Multiple Causes of Difficulty in Insight: The Case of the Nine-Dot Problem

Funny? Think About It! Selective effect of cognitive mechanisms of humour on insight problems

The present study aims to elucidate whether insight problem solving could be facilitated by the cognitive component of humour. The authors take interest in whether the logical mechanisms of humour can affect how fast insight problems are solved. To that end, the authors conducted two experiments where participants solved insight problems after watching visual humorous stimuli such as videos and slideshows. The first experiment demonstrated the overall impact of facilitation by humour on insight problem solving; however, it did not show any difference in how particular logical mechanisms of humour affect the solution time of insight problems. The second experiment showed that the cognitive component of humour could selectively affect insight problems whose difficulty stems from different sources. These results suggest that the cognitive component of humour, when operationalised as logical mechanisms and schema switching, contributes to solving insight problems.

Creativity From Constraint Exploration and Exploitation

Using the frameworks of creativity as problem solving and Integrated Constraints in Creativity (IConIC), this article develops the proposal that creativity is best understood in terms of a cycle of constraint exploration and exploitation. This general thesis, which applies to varied domains and levels of creativity, is supported by three specific proposals about the role of constraints in creativity, each of which is developed and illustrated with examples. First, constraints provide the criteria for the evaluation of creative outcomes, which can vary as a function of the emphasis on novel usefulness or useful novelty. Second, constraints are critical in each step of the creative process: problem finding, problem construction, and problem solving. Third, constraints play a key role in both open-ended and closed-ended creative problems. These arguments are supported by specific predictions, concerning: (a) task differences in whether novelty or usefulness are emphasized more; (b) individual differences in the processing of constraints (some may favor flexible constraint exploration, while others may favor persistent constraint exploitation), which I hypothesize also correlate with (c) engagement in different types of creative problem-solving (more open-ended, of the sort encountered in art, vs. more closed-ended, of the sort encountered in science, business, and engineering).

The lack of Aha! experience can be dependent on the problem difficulty

Previous research on how problem-difficulty affects solution-types of insight-problems has yielded contradictory findings. Thus, we aimed to examine the impact of problem-difficulty on solution-types in both inter- and intra-problem-difficulty contexts. For this, we employed the original 8-coin, and 9-dot problems and four hinted-versions of those that were manipulated by using hints-to-remove-sources-of-difficulty to alter their difficulty level. Those manipulations were executed based on the assumptions of constraint-relaxation and chunk-decomposition as posited by representational change theory. The study involved a total of 165 participants who were tested in five groups (33 per se), with each group receiving an original or hinted problem. Following their correct solutions, problem-solvers classified their solution-types (insight or non-insight solutions) by whether they had an Aha!-experience during the solution. Across all groups, 56.1% of correctly solved insight problems were solved with Aha!-experience, based on participants' self-reports, implying that correct solutions should not be equated with insight. Subsequently, the solution-type rates were compared for both original problems (inter-problem-difficulty) and hinted versions of those at each difficulty level (intra-problem-difficulty). Inter-problem-difficulty comparisons demonstrated that the easier 8-coin problem was more likely to be solved with insight than the harder 9-dot problem. In contrast, intra-problem-difficulty comparisons revealed that harder problems were more likely to be solved with insight. These findings suggest that problem-difficulty should be considered in future studies of insight. Finally, separate analyses on the predictive values of the cognitive-affective-dimensions on solution-types revealed that, after adjusting for problem-difficulty, problem-solvers with higher suddenness scores in both problems exhibited a significantly higher probability of generating insight solutions.

The irreconcilability of insight

We are said to experience insight when we suddenly and unexpectedly become aware of the solution to a problem that we previously took ourselves to be unable to solve. In the field of comparative cognition, there is rising interest in the question of whether non-human animals are capable of insightful problem-solving. Putative cases of animals demonstrating insight have generally attracted two types of criticism: first, that insight is being conflated with other cognitive capacities (e.g., causal cognition, or mental trial and error); and, second, that the relevant performances merely reflect associative learning-and on the received understanding of insight within comparative cognition, insight necessarily involves non-associative processes. I argue that even if we grant that some cases of animal insight do withstand these two criticisms, these cases of purported animal insight cannot shed light on the nature of insightful problem-solving in humans. For the phenomenon studied by cognitive psychologists under the heading of insight is fundamentally different from that studied in comparative cognition. In light of this impasse, I argue that the reinterpretation of the extant research on animal insight in terms of other high-level cognitive capacities (means-end reasoning in particular) can improve the prospect of a successful comparative research program.

The Unconscious Tug-of-War: Exploring the Effect of Stimulus Selection Bias on Creative Problem Solving with Multiple Unconscious Stimuli

Objective

This study innovatively investigated the potential selection bias involved in processing multiple subliminal stimuli during creative problem-solving (CPS). It addresses the existing gap in specialized research on how the handling of multiple unconscious stimuli influences higher-order cognitive processes, particularly creativity.

Methods

The study utilized a masked priming paradigm and a remote association task (RAT). Two experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 presented two stimuli simultaneously, with one being the correct answer, to examine whether there was a bias in the location of subliminal stimuli. In Experiment 2, two stimuli were presented sequentially, with one serving as the answer, to investigate whether there was a temporal bias in unconscious processing.

