1
|
Buccella A, Maoz U, Mudrik L. Towards an interdisciplinary "science of the mind": A call for enhanced collaboration between philosophy and neuroscience. Eur J Neurosci 2024; 60:4771-4784. [PMID: 38956706 DOI: 10.1111/ejn.16451] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/28/2023] [Revised: 04/25/2024] [Accepted: 06/10/2024] [Indexed: 07/04/2024]
Abstract
In recent decades, the neuroscientific community has moved from describing the neural underpinnings of mental phenomena-as characterized by experimental psychology and philosophy of mind-to attempting to redefine those mental phenomena based on neural findings. Nowadays, many are intrigued by the idea that neuroscience might provide the "missing piece" that would allow philosophers (and, to an extent, psychologists, too) to make important advances, generating new means that these disciplines lack to close knowledge gaps and answer questions like "What is Free Will?" and "Do humans have it?." In this paper, we argue that instead of striving for neuroscience to replace philosophy in the ongoing quest to understanding human thought and behavior, more synergetic relations should be established, where neuroscience does not only inspire philosophy but also draws from it. We claim that such a collaborative coevolution, with the two disciplines nourishing and influencing each other, is key to resolving long-lasting questions that have thus far proved impenetrable for either discipline on its own.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Uri Maoz
- Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA
| | - Liad Mudrik
- School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Dominik T, Mele A, Schurger A, Maoz U. Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 157:105503. [PMID: 38072144 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105503] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2023] [Revised: 11/09/2023] [Accepted: 12/04/2023] [Indexed: 12/23/2023]
Abstract
The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Alfred Mele
- Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, FL, USA
| | | | - Uri Maoz
- Brain Institute, Chapman University, CA, USA
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Differentiating the reported time of intent and action on the basis of temporal binding behaviors and confidence ratings. Atten Percept Psychophys 2022; 84:1328-1341. [PMID: 35426030 DOI: 10.3758/s13414-022-02479-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/20/2022] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
The reported time of intent (W) and the reported time of action (M) have been used as indices of consciousness during simple voluntary actions. However, it is unclear whether W is exclusively inferred from M. Past studies have suggested that W is inferred from M by demonstrating that W varies when judged in conjunction with M. The current study offers counterevidence by showing that W is independent of M under some circumstances related to temporal binding. Participants performed a voluntary keypress that elicited a tone (briefly delayed at 5 and 60 ms). Subsequently, they reported W or M and indicated the confidence of their report. Binding strength was measured as the extent to which the W and M reports gravitated toward the time of the tone. Moreover, the binding strength was evaluated in conjunction with time course and knowledge to assess whether the strength increases due to repeated exposure or weakens if informed of the tone delay manipulation, respectively. We observed that the binding strength associated with W increased over time, and being informed of the tone manipulation did not affect W's binding behaviors. In contrast, M's binding behaviors did not change over time but being informed of the tone manipulation may release M from binding. The corresponding confidence ratings associated with W were uniform whereas those associated with M fluctuated over time. Collectively, the results suggest that binding behaviors associated with W and M differ, and that W is not simply derived from M.
Collapse
|
4
|
Neafsey EJ. Conscious intention and human action: Review of the rise and fall of the readiness potential and Libet's clock. Conscious Cogn 2021; 94:103171. [PMID: 34325185 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103171] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2021] [Revised: 06/26/2021] [Accepted: 07/04/2021] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Is consciousness-the subjective awareness of the sensations, perceptions, beliefs, desires, and intentions of mental life-a genuine cause of human action or a mere impotent epiphenomenon accompanying the brain's physical activity but utterly incapable of making anything actually happen? This article will review the history and current status of experiments and commentary related to Libet's influential paper (Brain 106:623-664, 1983) whose conclusion "that cerebral initiation even of a spontaneous voluntary act …can and usually does begin unconsciously" has had a huge effect on debate about the efficacy of conscious intentions. Early (up to 2008) and more recent (2008 on) experiments replicating and criticizing Libet's conclusions and especially his methods will be discussed, focusing especially on recent observations that the readiness potential (RP) may only be an "artifact of averaging" and that, when intention is measured using "tone probes," the onset of intention is found much earlier and often before the onset of the RP. Based on these findings, Libet's methodology was flawed and his results are no longer valid reasons for rejecting Fodor's "good old commonsense belief/desire psychology" that "my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching.".
