Do HMOs have monopsony power?

Market Structure and Technical Efficiency in the Hospital Services Industry: A DEA Approach

This article uses data envelopment analysis and multiple regression analysis to examine empirically the impact of various market-structure elements on the technical efficiency of the hospital services industry in various metropolitan areas of the United States. Market-structure elements include the degree of rivalry among hospitals, extent of HMO activity, and health insurer concentration. The DEA results show the typical hospital services industry experienced 11 percent inefficiency in 1999. Moreover, multiple regression analysis indicates the level of technical efficiency varied directly across metropolitan hospital services industries in response to greater HMO activity and private health insurer concentration in the state. The analysis suggests the degree of rivalry among hospitals had no marginal effect on technical efficiency at the industry level. Evidence also implies that the presence of a state Certificate of Need law was not associated with a greater degree of inefficiency in the typical metropolitan hospital services industry.

Hospital prices and market structure in the hospital and insurance industries

There has been substantial consolidation among health insurers and hospitals, recently, raising questions about the effects of this consolidation on the exercise of market power. We analyze the relationship between insurer and hospital market concentration and the prices of hospital services. We use a national US dataset containing transaction prices for health care services for over 11 million privately insured Americans. Using three years of panel data, we estimate how insurer and hospital market concentration are related to hospital prices, while controlling for unobserved market effects. We find that increases in insurance market concentration are significantly associated with decreases in hospital prices, whereas increases in hospital concentration are non-significantly associated with increases in prices. A hypothetical merger between two of five equally sized insurers is estimated to decrease hospital prices by 6.7%.

Insurer-Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market

I use data on the hospital networks offered by managed care health insurers to estimate the expected division of profits between insurers and providers. I include a simple profit-maximization framework and an additional effect: hospitals that can secure demand without contracting with all insurers (e.g., those most attractive to consumers and those that are capacity constrained) may demand high prices that some insurers refuse to pay. Hospital mergers may also affect price bargaining. I estimate that all three types of hospitals capture higher markups than other providers. These results provide information on the hospital investment incentives generated by bargaining.

Do health insurers possess monopsony power in the hospital services industry?

This paper uses metropolitan data to test empirically if health insurers possess monopsony or monopoly-busting power on the buyer-side of the hospital services market. According to theory, monopsony power is indicated by a fall in output, whereas, monopoly-busting power is shown by an increase in output when buyer concentration rises. The empirical results provide evidence that greater health insurer buyer concentration is not associated with monopsony power. Instead, some evidence is found to suggest that higher health insurer concentration translates into increased monopoly-busting power. That is, metropolitan hospitals offer increased services when the buyer-side of the hospitals services market is more highly concentrated.

The effect of physician and health plan market concentration on prices in commercial health insurance markets

The objective of this paper is to describe the market structure of health plans (HPs) and physician organizations (POs) in California, a state with high levels of managed care penetration and selective contracting. First we calculate Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) concentration indices for HPs and POs in 42 California counties. We then estimate a multivariable regression model to examine the relationship between concentration measures and the prices paid by HPs to POs. Price data is from Medstat MarketScan databases. The findings show that any California counties exhibit what the Department of Justice would consider high HHI concentration measures, in excess of 1,800. More than three quarters of California counties exhibit HP concentration indices over 1,800, and 83% of counties have PO concentration levels in excess of 1,800. Half of the study counties exhibited PO concentration levels in excess of 3,600, compared to only 24% for plans. Multivariate price models suggest that PO concentration is associated with higher physician prices (p < or = 0.05), whereas HP concentration does not appear to be significantly associated with higher outpatient commercial payer prices.

A descriptive analysis of average productivity among health maintenance organizations, 1985 to 2001

This paper examines the evolution of average productivity among HMOs for 4,419 Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) from 1985 to 2001. For both IPA and non-IPA HMOs, HMO productivity increased from 1990 to 1996 and rapidly decreased from 1997 to 2001. In contrast to cost functions that show scale economies for IPA and non-IPA HMOs, production functions showed scale economies for IPA HMOs were constant and non-IPA HMOs having only slight scale economies. This suggests that much of the scale economies observed in cost functions are due to lower prices for resources used rather than improvements in production organization. Non-IPA HMOs and non-profit HMOs are more productive than IPA HMOs and for profit HMOs. Production organization for non-IPA HMOs appears to have improved over time, resulting in non-IPA HMOs being able to produce more member months of coverage with their production organization in 1997 to 2001 than they would have with their production organization in 1985 to 1990. Regulations requiring consumer involvement in HMO governance reduce productivity.

Responsibly managing the medical school--teaching hospital power relationship

The relationship between medical schools and their teaching hospitals involves a complex and variable mixture of monopoly and monopsony power, which has not been previously been ethically analyzed. As a consequence, there is currently no ethical framework to guide leaders of both institutions in the responsible management of this complex power relationship. The authors define these two forms of power and, using economic concepts, analyze the nature of such power in the medical school-teaching hospital relationship, emphasizing the potential for exploitation. Using concepts from both business ethics and medical ethics, the authors analyze the nature of transparency and co-fiduciary responsibility in this relationship. On the basis of both rational self-interest, drawn from business ethics, and co-fiduciary responsibility, drawn from medical ethics, they argue for the centrality of transparency in the medical school-teaching hospital relationship. Understanding the ethics of monopoly and monopsony power is essential for the responsible management of the complex relationship between medical schools and their teaching hospitals and can assist the leadership of academic health centers in carrying out one of their major responsibilities: to prevent the exploitation of monopoly power and monopsony power in this relationship.

The check is in the mail: determinants of claims payable timing among health maintenance organizations

This paper used financial data from health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the United States from the period 1985 to 2001 to examine the determinants of claims payable--the dollar amount of services rendered to enrollees but for which the HMO has not yet paid providers, such as physicians and hospitals. Claims payable management is important because delaying payments to providers can jeopardize provider operations and reduce HMO operational flexibility. The results show that HMOs manage claims payable with a multi-period perspective designed to evoke favorable responses and to avoid unfavorable ones from external parties, and to maintain flexibility for unexpected conditions. Higher HMO profitability, quicker receipt of premiums by the HMO, increased provider involvement, and greater local control of the HMO lead to faster payment to providers. Implications for HMO managers, providers, employers, and regulators are discussed.

Will physician unions improve health system performance?

In the public debate over the extension of collective bargaining rights to independent physicians, union proponents' primary argument has been that patients would benefit from allowing physicians to bargain collectively with health plans. This article examines the likely effects of physician unions on the U.S. health care system. Specifically considered are likely effects on economic efficiency, quality, access, and cost. Under none of these criteria are physician unions likely to improve health system performance, particularly when compared with available alternative strategies for dealing with problems identified by union proponents.