Results

Our findings revealed that when solving easy RATs, subliminal stimuli presented on the left side had a negative priming effect compared to the right side. The results revealed that unconscious processing of subliminal stimuli enhanced performance on difficult CPS. Additionally, a temporal bias was observed, with more recent subliminal stimuli having a stronger effect than earlier stimuli.

Conclusion

Unconscious processing can improve CPS, especially for difficult tasks, and there is a bias towards processing stimuli on the left and more recently presented stimuli. These findings contribute to our understanding of unconscious processing, particularly the processing of multiple subliminal stimuli in CPS, and provide insights into the biases that exist in unconscious processing.

Search and insight processes in card sorting games

Insight problems are particularly interesting, because problems which require restructuring allow researchers to investigate the underpinnings of the Aha-experience, creativity and out of the box thinking. There is a need for new insight tasks to probe and extend the limits of existing theories and cognitive frameworks. To shed more light on this fascinating issue, we addressed the question: Is it possible to convey a well-known card sorting game into an insight task? We introduced different conditions and tested them via two online experiments (N = 546). Between the conditions we systematically varied the available perceptual features, and the existence of non-obvious rules. We found that our card sorting game elicited insight experience. In the first experiment, our data revealed that solution strategies and insight experience varied by the availability and saliency of perceptual features. The discovery of a non-obvious rule, which is not hinted at by perceptual features, was most difficult. With our new paradigm, we were able to construe ambiguous problems which allowed participants to find more than one solution strategy. Interestingly, we realized interindividual preferences for different strategies. The same problem drove strategies which either relied on feature integration or on more deliberate strategies. The second experiment varied the degree of independence of a sorting rule from the standard rules which were in accordance with prior knowledge. It was shown that the more independent the hidden rule was, the more difficult the task became. In sum, we demonstrated a new insight task which extended the available task domains and shed light on sequential and multi-step rule learning problems. Finally, we provided a first sketch of a cognitive model that should help to integrate the data within the existing literature on cognitive models and speculated about the generalizability of the interplay of prior knowledge modification and variation for problem solving.

Where Does Eureka Come From? The Effect of Unreportable Hints on the Phenomenology of Insight

Insight interests researchers given its special cognitive mechanisms and phenomenology (an Aha! experience or Eureka moment). There is a considerable amount of research on the effect of hints on performance in insight problem solving. However, only a few studies address the effect of hints on the subjective experiences of solvers, and the picture their results provide is unclear. We analyze the effect of unreportable true and false hints on different dimensions of the Aha! experience (subjective suddenness, Aha! experience as an effect, and certainty). Using the processing fluency framework, we predict that true hints lead to more insights and stronger Aha! experience and certainty, while false hints lead to the opposite results due to the controlled inhibition of the inappropriate representation. The results showed that false hints decreased the chance of finding a correct solution. The true-hint condition did not lead to more correct solutions but made solutions feel sudden more often than the control condition. The ratings of the Aha! experience and certainty were higher for solutions obtained after true hints than after false hints. We obtained partial support for the effect of unreportable hints on "Eureka!" moments.

The role of creative cognitive reappraisals in positively transforming negative emotions

Recent studies have found the connections between cognitive reappraisals' creativity and their regulatory efficacy. The present study proposed and tested a novel hypothesis on the function of cognitive reappraisals, especially creative ones. That is, whether they could positively alter negative emotional arousal toward unpleasant stimuli. To this end, two questions were investigated: (a) whether the creative reappraisals were more capable than ordinary ones of transforming the negative stimuli (pictures) to be perceived as positive, and (b) whether these two kinds of reappraisals made the "negative-to-positive transformation" through different mechanisms. To answer the first question, we examined the power of the creative and ordinary reappraisals in making the "negative-to-positive transformation" using an indirect and delayed "positive-or-negative" picture-sorting task (Exp. 1, n = 41 with a statistical power of 0.877), or using a direct and immediate subjective rating (Exp. 2, n = 31 with a statistical power of 0.768). To answer the second question, we checked how the factor of creativeness (creative vs. ordinary reappraisal) interacted with the factor of "timing" (simultaneous vs. delayed reappraisal delivery, Exp. 1), or with that of "dose" (one vs. three reappraisal applications; Exp. 2), in making the "negative-to-positive transformation," respectively, and examined if the variation of "timing" or "dose" factors would exert different effects on the creative and ordinary reappraisals' regulatory function. Our results generally proved that creative reappraisal was more capable of making the "negative-to-positive transformation" than the ordinary reappraisal, regardless of the direct and indirect emotion evaluation ratings as well as the variations in the timing and dose of reappraisal delivery. Moreover, we found that these two kinds of reappraisals could show dissociable dose-dependent effects (but not timing-dependent ones), thus partially implying that creative and ordinary reappraisal might make the "negative-to-positive transformation" through fundamentally different processes or mechanisms.

