Visual fixations and the computation and comparison of value in simple choice

Semi-orthogonal subspaces for value mediate a binding and generalization trade-off

When choosing between options, we must associate their values with the actions needed to select them. We hypothesize that the brain solves this binding problem through neural population subspaces. Here, in macaques performing a choice task, we show that neural populations in five reward-sensitive regions encode the values of offers presented on the left and right in distinct subspaces. This encoding is sufficient to bind offer values to their locations while preserving abstract value information. After offer presentation, all areas encode the value of the first and second offers in orthogonal subspaces; this orthogonalization also affords binding. Our binding-by-subspace hypothesis makes two new predictions confirmed by the data. First, behavioral errors should correlate with spatial, but not temporal, neural misbinding. Second, behavioral errors should increase when offers have low or high values, compared to medium values, even when controlling for value difference. Together, these results support the idea that the brain uses semi-orthogonal subspaces to bind features.

Multiattribute Decision-making in Macaques Relies on Direct Attribute Comparisons

In value-based decisions, there are frequently multiple attributes, such as cost, quality, or quantity, that contribute to the overall goodness of an option. Because one option may not be better in all attributes at once, the decision process should include a means of weighing relevant attributes. Most decision-making models solve this problem by computing an integrated value, or utility, for each option from a weighted combination of attributes. However, behavioral anomalies in decision-making, such as context effects, indicate that other attribute-specific computations might be taking place. Here, we tested whether rhesus macaques show evidence of attribute-specific processing in a value-based decision-making task. Monkeys made a series of decisions involving choice options comprising a sweetness and probability attribute. Each attribute was represented by a separate bar with one of two mappings between bar size and the magnitude of the attribute (i.e., bigger = better or bigger = worse). We found that translating across different mappings produced selective impairments in decision-making. Choices were less accurate and preferences were more variable when like attributes differed in mapping, suggesting that preventing monkeys from easily making direct attribute comparisons resulted in less accurate choice behavior. This was not the case when mappings of unalike attributes within the same option were different. Likewise, gaze patterns favored transitions between like attributes over transitions between unalike attributes of the same option, so that like attributes were sampled sequentially to support within-attribute comparisons. Together, these data demonstrate that value-based decisions rely, at least in part, on directly comparing like attributes of multiattribute options.

Attentional dynamics of evidence accumulation explain why more numerate people make better decisions under risk

In decisions under risk, more numerate people are typically more likely to choose the option with the highest expected value (EV) than less numerate ones. Prior research indicates that this finding cannot be explained by differences in the reliance on explicit EV calculation. The current work uses the attentional Drift Diffusion Model as a unified computational framework to formalize three candidate mechanisms of pre-decisional information search and processing-namely, attention allocation, amount of deliberation, and distorted processing of value-which may differ between more and less numerate people and explain differences in decision quality. Computational modeling of an eye-tracking experiment on risky choice demonstrates that numeracy is linked to how people allocate their attention across the options, how much evidence they require before committing to a choice, and also how strongly they distort currently non-attended information during preference formation. Together, especially the latter two mechanisms largely mediate the effect of numeracy on decision quality. Overall, the current work disentangles and quantifies latent aspects of the dynamics of preference formation, explicates how their interplay may give rise to manifest differences in decision quality, and thereby provides a fully formalized, mechanistic explanation for the link between numeracy and decision quality in risky choice.

Cognitive mechanisms of learning in sequential decision-making under uncertainty: an experimental and theoretical approach

Learning to make adaptive decisions involves making choices, assessing their consequence, and leveraging this assessment to attain higher rewarding states. Despite vast literature on value-based decision-making, relatively little is known about the cognitive processes underlying decisions in highly uncertain contexts. Real world decisions are rarely accompanied by immediate feedback, explicit rewards, or complete knowledge of the environment. Being able to make informed decisions in such contexts requires significant knowledge about the environment, which can only be gained via exploration. Here we aim at understanding and formalizing the brain mechanisms underlying these processes. To this end, we first designed and performed an experimental task. Human participants had to learn to maximize reward while making sequences of decisions with only basic knowledge of the environment, and in the absence of explicit performance cues. Participants had to rely on their own internal assessment of performance to reveal a covert relationship between their choices and their subsequent consequences to find a strategy leading to the highest cumulative reward. Our results show that the participants' reaction times were longer whenever the decision involved a future consequence, suggesting greater introspection whenever a delayed value had to be considered. The learning time varied significantly across participants. Second, we formalized the neurocognitive processes underlying decision-making within this task, combining mean-field representations of competing neural populations with a reinforcement learning mechanism. This model provided a plausible characterization of the brain dynamics underlying these processes, and reproduced each aspect of the participants' behavior, from their reaction times and choices to their learning rates. In summary, both the experimental results and the model provide a principled explanation to how delayed value may be computed and incorporated into the neural dynamics of decision-making, and to how learning occurs in these uncertain scenarios.

A Bayesian Hierarchical Model of Trial-To-Trial Fluctuations in Decision Criterion

Classical decision models assume that the parameters giving rise to choice behavior are stable, yet emerging research suggests these parameters may fluctuate over time. Such fluctuations, observed in neural activity and behavioral strategies, have significant implications for understanding decision-making processes. However, empirical studies on fluctuating human decision-making strategies have been limited due to the extensive data requirements for estimating these fluctuations. Here, we introduce hMFC (Hierarchical Model for Fluctuations in Criterion), a Bayesian framework designed to estimate slow fluctuations in the decision criterion from limited data. We first showcase the importance of considering fluctuations in decision criterion: incorrectly assuming a stable criterion gives rise to apparent history effects and underestimates perceptual sensitivity. We then present a hierarchical estimation procedure capable of reliably recovering the underlying state of the fluctuating decision criterion with as few as 500 trials per participant, offering a robust tool for researchers with typical human datasets. Critically, hMFC does not only accurately recover the state of the underlying decision criterion, it also effectively deals with the confounds caused by criterion fluctuations. Lastly, we provide code and a comprehensive demo to enable widespread application of hMFC in decision-making research.

Gaze-centered gating, reactivation, and reevaluation of economic value in orbitofrontal cortex

During economic choice, options are often considered in alternation, until commitment. Nonetheless, neuroeconomics typically ignores the dynamic aspects of deliberation. We trained two male macaques to perform a value-based decision-making task in which two risky offers were presented in sequence at the opposite sides of the visual field, each followed by a delay epoch where offers were invisible. Surprisingly, during the two delays, subjects tend to look at empty locations where the offers had previously appeared, with longer fixations increasing the probability of choosing the associated offer. Spiking activity in orbitofrontal cortex reflects the value of the gazed offer, or of the offer associated with the gazed empty spatial location, even if it is not the most recent. This reactivation reflects a reevaluation process, as fluctuations in neural spiking correlate with upcoming choice. Our results suggest that look-at-nothing gazing triggers the reactivation of a previously seen offer for further evaluation.

