Ravens parallel great apes in physical and social cognitive skills

Investigating the relationship between physical cognitive tasks and a social cognitive task in a wild bird

Despite considerable research into the structure of cognition in non-human animal species, there is still much debate as to whether animal cognition is organised as a series of discrete domains or an overarching general cognitive factor. In humans, the existence of general intelligence is widely accepted, but less work has been undertaken in animal psychometrics to address this question. The relatively few studies on non-primate animal species that do investigate the structure of cognition rarely include tasks assessing social cognition and focus instead on physical cognitive tasks. In this study, we tested 36 wild Western Australian magpies (Gymnorhina tibicen dorsalis) on a battery of three physical (associative learning, spatial memory, and numerical assessment) and one social (observational spatial memory) cognitive task, to investigate if cognition in this species fits a general cognitive factor model, or instead one of separate physical and social cognitive domains. A principal component analysis (PCA) identified two principal components with eigenvalues exceeding 1; a first component onto which all three physical tasks loaded strongly and positively, and a second component onto which only the social task (observational spatial memory) loaded strongly and positively. These findings provide tentative evidence for separate physical and social cognitive domains in this species, and highlight the importance of including tasks assessing both social and physical cognition in cognitive test batteries.

Paleoneurology of stem palaeognaths clarifies the plesiomorphic condition of the crown bird central nervous system

Lithornithidae, an assemblage of volant Palaeogene fossil birds, provide our clearest insights into the early evolutionary history of Palaeognathae, the clade that today includes the flightless ratites and volant tinamous. The neotype specimen of Lithornis vulturinus, from the early Eocene (approximately 53 million years ago) of Europe, includes a partial neurocranium that has never been thoroughly investigated. Here, we describe these cranial remains including the nearly complete digital endocasts of the brain and bony labyrinth. The telencephalon of Lithornis is expanded and its optic lobes are ventrally shifted, as is typical for crown birds. The foramen magnum is positioned caudally, rather than flexed ventrally as in some crown birds, with the optic lobes, cerebellum, and foramen magnum shifted further ventrally. The overall brain shape is similar to that of tinamous, the only extant clade of flying palaeognaths, suggesting that several aspects of tinamou neuroanatomy may have been evolutionarily conserved since at least the early Cenozoic. The estimated ratio of the optic lobe's surface area relative to the total brain suggests a diurnal ecology. Lithornis may provide the clearest insights to date into the neuroanatomy of the ancestral crown bird, combining an ancestrally unflexed brain with a caudally oriented connection with the spinal cord, a moderately enlarged telencephalon, and ventrally shifted, enlarged optic lobes.

The evolution of social play in songbirds, parrots and cockatoos - emotional or highly complex cognitive behaviour or both?

Social play has been described in many animals. However, much of this social behaviour among birds, particularly in adults, is still relatively unexplored in terms of the environmental, psychological, and social dynamics of play. This paper provides an overview of what we know about adult social play in birds and addresses areas in which subtleties and distinctions, such as in play initiation and social organisation and its relationship to expressions of play, are considered in detail. The paper considers emotional, social, innovative, and cognitive aspects of play, then the environmental conditions and affiliative bonds, suggesting a surprisingly complex framework of criteria awaiting further research. Adult social play has so far been studied in only a small number of avian species, exclusively in those with a particularly large brain relative to body size without necessarily addressing brain functions and lateralization. When lateralization of brain function is considered, it can further illuminate a possibly significant relevance of play behaviour to the evolution of cognition, to management of emotions, and the development of sociality.

