and experience-crystallized efficiencies, not necessitating best or objective but fitness, i.e., perceived efficiency based on one's adaptive environment. These efficiencies are objectively arbitrary but determine the operation and level of one's consciousness, termed as extreme thrownness. (4) Since inclusive fitness drives efficiencies in the physiologic mechanism, morphology, and behavior (action) and originates one's goals, embodiment is necessarily entangled to human consciousness as it is at the intersection of mechanism or action (both necessitating embodiment) occurring in the world that determines fitness. (5) Perception is the operant process of consciousness and is the de facto goal adjudication process of consciousness. Goal operationalization is fundamentally efficiency-based via one's unique neuronal mapping as a byproduct of genetics, epigenetics, and experience. (6) Perception involves information intake and information discrimination, equally underpinned by efficiencies of inclusive fitness via extreme thrownness. Perception is not a 'frame rate' but Bayesian priors of efficiency based on one's extreme thrownness. (7) Consciousness and human consciousness are modular (i.e., a scalar level of richness, which builds up like building blocks) and dimensionalized (i.e., cognitive abilities become possibilities as the emergent phenomena at various modularities such as the stratified factors in factor analysis). (8) The meta dimensions of human consciousness seemingly include intelligence quotient, personality (five-factor model), richness of perception intake, and richness of perception discrimination, among other potentialities. (9) Future consciousness research should utilize factor analysis to parse modularities and dimensions of human consciousness and animal models.

Moral considerability of brain organoids from the perspective of computational architecture

Human brain organoids equipped with complex cytoarchitecture and closed-loop feedback from virtual environments could provide insights into neural mechanisms underlying cognition. Yet organoids with certain cognitive capacities might also merit moral consideration. A precautionary approach has been proposed to address these ethical concerns by focusing on the epistemological question of whether organoids possess neural structures for morally-relevant capacities that bear resemblance to those found in human brains. Critics challenge this similarity approach on philosophical, scientific, and practical grounds but do so without a suitable alternative. Here, I introduce an architectural approach that infers the potential for cognitive-like processing in brain organoids based on the pattern of information flow through the system. The kind of computational architecture acquired by an organoid then informs the kind of cognitive capacities that could, theoretically, be supported and empirically investigated. The implications of this approach for the moral considerability of brain organoids are discussed.

The irreconcilability of insight

We are said to experience insight when we suddenly and unexpectedly become aware of the solution to a problem that we previously took ourselves to be unable to solve. In the field of comparative cognition, there is rising interest in the question of whether non-human animals are capable of insightful problem-solving. Putative cases of animals demonstrating insight have generally attracted two types of criticism: first, that insight is being conflated with other cognitive capacities (e.g., causal cognition, or mental trial and error); and, second, that the relevant performances merely reflect associative learning-and on the received understanding of insight within comparative cognition, insight necessarily involves non-associative processes. I argue that even if we grant that some cases of animal insight do withstand these two criticisms, these cases of purported animal insight cannot shed light on the nature of insightful problem-solving in humans. For the phenomenon studied by cognitive psychologists under the heading of insight is fundamentally different from that studied in comparative cognition. In light of this impasse, I argue that the reinterpretation of the extant research on animal insight in terms of other high-level cognitive capacities (means-end reasoning in particular) can improve the prospect of a successful comparative research program.

Perspective: Social License as a Lens for Improving Ethical and Welfare Standards in Cephalopod Research