Fork in the road: How self-efficacy related to walking across terrain influences gaze behavior and path choice

Decisions about where to move occur throughout the day and are essential to life. Different movements may present different challenges and affect the likelihood of achieving a goal. Certain choices may have unintended consequences, some of which may cause harm and bias the decision. Movement decisions rely on a person gathering necessary visual information via shifts in gaze. Here we sought to understand what influences this information-seeking gaze behavior. Participants chose between walking across one of two paths that consisted of terrain images found in either hiking or urban environments. We manipulated the number and type of terrain of each path, which altered the amount of available visual information. We recorded gaze behavior during the approach to the paths and had participants rate the confidence in their ability to walk across each terrain type (i.e., self-efficacy) as though it was real. Participants did not direct gaze more to the path with greater visual information, regardless of how we quantified information. Rather, we show that a person's perception of their motor abilities predicts how they visually explore the environment with their eyes as well as their choice of action. The greater the self-efficacy in walking across one path, the more they directed gaze to it and the more likely they chose to walk across it.

Mild exogenous inflammation blunts neural signatures of bounded evidence accumulation and reward prediction error processing in healthy male participants

BACKGROUND

Altered neural haemodynamic activity during decision making and learning has been linked to the effects of inflammation on mood and motivated behaviours. So far, it has been reported that blunted mesolimbic dopamine reward signals are associated with inflammation-induced anhedonia and apathy. Nonetheless, it is still unclear whether inflammation impacts neural activity underpinning decision dynamics. The process of decision making involves integration of noisy evidence from the environment until a critical threshold of evidence is reached. There is growing empirical evidence that such process, which is usually referred to as bounded accumulation of decision evidence, is affected in the context of mental illness.

METHODS

In a randomised, placebo-controlled, crossover study, 19 healthy male participants were allocated to placebo and typhoid vaccination. Three to four hours post-injection, participants performed a probabilistic reversal-learning task during functional magnetic resonance imaging. To capture the hidden neurocognitive operations underpinning decision-making, we devised a hybrid sequential sampling and reinforcement learning computational model. We conducted whole brain analyses informed by the modelling results to investigate the effects of inflammation on the efficiency of decision dynamics and reward learning.

RESULTS

We found that during the decision phase of the task, typhoid vaccination attenuated neural signatures of bounded evidence accumulation in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, only for decisions requiring short integration time. Consistent with prior work, we showed that, in the outcome phase, mild acute inflammation blunted the reward prediction error in the bilateral ventral striatum and amygdala.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study extends current insights into the effects of inflammation on the neural mechanisms of decision making and shows that exogenous inflammation alters neural activity indexing efficiency of evidence integration, as a function of choice discriminability. Moreover, we replicate previous findings that inflammation blunts striatal reward prediction error signals.

Active sensing with predictive coding and uncertainty minimization

We present an end-to-end architecture for embodied exploration inspired by two biological computations: predictive coding and uncertainty minimization. The architecture can be applied to any exploration setting in a task-independent and intrinsically driven manner. We first demonstrate our approach in a maze navigation task and show that it can discover the underlying transition distributions and spatial features of the environment. Second, we apply our model to a more complex active vision task, whereby an agent actively samples its visual environment to gather information. We show that our model builds unsupervised representations through exploration that allow it to efficiently categorize visual scenes. We further show that using these representations for downstream classification leads to superior data efficiency and learning speed compared to other baselines while maintaining lower parameter complexity. Finally, the modular structure of our model facilitates interpretability, allowing us to probe its internal mechanisms and representations during exploration.

Humans can infer social preferences from decision speed alone

Humans are known to be capable of inferring hidden preferences and beliefs of their conspecifics when observing their decisions. While observational learning based on choices has been explored extensively, the question of how response times (RT) impact our learning of others' social preferences has received little attention. Yet, while observing choices alone can inform us about the direction of preference, they reveal little about the strength of this preference. In contrast, RT provides a continuous measure of strength of preference with faster responses indicating stronger preferences and slower responses signaling hesitation or uncertainty. Here, we outline a preregistered orthogonal design to investigate the involvement of both choices and RT in learning and inferring other's social preferences. Participants observed other people's behavior in a social preferences task (Dictator Game), seeing either their choices, RT, both, or no information. By coupling behavioral analyses with computational modeling, we show that RT is predictive of social preferences and that observers were able to infer those preferences even when receiving only RT information. Based on these findings, we propose a novel observational reinforcement learning model that closely matches participants' inferences in all relevant conditions. In contrast to previous literature suggesting that, from a Bayesian perspective, people should be able to learn equally well from choices and RT, we show that observers' behavior substantially deviates from this prediction. Our study elucidates a hitherto unknown sophistication in human observational learning but also identifies important limitations to this ability.

Heuristics in risky decision-making relate to preferential representation of information

When making choices, individuals differ from one another, as well as from normativity, in how they weigh different types of information. One explanation for this relates to idiosyncratic preferences in what information individuals represent when evaluating choice options. Here, we test this explanation with a simple risky-decision making task, combined with magnetoencephalography (MEG). We examine the relationship between individual differences in behavioral markers of information weighting and neural representation of stimuli pertinent to incorporating that information. We find that the extent to which individuals (N = 19) behaviorally weight probability versus reward information is related to how preferentially they neurally represent stimuli most informative for making probability and reward comparisons. These results are further validated in an additional behavioral experiment (N = 88) that measures stimulus representation as the latency of perceptual detection following priming. Overall, the results suggest that differences in the information individuals consider during choice relate to their risk-taking tendencies.

Optogenetic Inhibition of Rat Anterior Cingulate Cortex Impairs the Ability to Initiate and Stay on Task

Our prior research has identified neural correlates of cognitive control in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), leading us to hypothesize that the ACC is necessary for increasing attention as rats flexibly learn new contingencies during a complex reward-guided decision-making task. Here, we tested this hypothesis by using optogenetics to transiently inhibit the ACC, while rats of either sex performed the same two-choice task. ACC inhibition had a profound impact on behavior that extended beyond deficits in attention during learning when expected outcomes were uncertain. We found that ACC inactivation slowed and reduced the number of trials rats initiated and impaired both their accuracy and their ability to complete sessions. Furthermore, drift-diffusion model analysis suggested that free-choice performance and evidence accumulation (i.e., reduced drift rates) were degraded during initial learning-leading to weaker associations that were more easily overridden in later trial blocks (i.e., stronger bias). Together, these results suggest that in addition to attention-related functions, the ACC contributes to the ability to initiate trials and generally stay on task.

EZ-CDM: Fast, simple, robust, and accurate estimation of circular diffusion model parameters

The investigation of cognitive processes that form the basis of decision-making in paradigms involving continuous outcomes has gained the interest of modeling researchers who aim to develop a dynamic decision theory that accounts for both speed and accuracy. One of the most important of these continuous models is the circular diffusion model (CDM, Smith. Psychological Review, 123(4), 425. 2016), which posits a noisy accumulation process mathematically described as a stochastic two-dimensional Wiener process inside a disk. Despite the considerable benefits of this model, its mathematical intricacy has limited its utilization among scholars. Here, we propose a straightforward and user-friendly method for estimating the CDM parameters and fitting the model to continuous-scale data using simple formulas that can be readily computed and do not require theoretical knowledge of model fitting or extensive programming. Notwithstanding its simplicity, we demonstrate that the aforementioned method performs with a level of accuracy that is comparable to that of the maximum likelihood estimation method. Furthermore, a robust version of the method is presented, which maintains its simplicity while exhibiting a high degree of resistance to contaminant responses. Additionally, we show that the approach is capable of reliably measuring the key parameters of the CDM, even when these values are subject to across-trial variability. Finally, we demonstrate the practical application of the method on experimental data. Specifically, an illustrative example is presented wherein the method is employed along with estimating the probability of guessing. It is hoped that the straightforward methodology presented here will, on the one hand, help narrow the divide between theoretical constructs and empirical observations on continuous response tasks and, on the other hand, inspire cognitive psychology researchers to shift their laboratory investigations towards continuous response paradigms.

