Memory for multiple visual ensembles in infancy

The Influence of Memory on Visual Perception in Infants, Children, and Adults

Perception is not an independent, in-the-moment event. Instead, perceiving involves integrating prior expectations with current observations. How does this ability develop from infancy through adulthood? We examined how prior visual experience shapes visual perception in infants, children, and adults. Using an identical task across age groups, we exposed participants to pairs of colorful stimuli and implicitly measured their ability to discriminate relative saturation levels. Results showed that adult participants were biased by previously experienced exemplars, and exhibited weakened in-the-moment discrimination between different levels of saturation. In contrast, infants and children showed less influence of memory in their perception, and they actually outperformed adults in discriminating between current levels of saturation. Our findings suggest that as humans develop, their perception relies more on prior experience and less on current observation.

Remembering Sets: Capacity Limit and Time Limit of Ensemble Representations in Working Memory

In a constantly changing visual environment, the ability to extract and store ensemble representations plays a crucial role in efficiently processing and remembering complex visual information. However, how working memory maintains these ensemble representations remains unclear. Therefore, the present study aimed to investigate the limits and characteristics of ensemble representations in working memory using a change detection paradigm. Participants were presented with multiple sets of circles grouped by spatial proximity and were asked to memorize the mean diameter of the circles in each set. Results showed that working memory could stably maintain mean sizes of approximately two sets for at least four seconds. Moreover, the memory performance of ensembles was not affected by the number of circles within a set, suggesting that individual details were not stored in working memory. These results suggest that the visual system can effectively store ensembles in working memory without preserving detailed individual information.

Natural logic and baby LoTH

Language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH) is having a profound impact on cognition studies. However, much remains unknown about its basic primitives and generative operations. Infant studies are fundamental, but methodologically very challenging. By distilling potential primitives from work in natural-language semantics, an approach beyond the corset of standard formal logic may be undertaken. Still, the road ahead is challenging and long.

Keeping quantifier meaning in mind: Connecting semantics, cognition, and pragmatics

A complete theory of the meaning of linguistic expressions needs to explain their semantic properties, their links to non-linguistic cognition, and their use in communication. Even though in principle interconnected, these areas are generally not pursued in tandem. We present a novel take on the semantics-cognition-pragmatics interface. We propose that formal semantic differences in expressions' meanings lead those meanings to activate distinct cognitive systems, which in turn have downstream effects on when speakers prefer to use those expressions. As a case study, we focus on the quantifiers "each" and "every", which can be used to talk about the same state of the world, but have been argued to differ in meaning. In particular, we adopt a mentalistic proposal about these quantifiers on which "each" has a purely individualistic meaning that interfaces with the psychological system for representing object-files, whereas "every" has a meaning that implicates a group and interfaces with the psychological system for representing ensembles. In seven experiments, we demonstrate that this account correctly predicts both known and newly-observed constraints on how "each" and "every" are pragmatically used. More generally, this integrated approach to semantics, cognition, and pragmatics suggests that canonical patterns of language use can be affected in predictable ways by fine-grained differences in semantic meanings and the cognitive systems to which those meanings connect.

What aspects of counting help infants attend to numerosity?

Recent work shows that 18-month old infants understand that counting is numerically relevant-infants who see objects counted are more likely to represent the approximate number of objects in the array than infants who see the objects labeled but not counted. Which aspects of counting signal infants to attend to numerosity in this way? Here we asked whether infants rely on familiarity with the count words in their native language, or on procedures instantiated by the counting routine, independent of specific tokens. In three experiments (N = 48), we found that 18-month old infants from English-speaking households successfully distinguished four hidden objects from two when the objects were counted correctly, regardless of their familiarity with the count words (i.e., when objects were counted in familiar English and in unfamiliar German). However, when the objects were counted using familiar English count words in ways that violated basic counting principles, infants no longer represented the arrays, failing to distinguish four hidden objects from two. Together with previous findings, these results suggest that children may link the procedure of counting with numerosity years before they learn the meanings of the count words.