Interest in cephalopods as comparative models in neuroscience, cognition, behavior, and ecology is surging due to recent advances in culture and experimental techniques. Although cephalopods have a long history in research, their use had remained limited due to the challenges of funding work on comparative models, the lack of modern techniques applicable to them, and the small number of labs with the facilities to keep and house large numbers of healthy animals for long periods. Breakthroughs in each of these areas are now creating new interest in cephalopods from researchers who trained and worked in other models, as well as allowing established cephalopod labs to grow and collaborate more widely. This broadening of the field is essential to its long-term health, but also brings with it new and heightened scrutiny from animal rights organizations, federal regulatory agencies, and members of the public. As a community, it is critical that scientists working with cephalopods engage in discussions, studies, and communication that promote high standards for cephalopod welfare. The concept of "social license to operate," more commonly encountered in industry, recreation, and agriculture, provides a useful lens through which to view proactive steps the cephalopod research community may take to ensure a strong future for our field. In this Perspective, I discuss recent progress in cephalopod ethics and welfare studies, and use the conceptual framework of Social License to Operate to propose a forward-looking, public-facing strategy for the parallel development of welfare-focused best practices and scientific breakthroughs.

The feasibility of artificial consciousness through the lens of neuroscience

Interactions with large language models (LLMs) have led to the suggestion that these models may soon be conscious. From the perspective of neuroscience, this position is difficult to defend. For one, the inputs to LLMs lack the embodied, embedded information content characteristic of our sensory contact with the world around us. Secondly, the architectures of present-day artificial intelligence algorithms are missing key features of the thalamocortical system that have been linked to conscious awareness in mammals. Finally, the evolutionary and developmental trajectories that led to the emergence of living conscious organisms arguably have no parallels in artificial systems as envisioned today. The existence of living organisms depends on their actions and their survival is intricately linked to multi-level cellular, inter-cellular, and organismal processes culminating in agency and consciousness.

Cephalopods and the law

In this My word Daniel Osorio explains why cephalopod molluscs were protected by a European Union directive on laboratory animal legislation in 2013, and how the scientific community responded to the challenges posed by this development.

Listen to Us: Perceptions of Animal Voice and Agency

In many contexts, the interests of nonhuman animals (hereafter "animals") are often overlooked or considered to be a lower priority than those of humans. While strong arguments exist for taking animal moral claims seriously, these largely go unheard due to dominant anthropocentric attitudes and beliefs. This study aimed to explore how animal interests might be best represented in the human world. We conducted interviews to investigate people's perceptions of what it means to speak for other animals and who can reliably represent animal interests. Using Grounded Theory analytical methods, we identified one major theme: "Animal voice", and its subthemes: "Animals do/do not have a voice", "Human language constructs realities and paradigms", and "Let animals speak". Our findings illustrate how human language constructs contribute to shaping the realities of animals by contextually defining them as voiceless. This has serious implications for animals, society, and the environment. Drawing parallels with the relevant literature, our results reflect calls for the social and political recognition of animal voice as fundamental to animal representation. We recommend future research to focus on developing ethical and compassionate approaches to understanding animal subjective experiences to empower and amplify animal voices.

Introducing individual sentience profiles in nonhuman primate neuroscience research

The Animal Research Declaration is committed to establishing cohesive and rigorous ethical standards to safeguard the welfare of nonhuman primates (NHPs) engaged in neuroscience research (Petkov et al., 2022 this issue). As part of this mission, there is an expanding dialogue amongst neuroscientists, philosophers, and policymakers, that is centred on diverse aspects of animal welfare and scientific practice. This paper emphasises the necessity of integrating the assessment of animal sentience into the declaration. Animal sentience, in this context, refers to the recognized capacity that animals have for various kinds of subjective experience, with an associated positive or negative valence (Browning and Birch, 2022). Accordingly, NHP neuroscience researchers should work toward instituting a standardised approach for evaluating what can be termed "individual sentience profiles," representing the unique manner in which an individual NHP experiences specific events or environments. The adoption of this novel parameter would serve a triad of indispensable purposes: enhancing NHP welfare throughout research involvement, elevating the quality of life for NHPs in captivity, and refining the calibre of research outcomes.