Attribute latencies causally shape intertemporal decisions

Intertemporal choices - decisions that play out over time - pervade our life. Thus, how people make intertemporal choices is a fundamental question. Here, we investigate the role of attribute latency (the time between when people start to process different attributes) in shaping intertemporal preferences using five experiments with choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards. In the first experiment, we identify attribute latencies using mouse-trajectories and find that they predict individual differences in choices, response times, and changes across time constraints. In the other four experiments we test the causal link from attribute latencies to choice, staggering the display of the attributes. This changes attribute latencies and intertemporal preferences. Displaying the amount information first makes people more patient, while displaying time information first does the opposite. These findings highlight the importance of intra-choice dynamics in shaping intertemporal choices and suggest that manipulating attribute latency may be a useful technique for nudging.

Attention biases the process of risky decision-making: Evidence from eye-tracking

Attention determines what kind of option information is processed during risky choices owing to the limitation of visual attention. This paper reviews research on the relationship between higher-complexity risky decision-making and attention as illustrated by eye-tracking to explain the process of risky decision-making by the effect of attention. We demonstrate this process from three stages: the pre-phase guidance of options on attention, the process of attention being biased, and the impact of attention on final risk preference. We conclude that exogenous information can capture attention directly to salient options, thereby altering evidence accumulation. In particular, for multi-attribute risky decision-making, attentional advantages increase the weight of specific attributes, thus biasing risk preference in different directions. We highlight the significance of understanding how people use available information to weigh risks from an information-processing perspective via process data.

Boundary Conditions for the Positive Skew Bias

Gambles that involve a large but unlikely gain coupled with a small but likely loss-like a lottery ticket-are known as positively-skewed. There is evidence that people tend to prefer these positively skewed choices, leading to what is called a positive-skew bias. In this study, we attempt to better understand under what conditions people are more drawn toward positively skewed, relative to symmetric, gambles. Based on the animal literature, there is reason to believe that preference for skewed gambles is dependent on the strength of the skew, with a greater preference for more strongly skewed options. In two online studies (Study 1: N = 209; Study 2: N = 210), healthy participants across the lifespan (ages 22-85) made a series of choices between a positively skewed risky gamble and either a certain outcome (Study 1) or risky symmetric gamble (Study 2). Logistic regression analyses revealed that people were more likely to choose moderately- and strongly skewed gambles over certain outcomes, with the exception of when there were large potential losses (Study 1). However, a stronger skewness did not increase preference for positively skewed gambles over symmetric gambles, findings which also may depend on the valence of the expected outcome (Study 2). Taken together, these results suggest that there may be a greater preference for more strongly positively skewed gambles but it 1) is dependent on what other gamble is presented and 2) is most prevalent for positive expected values. Additionally, contrary to previous findings, we did not find strong evidence of an age-related increase in positive skew bias in either study. However, exploratory analyses revealed that decision making strategy and cognitive abilities may play a role.

Exploring Comprehension Strategies of Modular Process Models: A Combined Eye-Tracking and Concurrent Think-Aloud Study

The study of complex process models often encounters challenges in terms of comprehensibility. This paper explores using modularization as a strategy to mitigate such challenges, notably the reduction in complexity. Previous research has delved into the comprehensibility of modularized process models, yet an unresolved question about the cognitive factors at play during their comprehension still needs to be answered. Addressing the latter, the paper presents findings from an innovative study combining eye-tracking and concurrent think-aloud techniques involving 25 participants. The study aimed to comprehend how individuals comprehend process models when presented in three different modular formats: flattened process models, models with grouped elements, and models with subprocesses. The results shed light on varying comprehension strategies employed by participants when navigating through these modularized process models. The paper concludes by suggesting avenues for future research guided by these insights.

PyBEAM: A Bayesian approach to parameter inference for a wide class of binary evidence accumulation models

Many decision-making theories are encoded in a class of processes known as evidence accumulation models (EAM). These assume that noisy evidence stochastically accumulates until a set threshold is reached, triggering a decision. One of the most successful and widely used of this class is the Diffusion Decision Model (DDM). The DDM however is limited in scope and does not account for processes such as evidence leakage, changes of evidence, or time varying caution. More complex EAMs can encode a wider array of hypotheses, but are currently limited by computational challenges. In this work, we develop the Python package PyBEAM (Bayesian Evidence Accumulation Models) to fill this gap. Toward this end, we develop a general probabilistic framework for predicting the choice and response time distributions for a general class of binary decision models. In addition, we have heavily computationally optimized this modeling process and integrated it with PyMC, a widely used Python package for Bayesian parameter estimation. This 1) substantially expands the class of EAM models to which Bayesian methods can be applied, 2) reduces the computational time to do so, and 3) lowers the entry fee for working with these models. Here we demonstrate the concepts behind this methodology, its application to parameter recovery for a variety of models, and apply it to a recently published data set to demonstrate its practical use.

Active reinforcement learning versus action bias and hysteresis: control with a mixture of experts and nonexperts

Active reinforcement learning enables dynamic prediction and control, where one should not only maximize rewards but also minimize costs such as of inference, decisions, actions, and time. For an embodied agent such as a human, decisions are also shaped by physical aspects of actions. Beyond the effects of reward outcomes on learning processes, to what extent can modeling of behavior in a reinforcement-learning task be complicated by other sources of variance in sequential action choices? What of the effects of action bias (for actions per se) and action hysteresis determined by the history of actions chosen previously? The present study addressed these questions with incremental assembly of models for the sequential choice data from a task with hierarchical structure for additional complexity in learning. With systematic comparison and falsification of computational models, human choices were tested for signatures of parallel modules representing not only an enhanced form of generalized reinforcement learning but also action bias and hysteresis. We found evidence for substantial differences in bias and hysteresis across participants-even comparable in magnitude to the individual differences in learning. Individuals who did not learn well revealed the greatest biases, but those who did learn accurately were also significantly biased. The direction of hysteresis varied among individuals as repetition or, more commonly, alternation biases persisting from multiple previous actions. Considering that these actions were button presses with trivial motor demands, the idiosyncratic forces biasing sequences of action choices were robust enough to suggest ubiquity across individuals and across tasks requiring various actions. In light of how bias and hysteresis function as a heuristic for efficient control that adapts to uncertainty or low motivation by minimizing the cost of effort, these phenomena broaden the consilient theory of a mixture of experts to encompass a mixture of expert and nonexpert controllers of behavior.