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Edward J Neafsey
- Loyola University Chicago Stritch School of Medicine, Department of Molecular Pharmacology and Neuroscience, 2160 S. First Ave., Maywood, IL 60153, United States.
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Maoz U, Yaffe G, Koch C, Mudrik L. Neural precursors of decisions that matter-an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice. eLife 2019; 8:39787. [PMID: 31642807 PMCID: PMC6809608 DOI: 10.7554/elife.39787] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/03/2018] [Accepted: 10/03/2019] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
The readiness potential (RP)—a key ERP correlate of upcoming action—is known to precede subjects' reports of their decision to move. Some view this as evidence against a causal role for consciousness in human decision-making and thus against free-will. But previous work focused on arbitrary decisions—purposeless, unreasoned, and without consequences. It remains unknown to what degree the RP generalizes to deliberate, more ecological decisions. We directly compared deliberate and arbitrary decision-making during a $1000-donation task to non-profit organizations. While we found the expected RPs for arbitrary decisions, they were strikingly absent for deliberate ones. Our results and drift-diffusion model are congruent with the RP representing accumulation of noisy, random fluctuations that drive arbitrary—but not deliberate—decisions. They further point to different neural mechanisms underlying deliberate and arbitrary decisions, challenging the generalizability of studies that argue for no causal role for consciousness in decision-making to real-life decisions. Editorial note: This article has been through an editorial process in which the authors decide how to respond to the issues raised during peer review. The Reviewing Editor's assessment is that all the issues have been addressed (see decision letter).
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Uri Maoz
- Department of Psychology at Crean College of Health and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, Orange, United States.,Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, Orange, United States.,Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, United States.,Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, United States.,Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, United States.,Division of Biology and Bioengineering, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, United States
| | - Gideon Yaffe
- Yale Law School, Yale University, New Haven, United States
| | - Christof Koch
- Allen Institute for Brain Science, Seattle, United States
| | - Liad Mudrik
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.,School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Isham EA, Wulf KA, Mejia C, Krisst LC. Deliberation period during easy and difficult decisions: re-examining Libet's "veto" window in a more ecologically valid framework. Neurosci Conscious 2017; 2017:nix002. [PMID: 30042837 PMCID: PMC6007182 DOI: 10.1093/nc/nix002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/06/2016] [Revised: 01/23/2017] [Accepted: 01/26/2017] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Whether consciousness plays a causal role in cognitive processing remains debated. According to Benjamin Libet, consciousness is needed to deliberate and veto an action that is initiated unconsciously. Libet offered that the deliberation window takes place between the time of conscious intent (W) and action (MR). We further examined this deliberation-veto hypothesis by measuring the length of the temporal window (W-MR) when making easy and difficult choices. If Libet were correct that the W-MR is intended for evaluation and cancelation, we should expect a shorter W-MR for an easy decision since less deliberation is presumably needed. Instead, we observed a less intuitive effect: The W-MR window in the easy trials was longer than the W-MR window in the difficult ones. Our results suggest several interpretations including the idea that consciousness may play a causal role in decision making but not in a straightforward manner as assumed by Libet's veto hypothesis.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Eve A Isham
- UC Davis Department of Psychology, Center for Mind and Brain
| | - Krystal A Wulf
- UC Davis Department of Psychology, Center for Mind and Brain
| | - Camille Mejia
- UC Davis Department of Psychology, Center for Mind and Brain
| | - Lara C Krisst
- UC Davis Department of Psychology, Center for Mind and Brain
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Libet’s experiment: Questioning the validity of measuring the urge to move. Conscious Cogn 2017; 49:255-263. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.01.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/01/2016] [Revised: 01/05/2017] [Accepted: 01/09/2017] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
|
8
|
Deutschländer R, Pauen M, Haynes JD. Probing folk-psychology: Do Libet-style experiments reflect folk intuitions about free action? Conscious Cogn 2016; 48:232-245. [PMID: 28013177 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.11.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/10/2016] [Revised: 11/03/2016] [Accepted: 11/05/2016] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
There is an ongoing debate in philosophy and psychology about when one should consider an action to be free. Several aspects are frequently suggested as relevant: (a) a prior intention, (b) a conscious action-related thought, (c) prior deliberation, (d) a meaningful choice, (e) different consequences of the action, and (f) the duration between intention and action. Here we investigated which criteria laypeople adopt and thus probed their intuitions about free actions in three surveys based on daily life scenarios. First, our results indicate that laypeople consider a conscious intention important for an action to be free. Second, laypeople consider spontaneous actions without consequences to be freer than actions with prior deliberation. Third, laypeople consider proximal rather than distal intentions relevant when it comes to judging actions as free. Taken together, these results suggest that simple laboratory experiments on action choices reflect laypeople's intuitions of free actions to a considerable degree.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Robert Deutschländer
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience, Charité - Universitätsmedizin, Berlin, Germany.