Temporospatial Nestedness in Consciousness: An Updated Perspective on the Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness

Time and space are fundamental elements that permeate the fabric of nature, and their significance in relation to neural activity and consciousness remains a compelling yet unexplored area of research. The Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) provides a framework that links time, space, neural activity, and consciousness, shedding light on the intricate relationships among these dimensions. In this review, I revisit the fundamental concepts and mechanisms proposed by the TTC, with a particular focus on the central concept of temporospatial nestedness. I propose an extension of temporospatial nestedness by incorporating the nested relationship between the temporal circuit and functional geometry of the brain. To further unravel the complexities of temporospatial nestedness, future research directions should emphasize the characterization of functional geometry and the temporal circuit across multiple spatial and temporal scales. Investigating the links between these scales will yield a more comprehensive understanding of how spatial organization and temporal dynamics contribute to conscious states. This integrative approach holds the potential to uncover novel insights into the neural basis of consciousness and reshape our understanding of the world-brain dynamic.

Optimism about Measuring Animal Feelings

While animal sentience research has flourished in the last decade, scepticism about our ability to accurately measure animal feelings has unfortunately remained fairly common. Here, we argue that evolutionary considerations about the functions of feelings will give us more reason for optimism and outline a method for how this might be achieved.

Behavioral assessment scale of consciousness for nonhuman primates: A Delphi study

OBJECTIVE

Nonhuman primates (NHPs) are suitable for being model animals in the study of consciousness and loss of consciousness (LoC) with a similar brain structure and function to humans. However, there is no effective consciousness assessment scale for them. This study aimed to develop a behavioral assessment scale of consciousness for NHPs.

METHODS

We constructed an initial indicator framework based on the clinical consciousness disorder assessment scales and the physiological characteristics, consciousness, and arousal behavior of NHPs. A two-round online Delphi method was conducted by a multidisciplinary expert panel to construct a behavioral assessment scale of consciousness for NHPs. The indicators and descriptions were revised according to the experts' feedback and then sent out for repeated consultations along with a summary of the results of the previous round of consultations. The accepted competencies of indicators were established with mean scores in two scoring criteria (importance and feasibility) ≥4.0, agreement rate with a rating of importance or essential ≥70.0%, and a coefficient of variation ≤0.25, as well as discussions of the research group.

RESULTS

Consensus was achieved after the second round of consultations, which was completed by 28 experts who specialized in rehabilitation, neuroscience, psychology, neurosurgery, and neurology. A new behavioral assessment scale of consciousness for NHPs, including 37 items organized hierarchically within seven dimensions including visual function, auditory function, motor function, orofacial movements, arousal, brainstem reflexes, and respiration, was developed in this study.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has successfully developed a behavioral assessment scale for measuring the conscious state of NHPs or NHP models with LoC. This tool is expected to facilitate future research into the underlying mechanisms of consciousness by providing a detailed and comprehensive means of measurement.

A cognitive account of trace conditioning in insects

Trace conditioning is a form of Pavlovian learning in which the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the unconditioned stimulus (US) are separated by a temporal gap. Insects learn trace associations of variable nature (appetitive, aversive) and involving CSs of different sensory modalities (olfactory, visual). The accessibility of the insect neural system in behaving animals allowed identifying neural processes driving trace conditioning: the existence of prolonged neural responses to the CS after stimulus offset and the anticipation of US responses during the free-stimulus gap. Specific brain structures, such as the mushroom bodies seem to be allocated to this learning form. Here, we posit that a further component facilitating trace conditioning in insects relates to neuromodulatory mechanisms underlying enhanced attention. We thus propose a model based on different types of mushroom-body neurons, which provides a cognitive account of trace conditioning in insects.

Why it hurts: with freedom comes the biological need for pain

We argue that pain is not needed to protect the body from damage unless the organism is able to make free choices in action selection. Then pain (including its affective and evaluative aspects) provides a necessary prioritising motivation to select actions expected to avoid it, whilst leaving the possibility of alternative actions to serve potentially higher priorities. Thus, on adaptive grounds, only organisms having free choice over action selection should experience pain. Free choice implies actions must be selected following appraisal of their effects, requiring a predictive model generating estimates of action outcomes. These features give organisms anticipatory behavioural autonomy (ABA), for which we propose a plausible system using an internal predictive model, integrated into a system able to produce the qualitative and affective aspects of pain. Our hypothesis can be tested using behavioural experiments designed to elicit trade-off responses to novel experiences for which algorithmic (automaton) responses might be inappropriate. We discuss the empirical evidence for our hypothesis among taxonomic groups, showing how testing for ABA guides thinking on which groups might experience pain. It is likely that all vertebrates do and plausible that some invertebrates do (decapods, cephalopods and at least some insects).