Between automatic and control processes: How relationships between problem elements interact to facilitate or impede insight

Solving a problem requires relating the pieces of information available to each other and to the solution. We investigated how the strength of these relationships determines the likelihood of solving insight tasks based on remote associates. In these tasks, the solver is provided with several cues (e.g., drop, coat, summer) and has to find the solution that matches those cues (e.g., rain). We measured the semantic similarity between the cues and the solution (cue-solution similarity) as well as between cues (cue-cue similarity). We assume those relationships modulate two basic processes underlying insight problem-solving. First, there is an automatic activation process whereby conceptual activation spreads across a semantic network from each cue node to their associated nodes, potentially reaching the node of the solution. Thus, in general, the higher cue-solution similarity, the more likely the solution will be found (Prediction 1). Second, there is a controlled search process focused on an area in semantic space whose radius depends on competing cue-cue similarity. High cue-cue similarity will bias a search for the solution close to the provided cues because the associated nodes shared by both cues are highly coactivated. Therefore, high cue-cue similarity will have a beneficial effect when the cue-solution similarity is high but a detrimental effect when cue-solution similarity is low (Prediction 2). Our two predictions were confirmed using both verbal and pictorial remote association tasks, supporting the view that insight is dependent on an interaction of meaningful relationships between cues and solutions, and clarify the mechanisms of insight problem solving in remote associates.

Sleep and incubation: Using problem reactivation during sleep to study forgetting fixation and unconscious processing during sleep incubation

When people are stuck on a problem, they sometimes benefit from an incubation period -a break from working on the problem. Anecdotes and empirical evidence suggest that sleeping during incubation is useful, but the mechanisms remain poorly understood. We examined how targeted memory reactivation during sleep, which boosts next-day solving, relates to forgetting fixation, a well-supported explanation of awake incubation. In evening sessions, participants attempted puzzles, while a unique sound cue played during each puzzle. Half the time, puzzles included fixating information reinforcing an incorrect representation. Later, during deep sleep, sounds associated with half of participants' previously unsolved puzzles were presented. The sounds should strengthen puzzle memories and reduce forgetting of the fixating information. In morning solving, overnight cueing reliably interacted with fixating information: participants solved numerically more cued than uncued puzzles, but only when puzzles included fixating information. These results suggest that additional processing occurred beyond simple fixation forgetting.

Common and specific neural correlates underlying insight and ordinary problem solving

Previous studies have investigated the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying insight problem solving (INPS). However, it is still unclear which mechanisms are common to both INPS and ordinary problem solving (ORPS), and which are distinctly involved in only one of these processes. In this study, we selected two types of Chinese character chunk decompositions, ordinary Chinese character chunk decomposition (OCD) and creative Chinese character chunk decomposition (CCD), as representatives of ORPS and INPS, respectively. By using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to record brain activations when subjects executed OCD or CCD operations, we found that both ORPS and INPS resulted in significant activations in the widespread frontoparietal cognitive control network, including the middle frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, and inferior parietal lobe. Furthermore, compared with ORPS, INPS led to greater activations in higher-level brain regions related to symbolic processing in the default mode network, including the anterior cingulate cortex, superior temporal gyrus, angular gyrus, and precuneus. Conversely, ORPS induced greater activations than INPS in more posterior brain regions related to visuospatial attention and visual perception, such as the inferior temporal gyrus, hippocampus, and middle occipital gyrus/superior parietal gyrus/fusiform gyrus. In addition, an ROI analysis corroborated the neural commonalities and differences between ORPS and INPS. These findings provide new evidence that ORPS and INPS rely on common as well as distinct cognitive processes and cortical mechanisms.

Brain Activations and Functional Connectivity Patterns Associated with Insight-Based and Analytical Anagram Solving

Insight is one of the most mysterious problem-solving phenomena involving the sudden emergence of a solution, often preceded by long unproductive attempts to find it. This seemingly unexplainable generation of the answer, together with the role attributed to insight in the advancement of science, technology and culture, stimulate active research interest in discovering its neuronal underpinnings. The present study employs functional Magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to probe and compare the brain activations occurring in the course of solving anagrams by insight or analytically, as judged by the subjects. A number of regions were activated in both strategies, including the left premotor cortex, left claustrum, and bilateral clusters in the precuneus and middle temporal gyrus. The activated areas span the majority of the clusters reported in a recent meta-analysis of insight-related fMRI studies. At the same time, the activation patterns were very similar between the insight and analytical solutions, with the only difference in the right sensorimotor region probably explainable by subject motion related to the study design. Additionally, we applied resting-state fMRI to study functional connectivity patterns correlated with the individual frequency of insight anagram solutions. Significant correlations were found for the seed-based connectivity of areas in the left premotor cortex, left claustrum, and left frontal eye field. The results stress the need for optimizing insight paradigms with respect to the accuracy and reliability of the subjective insight/analytical solution classification. Furthermore, the short-lived nature of the insight phenomenon makes it difficult to capture the associated neural events with the current experimental techniques and motivates complementing such studies by the investigation of the structural and functional brain features related to the individual differences in the frequency of insight-based decisions.