Stuck on the Last: The Last-Presented Benefit as an Index of Attentional Refreshing in Adolescents

Working memory is a limited-capacity system responsible for maintaining information that is known to dramatically develop throughout childhood and adolescence. Different maintenance mechanisms are proposed to support working memory development, among which is attentional refreshing. Attentional refreshing is assumed to improve the accessibility of working-memory representations by cycling attention from one mental representation to the other, serially. It has been suggested that the efficiency of refreshing increases between the ages of 7 and 14 years old, thereby supporting working memory development. Yet, there is not much research about refreshing in adolescence. Here, we investigate the occurrence of refreshing in 15-year-olds by using a recently-developed index, i.e., the last-presented benefit. Adolescents had to remember a list of four letters and judge whether a subsequent probe letter was present or not in the list. Reaction times to the probe were used to assess the spontaneous occurrence of refreshing. We found that, unlike young adults, 15-year-olds showed consistent speeded responses to probes matching the last-presented memory item, indicating that, in this task, adolescents did not refocus their attention away from the last memory item to initiate refreshing. Implications for working memory functioning and development are discussed.

Environmental influences on mathematics performance in early childhood

Math skills relate to lifelong career, health, and financial outcomes. Individuals' own cognitive abilities predict math performance and there is growing recognition that environmental influences including differences in culture and variability in math engagement also impact math skills. In this Review, we summarize evidence indicating that differences between languages, exposure to math-focused language, socioeconomic status, attitudes and beliefs about math, and engagement with math activities influence young children's math performance. These influences play out at the community and individual level. However, research on the role of these environmental influences for foundational number skills, including understanding of number words, is limited. Future research is needed to understand individual differences in the development of early emerging math skills such as number word skills, examining to what extent different types of environmental input are necessary and how children's cognitive abilities shape the impact of environmental input.

Numerosity perception is tuned to salient environmental features

Numerosity perception is a key ability to guide behavior. However, current models propose that number units encode an abstract representation of numerosity regardless of the non-numerical attributes of the stimuli, suggesting rather coarse environmental tuning. Here we investigated whether numerosity systems spontaneously adapt to all visible items, or to subsets segregated by salient attributes such as color or pitch. We measured perceived numerosity after participants adapted to highly numerous stimuli with color either matched to or different from the test. Matched colors caused a 25% underestimation of numerosity, while different colors had virtually no effect. This was true both for physically different colors, and for the same colors perceived as different, via a color-assimilation illusion. A similar result occurred in the acoustic domain, where adaptation magnitude was halved when the adaptor and test differed in pitch. Taken together, our results support the idea that numerosity perception is selectively tuned to salient environmental attributes.

A Model of Scientific Data Reasoning

Data reasoning is an essential component of scientific reasoning, as a component of evidence evaluation. In this paper, we outline a model of scientific data reasoning that describes how data sensemaking underlies data reasoning. Data sensemaking, a relatively automatic process rooted in perceptual mechanisms that summarize large quantities of information in the environment, begins early in development, and is refined with experience, knowledge, and improved strategy use. Summarizing data highlights set properties such as central tendency and variability, and these properties are used to draw inferences from data. However, both data sensemaking and data reasoning are subject to cognitive biases or heuristics that can lead to flawed conclusions. The tools of scientific reasoning, including external representations, scientific hypothesis testing, and drawing probabilistic conclusions, can help reduce the likelihood of such flaws and help improve data reasoning. Although data sensemaking and data reasoning are not supplanted by scientific data reasoning, scientific reasoning skills can be leveraged to improve learning about science and reasoning with data.

Possible Objects: Topological Approaches to Individuation

We think of the world around us as divided into physical objects like toasters and daisies, rather than solely as a smear of properties like yellow and smooth. How do we single out these objects? One theory of object concepts uses part-of relations and relations of connectedness. According to this proposal, an object is a connected spatial item of maximal extent: Any other connected item that overlaps (i.e., shares a part with) the object must be a part of that object. This article reports four experiments that test this proposal. Participants see descriptions or diagrams of spatial items that vary across trials in their relative positions. In separate experiments, participants decide whether the items are physical objects, whether they are wholes, or how many objects are present. All experiments find support for connectedness as a contributor to object status, but they find little support for maximality. The results suggest that maximality is not a necessary feature of wholes or of objects.