Non-Human Moral Status: Problems with Phenomenal Consciousness

Consciousness-based approaches to non-human moral status maintain that consciousness is necessary for (some degree or level of) moral status. While these approaches are intuitive to many, in this paper I argue that the judgment that consciousness is necessary for moral status is not secure enough to guide policy regarding non-humans, that policies responsive to the moral status of non-humans should take seriously the possibility that psychological features independent of consciousness are sufficient for moral status. Further, I illustrate some practical consequences of calling consciousness-based views into question.

Profiles of animal consciousness: A species-sensitive, two-tier account to quality and distribution

The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how conscious experience differs in detail between species (the quality question). We propose a framework which clearly distinguishes both questions and tackles both of them. This two-tier account distinguishes consciousness along ten dimensions and suggests cognitive capacities which serve as distinct operationalizations for each dimension. The two-tier account achieves three valuable aims: First, it separates strong and weak indicators of the presence of consciousness. Second, these indicators include not only different specific contents but also differences in the way particular contents are processed (by processes of learning, reasoning or abstraction). Third, evidence of consciousness from each dimension can be combined to derive the distinctive multi-dimensional consciousness profile of various species. Thus, the two-tier account shows how the kind of conscious experience of different species can be systematically compared.

A theoretical approach to improving interspecies welfare comparisons

The number of animals bred, raised, and slaughtered each year is on the rise, resulting in increasing impacts to welfare. Farmed animals are also becoming more diverse, ranging from pigs to bees. The diversity and number of species farmed invite questions about how best to allocate currently limited resources towards safeguarding and improving welfare. This is of the utmost concern to animal welfare funders and effective altruism advocates, who are responsible for targeting the areas most likely to cause harm. For example, is tail docking worse for pigs than beak trimming is for chickens in terms of their pain, suffering, and general experience? Or are the welfare impacts equal? Answering these questions requires making an interspecies welfare comparison; a judgment about how good or bad different species fare relative to one another. Here, we outline and discuss an empirical methodology that aims to improve our ability to make interspecies welfare comparisons by investigating welfare range, which refers to how good or bad animals can fare. Beginning with a theory of welfare, we operationalize that theory by identifying metrics that are defensible proxies for measuring welfare, including cognitive, affective, behavioral, and neuro-biological measures. Differential weights are assigned to those proxies that reflect their evidential value for the determinants of welfare, such as the Delphi structured deliberation method with a panel of experts. The evidence should then be reviewed and its quality scored to ascertain whether particular taxa may possess the proxies in question to construct a taxon-level welfare range profile. Finally, using a Monte Carlo simulation, an overall estimate of comparative welfare range relative to a hypothetical index species can be generated. Interspecies welfare comparisons will help facilitate empirically informed decision-making to streamline the allocation of resources and ultimately better prioritize and improve animal welfare.

Comparing rapid rule-learning strategies in humans and monkeys

Inter-species comparisons are key to deriving an understanding of the behavioral and neural correlates of human cognition from animal models. We perform a detailed comparison of macaque monkey and human strategies on an analogue of the Wisconsin Card Sort Test, a widely studied and applied multi-attribute measure of cognitive function, wherein performance requires the inference of a changing rule given ambiguous feedback. We found that well-trained monkeys rapidly infer rules but are three times slower than humans. Model fits to their choices revealed hidden states akin to feature-based attention in both species, and decision processes that resembled a Win-stay lose-shift strategy with key differences. Monkeys and humans test multiple rule hypotheses over a series of rule-search trials and perform inference-like computations to exclude candidates. An attention-set based learning stage categorization revealed that perseveration, random exploration and poor sensitivity to negative feedback explain the under-performance in monkeys.

