Moral judgment modulation by disgust priming via altered fronto-temporal functional connectivity

Find the Gap: AI, Responsible Agency and Vulnerability

The responsibility gap, commonly described as a core challenge for the effective governance of, and trust in, AI and autonomous systems (AI/AS), is traditionally associated with a failure of the epistemic and/or the control condition of moral responsibility: the ability to know what we are doing and exercise competent control over this doing. Yet these two conditions are a red herring when it comes to understanding the responsibility challenges presented by AI/AS, since evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that individual humans face very similar responsibility challenges with regard to these two conditions. While the problems of epistemic opacity and attenuated behaviour control are not unique to AI/AS technologies (though they can be exacerbated by them), we show that we can learn important lessons for AI/AS development and governance from how philosophers have recently revised the traditional concept of moral responsibility in response to these challenges to responsible human agency from the cognitive sciences. The resulting instrumentalist views of responsibility, which emphasize the forward-looking and flexible role of agency cultivation, hold considerable promise for integrating AI/AS into a healthy moral ecology. We note that there nevertheless is a gap in AI/AS responsibility that has yet to be extensively studied and addressed, one grounded in a relational asymmetry of vulnerability between human agents and sociotechnical systems like AI/AS. In the conclusion of this paper we note that attention to this vulnerability gap must inform and enable future attempts to construct trustworthy AI/AS systems and preserve the conditions for responsible human agency.

Neural activities during the Processing of unattended and unseen emotional faces: a voxel-wise Meta-analysis

Voxel-wise meta-analyses of task-evoked regional activity were conducted for healthy individuals during the unconscious processing of emotional and neutral faces with an aim to examine whether and how different experimental paradigms influenced brain activation patterns. Studies were categorized into sensory and attentional unawareness paradigms. Thirty-four fMRI studies including 883 healthy participants were identified. Across experimental paradigms, unaware emotional faces elicited stronger activation of the limbic system, striatum, inferior frontal gyrus, insula and the temporal lobe, compared to unaware neutral faces. Crucially, in attentional unawareness paradigms, unattended emotional faces elicited a right-lateralized increased activation (i.e., right amygdala, right temporal pole), suggesting a right hemisphere dominance for processing emotional faces during inattention. By contrast, in sensory unawareness paradigms, unseen emotional faces elicited increased activation of the left striatum, the left amygdala and the right middle temporal gyrus. Additionally, across paradigms, unconsciously processed positive emotions were found associated with more activation in temporal and parietal cortices whereas unconsciously processed negative emotions elicited stronger activation in subcortical regions, compared to neutral faces.

Effects of Core Disgust and Moral Disgust on Moral Judgment: An Event-Related Potential Study

Core disgust is elicited by physical or chemical stimuli, while moral disgust is evoked by abstract violations of moral norms. Although previous studies have pointed out these two types of disgust can affect behavior and spatial dimensions of moral judgment, less is known about how moral and core disgust affect the temporal neural processing of moral judgment. In addition, whether moral and core disgust are only related to purity-based moral judgment or all kinds of moral judgment is still controversial. This study aimed to explore how core and moral disgust affect the neural processing of purity-based moral judgment by using affective priming and moral judgment tasks. The behavioral results showed that the severity of moral violation of non-purity ones is higher than purity ones. The event-related potentials (ERP) results mainly revealed that earlier P2 and N2 components, which represent the automatic moral processes, can differentiate neutral and two types of disgust rather than differentiating moral domain, while the later N450, frontal, and parietal LPP components, which represent the conflict detection and, later, cognitive processing can differentiate the purity and non-purity ones rather than differentiating priming type. Moreover, core and moral disgust priming mainly differed in the purity-based moral processing indexed by parietal LPP. Our findings confirmed that the disgusting effect on moral judgments can be explained within the framework of dual-process and social intuitionist models, suggesting that emotions, including core and moral disgust, played an essential role in the automatic intuition process. The later parietal LPP results strongly supported that core disgust only affected the purity-based moral judgment, fitting the primary purity hypothesis well. We show how these theories can provide novel insights into the temporal mechanisms of moral judgment.