Investigating the suitability of online eye tracking for psychological research: Evidence from comparisons with in-person data using emotion-attention interaction tasks

The future is bound to bring rapid methodological changes to psychological research. One such promising candidate is the use of webcam-based eye tracking. Earlier research investigating the quality of online eye-tracking data has found increased spatial and temporal error compared to infrared recordings. Our studies expand on this work by investigating how this spatial error impacts researchers' abilities to study psychological phenomena. We carried out two studies involving emotion-attention interaction tasks, using four participant samples. In each study, one sample involved typical in-person collection of infrared eye-tracking data, and the other involved online collection of webcam-based data. We had two main findings: First, we found that the online data replicated seven of eight in-person results, although the effect sizes were just 52% [42%, 62%] the size of those seen in-person. Second, explaining the lack of replication in one result, we show how online eye tracking is biased toward recording more gaze points near the center of participants' screen, which can interfere with comparisons if left unchecked. Overall, our results suggest that well-powered online eye-tracking research is highly feasible, although researchers must exercise caution, collecting more participants and potentially adjusting their stimulus designs or analytic procedures.

Are there jumps in evidence accumulation, and what, if anything, do they reflect psychologically? An analysis of Lévy Flights models of decision-making

According to existing theories of simple decision-making, decisions are initiated by continuously sampling and accumulating perceptual evidence until a threshold value has been reached. Many models, such as the diffusion decision model, assume a noisy accumulation process, described mathematically as a stochastic Wiener process with Gaussian distributed noise. Recently, an alternative account of decision-making has been proposed in the Lévy Flights (LF) model, in which accumulation noise is characterized by a heavy-tailed power-law distribution, controlled by a parameter, [Formula: see text]. The LF model produces sudden large "jumps" in evidence accumulation that are not produced by the standard Wiener diffusion model, which some have argued provide better fits to data. It remains unclear, however, whether jumps in evidence accumulation have any real psychological meaning. Here, we investigate the conjecture by Voss et al. (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 26(3), 813-832, 2019) that jumps might reflect sudden shifts in the source of evidence people rely on to make decisions. We reason that if jumps are psychologically real, we should observe systematic reductions in jumps as people become more practiced with a task (i.e., as people converge on a stable decision strategy with experience). We fitted five versions of the LF model to behavioral data from a study by Evans and Brown (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(2), 597-606, 2017), using a five-layer deep inference neural network for parameter estimation. The analysis revealed systematic reductions in jumps as a function of practice, such that the LF model more closely approximated the standard Wiener model over time. This trend could not be attributed to other sources of parameter variability, speaking against the possibility of trade-offs with other model parameters. Our analysis suggests that jumps in the LF model might be capturing strategy instability exhibited by relatively inexperienced observers early on in task performance. We conclude that further investigation of a potential psychological interpretation of jumps in evidence accumulation is warranted.

A neurocomputational account of the link between social perception and social action

People selectively help others based on perceptions of their merit or need. Here, we develop a neurocomputational account of how these social perceptions translate into social choice. Using a novel fMRI social perception task, we show that both merit and need perceptions recruited the brain's social inference network. A behavioral computational model identified two non-exclusive mechanisms underlying variance in social perceptions: a consistent tendency to perceive others as meritorious/needy (bias) and a propensity to sample and integrate normative evidence distinguishing high from low merit/need in other people (sensitivity). Variance in people's merit (but not need) bias and sensitivity independently predicted distinct aspects of altruism in a social choice task completed months later. An individual's merit bias predicted context-independent variance in people's overall other-regard during altruistic choice, biasing people towards prosocial actions. An individual's merit sensitivity predicted context-sensitive discrimination in generosity towards high and low merit recipients by influencing other-regard and self-regard during altruistic decision-making. This context-sensitive perception-action link was associated with activation in the right temporoparietal junction. Together, these findings point towards stable, biologically based individual differences in perceptual processes related to abstract social concepts like merit, and suggest that these differences may have important behavioral implications for an individual's tendency toward favoritism or discrimination in social settings.

Computational Social Psychology

Social psychologists attempt to explain how we interact by appealing to basic principles of how we think. To make good on this ambition, they are increasingly relying on an interconnected set of formal tools that model inference, attribution, value-guided decision making, and multi-agent interactions. By reviewing progress in each of these areas and highlighting the connections between them, we can better appreciate the structure of social thought and behavior, while also coming to understand when, why, and how formal tools can be useful for social psychologists.

Value-modulated attentional capture is augmented by win-related sensory cues

Attentional prioritisation of stimuli in the environment plays an important role in overt choice. Previous research shows that prioritisation is influenced by the magnitude of paired rewards, in that stimuli signalling high-value rewards are more likely to capture attention than stimuli signalling low-value rewards; and this attentional bias has been proposed to play a role in addictive and compulsive behaviours. A separate line of research has shown that win-related sensory cues can bias overt choices. However, the role that these cues play in attentional selection is yet to be investigated. Participants in this study completed a visual search task in which they responded to a target shape in order to earn reward. The colour of a distractor signalled the magnitude of reward and type of feedback on each trial. Participants were slower to respond to the target when the distractor signalled high reward compared to when the distractor signalled low reward, suggesting that the high-reward distractors had increased attentional priority. Critically, the magnitude of this reward-related attentional bias was further increased for a high-reward distractor with post-trial feedback accompanied by win-related sensory cues. Participants also demonstrated an overt choice preference for the distractor that was associated with win-related sensory cues. These findings demonstrate that stimuli paired with win-related sensory cues are prioritised by the attention system over stimuli with equivalent physical salience and learned value. This attentional prioritisation may have downstream implications for overt choices, especially in gambling contexts where win-related sensory cues are common.

The Future of Decisions From Experience: Connecting Real-World Decision Problems to Cognitive Processes

In many important real-world decision domains, such as finance, the environment, and health, behavior is strongly influenced by experience. Renewed interest in studying this influence led to important advancements in the understanding of these decisions from experience (DfE) in the last 20 years. Building on this literature, we suggest ways the standard experimental design should be extended to better approach important real-world DfE. These extensions include, for example, introducing more complex choice situations, delaying feedback, and including social interactions. When acting upon experiences in these richer and more complicated environments, extensive cognitive processes go into making a decision. Therefore, we argue for integrating cognitive processes more explicitly into experimental research in DfE. These cognitive processes include attention to and perception of numeric and nonnumeric experiences, the influence of episodic and semantic memory, and the mental models involved in learning processes. Understanding these basic cognitive processes can advance the modeling, understanding and prediction of DfE in the laboratory and in the real world. We highlight the potential of experimental research in DfE for theory integration across the behavioral, decision, and cognitive sciences. Furthermore, this research could lead to new methodology that better informs decision-making and policy interventions.

Noticing people, discounts and non-tobacco flavours in e-cigarette ads may increase e-cigarette product appeal among non-tobacco-using young adults

INTRODUCTION

Young adults new to tobacco (including e-cigarettes) are at an increased risk of e-cigarette use after e-cigarette exposure. This study examined the association between noticing e-cigarette advertising features and perceived product appeal among non-tobacco-using young adults.