Functional geometry of the cortex encodes dimensions of consciousness

Consciousness is a multidimensional phenomenon, but key dimensions such as awareness and wakefulness have been described conceptually rather than neurobiologically. We hypothesize that dimensions of consciousness are encoded in multiple neurofunctional dimensions of the brain. We analyze cortical gradients, which are continua of the brain's overarching functional geometry, to characterize these neurofunctional dimensions. We demonstrate that disruptions of human consciousness - due to pharmacological, neuropathological, or psychiatric causes - are associated with a degradation of one or more of the major cortical gradients depending on the state. Network-specific reconfigurations within the multidimensional cortical gradient space are associated with behavioral unresponsiveness of various etiologies, and these spatial reconfigurations correlate with a temporal disruption of structured transitions of dynamic brain states. In this work, we therefore provide a unifying neurofunctional framework for multiple dimensions of human consciousness in both health and disease.

Introducing a depression-like syndrome for translational neuropsychiatry: a plea for taxonomical validity and improved comparability between humans and mice

Depressive disorders are the most burdensome psychiatric disorders worldwide. Although huge efforts have been made to advance treatment, outcomes remain unsatisfactory. Many factors contribute to this gridlock including suboptimal animal models. Especially limited study comparability and replicability due to imprecise terminology concerning depressive-like states are major problems. To overcome these issues, new approaches are needed. Here, we introduce a taxonomical concept for modelling depression in laboratory mice, which we call depression-like syndrome (DLS). It hinges on growing evidence suggesting that mice possess advanced socioemotional abilities and can display non-random symptom patterns indicative of an evolutionary conserved disorder-like phenotype. The DLS approach uses a combined heuristic method based on clinical depression criteria and the Research Domain Criteria to provide a biobehavioural reference syndrome for preclinical rodent models of depression. The DLS criteria are based on available, species-specific evidence and are as follows: (I) minimum duration of phenotype, (II) significant sociofunctional impairment, (III) core biological features, (IV) necessary depressive-like symptoms. To assess DLS presence and severity, we have designed an algorithm to ensure statistical and biological relevance of findings. The algorithm uses a minimum combined threshold for statistical significance and effect size (p value ≤ 0.05 plus moderate effect size) for each DLS criterion. Taken together, the DLS is a novel, biologically founded, and species-specific minimum threshold approach. Its long-term objective is to gradually develop into an inter-model validation standard and microframework to improve phenotyping methodology in translational research.

The Case for Octopus Consciousness: Valence

Octopuses may demonstrate perceptual richness, neural unity, temporality, and finally, valence or affective evaluation, as the neural basis for consciousness. Octopuses attach a positive valence to food as ‘specializing generalists’ with long-term learning and flexible choices. They value shelter, yet modify, adapt and even transport it where necessary. They attach a negative valence to what may be described as pain, monitoring and protecting the damaged area and learning to associate locations with pain relief. Finally and surprisingly, octopuses attach a negative value to uncertainty so that they explore their environment before exploiting certain aspects of it and even exhibit motor play. This series of four papers, culminating in the present one, demonstrates in detail why the Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness has suggested octopuses might have the substrate for consciousness, although it is likely not similar to or as complex as that shown by ‘higher’ vertebrate lineages.

Confidence Levels or Degrees of Sentience?

I applaud recent improvements upon previous guidelines for the assessment of pain in non-human species and the application of their framework towards decapod crustaceans. Rather than constituting a mere intermediate solution between the scientific difficulty of settling questions of animal consciousness and the need for a framework for the purposes of animal welfare legislation, I will argue that the longer lists of criteria for animal sentience should make us realize that animal sentience is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that must be studied with a plethora of methods in order to assess its diversity across the tree of life.