| | - Michael Pauen
- Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
| | - John-Dylan Haynes
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience, Charité - Universitätsmedizin, Berlin, Germany; Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany; Berlin Center of Advanced Neuroimaging, Charité - Universitätsmedizin, Berlin, Germany; Cluster of Excellence NeuroCure, Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany; Department of Psychology, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany; Clinic of Neurology, Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany.
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Bode S, Murawski C, Soon CS, Bode P, Stahl J, Smith PL. Demystifying “free will”: The role of contextual information and evidence accumulation for predictive brain activity. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2014; 47:636-45. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.10.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/05/2014] [Revised: 08/19/2014] [Accepted: 10/20/2014] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
|
10
|
Miller J, Schwarz W. Brain signals do not demonstrate unconscious decision making: An interpretation based on graded conscious awareness. Conscious Cogn 2014; 24:12-21. [PMID: 24394375 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.12.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/09/2013] [Revised: 10/06/2013] [Accepted: 12/08/2013] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
|
11
|
Abstract
Unconscious neural activity has been repeatedly shown to precede and potentially even influence subsequent free decisions. However, to date, such findings have been mostly restricted to simple motor choices, and despite considerable debate, there is no evidence that the outcome of more complex free decisions can be predicted from prior brain signals. Here, we show that the outcome of a free decision to either add or subtract numbers can already be decoded from neural activity in medial prefrontal and parietal cortex 4 s before the participant reports they are consciously making their choice. These choice-predictive signals co-occurred with the so-called default mode brain activity pattern that was still dominant at the time when the choice-predictive signals occurred. Our results suggest that unconscious preparation of free choices is not restricted to motor preparation. Instead, decisions at multiple scales of abstraction evolve from the dynamics of preceding brain activity.
Collapse
|
12
|
Tracking the unconscious generation of free decisions using ultra-high field fMRI. PLoS One 2011; 6:e21612. [PMID: 21760881 PMCID: PMC3124546 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0021612] [Citation(s) in RCA: 66] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/09/2011] [Accepted: 06/03/2011] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Recently, we demonstrated using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that the outcome of free decisions can be decoded from brain activity several seconds before reaching conscious awareness. Activity patterns in anterior frontopolar cortex (BA 10) were temporally the first to carry intention-related information and thus a candidate region for the unconscious generation of free decisions. In the present study, the original paradigm was replicated and multivariate pattern classification was applied to functional images of frontopolar cortex, acquired using ultra-high field fMRI at 7 Tesla. Here, we show that predictive activity patterns recorded before a decision was made became increasingly stable with increasing temporal proximity to the time point of the conscious decision. Furthermore, detailed questionnaires exploring subjects' thoughts before and during the decision confirmed that decisions were made spontaneously and subjects were unaware of the evolution of their decision outcomes. These results give further evidence that FPC stands at the top of the prefrontal executive hierarchy in the unconscious generation of free decisions.