The late parietal event-related potential component is hierarchically sensitive to chunk tightness during chunk decomposition

The current study analyzed event-related potentials (ERPs) associated with visuo-spatial transformation in order to examine how "chunk tightness" affects the difficulty of chunk decomposition problems. Participants completed a Chinese character decomposition task in three conditions according to the tightness of the to-be-decomposed chunk (tight vs. medium vs. loose). Behavioral data showed that performance became worse (longer reaction time, lower accuracy) as chunk tightness increased. ERP data showed that, as chunk tightness increased, the LPC exhibited a significant decrease at posterior electrode sites. The results indicate that chunk tightness might exert its primary effect on chunk decomposition difficulty by increasing the difficulty of visuo-spatial transformation, a process linked to the parietal LPC.

How physical interaction with insight problems affects solution rates, hint use, and cognitive load

So-called insight problems are widely studied because they tap into the creative thinking that is crucial for solving real problems. However, insight problems are typically presented in static formats (on paper, computer) that allow no physical interaction with the problem elements, whereas such an interaction might in fact reduce the load on limited cognitive resources, such as working memory (WM) capacity, thereby facilitating solutions. To test this proposition, 124 young adults were allowed to interact physically with nine established insight problems, while another 124 people attempted to solve these problems using paper and pencil. Additionally, hints were provided for three problems that typically no-one solves. No general facilitating effect of physical interaction was found, with only one problem clearly benefitting from it. Furthermore, making use of hints was actually hindered by physical interaction. No difference in perceived task load and correlation with WM capacity was observed between the formats, and subjective ratings of insight were virtually unaffected by presentation format. Overall, physical interaction minimally affected insight problem-solving, which appears to rely strongly on internalized cognitive processing involving WM.

Left Prefrontal Cortex Supports the Recognition of Meaningful Patterns in Ambiguous Stimuli

Processing of ambiguous visual stimuli has been associated with an increased activation of the left lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) in neuroimaging studies. Nevertheless, the functional role of prefrontal activity in this process is not fully understood. In this experiment we asked participants to evaluate ambiguous inkblots from the Rorschach test, while stimulating the left lateral PFC using excitatory anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). In addition, visual insight ability was assessed as a control measure requiring visual and conceptual restructuring and convergent thinking rather than divergent idea generation employed to interpret the equivocal Rorschach inkblots. Using a randomized double-blind design, we demonstrated that anodal tDCS increased the number of meaningful patterns recognized in the inkblots but had no significant effect on visual insight. These findings support the role of left lateral PFC in the processing of ambiguous visual information and object recognition. More generally, we discuss that the PFC may be involved in the mechanisms supporting the activation of stored visual and semantic representations in order to compensate for less informative bottom-up inputs and thus facilitate flexible cognition and idea generation.

The Role of Motor Activity in Insight Problem Solving (the Case of the Nine-Dot Problem)

Attempts to estimate the contribution made by motor activity to insight problem solving is hindered by a lack of detailed description of motor behavior. The goal of this study was to develop and put to the test a novel method for studying the dynamics of insight problem solving based on a quantitative analysis of ongoing motor activity. As a proper problem model, we chose the nine-dot problem (Maier, 1930), in which solvers had to draw a sequence of connected line segments. Instead of using the traditional pen-and-paper way of solving the nine-dot problem we asked participants to use their index finger to draw line segments on the surface of a tablet computer. We are arguing that successful studying of the role of motor activity during problem solving requires the distinction between its instrumental and functional role. We considered the functional role on the motor activity as closely related to the on-line mode of motor planning. The goal of Experiment 1 was to explore the potential power of the method and, at the same time, to assay the patterns of motor activity related to on-line and off-line modes of motor planning. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to uncover the potential impact of preliminary motor training on the motor output of successful and unsuccessful problem solvers. In these experiments, we tested hypotheses on how preliminary motor training, which presumably played a functional role in Experiment 2 and an instrumental role in Experiment 3, affects the motor activity of a problem solver and hence their effectiveness in solving the problem. The three experiments showed consistent results. They suggest that successful solving of the nine-dot problem relies upon the functional role of motor activity and requires both off-line and on-line modes of motor planning, with the latter helping to overcome the perceptual constraints imposed by a spatial arrangement of the nine dots. The method that we applied allows for systematic comparison between successful and unsuccessful problem solvers based on the quantitative parameters of their motor activity. Through it, we found new specific patterns of motor activity that differentiate successful and unsuccessful solvers.

Neural correlates of creative insight: Amplitude of low-frequency fluctuation of resting-state brain activity predicts creative insight

Creative insight has attracted much attention across cultures. Although previous studies have explored the neural correlates of creative insight by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), little is known about intrinsic resting-state brain activity associated with creative insight. In the present study, we used amplitude of low-frequency fluctuation (ALFF) as an index in resting-state fMRI (rs-fMRI) to identify brain regions involved in individual differences in creative insight, which was measured by the response time of creative Chinese character chunk decomposition. Our results showed that ALFF in the superior frontal gyrus (SFG) positively predicted creative insight, while ALFF in the middle cingulate cortex/insula cortex (MCC/IC), superior temporal gyrus/angular gyrus (STG/AG), anterior cingulate cortex/caudate nucleus (ACC/CN), and culmen/declive (CU/DC) negatively predicted creative insight. Moreover, these findings indicate that spontaneous brain activity in multiple regions related to breaking mental sets, solutions exploring, evaluation of novel solutions, forming task-related associations, and emotion experience contributes to creative insight. In conclusion, the present study provides new evidence to further understand the cognitive processing and neural correlates of creative insight.

