Inhibition and cognitive flexibility are related to prediction of one's own future preferences in young British and Chinese children

The ability to shift from current to future perspective is pivotal to future-oriented cognition. With two distinct cultural groups, UK (N = 92) and China (N = 90), we investigated 3 to 5-year-olds' understanding of preference changes occurring within themselves and their peers (another child). We administered a battery of representative tasks of executive function and theory of mind to examine their underlying relationships with children's ability to predict future preferences. British 3-year-olds outperformed Chinese children in predicting future preferences, while no country differences were observed between the 4- and 5-year-olds. Across the UK and China, children were more accurate when predicting for their peers than for themselves. They were also more accurate when their current preferences were identified first, i.e. before answering questions about the future. Chinese children outperformed their British counterparts on inhibition and cognitive flexibility tasks whereas there were no Eastern and Western differences in their theory of mind abilities. After controlling for age and children's knowledge of generic adult preferences, children's performance in the inhibition and cognitive flexibility tasks were significantly correlated with the prediction of their own future preferences, but they were not significantly correlated when predicting for a peer. These results are discussed in relation to the conflicts between multiple perspectives and the cognitive correlates of future-oriented cognition.

Spelling out some unaddressed conceptual and methodological challenges in empirical lifespan research

The importance of taking a lifespan approach to describe and understand human development has long been acknowledged (e.g., Baltes, 1987). Nevertheless, theoretical or empirical research that actually encompasses the entire lifespan, that is, from early childhood to old age, is rare. This is not surprising given the challenges such an approach entails. Many of these challenges (e.g., establishing measurement invariance between age groups) have been addressed in the previous literature, but others have not yet been sufficiently considered. The main purpose of this article is to present several examples of such largely unaddressed conceptual and methodological challenges and reflect upon possible ways to address them. We discuss the usefulness of a lifespan approach and the generalization of the challenges to other research comparing different groups, such as gender, culture, or species.

Neuropsychological Development of Cool and Hot Executive Functions Between 6 and 12 Years of Age: A Systematic Review

Previous studies on the development of executive functions (EFs) in middle childhood have traditionally focused on cognitive, or "cool," EFs: working memory, inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility. However, knowledge of the development of socio-emotional, or "hot," EFs, such as delay of gratification, decision-making and theory of mind, is more limited. The main aims of this systematic review were to characterize the typical development of both the primary cool and hot EFs in middle childhood, and to identify the main tools for evaluating EFs as a whole. We conducted a systematic search on studies of cognitive and socio-emotional EFs published in the last 5 years in Pubmed, PsycInfo, and WoS databases. Of 44 studies selected, we found a variety of tasks measuring cool EFs, while measures of hot EFs were limited. Nevertheless, the available data suggest that cool and hot components follow distinct, but related, developmental trajectories during middle childhood.

Dichotomous thinking about social groups: Learning about one group can activate opposite beliefs about another group

Across three studies (N = 607), we examined people's use of a dichotomizing heuristic-the inference that characteristics belonging to one group do not apply to another group-when making judgments about novel social groups. Participants learned information about one group (e.g., "Zuttles like apples"), and then made inferences about another group (e.g., "Do Twiggums like apples or hate apples?"). Study 1 acted as a proof of concept: Eight-year-olds and adults (but not 5-year-olds) assumed that the two groups would have opposite characteristics. Learning about the group as a generic whole versus as specific individuals boosted the use of the heuristic. Study 2 and Study 3 (sample sizes, methods, and analyses pre-registered), examined whether the presence or absence of several factors affected the activation and scope of the dichotomizing heuristic in adults. Whereas learning about or treating the groups as separate was necessary for activating dichotomous thinking, intergroup conflict and featuring only two (versus many) groups was not required. Moreover, the heuristic occurred when participants made both binary and scaled decisions. Once triggered, adults applied this cognitive shortcut widely-not only to benign (e.g., liking apples) and novel characteristics (e.g., liking modies), but also to evaluative traits signaling the morals or virtues of a social group (e.g., meanness or intelligence). Adults did not, however, extend the heuristic to the edges of improbability: They failed to dichotomize when doing so would attribute highly unusual preferences (e.g., disliking having fun). Taken together, these studies indicate the presence of a dichotomizing heuristic with broad implications for how people make social group inferences.

Children's and Adults' Beliefs about the Stability of Traits from Infancy to Adulthood: Contributions of Age and Executive Function

We examined developmental differences and sources of variability in trait reasoning. Four- to 10-year-olds and adults (N=198) rated how mean or nice "medium-mean" and "medium-nice" babies, kids, and teenagers were earlier in their lifetime and would be at older ages. Participants expected nice-labeled characters to be nice throughout their lives (participant age effects were null). In contrast, we documented age-related differences in judgments about meanness. With increasing participant age, individuals expected that meanness present in infancy, childhood, and adolescence would persist into adulthood. We discovered a curvilinear pattern in assessments of whether meanness originates during infancy: Four- to 5-year-olds and adults expected mean-labeled kids and teenagers to have been nicer as babies than did 6- to 10-year-olds. Controlling for age and working memory, participants with better inhibitory control more frequently expected mean-labeled individuals to remain mean across the lifespan, but inhibitory control was unrelated to judgments about nice-labeled individuals.

Pain in the Past and Pleasure in the Future: The Development of Past-Future Preferences for Hedonic Goods

It seems self-evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future pain or pleasure. We find consistent evidence that, all else being equal, adults and children aged 7 and over prefer pleasure to lie in the future and pain in the past and believe that other people will, too. They also predict that other people will be happier when pleasure is in the future rather than the past but sadder when pain is in the future rather than the past. Younger children have the same temporal preferences as adults for their own painful experiences, but they prefer their pleasure to lie in the past and do not predict that others' levels of happiness or sadness vary dependent on whether experiences lie in the past or the future. However, from the age of 7, temporal preferences were typically abandoned at the earliest opportunity when the quantity of past pain or pleasure was greater than the quantity located in the future. Past-future preferences for hedonic goods emerge early developmentally but are surprisingly flexible.

Optimism and Wishful Thinking: Consistency Across Populations in Children's Expectations for the Future

Two studies investigated 5- to 10-year-olds' (N = 194) positivity bias when forecasting the future. Children from two geographic locations (mostly Caucasian, higher income college town; mostly African American, lower income urban community) completed a future expectations task (FET). For multiple scenarios, children predicted whether a positive versus negative (optimism items) or a positive versus extraordinary positive (wishful thinking items) outcome would occur, including its likelihood. In both samples, optimism and wishful thinking decreased with age, optimism was higher than wishful thinking, children did not show a comparative self-optimism bias, and individual differences in the FET optimism score correlated with self-reported dispositional optimism and hope. Exploratory comparisons revealed between-sample equivalence in responses to all measures, except for less tempered wishful thinking in the urban community.

Is There a Downside to Anticipating the Upside? Children's and Adults' Reasoning About How Prior Expectations Shape Future Emotions

Four- to 10-year-olds and adults (N = 205) responded to vignettes involving three individuals with different expectations (high, low, and no) for a future event. Participants judged characters' pre-outcome emotions, as well as predicted and explained their feelings following three events (positive, attenuated, and negative). Although adults rated high-expectation characters more negatively than low-expectation characters after all outcomes, children shared this intuition starting at 6-7 years for negative outcomes, 8-10 years for attenuated, and never for positive. Comparison to baseline (no expectation) indicated that understanding the costs of high expectations emerges first and remains more robust across age than recognition that low expectations carry benefits. Explanation analyses further clarified this developing awareness about the relation between thoughts and emotions over time.