Collapse
|
13
|
|
14
|
|
15
|
|
16
|
|
17
|
|
18
|
|
19
|
|
20
|
|
21
|
|
22
|
Abstract
AbstractWe compare the way two models of consciousness treat subjective timing. According to the standard “Cartesian Theater” model, there is a place in the brain where “it all comes together,” and the discriminations in all modalities are somehow put into registration and “presented” for subjective judgment. The timing of the events in this theater determines subjective order. According to the alternative “Multiple Drafts” model, discriminations are distributed in both space and time in the brain. These events do have temporal properties, but those properties do not determine subjective order because there is no single, definitive “stream of consciousness,” only a parallel stream of conflicting and continuously revised contents. Four puzzling phenomena that resist explanation by the Cartesian model are analyzed: (1) a gradual apparent motion phenomenon involving abrupt color change (Kolers & von Grünau 1976), (2) an illusion of an evenly spaced series of “hops” produced by two or more widely spaced series of taps delivered to the skin (Geldard & Sherrick's “cutaneous rabbit” [1972]), (3) backwards referral in time, and (4) subjective delay of consciousness of intention (both reported in this journal by LIbet 1985a; 1987; 1989a). The unexamined assumptions that have always made the Cartesian Theater so attractive are exposed and dismantled. The Multiple Drafts model provides a better account of the puzzling phenomena, avoiding the scientific and metaphysical extravagances of the Cartesian Theater: The temporal order of subjective events is a product of the brain's interpretational processes, not a direct reflection of events making up those processes.
Collapse
|
23
|
|
24
|
|
25
|
|
26
|
|
27
|
|
28
|
Haynes JD. Beyond Libet: Long-Term Prediction of Free Choices from Neuroimaging Signals. RESEARCH AND PERSPECTIVES IN NEUROSCIENCES 2011. [DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-18015-6_10] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/01/2023]
|
29
|
Subjective reports of stimulus, response, and decision times in speeded tasks: How accurate are decision time reports? Conscious Cogn 2010; 19:1013-36. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.06.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/26/2010] [Revised: 06/02/2010] [Accepted: 06/03/2010] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
|
30
|
|
31
|
Are the mental experiences of will and self-control significant for the performance of a voluntary act? Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00055849] [Citation(s) in RCA: 38] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
|
32
|
|
33
|
|
34
|
Danquah AN, Farrell MJ, O’Boyle DJ. Biases in the subjective timing of perceptual events: Libet et al. (1983) revisited. Conscious Cogn 2008; 17:616-27. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.09.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2007] [Revised: 09/25/2007] [Accepted: 09/27/2007] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
|
35
|
|
36
|
Tsakiris M, Haggard P. Awareness of somatic events associated with a voluntary action. Exp Brain Res 2003; 149:439-46. [PMID: 12677324 DOI: 10.1007/s00221-003-1386-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 80] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/20/2002] [Accepted: 12/23/2002] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
How does the brain distinguish actions that we perform from movements imposed on us? To study links between the representations of actions and their somatosensory consequences, we compared the perceived times of voluntary actions or involuntary movements and of a subsequent somatic effect (a TMS-induced twitch of the right index finger). Participants perceived voluntary actions as occurring later and their bodily effects as occurring earlier in the agency context, compared to single-event baseline conditions. When the voluntary action was replaced by a passive, involuntary movement this attraction effect reversed. In a second experiment, subjects rated the intensity of the same TMS-induced somatic effect, again following a voluntary action or a passive movement. When the somatic effect was caused by a voluntary action, it was perceived as significantly less intense than when it followed a passive movement. Our results suggest a binding mechanism integrating awareness of somatic consequences occurring in voluntary action. This 'intentional binding' mechanism might underlie the way in which the mind constructs a strong association between intentions, actions and consequences so as to generate the unique and private phenomenological experience of self-agency.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Manos Tsakiris
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, 17 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3AR, UK.