Feelings-of-Warmth Increase More Abruptly for Verbal Riddles Solved With in Contrast to Without Aha! Experience

When we are confronted with a new problem, we typically try to apply strategies that have worked in the past and which usually lead closer to the solution incrementally. However, sometimes, either during a problem-solving attempt that does not seem to lead closer to the solution, or when we have given up on problem-solving for the moment, the solution seems to appear out of nowhere. This is often called a moment of insight. Whereas the cognitive processes of getting closer to the solution are still unknown for insight problem-solving, there are two diverging theories on the subjective feeling of getting closer to the solution: (1) One that states that an intuitive feeling of closeness to the solution increases slowly, but incrementally, before it surpasses the threshold to consciousness and becomes verbalizable (=insight) (continuous approach), and (2) another that proposes that the feeling of closeness to the solution does not increase before it exceeds the threshold to consciousness (discontinuous approach). Here, we investigated the subjective feeling of closeness to the solution, assessed as feeling-of-warmth (FoW), its relationship to solving the problem versus being presented with it and whether a feeling of Aha! was experienced. Additionally, we tested whether Aha! experiences are more likely when the problem is solved actively by the participant or presented to the participant after an unsuccessful problem-solving attempt, and whether the frequency of Aha! experiences correlates with problem difficulty. To our knowledge, this is the first study combining the CRAT with FoW assessments for the named conditions (solved/unsolved, three difficulty levels, Aha!/no Aha!). We used a verbal problem-solving task, the Compound Remote Associates Task (CRAT). Our data revealed that Aha! experiences were more often reported for solutions generated by the participant compared to solutions presented after unsuccessful problem-solving. Moreover, FoW curves showed a steeper increase for the last two FoW ratings when problems were solved with Aha! in contrast to without Aha!. Based on this observation, we provide a preliminary explanation for the underlying cognitive process of solving CRA problems via insight.

In Search of Somatic Precursors of Spontaneous Insight

Abstract. A considerable number of behavioral and neuroscientific studies on insight problem solving have revealed behavioral and neural correlates of the dynamic insight process; however, somatic correlates, particularly somatic precursors of creative insight, remain undetermined. To characterize the somatic precursor of spontaneous insight, 22 healthy volunteers were recruited to solve the compound remote associate (CRA) task in which a problem can be solved by either an insight or an analytic strategy. The participants’ peripheral nervous activities, particularly electrodermal and cardiovascular responses, were continuously monitored and separately measured. The results revealed a greater skin conductance magnitude for insight trials than for non-insight trials in the 4-s time span prior to problem solutions and two marginally significant correlations between pre-solution heart rate variability (HRV) and the solution time of insight trials. Our findings provide the first direct evidence that spontaneous insight in problem solving is a somatically peculiar process that is distinct from the stepwise process of analytic problem solving and can be represented by a special somatic precursor, which is a stronger pre-solution electrodermal activity and a correlation between problem solution time and certain HRV indicators such as the root mean square successive difference (RMSSD).

Quantifying insightful problem solving: a modified compound remote associates paradigm using lexical priming to parametrically modulate different sources of task difficulty

Insight problem solving has been conceptualized as a dynamic search through a constrained search space, where a non-obvious solution needs to be found. Multiple sources of task difficulty have been defined that can keep the problem solver from finding the right solution such as an overly large search space or knowledge constraints requiring a change of the problem representation. Up to now, there are very few accounts that focus on different aspects of difficulty within an insight problem-solving context and how they affect task performance as well as the probability of finding a solution that is accompanied by an Aha! experience. In addition, we are not aware of any approaches investigating how knowledge constraints parametrically modulate task performance and the Aha! experience in compound remote associates (CRA) when controlling for other sources of task difficulty. Therefore, we first developed, tested, and externally validated a modified CRA paradigm in combination with lexical priming that is more likely to elicit representational change than the classical CRA tasks. Second, we parametrically estimated the effect of the knowledge constraint together with other sources of difficulty (size of the problem and search space, word length and frequency) using general linear mixed models. The knowledge constraint (and the size of the search space) was operationalized as lexical distance (measured as cosine distances) between different word pairs within this task. Our results indicate that the experimentally induced knowledge constraint still affects task performance and is negatively related to the Aha! experience when controlling for various other types of task difficulties. Finally, we will present the complete stimulus set in German language together with their statistical (i.e., item difficulty and mean solution time) and lexical properties.

