The evil of banality: When choosing between the mundane feels like choosing between the worst

Sensitivity to the Instrumental Value of Choice Increases Across Development

Across development, people tend to demonstrate a preference for contexts in which they have the opportunity to make choices. However, it is not clear how children, adolescents, and adults learn to calibrate this preference based on the costs and benefits of agentic choice. Here, in both a primary, in-person, reinforcement-learning experiment (N = 92; age range = 10-25 years) and a preregistered online replication study (N = 150; age range = 8-25 years), we found that participants overvalued agentic choice but also calibrated their agency decisions to the reward structure of the environment, increasingly selecting agentic choice when choice had greater instrumental value. Regression analyses and computational modeling of participant choices revealed that participants' bias toward agentic choice-reflecting its intrinsic value-remained consistent across age, whereas sensitivity to the instrumental value of agentic choice increased from childhood to early adulthood.

Mutual inclusivity improves decision-making by smoothing out choice's competitive edge

Decisions form a central bottleneck to most tasks, one that people often experience as costly. Past work proposes mitigating those costs by lowering one's threshold for deciding. Here, we test an alternative solution, one that targets the basis for most choice costs: that choosing one option sacrifices others (mutual exclusivity). Across 5 studies (N = 462), we test whether this tension can be relieved by framing choices as inclusive (allowing selection of more than one option, as in buffets). We find that inclusivity makes choices more efficient, by selectively reducing competition between potential responses as participants accumulate information for each of their options. Inclusivity also made participants feel less conflicted, especially when they couldn't decide which good option to keep or which bad option to get rid of. These inclusivity benefits were also distinguishable from the effects of manipulating decision threshold (increased urgency), which improved choices but not experiences thereof.

Filling the gaps: Cognitive control as a critical lens for understanding mechanisms of value-based decision-making

While often seeming to investigate rather different problems, research into value-based decision making and cognitive control have historically offered parallel insights into how people select thoughts and actions. While the former studies how people weigh costs and benefits to make a decision, the latter studies how they adjust information processing to achieve their goals. Recent work has highlighted ways in which decision-making research can inform our understanding of cognitive control. Here, we provide the complementary perspective: how cognitive control research has informed understanding of decision-making. We highlight three particular areas of research where this critical interchange has occurred: (1) how different types of goals shape the evaluation of choice options, (2) how people use control to adjust the ways they make their decisions, and (3) how people monitor decisions to inform adjustments to control at multiple levels and timescales. We show how adopting this alternate viewpoint offers new insight into the determinants of both decisions and control; provides alternative interpretations for common neuroeconomic findings; and generates fruitful directions for future research.

Optimal policy for attention-modulated decisions explains human fixation behavior

Traditional accumulation-to-bound decision-making models assume that all choice options are processed with equal attention. In real life decisions, however, humans alternate their visual fixation between individual items to efficiently gather relevant information (Yang et al., 2016). These fixations also causally affect one's choices, biasing them toward the longer-fixated item (Krajbich et al., 2010). We derive a normative decision-making model in which attention enhances the reliability of information, consistent with neurophysiological findings (Cohen and Maunsell, 2009). Furthermore, our model actively controls fixation changes to optimize information gathering. We show that the optimal model reproduces fixation-related choice biases seen in humans and provides a Bayesian computational rationale for this phenomenon. This insight led to additional predictions that we could confirm in human data. Finally, by varying the relative cognitive advantage conferred by attention, we show that decision performance is benefited by a balanced spread of resources between the attended and unattended items.

Neural underpinnings of value-guided choice during auction tasks: An eye-fixation related potentials study

Values are attributed to goods during free viewing of objects which entails multi- and trans-saccadic cognitive processes. Using electroencephalographic eye-fixation related potentials, the present study investigated how neural signals related to value-guided choice evolved over time when viewing household and office products during an auction task. Participants completed a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction task whereby half of the stimuli were presented in either a free or forced bid protocol to obtain willingness-to-pay. Stimuli were assigned to three value categories of low, medium and high value based on subjective willingness-to-pay. Eye fixations were organised into five 800 ms time-bins spanning the objects total viewing time. Independent component analysis was applied to eye-fixation related potentials. One independent component (IC) was found to represent fixations for high value products with increased activation over the left parietal region of the scalp. An IC with a spatial maximum over a fronto-central region of the scalp coded the intermediate values. Finally, one IC displaying activity that extends over the right frontal scalp region responded to intermediate- and low-value items. Each of these components responded early on during viewing an object and remained active over the entire viewing period, both during free and forced bid trials. Results suggest that the subjective value of goods are encoded using sets of brain activation patterns which are tuned to respond uniquely to either low, medium, or high values. Data indicates that the right frontal region of the brain responds to low and the left frontal region to high values. Values of goods are determined at an early point in the decision making process and carried for the duration of the decision period via trans-saccadic processes.

Goal congruency dominates reward value in accounting for behavioral and neural correlates of value-based decision-making

When choosing between options, whether menu items or career paths, we can evaluate how rewarding each one will be, or how congruent it is with our current choice goal (e.g., to point out the best option or the worst one.). Past decision-making research interpreted findings through the former lens, but in these experiments the most rewarding option was always most congruent with the task goal (choosing the best option). It is therefore unclear to what extent expected reward vs. goal congruency can account for choice value findings. To deconfound these two variables, we performed three behavioral studies and an fMRI study in which the task goal varied between identifying the best vs. the worst option. Contrary to prevailing accounts, we find that goal congruency dominates choice behavior and neural activity. We separately identify dissociable signals of expected reward. Our findings call for a reinterpretation of previous research on value-based choice.

Decision-making research has confounded the reward value of options with their goal-congruency, as the task goal was always to pick the most rewarding option. Here, authors separately asked participants to select the least rewarding of a set of options, revealing a dominant role for goal congruency.

Dissociable components of the reward circuit are involved in appraisal versus choice

People can evaluate a set of options as a whole, or they can approach those same options with the purpose of making a choice between them. A common network has been implicated across these two types of evaluations, including regions of ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the posterior midline. We test the hypothesis that sub-components of this reward circuit are differentially involved in triggering more automatic appraisal of one’s options (Dorsal Value Network) versus explicitly comparing between those options (Ventral Value Network). Participants undergoing fMRI were instructed to appraise how much they liked a set of products (Like) or to choose the product they most preferred (Choose). Activity in the Dorsal Value Network consistently tracked set liking, across both task-relevant (Like) and task-irrelevant (Choose) trials. In contrast, the Ventral Value Network was particularly sensitive to evaluation condition (more active during Choose than Like trials). Within vmPFC, anatomically distinct regions were dissociated in their sensitivity to choice (ventrally, in medial OFC) versus appraisal (dorsally, in pregenual ACC). Dorsal regions additionally tracked decision certainty across both types of evaluation. These findings suggest that separable mechanisms drive decisions about how good one’s options are versus decisions about which option is best.