METHODS

A sample of non-tobacco-using young adults (ages 18-29 years; n=1993) completed an online survey in 2021. We content analysed visible features from 12 e-cigarette ads that represented commonly used e-cigarette brands. Participants viewed the ads and clicked on the areas of the ads that drew their attention. Participants reported e-cigarette product appeal for each ad, including ad liking, product curiosity and use interest. We used generalised estimating equations to examine within-person associations between noticing specific ad features and reporting each and any type of product appeal, adjusting for noticing other features and participant characteristics.

RESULTS

Noticing people, discounts, non-tobacco (menthol and mint/fruit) flavours, positive experience claims or product images was positively associated with having any e-cigarette product appeal. Noticing discounts or mint/fruit flavours was also positively associated with e-cigarette use interest. In contrast, noticing nicotine warnings or smoking cessation claims was negatively associated with ad liking and product curiosity.

CONCLUSIONS

Attention to several e-cigarette ad features (eg, people, discounts, non-tobacco flavours) was associated with increased e-cigarette product appeal, whereas attention to nicotine warnings and smoking cessation claims was associated with reduced appeal among non-tobacco-using young adults. Restricting appeal-promoting features while strengthening the effects of nicotine warnings and smoker-targeted claims in e-cigarette ads may potentially reduce e-cigarettes' overall appeal among this priority population.

A view-based decision mechanism for rewards in the primate amygdala

Primates make decisions visually by shifting their view from one object to the next, comparing values between objects, and choosing the best reward, even before acting. Here, we show that when monkeys make value-guided choices, amygdala neurons encode their decisions in an abstract, purely internal representation defined by the monkey's current view but not by specific object or reward properties. Across amygdala subdivisions, recorded activity patterns evolved gradually from an object-specific value code to a transient, object-independent code in which currently viewed and last-viewed objects competed to reflect the emerging view-based choice. Using neural-network modeling, we identified a sequence of computations by which amygdala neurons implemented view-based decision making and eventually recovered the chosen object's identity when the monkeys acted on their choice. These findings reveal a neural mechanism in the amygdala that derives object choices from abstract, view-based computations, suggesting an efficient solution for decision problems with many objects.

Cognitive-attentional mechanisms of cooperation-with implications for attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and cognitive neuroscience

People's cooperativeness depends on many factors, such as their motives, cognition, experiences, and the situation they are in. To date, it is unclear how these factors interact and shape the decision to cooperate. We present a computational account of cooperation that not only provides insights for the design of effective incentive structures but also redefines neglected social-cognitive characteristics associated with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Leveraging game theory, we demonstrate that the source and magnitude of conflict between different motives affected the speed and frequency of cooperation. Integrating eye-tracking to measure motivation-based information processing during decision-making shows that participants' visual fixations on the gains of cooperation rather than its costs and risks predicted their cooperativeness on a trial-by-trial basis. Using Bayesian hierarchical modeling, we find that a situation's prosociality and participants' past experience each bias the decision-making process distinctively. ADHD characteristics explain individual differences in responsiveness across contexts, highlighting the clinical importance of experimentally studying reactivity in social interactions. We demonstrate how the use of eye-tracking and computational modeling can be used to experimentally investigate social-cognitive characteristics in clinical populations. We also discuss possible underlying neural mechanisms to be investigated in future studies.

Affect-congruent attention modulates generalized reward expectations

Positive and negative affective states are respectively associated with optimistic and pessimistic expectations regarding future reward. One mechanism that might underlie these affect-related expectation biases is attention to positive- versus negative-valence features (e.g., attending to the positive reviews of a restaurant versus its expensive price). Here we tested the effects of experimentally induced positive and negative affect on feature-based attention in 120 participants completing a compound-generalization task with eye-tracking. We found that participants' reward expectations for novel compound stimuli were modulated in an affect-congruent way: positive affect induction increased reward expectations for compounds, whereas negative affect induction decreased reward expectations. Computational modelling and eye-tracking analyses each revealed that these effects were driven by affect-congruent changes in participants' allocation of attention to high- versus low-value features of compounds. These results provide mechanistic insight into a process by which affect produces biases in generalized reward expectations.

Behavioral read-out from population value signals in primate orbitofrontal cortex

The primate orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has long been recognized for its role in value-based decisions; however, the exact mechanism linking value representations in the OFC to decision outcomes has remained elusive. Here, to address this question, we show, in non-human primates, that trial-wise variability in choices can be explained by variability in value signals decoded from many simultaneously recorded OFC neurons. Mechanistically, this relationship is consistent with the projection of activity within a low-dimensional value-encoding subspace onto a potentially higher-dimensional, behaviorally potent output subspace. Identifying this neural-behavioral link answers longstanding questions about the role of the OFC in economic decision-making and suggests population-level read-out mechanisms for the OFC similar to those recently identified in sensory and motor cortex.

Risky decisions are influenced by individual attributes as a function of risk preference

It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attributes or dimensions - such as probabilities and amounts of money to be earned during risky choices - are resolved by first combining the attributes of each option to form an overall expected value and then comparing the expected values of the alternative options, using a unique evidence accumulation process. A plausible alternative would be performing independent comparisons between the individual attributes and then integrating the results of the comparisons afterwards. Here, we devise a novel method to disambiguate between these types of models, by orthogonally manipulating the expected value of choice options and the relative salience of their attributes. Our results, based on behavioral measures and drift-diffusion models, provide evidence in favor of the framework where information about individual attributes independently impacts deliberation. This suggests that risky decisions are resolved by running in parallel multiple comparisons between the separate attributes - possibly alongside an additional comparison of expected value. This result stands in contrast with the assumption of standard economic theory that choices require a unique comparison of expected values and suggests that at the cognitive level, decision processes might be more distributed than commonly assumed. Beyond our planned analyses, we also discovered that attribute salience affects people of different risk preference type in different ways: risk-averse participants seem to focus more on probability, except when monetary amount is particularly high; risk-neutral/seeking participants, in contrast, seem to focus more on monetary amount, except when probability is particularly low.

Multi-attribute decision-making in macaques relies on direct attribute comparisons

In value-based decisions, there are frequently multiple attributes, such as cost, quality, or quantity, that contribute to the overall goodness of an option. Since one option may not be better in all attributes at once, the decision process should include a means of weighing relevant attributes. Most decision-making models solve this problem by computing an integrated value, or utility, for each option from a weighted combination of attributes. However, behavioral anomalies in decision-making, such as context effects, indicate that other attribute-specific computations might be taking place. Here, we tested whether rhesus macaques show evidence of attribute-specific processing in a value-based decision-making task. Monkeys made a series of decisions involving choice options comprising a sweetness and probability attribute. Each attribute was represented by a separate bar with one of two mappings between bar size and the magnitude of the attribute (i.e., bigger=better or bigger=worse). We found that translating across different mappings produced selective impairments in decision-making. When like attributes differed, monkeys were prevented from easily making direct attribute comparisons, and choices were less accurate and preferences were more variable. This was not the case when mappings of unalike attributes within the same option were different. Likewise, gaze patterns favored transitions between like attributes over transitions between unalike attributes of the same option, so that like attributes were sampled sequentially to support within-attribute comparisons. Together, these data demonstrate that value-based decisions rely, at least in part, on directly comparing like attributes of multi-attribute options.