Regional Homogeneity Predicts Creative Insight: A Resting-State fMRI Study

Creative insight plays an important role in our daily life. Previous studies have investigated the neural correlates of creative insight by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), however, the intrinsic resting-state brain activity associated with creative insight is still unclear. In the present study, we used regional homogeneity (ReHo) as an index in resting-state fMRI (rs-fMRI) to identify brain regions involved in individual differences in creative insight, which was compued by the response time (RT) of creative Chinese character chunk decomposition. The findings indicated that ReHo in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)/caudate nucleus (CN) and angular gyrus (AG)/superior temporal gyrus (STG)/inferior parietal lobe (IPL) negatively predicted creative insight. Furthermore, these findings suggested that spontaneous brain activity in multiple regions related to breaking and establishing mental sets, goal-directed solutions exploring, shifting attention, forming new associations and emotion experience contributes to creative insight. In conclusion, the present study provides new evidence to further understand the cognitive processing and neural correlates of creative insight.

Sleep Does Not Promote Solving Classical Insight Problems and Magic Tricks

During creative problem solving, initial solution attempts often fail because of self-imposed constraints that prevent us from thinking out of the box. In order to solve a problem successfully, the problem representation has to be restructured by combining elements of available knowledge in novel and creative ways. It has been suggested that sleep supports the reorganization of memory representations, ultimately aiding problem solving. In this study, we systematically tested the effect of sleep and time on problem solving, using classical insight tasks and magic tricks. Solving these tasks explicitly requires a restructuring of the problem representation and may be accompanied by a subjective feeling of insight. In two sessions, 77 participants had to solve classical insight problems and magic tricks. The two sessions either occurred consecutively or were spaced 3 h apart, with the time in between spent either sleeping or awake. We found that sleep affected neither general solution rates nor the number of solutions accompanied by sudden subjective insight. Our study thus adds to accumulating evidence that sleep does not provide an environment that facilitates the qualitative restructuring of memory representations and enables problem solving.

Insight into the ten-penny problem: guiding search by constraints and maximization

For a long time, insight problem solving has been either understood as nothing special or as a particular class of problem solving. The first view implicates the necessity to find efficient heuristics that restrict the search space, the second, the necessity to overcome self-imposed constraints. Recently, promising hybrid cognitive models attempt to merge both approaches. In this vein, we were interested in the interplay of constraints and heuristic search, when problem solvers were asked to solve a difficult multi-step problem, the ten-penny problem. In three experimental groups and one control group (N = 4 × 30) we aimed at revealing, what constraints drive problem difficulty in this problem, and how relaxing constraints, and providing an efficient search criterion facilitates the solution. We also investigated how the search behavior of successful problem solvers and non-solvers differ. We found that relaxing constraints was necessary but not sufficient to solve the problem. Without efficient heuristics that facilitate the restriction of the search space, and testing the progress of the problem solving process, the relaxation of constraints was not effective. Relaxing constraints and applying the search criterion are both necessary to effectively increase solution rates. We also found that successful solvers showed promising moves earlier and had a higher maximization and variation rate across solution attempts. We propose that this finding sheds light on how different strategies contribute to solving difficult problems. Finally, we speculate about the implications of our findings for insight problem solving.

Search and Coherence-Building in Intuition and Insight Problem Solving

Coherence-building is a key concept for a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of intuition and insight problem solving. There are several accounts that address certain aspects of coherence-building. However, there is still no proper framework defining the general principles of coherence-building. We propose a four-stage model of coherence-building. The first stage starts with spreading activation restricted by constraints. This dynamic is a well-defined rule based process. The second stage is characterized by detecting a coherent state. We adopted a fluency account assuming that the ease of information processing indicates the realization of a coherent state. The third stage is designated to evaluate the result of the coherence-building process and assess whether the given problem is solved or not. If the coherent state does not fit the requirements of the task, the process re-enters at stage 1. These three stages characterize intuition. For insight problem solving a fourth stage is necessary, which restructures the given representation after repeated failure, so that a new search space results. The new search space enables new coherent states. We provide a review of the most important findings, outline our model, present a large number of examples, deduce potential new paradigms and measures that might help to decipher the underlying cognitive processes.

Cognitive Architecture with Evolutionary Dynamics Solves Insight Problem

In this paper, we show that a neurally implemented a cognitive architecture with evolutionary dynamics can solve the four-tree problem. Our model, called Darwinian Neurodynamics, assumes that the unconscious mechanism of problem solving during insight tasks is a Darwinian process. It is based on the evolution of patterns that represent candidate solutions to a problem, and are stored and reproduced by a population of attractor networks. In our first experiment, we used human data as a benchmark and showed that the model behaves comparably to humans: it shows an improvement in performance if it is pretrained and primed appropriately, just like human participants in Kershaw et al. (2013)'s experiment. In the second experiment, we further investigated the effects of pretraining and priming in a two-by-two design and found a beginner's luck type of effect: solution rate was highest in the condition that was primed, but not pretrained with patterns relevant for the task. In the third experiment, we showed that deficits in computational capacity and learning abilities decreased the performance of the model, as expected. We conclude that Darwinian Neurodynamics is a promising model of human problem solving that deserves further investigation.