Why the Epistemic Objection Against Using Sentience as Criterion of Moral Status is Flawed

According to a common view, sentience is necessary and sufficient for moral status. In other words, whether a being has intrinsic moral relevance is determined by its capacity for conscious experience. The epistemic objection derives from our profound uncertainty about sentience. According to this objection, we cannot use sentience as a criterion to ascribe moral status in practice because we won't know in the foreseeable future which animals and AI systems are sentient while ethical questions regarding the possession of moral status are urgent. Therefore, we need to formulate an alternative criterion. I argue that the epistemic objection is dissolved once one clearly distinguishes between the question what determines moral status and what criterion should be employed in practice to ascribe moral status. Epistemic concerns are irrelevant to the former question and-I will argue-criteria of moral status have inescapably to be based on sentience, if one concedes that sentience determines moral status. It follows that doubts about our epistemic access to sentience cannot be used to motivate an alternative criterion of moral status. If sentience turns out to be unknowable, then moral status is unknowable. However, I briefly advocate against such strong pessimism.

Practical Application of the Five Domains Animal Welfare Framework for Supply Food Animal Chain Managers

The author has worked as a consultant with global commercial supply managers for over 20 years. The focus of this commentary will be practical application of The Five Domains Model in commercial systems. Commercial buyers of meat need simple easy-to-use guidelines. They have to use auditors that can be trained in a workshop that lasts for only a few days. Auditing of slaughter plants by major buyers has resulted in great improvements. Supply chain managers need clear guidance on conditions that would result in a failed audit. Animal based outcome measures that can be easily assessed should be emphasized in commercial systems. Some examples of these key animal welfare indicators are: percentage of animals stunned effectively with a single application of the stunner, percentage of lame animals, foot pad lesions on poultry, and body condition scoring. A farm that supplies a buyer must also comply with housing specifications. The farm either has the specified housing or does not have it. It will be removed from the approved supplier list if housing does not comply. These types of easy to assess indicators can be easily evaluated within the four domains of nutrition, environment, health and behavioral interactions. The Five Domains Framework can also be used in a program for continuous improvement of animal welfare.

Structural clues to articular calcified cartilage function: A descriptive review of this crucial interface tissue

Articular calcified cartilage (ACC) has been dismissed, by some, as a remnant of endochondral ossification without functional relevance to joint articulation or weight-bearing. Recent research indicates that morphologic and metabolic ACC features may be important, reflecting knee joint osteoarthritis (OA) predisposition. ACC is less investigated than neighbouring joint tissues, with its component chondrocytes and mineralised matrix often being either ignored or integrated into analyses of hyaline articular cartilage and subchondral bone tissue respectively. Anatomical variation in ACC is recognised between species, individuals and age groups, but the selective pressures underlying this variation are unknown. Consequently, optimal ACC biomechanical features are also unknown as are any potential locomotory roles. This review collates descriptions of ACC anatomy and biology in health and disease, with a view to revealing its structure/function relationship and highlighting potential future research avenues. Mouse models of healthy and OA joint ageing have shown disparities in ACC load-induced deformations at the knee joint. This raises the hypothesis that ACC response to locomotor forces over time may influence, or even underlie, the bony and hyaline cartilage symptoms characteristic of OA. To effectively investigate the ACC, greater resolution of joint imaging and merging of hierarchical scale data will be required. An appreciation of OA as a 'whole joint disease' is expanding, as is the possibility that the ACC may be a key player in healthy ageing and in the transition to OA joint pathology.