Significance Statement

Value-based decision-making is a cognitive function impacted by a number of clinical conditions, including substance use disorder and mood disorders. Understanding the neural mechanisms, including online processing steps involved in decision formation, will provide critical insights into decision-making deficits characteristic of human psychiatric disorders. Using rhesus monkeys as a model species capable of complex decision-making, this study shows that decisions involve a process of comparing like features, or attributes, of multi-attribute options. This is contrary to popular models of decision-making in which attributes are first combined into an overall value, or utility, to make a choice. Therefore, these results serve as an important foundation for establishing a more complete understanding of the neural mechanisms involved in forming complex decisions.

Interaction between decision-making and motor learning when selecting reach targets in the presence of bias and noise

Motor errors can have both bias and noise components. Bias can be compensated for by adaptation and, in tasks in which the magnitude of noise varies across the environment, noise can be reduced by identifying and then acting in less noisy regions of the environment. Here we examine how these two processes interact when participants reach under a combination of an externally imposed visuomotor bias and noise. In a center-out reaching task, participants experienced noise (zero-mean random visuomotor rotations) that was target-direction dependent with a standard deviation that increased linearly from a least-noisy direction. They also experienced a constant bias, a visuomotor rotation that varied (across groups) from 0 to 40 degrees. Critically, on each trial, participants could select one of three targets to reach to, thereby allowing them to potentially select targets close to the least-noisy direction. The group who experienced no bias (0 degrees) quickly learned to select targets close to the least-noisy direction. However, groups who experienced a bias often failed to identify the least-noisy direction, even though they did partially adapt to the bias. When noise was introduced after participants experienced and adapted to a 40 degrees bias (without noise) in all directions, they exhibited an improved ability to find the least-noisy direction. We developed two models-one for reach adaptation and one for target selection-that could explain participants' adaptation and target-selection behavior. Our data and simulations indicate that there is a trade-off between adaptation and selection. Specifically, because bias learning is local, participants can improve performance, through adaptation, by always selecting targets that are closest to a chosen direction. However, this comes at the expense of improving performance, through selection, by reaching toward targets in different directions to find the least-noisy direction.

Modelling decision-making biases

Biases are a fundamental aspect of everyday life decision-making. A variety of modelling approaches have been suggested to capture decision-making biases. Statistical models are a means to describe the data, but the results are usually interpreted according to a verbal theory. This can lead to an ambiguous interpretation of the data. Mathematical cognitive models of decision-making outline the structure of the decision process with formal assumptions, providing advantages in terms of prediction, simulation, and interpretability compared to statistical models. We compare studies that used both signal detection theory and evidence accumulation models as models of decision-making biases, concluding that the latter provides a more comprehensive account of the decision-making phenomena by including response time behavior. We conclude by reviewing recent studies investigating attention and expectation biases with evidence accumulation models. Previous findings, reporting an exclusive influence of attention on the speed of evidence accumulation and prior probability on starting point, are challenged by novel results suggesting an additional effect of attention on non-decision time and prior probability on drift rate.

Working memory and attention in choice

We study the role of attention and working memory in choices where options are presented sequentially rather than simultaneously. We build a model where a costly attention effort is chosen, which can vary over time. Evidence is accumulated proportionally to this effort and the utility of the reward. Crucially, the evidence accumulated decays over time. Optimal attention allocation maximizes expected utility from final choice; the optimal solution takes the decay into account, so attention is preferentially devoted to later times; but convexity of the flow attention cost prevents it from being concentrated near the end. We test this model with a choice experiment where participants observe sequentially two options. In our data the option presented first is, everything else being equal, significantly less likely to be chosen. This recency effect has a natural explanation with appropriate parameter values in our model of leaky evidence accumulation, where the decline is stronger for the option observed first. Analysis of choice, response time and brain imaging data provide support for the model. Working memory plays an essential role. The recency bias is stronger for participants with weaker performance in working memory tasks. Also activity in parietal areas, coding the stored value in working, declines over time as predicted.

How Do People Process Different Representations of Statistical Information? Insights into Cognitive Effort, Representational Inconsistencies, and Individual Differences

BACKGROUND

Graphical representation formats (e.g., icon arrays) have been shown to lead to better understanding of the benefits and risks of treatments compared to numbers. We investigate the cognitive processes underlying the effects of format on understanding: how much cognitive effort is required to process numerical and graphical representations, how people process inconsistent representations, and how numeracy and graph literacy affect information processing.

METHODS

In a preregistered between-participants experiment, 665 participants answered questions about the relative frequencies of benefits and side effects of 6 medications. First, we manipulated whether the medical information was represented numerically, graphically (as icon arrays), or inconsistently (numerically for 3 medications and graphically for the other 3). Second, to examine cognitive effort, we manipulated whether there was time pressure or not. In an additional intervention condition, participants translated graphical information into numerical information before answering questions. We also assessed numeracy and graph literacy.

RESULTS

Processing icon arrays was more strongly affected by time pressure than processing numbers, suggesting that graphical formats required more cognitive effort. Understanding was lower when information was represented inconsistently (v. consistently) but not if there was a preceding intervention. Decisions based on inconsistent representations were biased toward graphically represented options. People with higher numeracy processed quantitative information more efficiently than people with lower numeracy did. Graph literacy was not related to processing efficiency.

LIMITATIONS

Our study was conducted with a nonpatient sample, and the medical information was hypothetical.

CONCLUSIONS

Although graphical (v. numerical) formats have previously been found to lead to better understanding, they may require more cognitive effort. Therefore, the goal of risk communication may play an important role when choosing how to communicate medical information.

HIGHLIGHTS

This article investigates the cognitive processes underlying the effects of representation format on the understanding of statistical information and individual differences therein.Processing icon arrays required more cognitive effort than processing numbers did.When information was represented inconsistently (i.e., partly numerically and partly graphically), understanding was lower than with consistent representation, and decisions were biased toward the graphically represented options.People with higher numeracy processed quantitative information more efficiently than people with lower numeracy did.

Psychological value theory: A computational cognitive model of charitable giving

Charitable giving involves a complex economic and social decision because the giver expends resources for goods or services they will never receive. Although psychologists have identified numerous factors that influence charitable giving, there currently exists no unifying computational model of charitable choice. Here, we submit one such model, based within the strictures of Psychological Value Theory (PVT). In four experiments, we assess whether charitable giving is driven by the perceived Psychological Value of the recipient. Across all four experiments, we simultaneously predict response choice and response time with high accuracy. In a fifth experiment, we show that PVT predicts charitable giving more accurately than an account based on competence and warmth. PVT accurately predicts which charity a respondent will choose to donate to and separately, whether a respondent will choose to donate at all. PVT models the cognitive processes underlying charitable donations and it provides a computational framework for integrating known influences on charitable giving. For example, we show that in-group preference influences charitable giving by changing the Psychological Values of the options, rather than by bringing about a response bias toward the in-group.