What about False Insights? Deconstructing the Aha! Experience along Its Multiple Dimensions for Correct and Incorrect Solutions Separately

The subjective Aha! experience that problem solvers often report when they find a solution has been taken as a marker for insight. If Aha! is closely linked to insightful solution processes, then theoretically, an Aha! should only be experienced when the correct solution is found. However, little work has explored whether the Aha! experience can also accompany incorrect solutions ("false insights"). Similarly, although the Aha! experience is not a unitary construct, little work has explored the different dimensions that have been proposed as its constituents. To address these gaps in the literature, 70 participants were presented with a set of difficult problems (37 magic tricks), and rated each of their solutions for Aha! as well as with regard to Suddenness in the emergence of the solution, Certainty of being correct, Surprise, Pleasure, Relief, and Drive. Solution times were also used as predictors for the Aha!

EXPERIENCE

This study reports three main findings: First, false insights exist. Second, the Aha! experience is multidimensional and consists of the key components Pleasure, Suddenness and Certainty. Third, although Aha! experiences for correct and incorrect solutions share these three common dimensions, they are also experienced differently with regard to magnitude and quality, with correct solutions emerging faster, leading to stronger Aha! experiences, and higher ratings of Pleasure, Suddenness, and Certainty. Solution correctness proffered a slightly different emotional coloring to the Aha! experience, with the additional perception of Relief for correct solutions, and Surprise for incorrect ones. These results cast some doubt on the assumption that the occurrence of an Aha! experience can serve as a definitive signal that a true insight has taken place. On the other hand, the quantitative and qualitative differences in the experience of correct and incorrect solutions demonstrate that the Aha! experience is not a mere epiphenomenon. Strong Aha! experiences are clearly, but not exclusively linked to correct solutions.

Interrupted: The roles of distributed effort and incubation in preventing fixation and generating problem solutions

Fixation on inappropriate concepts is a key barrier to problem solving. Previous research has shown that continuous work is likely to cause repeated retrieval of those concepts, resulting in increased fixation. Accordingly, distributing effort across problems through multiple, brief, and interlaced sessions (distributed effort) should prevent such fixation and in turn enhance problem solving. This study examined whether distributed effort can provide an advantage for problem solving, particularly for problems that can induce fixation (Experiment 1), and whether and how incubation can be combined with distributed effort to further enhance performance (Experiment 2). Remote Associates Test (RAT) problems were used as the problem-solving tasks. Half of them (i.e., misleading RAT) were more likely to mislead individuals to fixate on incorrect associates than the other half. Experiments revealed a superiority of distributed over massed effort on misleading RAT performance and a differing time course of incubation for the massed and distributed groups. We conclude that distributed effort facilitates problem solving, most likely via overcoming fixation. Cognitive mechanisms other than the commonly posited forgetting of inappropriate ideas may occur during incubation to facilitate problem solving. The experiments in this article offer support for the occurrence of spreading activation during incubation.

Can Contraries Prompt Intuition in Insight Problem Solving?

This paper aims to test whether the use of contraries can facilitate spatial problem solving. Specifically, we examined whether a training session which included explicit guidance on thinking in contraries would improve problem solving abilities. In our study, the participants in the experimental condition were exposed to a brief training session before being presented with seven visuo-spatial problems to solve. During training it was suggested that it would help them to find the solution to the problems if they systematically transformed the spatial features of each problem into their contraries. Their performance was compared to that of a control group (who had no training). Two participation conditions were considered: small groups and individuals. Higher success rates were found in the groups exposed to training as compared to the individuals (in both the training and no training conditions), even though the time required to find a solution was longer. In general, participants made more attempts (i.e., drawings) when participating in groups than individually. The number of drawings done while the participants were trying to solve the problems did not increase after training. In order to explore if the quality (if not the number) of drawings was modified, we sampled one problem out of the seven we had used in the experiment (the “pigs in a pen” problem) and examined the drawings in detail. Differences between the training and no training conditions emerged in terms of properties focused on and transformed in the drawings. Based on these results, in the final discussion possible explanations are suggested as to why training had positive effects specifically in the group condition.

Intuition and Insight: Two Processes That Build on Each Other or Fundamentally Differ?

Intuition and insight are intriguing phenomena of non-analytical mental functioning: whereas intuition denotes ideas that have been reached by sensing the solution without any explicit representation of it, insight has been understood as the sudden and unexpected apprehension of the solution by recombining the single elements of a problem. By face validity, the two processes appear similar; according to a lay perspective, it is assumed that intuition precedes insight. Yet, predominant scientific conceptualizations of intuition and insight consider the two processes to differ with regard to their (dis-)continuous unfolding. That is, intuition has been understood as an experience-based and gradual process, whereas insight is regarded as a genuinely discontinuous phenomenon. Unfortunately, both processes have been investigated differently and without much reference to each other. In this contribution, we therefore set out to fill this lacuna by examining the conceptualizations of the assumed underlying cognitive processes of both phenomena, and by also referring to the research traditions and paradigms of the respective field. Based on early work put forward by Bowers et al. (1990, 1995), we referred to semantic coherence tasks consisting of convergent word triads (i.e., the solution has the same meaning to all three clue words) and/or divergent word triads (i.e., the solution means something different with respect to each clue word) as an excellent kind of paradigm that may be used in the future to disentangle intuition and insight experimentally. By scrutinizing the underlying mechanisms of intuition and insight, with this theoretical contribution, we hope to launch lacking but needed experimental studies and to initiate scientific cooperation between the research fields of intuition and insight that are currently still separated from each other.