Memory integration into visual perception in infancy, childhood, and adulthood

We compared the influence of prior knowledge on visual perception in infants, children, and adults in order to explore the developmental trajectory by which prior knowledge is integrated with new sensory input. Using an identical task across age groups, we tested how participants' accumulated experience affected their ability to judge the relative saturation levels within a pair of sequentially-presented stimuli. We found that infants and children, relative to adults, showed greater influence of the current observation and reduced influence of memory in their perception. In fact, infants and children outperformed adults in discriminating between different levels of saturation, and their performance was less biased by previously-experienced exemplars. Thus, the development of perceptual integration of memory leads to less precise discrimination in the moment, but allows observers to make use of their prior experience in interpreting a complex sensory environment.

Infants use linguistic group distinctions to chunk items in memory

Although the capacity of infants' working memory is highly constrained, infants can overcome this limit via chunking; for example, they can use spatial cues to group individual objects into sets, thereby increasing memory efficiency. Here we investigated the use of abstract social knowledge as a basis for chunking. In four experiments, we asked whether 16-month-olds can use their sensitivity to distinctions between languages to efficiently chunk an array. Infants saw four identical dolls hidden in a box. Without chunking cues, infants in previous experiments fail to remember this number of items in such arrays. In Experiment 1, infants saw two of the four dolls each produce an utterance in a familiar language (English) prior to hiding and saw the other two dolls each produce an unfamiliar language (German or Mandarin). Infants successfully remembered all four dolls. Next we asked whether infants could chunk using linguistic group distinctions even when all dolls spoke unfamiliar languages. Infants failed to chunk speakers of unfamiliar languages when each doll within a pair produced a unique utterance (Experiment 2), but they succeeded when each doll within a pair produced the same utterance (Experiment 3). Infants' performance was not driven by low-level acoustical cues in the utterances given that infants failed to chunk when the dolls' speech was played backward (Experiment 4). Together, these results suggest that infants can leverage their early sensitivities to linguistic distinctions to hierarchically reorganize their memory representations, thereby overcoming working memory limits.

Core mathematical abilities in infants: Number and much more

Adults' ability to process numerical information can be traced back to the first days of life. The cognitive mechanisms underlying numerical representations are functional in preverbal infants, who are able to both track a small number of individuals and to estimate the numerosity of large sets across different modalities. This ability is closely linked to their ability to compute other quantitative dimensions such as spatial extent and temporal duration. In fact, the human mind establishes, early in life, spontaneous links between number, space, and time, which are privileged relative to links with other continuous dimensions (like loudness and brightness). Finally, preverbal infants do not only associate numbers to corresponding spatial extents but also to different spatial positions along a spatial axis. It is argued that these number-space mappings are at the origins of the "mental number line" representation, which is already functional in the first year of life.

The time-limited visual statistician

The visual system can calculate summary statistics over time. For example, the multiple frames of a movie showing a dynamically changing disk can be collapsed to form a single representation of that disk's mean size. Summary representations of dynamic information may engage online updating processes that establish a running average of the mean by continuously adjusting the persisting representation of the average in tandem with the arrival of incoming information. Alternatively, summary representations may involve subsampling strategies that reflect limitations in the degree to which the visual system can integrate information over time. Observers watched movies of a disk that changed size smoothly at different rates and then reported the disk's average size by adjusting the diameter of a response disk. Critically, the movie varied in duration. Size estimates depended on the duration of the movie. They were constant and fairly accurate for movie durations up to approximately 600 ms, at which point accuracy decreased with increasing duration to imprecise levels by about 1,000 ms. Summary statistics established over time are unlikely to be updated continuously and may instead be restricted by subsampling processes, such as limited temporal windows of integration. (PsycINFO Database Record