Framing Subjective Emotion Reports as Dynamic Affective Decisions

Self-reports remain affective science's only direct measure of subjective affective experiences. Yet, little research has sought to understand the psychological process that transforms subjective experience into self-reports. Here, we propose that by framing these self-reports as dynamic affective decisions, affective scientists may leverage the computational tools of decision-making research, sequential sampling models specifically, to better disentangle affective experience from the noisy decision processes that constitute self-report. We further outline how such an approach could help affective scientists better probe the specific mechanisms that underlie important moderators of affective experience (e.g., contextual differences, individual differences, and emotion regulation) and discuss how adopting this decision-making framework could generate insight into affective processes more broadly and facilitate reciprocal collaborations between affective and decision scientists towards a more comprehensive and integrative psychological science.

Peripheral Visual Information Halves Attentional Choice Biases

A growing body of research has shown that simple choices involve the construction and comparison of values at the time of decision. These processes are modulated by attention in a way that leaves decision makers susceptible to attentional biases. Here, we studied the role of peripheral visual information on the choice process and on attentional choice biases. We used an eye-tracking experiment in which participants (N = 50 adults) made binary choices between food items that were displayed in marked screen "shelves" in two conditions: (a) where both items were displayed, and (b) where items were displayed only when participants fixated within their shelves. We found that removing the nonfixated option approximately doubled the size of the attentional biases. The results show that peripheral visual information is crucial in facilitating good decisions and suggest that individuals might be influenceable by settings in which only one item is shown at a time, such as e-commerce.

Individual risk attitudes arise from noise in neurocognitive magnitude representations

Humans are generally risk averse, preferring smaller certain over larger uncertain outcomes. Economic theories usually explain this by assuming concave utility functions. Here, we provide evidence that risk aversion can also arise from relative underestimation of larger monetary payoffs, a perceptual bias rooted in the noisy logarithmic coding of numerical magnitudes. We confirmed this with psychophysics and functional magnetic resonance imaging, by measuring behavioural and neural acuity of magnitude representations during a magnitude perception task and relating these measures to risk attitudes during separate risky financial decisions. Computational modelling indicated that participants use similar mental magnitude representations in both tasks, with correlated precision across perceptual and risky choices. Participants with more precise magnitude representations in parietal cortex showed less variable behaviour and less risk aversion. Our results highlight that at least some individual characteristics of economic behaviour can reflect capacity limitations in perceptual processing rather than processes that assign subjective values to monetary outcomes.

The role of attention in status quo bias

In many decision-making contexts, people often persist with their previous selections. This predisposition to choose to maintain a current (or previous) choice is referred to as the status quo bias (SQB). In this work, we propose that increased attention towards the status quo option-enabled by its visual salience-is a previously underappreciated driver of SQB. We base this hypothesis on three propositions: (1) the status quo bias option is often more visually salient relative to the non-status quo options on offer, (2) greater visual salience of an option biases attention towards that option, and (3) increased attention towards an option leads to that option being selected at greater rates. We examined the attention hypothesis among 6,854 participants in four studies. Studies 1 and 2 showed that increasing the visual salience of a non-status quo option (i.e., the type of visual salience often garnered by the status quo option) increased the selection rate of that option. Study 3 directly tested the hypothesis by lessening the visual salience of the status quo option. Doing so eliminated SQB. Study 4 replicated and extended the findings of Study 3 in a real-world decision context. Collectively, these studies suggest that the selection of the status quo may often be related to its salience relative to other available options.

Beyond simple laboratory studies: Developing sophisticated models to study rich behavior

Psychology and neuroscience are concerned with the study of behavior, of internal cognitive processes, and their neural foundations. However, most laboratory studies use constrained experimental settings that greatly limit the range of behaviors that can be expressed. While focusing on restricted settings ensures methodological control, it risks impoverishing the object of study: by restricting behavior, we might miss key aspects of cognitive and neural functions. In this article, we argue that psychology and neuroscience should increasingly adopt innovative experimental designs, measurement methods, analysis techniques and sophisticated computational models to probe rich, ecologically valid forms of behavior, including social behavior. We discuss the challenges of studying rich forms of behavior as well as the novel opportunities offered by state-of-the-art methodologies and new sensing technologies, and we highlight the importance of developing sophisticated formal models. We exemplify our arguments by reviewing some recent streams of research in psychology, neuroscience and other fields (e.g., sports analytics, ethology and robotics) that have addressed rich forms of behavior in a model-based manner. We hope that these "success cases" will encourage psychologists and neuroscientists to extend their toolbox of techniques with sophisticated behavioral models - and to use them to study rich forms of behavior as well as the cognitive and neural processes that they engage.

Measuring utility with diffusion models

The drift diffusion model (DDM) is a prominent account of how people make decisions. Many of these decisions involve comparing two alternatives based on differences of perceived stimulus magnitudes, such as economic values. Here, we propose a consistent estimator for the parameters of a DDM in such cases. This estimator allows us to derive decision thresholds, drift rates, and subjective percepts (i.e., utilities in economic choice) directly from the experimental data. This eliminates the need to measure these values separately or to assume specific functional forms for them. Our method also allows one to predict drift rates for comparisons that did not occur in the dataset. We apply the method to two datasets, one comparing probabilities of earning a fixed reward and one comparing objects of variable reward value. Our analysis indicates that both datasets conform well to the DDM. We find that utilities are linear in probability and slightly convex in reward.

The art of the deal: Deciphering the endowment effect from traders' eyes

People are often reluctant to trade, a reticence attributed to the endowment effect. The prevailing account attributes the endowment effect to valuation-related bias, manifesting as sellers valuing goods more than buyers, whereas an alternative account attributes it to response-related bias, manifesting as both buyers and sellers tending to stick to the status quo. Here, by tracking and modeling eye activity of buyers and sellers during trading, we accommodate both views within an evidence-accumulation framework. We find that valuation-related bias is indexed by asymmetric attentional allocation between buyers and sellers, whereas response-related bias is indexed by arousal-linked pupillary reactivity. A deal emerges when both buyers and sellers attend to their potential gains and dilate their pupils. Our study provides preliminary evidence for our computational framework of the dynamic processes mediating the endowment effect and identifies physiological biomarkers of deal-making.

Gaze differences in configural and elemental evaluation during multi-attribute decision-making

Introduction

While many everyday choices are between multi-attribute options, how attribute values are integrated to allow such choices remains unclear. Recent findings suggest a distinction between elemental (attribute-by-attribute) and configural (holistic) evaluation of multi-attribute options, with different neural substrates. Here, we asked if there are behavioral or gaze pattern differences between these putatively distinct modes of multi-attribute decision-making.

Methods

Thirty-nine healthy men and women learned the monetary values of novel multi-attribute pseudo-objects (fribbles) and then made choices between pairs of these objects while eye movements were tracked. Value was associated with individual attributes in the elemental condition, and with unique combinations of attributes in the configural condition. Choice, reaction time, gaze fixation time on options and individual attributes, and within- and between-option gaze transitions were recorded.