Hermit crabs, shells, and sentience

Hermit crabs have an intimate relationship with gastropod shells and show numerous activities by which they locate, select, and change shells in different contexts. They gather information about new shells and update information about their existing shells. This involves integration of different sensory modalities, memory-formation, and comparison of the overall value of each shell. Crabs also fight to get shells from other crabs, and again they gather information about the shell qualities and the opponent. Attacking crabs monitor their fight performance, and defenders are influenced by attacker activities, and both crabs are influenced by the gain or loss that might be made by swapping shells. Swapping shells involves the defender being naked for a short period. Leaving a shell also occurs if the shell is experimentally fixed in place or buried in sand or if small electric shocks are applied to the abdomen, and the quality of the current shell is traded-off against escaping possible asphyxiation or the aversive shocks. Hermit crabs show remarkable abilities, involving future planning, with respect to recognizing the shape and size of shells, and how they limit their passage through environmental obstructions. They also assess if shells might become available and wait for that to happen. Groups of crabs arrange themselves in size order so that orderly transfer of shells might occur down a line of crabs. These observations are discussed in the light of complex perceptual and cognitive abilities, and the possibility of sentience and awareness is discussed.

The Scientific Study of Consciousness Cannot and Should Not Be Morally Neutral

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one's own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programs or interpret results in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that because consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of nonhuman animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics-the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Finally, in light of these considerations, we call for a discussion of the immediate ethical corollaries of the body of knowledge that has accumulated and for a more explicit consideration of the role of ideology and ethics in the scientific study of consciousness.

In search for consciousness in animals: Using working memory and voluntary attention as behavioral indicators

Whether animals have subjective experiences about the content of their sensory input, i.e., whether they are aware of stimuli, is a notoriously difficult question to answer. If consciousness is present in animals, it must share fundamental characteristics with human awareness. Working memory and voluntary/endogenous attention are suggested as diagnostic features of conscious awareness. Behavioral evidence shows clear signatures of both working memory and voluntary attention as minimal criterium for sensory consciousness in mammals and birds. In contrast, reptiles and amphibians show no sign of either working memory or volitional attention. Surprisingly, some species of teleost fishes exhibit elementary working memory and voluntary attention effects suggestive of possibly rudimentary forms of subjective experience. With the potential exception of honeybees, evidence for conscious processing is lacking in invertebrates. These findings suggest that consciousness is not ubiquitous in the animal kingdom but also not exclusive to humans. The phylogenetic gap between animal taxa argues that evolution does not rely on specific neural substrates to endow distantly related species with basic forms of consciousness.

An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.

Awareness and consciousness in humans and animals – neural and behavioral correlates in an evolutionary perspective

Awareness or consciousness in the context of stimulus perception can directly be assessed in well controlled test situations with humans via the persons’ reports about their subjective experiences with the stimuli. Since we have no direct access to subjective experiences in animals, their possible awareness or consciousness in stimulus perception tasks has often been inferred from behavior and cognitive abilities previously observed in aware and conscious humans. Here, we analyze published human data primarily on event-related potentials and brain-wave generation during perception and responding to sensory stimuli and extract neural markers (mainly latencies of evoked-potential peaks and of gamma-wave occurrence) indicating that a person became aware or conscious of the perceived stimulus. These neural correlates of consciousness were then applied to sets of corresponding data from various animals including several species of mammals, and one species each of birds, fish, cephalopods, and insects. We found that the neural markers from studies in humans could also successfully be applied to the mammal and bird data suggesting that species in these animal groups can become subjectively aware of and conscious about perceived stimuli. Fish, cephalopod and insect data remained inconclusive. In an evolutionary perspective we have to consider that both awareness of and consciousness about perceived stimuli appear as evolved, attention-dependent options added to the ongoing neural activities of stimulus processing and action generation. Since gamma-wave generation for functional coupling of brain areas in aware/conscious states is energetically highly cost-intensive, it remains to be shown which animal species under which conditions of lifestyle and ecological niche may achieve significant advantages in reproductive fitness by drawing upon these options. Hence, we started our discussion about awareness and consciousness in animals with the question in how far these expressions of brain activity are necessary attributes for perceiving stimuli and responding in an adaptive way.

Descending control of nociception in insects?