| | | |
Collapse
|
37
|
Gomes G. The interpretation of Libet's results on the timing of conscious events: a commentary. Conscious Cogn 2002; 11:221-30; discussion 308-13, 314-25. [PMID: 12191939 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.2002.0556] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller, in this issue, is given. Average shift in the point of subjective equality (PSE), calculated by Klein on Libet's data, and corresponding change in mean shift, calculated by Libet et al. (1983), may be "corrected," taking as a reference point the end of the minimum train duration. Values obtained, if significant, indicate a latency for conscious sensation of the skin stimulus of at least 230 ms. Pockett's main conclusions are favored, but her explanation of peripheral-lemniscal couplings is found to be unconvincing. Trevena and Miller's article unsuccessfully tries to rescue a dualist interactionist view. Libet's method of timing intentions is thoroughly criticized.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Gilberto Gomes
- Universidade Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
| |
Collapse
|
38
|
Breitmeyer BG. In support of Pockett's critique of Libet's studies of the time course of consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2002; 11:280-3; discussion 304-7. [PMID: 12191944 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.2002.0555] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Susan Pockett presents sound arguments supporting her reinterpretations of data that Libet and co-workers used to support a number of intriguing and influential conclusions regarding the microgenesis and timing of (a) conscious sensory experience and (b) volitionally controlled motor responses. The following analysis, extending and elaborating some of her main arguments, proposes that Libet's experimental methodologies and rationales, and thus also his interpretation of data, are flawed and that neglect or ignorance of methodological and empirical constraints well known to sensory psychologists risks drawing premature or faulty conclusions about the timing of conscious experience.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Bruno G Breitmeyer
- Department of Psychology, University of Houston, Houston, Texas 77204-5022, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
39
|
|
40
|
Trevena JA, Miller J. Cortical movement preparation before and after a conscious decision to move. Conscious Cogn 2002; 11:162-90; discussion 314-25. [PMID: 12191935 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.2002.0548] [Citation(s) in RCA: 77] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
The idea that our conscious decisions determine our actions has been challenged by a report suggesting that the brain starts to prepare for a movement before the person concerned has consciously decided to move (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Libet et al. claimed that their results show that our actions are not consciously initiated. The current article describes two experiments in which we attempted to replicate Libet et al.'s comparison of participants' movement-related brain activity with the reported times of their decisions to move and also the reported times of their decisions of which hand to move. We also looked at the distribution of participants' reports over time to evaluate an alternative explanation of Libet et al.'s (1983) results. Although the Readiness Potential was usually present before all of the decisions to move, consistent with the findings of Keller and Heckhausen (1990) and Libet et al. (1983), we found that many reported decision times were before the onset of the Lateralized Readiness Potential, which measures hand-specific movement preparation. The latter finding is consistent with the conclusion that the LRP always started after the conscious decision to move. We conclude that even though activity related to movement anticipation may be present before a conscious decision to move, the cortical preparation necessary for the movement to happen immediately may not start until after the conscious decision to move.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Judy Arnel Trevena
- Department of Psychology, University of Otago, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand
| | | |
Collapse
|
41
|
Abstract
Humans have the conscious experience of 'free will': we feel we can generate our actions, and thus affect our environment. Here we used the perceived time of intentional actions and of their sensory consequences as a means to study consciousness of action. These perceived times were attracted together in conscious awareness, so that subjects perceived voluntary movements as occurring later and their sensory consequences as occurring earlier than they actually did. Comparable involuntary movements caused by magnetic brain stimulation reversed this attraction effect. We conclude that the CNS applies a specific neural mechanism to produce intentional binding of actions and their effects in conscious awareness.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Patrick Haggard
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, 17 Queen Square, London WC1N 3AR, UK.
| | | | | |
Collapse
|
42
|
Gomes G. The timing of conscious experience: a critical review and reinterpretation of Libet's research. Conscious Cogn 1998; 7:559-95. [PMID: 9817814 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.1998.0332] [Citation(s) in RCA: 55] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occur after the Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, the end of cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments (Libet et al., 1983a) is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness.
Collapse
|
43
|
|
44
|
In defense off the pineal gland. Behav Brain Sci 1992. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00068448] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
|
45
|
Time and consciousness. Behav Brain Sci 1992. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00068412] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
|
46
|
Does the perception of temporal sequence throw light on consciousness? Behav Brain Sci 1992. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x0006845x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
|
47
|
|
48
|
|
49
|
Global pattern perception and temporal order judgments. Behav Brain Sci 1992. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00068485] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
|
50
|
Closing the Cartesian Theatre. Behav Brain Sci 1992. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00068503] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
|