Results

There were systematic behavioral differences between elemental and configural conditions. Elemental trials had longer reaction times and more between-option transitions, while configural trials had more within-option transitions. The effect of last fixation on choice was more pronounced in the configural condition.

Discussion

We observed differences in gaze patterns and the influence of last fixation location on choice in multi-attribute value-based choices depending on how value is associated with those attributes. This adds support for the claim that multi-attribute option values may emerge either elementally or holistically, reminiscent of similar distinctions in multi-attribute object recognition. This may be important to consider in neuroeconomics research that involve visually-presented complex objects.

Monkeys exhibit human-like gaze biases in economic decisions

In economic decision-making individuals choose between items based on their perceived value. For both humans and nonhuman primates, these decisions are often carried out while shifting gaze between the available options. Recent studies in humans suggest that these shifts in gaze actively influence choice, manifesting as a bias in favor of the items that are viewed first, viewed last, or viewed for the overall longest duration in a given trial. This suggests a mechanism that links gaze behavior to the neural computations underlying value-based choices. In order to identify this mechanism, it is first necessary to develop and validate a suitable animal model of this behavior. To this end, we have created a novel value-based choice task for macaque monkeys that captures the essential features of the human paradigms in which gaze biases have been observed. Using this task, we identified gaze biases in the monkeys that were both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in humans. In addition, the monkeys' gaze biases were well-explained using a sequential sampling model framework previously used to describe gaze biases in humans-the first time this framework has been used to assess value-based decision mechanisms in nonhuman primates. Together, these findings suggest a common mechanism that can explain gaze-related choice biases across species, and open the way for mechanistic studies to identify the neural origins of this behavior.

Cognitive and neural bases of visual-context-guided decision-making

Humans adjust their behavioral strategies based on feedback, a process that may depend on intrinsic preferences and contextual factors such as visual salience. In this study, we hypothesized that decision-making based on visual salience is influenced by habitual and goal-directed processes, which can be evidenced by changes in attention and subjective valuation systems. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of studies to investigate the behavioral and neural mechanisms underlying visual salience-driven decision-making. We first established the baseline behavioral strategy without salience in Experiment 1 (n = 21). We then highlighted the utility or performance dimension of the chosen outcome using colors in Experiment 2 (n = 30). We demonstrated that the difference in staying frequency increased along the salient dimension, confirming a salience effect. Furthermore, the salience effect was abolished when directional information was removed in Experiment 3 (n = 28), suggesting that the salience effect is feedback-specific. To generalize our findings, we replicated the feedback-specific salience effects using eye-tracking and text emphasis. The fixation differences between the chosen and unchosen values were enhanced along the feedback-specific salient dimension in Experiment 4 (n = 48) but unchanged after removing feedback-specific information in Experiment 5 (n = 32). Moreover, the staying frequency was correlated with fixation properties, confirming that salience guides attention deployment. Lastly, our neuroimaging study (Experiment 6, n = 25) showed that the striatum subregions encoded salience-based outcome evaluation, while the vmPFC encoded salience-based behavioral adjustments. The connectivity of the vmPFC-ventral striatum accounted for individual differences in utility-driven, whereas the vmPFC-dmPFC for performance-driven behavioral adjustments. Together, our results provide a neurocognitive account of how task-irrelevant visual salience drives decision-making by involving attention and the frontal-striatal valuation systems. PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Humans may use the current outcome to make behavior adjustments. How this occurs may depend on stable individual preferences and contextual factors, such as visual salience. Under the hypothesis that visual salience determines attention and subsequently modulates subjective valuation, we investigated the underlying behavioral and neural bases of visual-context-guided outcome evaluation and behavioral adjustments. Our findings suggest that the reward system is orchestrated by visual context and highlight the critical role of attention and the frontal-striatal neural circuit in visual-context-guided decision-making that may involve habitual and goal-directed processes.

The framing of choice nudges prolonged processing in the evaluation of food images

Previous research suggests that the type of choice framing for evaluation tasks can influence the relationship between response time and preference-based decision-making. Two separable factors may modulate the preference-based decision-making: The set of choice options (with or without an option to defer) and the constraint of choice (with high or low maximum for inclusion). To clarify how these factors influence the process of preference-based decision-making, we designed a virtual-shopping paradigm with a series of food images presented consecutively, while varying the set of choice options and the constraint of choice. For the set of choice options, subjects were asked to choose for each food image in either a two-options condition (i.e., "take it" or "leave it"), or a three-options condition (i.e., "take it," "wait," or "leave it"). For the constraint of choice, subjects were instructed to select a maximum of either five items out of 80 (i.e., highly constrained) or 15 items out of 80 (i.e., less constrained). As in previous findings, the response times were consistently longer for "take it" than for "leave it" options. Importantly, this difference was exacerbated under high constraint, when subjects could select only five items, suggesting a role for opportunity-cost consideration in the decision process. Furthermore, as compared to two-options tasks, subjects consistently spent more time overall in the three-options tasks (with the option to defer), displaying lower acceptance rates, and particularly long response times for the "wait" option. This finding suggests that choice framing with a defer option nudges prolonged processing.

DeePay: deep learning decodes EEG to predict consumer's willingness to pay for neuromarketing

There is an increasing demand within consumer-neuroscience (or neuromarketing) for objective neural measures to quantify consumers' subjective valuations and predict responses to marketing campaigns. However, the properties of EEG raise difficulties for these aims: small datasets, high dimensionality, elaborate manual feature extraction, intrinsic noise, and between-subject variations. We aimed to overcome these limitations by combining unique techniques of Deep Learning Networks (DLNs), while providing interpretable results for neuroscientific and decision-making insight. In this study, we developed a DLN to predict subjects' willingness to pay (WTP) based on their EEG data. In each trial, 213 subjects observed a product's image, from 72 possible products, and then reported their WTP for the product. The DLN employed EEG recordings from product observation to predict the corresponding reported WTP values. Our results showed 0.276 test root-mean-square-error and 75.09% test accuracy in predicting high vs. low WTP, surpassing other models and a manual feature extraction approach. Network visualizations provided the predictive frequencies of neural activity, their scalp distributions, and critical timepoints, shedding light on the neural mechanisms involved with evaluation. In conclusion, we show that DLNs may be the superior method to perform EEG-based predictions, to the benefit of decision-making researchers and marketing practitioners alike.

Modeling Eye Movements During Decision Making: A Review

This article reviews recent advances in the psychometric and econometric modeling of eye-movements during decision making. Eye movements offer a unique window on unobserved perceptual, cognitive, and evaluative processes of people who are engaged in decision making tasks. They provide new insights into these processes, which are not easily available otherwise, allow for explanations of fundamental search and choice phenomena, and enable predictions of future decisions. We propose a theoretical framework of the search and choice tasks that people commonly engage in and of the underlying cognitive processes involved in those tasks. We discuss how these processes drive specific eye-movement patterns. Our framework emphasizes the central role of task and strategy switching for complex goal attainment. We place the extant literature within that framework, highlight recent advances in modeling eye-movement behaviors during search and choice, discuss limitations, challenges, and open problems. An agenda for further psychometric modeling of eye movements during decision making concludes the review.