Modulation of nociception allows animals to optimize chances of survival by adapting their behaviour in different contexts. In mammals, this is executed by neurons from the brain and is referred to as the descending control of nociception. Whether insects have such control, or the neural circuits allowing it, has rarely been explored. Based on behavioural, neuroscientific and molecular evidence, we argue that insects probably have descending controls for nociception. Behavioural work shows that insects can modulate nocifensive behaviour. Such modulation is at least in part controlled by the central nervous system since the information mediating such prioritization is processed by the brain. Central nervous system control of nociception is further supported by neuroanatomical and neurobiological evidence showing that the insect brain can facilitate or suppress nocifensive behaviour, and by molecular studies revealing pathways involved in the inhibition of nocifensive behaviour both peripherally and centrally. Insects lack the endogenous opioid peptides and their receptors that contribute to mammalian descending nociception controls, so we discuss likely alternative molecular mechanisms for the insect descending nociception controls. We discuss what the existence of descending control of nociception in insects may reveal about pain perception in insects and finally consider the ethical implications of these novel findings.

A voice without a mouth no more: The neurobiology of language and consciousness

Most research on the neurobiology of language ignores consciousness and vice versa. Here, language, with an emphasis on inner speech, is hypothesised to generate and sustain self-awareness, i.e., higher-order consciousness. Converging evidence supporting this hypothesis is reviewed. To account for these findings, a 'HOLISTIC' model of neurobiology of language, inner speech, and consciousness is proposed. It involves a 'core' set of inner speech production regions that initiate the experience of feeling and hearing words. These take on affective qualities, deriving from activation of associated sensory, motor, and emotional representations, involving a largely unconscious dynamic 'periphery', distributed throughout the whole brain. Responding to those words forms the basis for sustained network activity, involving 'default mode' activation and prefrontal and thalamic/brainstem selection of contextually relevant responses. Evidence for the model is reviewed, supporting neuroimaging meta-analyses conducted, and comparisons with other theories of consciousness made. The HOLISTIC model constitutes a more parsimonious and complete account of the 'neural correlates of consciousness' that has implications for a mechanistic account of mental health and wellbeing.

The strength of weak integrated information theory

The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is divisive: while some believe it provides an unprecedentedly powerful approach to address the 'hard problem', others dismiss it on grounds that it is untestable. We argue that the appeal and applicability of IIT can be greatly widened if we distinguish two flavours of the theory: strong IIT, which identifies consciousness with specific properties associated with maxima of integrated information; and weak IIT, which tests pragmatic hypotheses relating aspects of consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics. We review challenges for strong IIT, explain how existing empirical findings are well explained by weak IIT without needing to commit to the entirety of strong IIT, and discuss the outlook for both flavours of IIT.

Theories of consciousness

Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.

The Case for Octopus Consciousness: Temporality

Temporality is one of the criteria that Birch has advanced for areas of cognitive ability that may underlie animal sentience. An ability to integrate and use information across time must be more than simply learning pieces of information and retrieving them. This paper looks at such wider use of information by octopuses across time. It evaluates accumulation of information about one’s place in space, as used across immediate egocentric localization by cuttlefish and medium distance navigation in octopuses. Information about useful items in the environment can be incorporated for future use by octopuses, including for shelter in antipredator situations. Finding prey is not random but can be predicted by environmental cues, especially by cuttlefish about future contingencies. Finally, the paper examines unlimited associative learning and constraints on learning, and the ability of cephalopods to explore and seek out information, even by play, for future use.

Equivocating on unconsciousness

In the language used by those who take an empirical approach to the study of consciousness, the subliminal–supraliminal binary and the unconscious–conscious process binary are treated as one and the same, despite the unconscious–conscious process distinction having a historical association to a different meaning. The historical meaning of the unconscious–conscious process distinction may then become implicitly associated with the interpretations of related studies, resulting in a misinterpretation of evidence. This is to say, where the ability to differentially respond to subliminal and supraliminal stimuli may be indicative of a variety of “unconscious” and “conscious” processes, as these terms relate to a qualitative conception of consciousness, subliminal threshold testing does not tell us anything about consciousness and the associated binary of “unconscious” and “conscious” processes as these terms relate to their historical, metacognitive conceptions.

Animal sentience

'Sentience' sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research.