Infants use temporal regularities to chunk objects in memory

Infants, like adults, can maintain only a few items in working memory, but can overcome this limit by creating more efficient representations, or "chunks." Previous research shows that infants can form chunks using shared features or spatial proximity between objects. Here we asked whether infants also can create chunked representations using regularities that unfold over time. Thirteen-month old infants first were familiarized with four objects of different shapes and colors, presented in successive pairs. For some infants, the identities of objects in each pair varied randomly across familiarization (Experiment 1). For others, the objects within a pair always co-occurred, either in consistent relative spatial positions (Experiment 2a) or varying spatial positions (Experiment 2b). Following familiarization, infants saw all four objects hidden behind a screen and then saw the screen lifted to reveal either four objects or only three. Infants in Experiment 1, who had been familiarized with random object pairings, failed to look longer at the unexpected 3-object outcome; they showed the same inability to concurrently represent four objects as in other studies of infant working memory. In contrast, infants in Experiments 2a and 2b, who had been familiarized with regularly co-occurring pairs, looked longer at the unexpected outcome. These infants apparently used the co-occurrence between individual objects during familiarization to form chunked representations that were later deployed to track the objects as they were hidden at test. In Experiment 3, we confirmed that the familiarization affected infants' ability to remember the occluded objects rather than merely establishing longer-term memory for object pairs. Following familiarization to consistent pairs, infants who were not shown a hiding event (but merely saw the same test outcomes as in Experiments 2a and b) showed no preference for arrays of three versus four objects. Finally, in Experiments 4 and 5, we asked whether infants also remembered the specific identities of the objects in each chunk. In Experiment 4, we confirmed that infants remembered objects' identities in smaller arrays that did not require chunking. Next, in Experiment 5, we asked whether infants also remembered objects' identities in larger arrays that had been chunked on the basis of temporal regularities. Following a familiarization phase identical to that in Experiment 2a, we hid all four objects and then revealed either these same four objects, or four objects of which two had unexpectedly changed shape and color. Surprisingly, infants failed to look longer at the identity change outcome. Taken together, our results suggest that infants can use temporal regularities between objects to increase memory for objects' existence, but not necessarily for objects' identities.

Ensemble perception of size in 4-5-year-old children

Groups of objects are nearly everywhere we look. Adults can perceive and understand the 'gist' of multiple objects at once, engaging ensemble-coding mechanisms that summarize a group's overall appearance. Are these group-perception mechanisms in place early in childhood? Here, we provide the first evidence that 4-5-year-old children use ensemble coding to perceive the average size of a group of objects. Children viewed a pair of trees, with each containing a group of differently sized oranges. We found that, in order to determine which tree had the larger oranges overall, children integrated the sizes of multiple oranges into ensemble representations. This pooling occurred rapidly, and it occurred despite conflicting information from numerosity, continuous extent, density, and contrast. An ideal observer analysis showed that although children's integration mechanisms are sensitive, they are not yet as efficient as adults'. Overall, our results provide a new insight into the way children see and understand the environment, and they illustrate the fundamental nature of ensemble coding in visual perception.

Array heterogeneity prevents catastrophic forgetting in infants

Working memory is limited in adults and infants. But unlike adults, infants whose working memory capacity is exceeded often fail in a particularly striking way: they do not represent any of the presented objects, rather than simply remembering as many objects as they can and ignoring anything further (Feigenson & Carey, 2003, 2005). Here we explored the nature of this "catastrophic forgetting," asking whether stimuli themselves modulate the way in which infants' memory fails. We showed 13-month old infants object arrays that either were within or that exceeded working memory capacity--but, unlike previous experiments, presented objects with contrasting features. Although previous studies have repeatedly documented infants' failure to represent four identical hidden objects, in Experiments 1 and 2 we found that infants who saw four contrasting objects hidden, and then retrieved just two of the four, successfully continued searching for the missing objects. Perceptual contrast between objects sufficed to drive this success; infants succeeded regardless of whether the different objects were contrastively labeled, and regardless of whether the objects were semantically familiar or completely novel. In Experiment 3 we explored the nature of this surprising success, asking whether array heterogeneity actually expanded infants' working memory capacity or rather prevented catastrophic forgetting. We found that infants successfully continued searching after seeing four contrasting objects hidden and retrieving two of them, but not after retrieving three of them. This suggests that, like adults, infants were able to remember up to, but not beyond, the limits of their working memory capacity when representing heterogeneous arrays.

Numerical representations and intuitions of probabilities at 12 months

Recent research shows that preverbal infants can reason about single-case probabilities without relying on observed frequencies, adapting their predictions to relevant dynamic parameters of the situation (Téglás, Vul, Girotto, Gonzalez, Tenenbaum & Bonatti, ; Téglás, Girotto, Gonzalez & Bonatti, ). Here we show that intuitions of probabilities may derive from the ability to represent a limited number of possibilities. After watching a scene containing moving objects of two ensembles, 12-month-olds looked longer at an unlikely than at a likely single-case outcome when the objects were within the parallel individuation range. However, they did not do so when the scene contained the same ratio between ensembles but a larger number of objects. At the same time, they could form rational expectations about single-case outcomes in scenes containing the same large number of objects when they could exploit subtle physical parameters induced by the objects' movements and their spatial configuration. Our findings demonstrate that at early stages of development the mental representations involved in probability estimations of future individual situations are powerful and sophisticated, but at the same time they depend on infants' overall cognitive architecture, being constrained by the numerical representations spontaneously induced by the situations.

