Back from the future: Volitional postdiction of perceived apparent motion direction

Subjective control of polystable illusory apparent motion: Is control possible when the stimulus affords countless motion possibilities?

We investigate whether a new polystable illusion, illusory apparent motion (IAM), is susceptible to subjective perceptual control as has been shown in other polystable stimuli (e.g., the Necker cube, apparent motion quartets). Previous research has demonstrated that, although IAM shares some properties in common with other polystable stimuli, it also has some unique ones that make it unclear whether it should have similar susceptibility to subjective control. For example, IAM can be perceived in a countless number of directions and motion patterns (e.g., up–down, left–left, contracting–expanding, shear, diagonal). To explore perceptual control of IAM, in experiment 1 (n = 99) we used a motion persistence paradigm where participants are primed with different motion patterns and are instructed to control (change or hold) the initial motion pattern and indicate when the motion pattern changes. Building on experiment 1, experiment 2 (n = 76) brings the method more in line with previous subjective control research, testing whether participants can control their perception of IAM in a context without priming and while dynamically reporting their percepts throughout the trial. Findings from the two experiments demonstrate that participants were able to control their perception of IAM across paradigms. We explore the implications of these findings, strategies reported, and open questions for future research.

The postdictive effect of choice reflects the modulation of attention on choice

Our conscious perception of the world is not an instantaneous, moment-by-moment construction. Rather, our perception of an event is influenced, over time, by information gained after the event; this is known as a postdictive effect. A recent study reported that this postdictive effect could occur even in choice. The present study sought to test whether the striking postdictive effect of choice reflects the modulation of attention on choice, by directly and systematically manipulating attention in two experiments. Specifically, Experiment 1 revealed that the robust postdictive effect of choice was almost completely eliminated when attentional bias was removed. More important, Experiment 2 demonstrated that the postdictive effect of choice could be modulated by directly manipulating participants’ attention with a spatial cue, in particular, when the cue appeared at short time delays. These results suggest that choice could be considerably postdictively influenced by attention and this effect was most pronounced within a short time window wherein decision making was most likely in progress. The current study not only enables clarification of the mechanism of the newly discovered postdictive effect of choice, but also extends evidence of the modulation of attention on decision making.

All in Good Time: Long-Lasting Postdictive Effects Reveal Discrete Perception

Is consciousness a continuous stream of percepts or is it discrete, occurring only at certain moments in time? This question has puzzled philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists for centuries. Both hypotheses have fallen repeatedly in and out of favor. Here, we review recent studies exploring long-lasting postdictive effects and show that the results favor a two-stage discrete model, in which substantial periods of continuous unconscious processing precede discrete conscious percepts. We propose that such a model marries the advantages of both continuous and discrete models and resolves centuries old debates about perception and consciousness.

Feature integration within discrete time windows

Sensory information must be integrated over time to perceive, for example, motion and melodies. Here, to study temporal integration, we used the sequential metacontrast paradigm in which two expanding streams of lines are presented. When a line in one stream is offset observers perceive all other lines to be offset too, even though they are straight. When more lines are offset the offsets integrate mandatorily, i.e., observers cannot report the individual offsets. We show that mandatory integration lasts for up to 450 ms, depending on the observer. Importantly, integration occurs only when offsets are presented within a discrete window of time. Even stimuli that are in close spatio-temporal proximity do not integrate if they are in different windows. A window of integration starts with stimulus onset and integration in the next window has similar characteristics. We present a two-stage computational model based on discrete time windows that captures these effects.

In order to perceive moving or changing objects, sensory information must be integrated over time. Here, using a visual sequential metacontrast paradigm, the authors show that integration occurs only when subsequent stimuli are presented within a discrete window of time after the initial stimulus.