On the adaptive function of children's and adults' false memories

Recent research has shown that memory illusions can successfully prime both children's and adults' performance on complex, insight-based problems (compound remote associates tasks or CRATs). The current research aimed to clarify the locus of these priming effects. Like before, Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists were selected to prime subsequent CRATs such that the critical lures were also the solution words to a subset of the CRATs participants attempted to solve. Unique to the present research, recognition memory tests were used and participants were either primed during the list study phase, during the memory test phase, or both. Across two experiments, primed problems were solved more frequently and significantly faster than unprimed problems. Moreover, when participants were primed during the list study phase, subsequent solution times and rates were considerably superior to those produced by those participants who were simply primed at test. Together, these are the first results to show that false-memory priming during encoding facilitates problem-solving in both children and adults.

Insight and Search in Katona’s Five-Square Problem

Insights are often productive outcomes of human thinking. We provide a cognitive model that explains insight problem solving by the interplay of problem space search and representational change, whereby the problem space is constrained or relaxed based on the problem representation. By introducing different experimental conditions that either constrained the initial search space or helped solvers to initiate a representational change, we investigated the interplay of problem space search and representational change in Katona’s five-square problem. Testing 168 participants, we demonstrated that independent hints relating to the initial search space and to representational change had little effect on solution rates. However, providing both hints caused a significant increase in solution rates. Our results show the interplay between problem space search and representational change in insight problem solving: The initial problem space can be so large that people fail to encounter impasse, but even when representational change is achieved the resulting problem space can still provide a major obstacle to finding the solution.

Effects of subliminal hints on insight problem solving

Two experiments tested a total of 509 participants on insight problems (the radiation problem and the nine-dot problem). Half of the participants were first exposed to a 1-min movie that included a subliminal hint. The hint raised the solution rate of people who did not recognize it. In addition, the way they solved the problem was affected by the hint. In Experiment 3, a novel technique was introduced to address some methodological concerns raised by Experiments 1 and 2. A total of 80 participants solved the 10-coin problem, and half of them were exposed to a subliminal hint. The hint facilitated solving the problem, and it shortened the solution time. Some implications of subliminal priming for research on and theorizing about insight problem solving are discussed.

Distinguishing Three Accounts of Situation Awareness based on their Domains of Origin

Review of the literature reveals that different treatments and applications of situation awareness (SA) theories and measures often include reference to, or verification from, specific domains. This leads to the postulate that the application domain from which a conceptualization of SA arises plays a fundamental role in that conceptualization. To test this postulate, we compare SA accounts originating from three different domains -aviation, military command and control, and process control. The comparison of the three SA accounts illustrates that the domain of origin can have significant influence on the fundamental characterization of SA. In particular, the choices for the research paradigm in psychology, cognitive components (e.g., metacognition), orientation of time, and scaling of time can be partly traced back to properties or operator challenges specific to the domains of origin. Our comparison demonstrates that domain properties must be carefully examined for conceptualization and application of the SA notion.

Dynamic neural network of insight: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study on solving Chinese 'chengyu' riddles

The key components of insight include breaking mental sets and forming the novel, task-related associations. The majority of researchers have agreed that the anterior cingulate cortex may mediate processes of breaking one’s mental set, while the exact neural correlates of forming novel associations are still debatable. In the present study, we used a paradigm of answer selection to explore brain activations of insight by using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging during solving Chinese ‘chengyu’ (in Chinese pinyin) riddles. Based on the participant’s choice, the trials were classified into the insight and non-insight conditions. Both stimulus-locked and response-locked analyses are conducted to detect the neural activity corresponding to the early and late periods of insight solution, respectively. Our data indicate that the early period of insight solution shows more activation in the middle temporal gyrus, the middle frontal gyrus and the anterior cingulate cortex. These activities might be associated to the extensive semantic processing, as well as detecting and resolving cognitive conflicts. In contrast, the late period of insight solution produced increased activities in the hippocampus and the amygdala, possibly reflecting the forming of novel association and the concomitant “Aha” feeling. Our study supports the key role of hippocampus in forming novel associations, and indicates a dynamic neural network during insight solution.

Aha! experiences leave a mark: facilitated recall of insight solutions

The present study investigates a possible memory advantage for solutions that were reached through insightful problem solving. We hypothesized that insight solutions (with Aha! experience) would be remembered better than noninsight solutions (without Aha! experience). 34 video clips of magic tricks were presented to 50 participants as a novel problem-solving task, asking them to find out how the trick was achieved. Upon discovering the solution, participants had to indicate whether they had experienced insight during the solving process. After a delay of 14 days, a recall of solutions was conducted. Overall, 55 % of previously solved tricks were recalled correctly. Comparing insight and noninsight solutions, 64.4 % of all insight solutions were recalled correctly, whereas only 52.4 % of all noninsight solutions were recalled correctly. We interpret this finding as a facilitating effect of previous insight experiences on the recall of solutions.