Young children 'solve for x' using the Approximate Number System

The Approximate Number System (ANS) supports basic arithmetic computation in early childhood, but it is unclear whether the ANS also supports the more complex computations introduced later in formal education. 'Solving for x' in addend-unknown problems is notoriously difficult for children, who often struggle with these types of problems well into high school. Here we asked whether 4-6-year-old children could solve for an unknown addend using the ANS. We presented problems either symbolically, using Arabic numerals or verbal number words, or non-symbolically, using collections of objects while preventing verbal counting. Across five experiments, children failed to identify the value of the unknown addend when problems were presented symbolically, but succeeded when problems were presented non-symbolically. Our results suggest that, well before formal exposure to unknown-addend problems, children appear to 'solve for x' in an intuitive way, using the ANS.

What's the object of object working memory in infancy? Unraveling 'what' and 'how many'

Infants have a bandwidth-limited object working memory (WM) that can both individuate and identify objects in a scene, (answering 'how many?' or 'what?', respectively). Studies of infants' WM for objects have typically looked for limits on either 'how many' or 'what', yielding different estimates of infant capacity. Infants can keep track of about three individuals (regardless of identity), but appear to be much more limited in the number of specific identities they can recall. Why are the limits on 'how many' and 'what' different? Are the limits entirely separate, do they interact, or are they simply two different aspects of the same underlying limit? We sought to unravel these limits in a series of experiments which tested 9- and 12-month-olds' WM for object identities under varying degrees of difficulty. In a violation-of-expectation looking-time task, we hid objects one at a time behind separate screens, and then probed infants' WM for the shape identity of the penultimate object in the sequence. We manipulated the difficulty of the task by varying both the number of objects in hiding locations and the number of means by which infants could detect a shape change to the probed object. We found that 9-month-olds' WM for identities was limited by the number of hiding locations: when the probed object was one of two objects hidden (one in each of two locations), 9-month-olds succeeded, and they did so even though they were given only one means to detect the change. However, when the probed object was one of three objects hidden (one in each of three locations), they failed, even when they were given two means to detect the shape change. Twelve-month-olds, by contrast, succeeded at the most difficult task level. Results show that WM for 'how many' and for 'what' are not entirely separate. Individuated objects are tracked relatively cheaply. Maintaining bindings between indexed objects and identifying featural information incurs a greater attentional/memory cost. This cost reduces with development. We conclude that infant WM supports a small number of featureless object representations that index the current locations of objects. These can have featural information bound to them, but only at substantial cost.

Working memory capacity as a dynamic process

A well-known characteristic of working memory (WM) is its limited capacity. The source of such limitations, however, is a continued point of debate. Developmental research is positioned to address this debate by jointly identifying the source(s) of limitations and the mechanism(s) underlying capacity increases. Here we provide a cross-domain survey of studies and theories of WM capacity development, which reveals a complex picture: dozens of studies from 50 papers show nearly universal increases in capacity estimates with age, but marked variation across studies, tasks, and domains. We argue that the full pattern of performance cannot be captured through traditional approaches emphasizing single causes, or even multiple separable causes, underlying capacity development. Rather, we consider WM capacity as a dynamic process that emerges from a unified cognitive system flexibly adapting to the context and demands of each task. We conclude by enumerating specific challenges for researchers and theorists that will need to be met in order to move our understanding forward.

Infants use different mechanisms to make small and large number ordinal judgments

Previous research has shown indirectly that infants may use two different mechanisms--an object tracking system and an analog magnitude mechanism--to represent small (<4) and large (≥4) numbers of objects, respectively. The current study directly tested this hypothesis in an ordinal choice task by presenting 10- to 12-month-olds with a choice between different numbers of hidden food items. Infants reliably chose the larger amount when choosing between two exclusively small (1 vs. 2) or large (4 vs. 8) sets, but they performed at chance when one set was small and the other was large (2 vs. 4) even when the ratio between the sets was very favorable (2 vs. 8). The current findings support the two-mechanism hypothesis and, furthermore, suggest that the representations from the object tracking system and the analog magnitude mechanism are incommensurable.