Changes in the dopaminergic circuitry and adult neurogenesis linked to reinforcement learning in corvids

The caudolateral nidopallium (NCL, an analog of the prefrontal cortex) is known to be involved in learning, memory, and discrimination in corvids (a songbird), whereas the involvement of other brain regions in these phenomena is not well explored. We used house crows (Corvus splendens) to explore the neural correlates of learning and decision-making by initially training them on a shape discrimination task followed by immunohistochemistry to study the immediate early gene expression (Arc), a dopaminoceptive neuronal marker (DARPP-32, Dopamine- and cAMP-regulated phosphoprotein, Mr 32 kDa) to understand the involvement of the reward pathway and an immature neuronal marker (DCX, doublecortin) to detect learning-induced changes in adult neurogenesis. We performed neuronal counts and neuronal tracing, followed by morphometric analyses. Our present results have demonstrated that besides NCL, other parts of the caudal nidopallium (NC), avian basal ganglia, and intriguingly, vocal control regions in house crows are involved in visual discrimination. We have also found that training on the visual discrimination task can be correlated with neurite pruning in mature dopaminoceptive neurons and immature DCX-positive neurons in the NC of house crows. Furthermore, there is an increase in the incorporation of new neurons throughout NC and the medial striatum which can also be linked to learning. For the first time, our results demonstrate that a combination of structural changes in mature and immature neurons and adult neurogenesis are linked to learning in corvids.

Why birds are smart

Many cognitive neuroscientists believe that both a large brain and an isocortex are crucial for complex cognition. Yet corvids and parrots possess non-cortical brains of just 1-25 g, and these birds exhibit cognitive abilities comparable with those of great apes such as chimpanzees, which have brains of about 400 g. This opinion explores how this cognitive equivalence is possible. We propose four features that may be required for complex cognition: a large number of associative pallial neurons, a prefrontal cortex (PFC)-like area, a dense dopaminergic innervation of association areas, and dynamic neurophysiological fundaments for working memory. These four neural features have convergently evolved and may therefore represent 'hard to replace' mechanisms enabling complex cognition.

Developing evolutionary anthropology in local ecosystems

The traditional regional focus of evolutionary anthropology-typically defined as places where hominin fossils, nonhuman primates, and non-western populations reside-forms the basis of much evolutionary anthropological research. Using the highly biodiverse temperate region of Appalachia as an example, we suggest that evolutionary anthropologists have much to gain by stepping outside of this traditional geographic area. Being purposely provocative, we argue that evolutionary anthropologists might also benefit from conducting research in Appalachia and other temperate ecosystems. We briefly discuss multiple areas of study-including studies of seed dispersal, functional redundancy, convergent evolution, human behavioral ecology, and conservation-and how they can be considered within the purview of integrative and evolutionary anthropology. We also highlight broader impacts to higher education that evolutionary anthropologists can help promote by working in local ecosystems.

The evolutionary origins of the Global Neuronal Workspace in vertebrates

The Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness offers an explicit functional architecture that relates consciousness to cognitive abilities such as perception, attention, memory, and evaluation. We show that the functional architecture of the Global Neuronal Workspace, which is based mainly on human studies, corresponds to the cognitive-affective architecture proposed by the Unlimited Associative Learning theory that describes minimal consciousness. However, we suggest that when applied to basal vertebrates, both models require important modifications to accommodate what has been learned about the evolution of the vertebrate brain. Most importantly, comparative studies suggest that in basal vertebrates, the Global Neuronal Workspace is instantiated by the event memory system found in the hippocampal homolog. This proposal has testable predictions and implications for understanding hippocampal and cortical functions, the evolutionary relations between memory and consciousness, and the evolution of unified perception.

Wild mockingbirds distinguish among familiar humans

Although individuals of some species appear able to distinguish among individuals of a second species, an alternative explanation is that individuals of the first species may simply be distinguishing between familiar and unfamiliar individuals of the second species. In that case, they would not be learning unique characteristics of any given heterospecific, as commonly assumed. Here we show that female Northern Mockingbirds (Mimus polyglottos) can quickly learn to distinguish among different familiar humans, flushing sooner from their nest when approached by people who pose increasingly greater threats. These results demonstrate that a common small songbird has surprising cognitive abilities, which likely facilitated its widespread success in human-dominated habitats. More generally, urban wildlife may be more perceptive of differences among humans than previously imagined.

Could theropod dinosaurs have evolved to a human level of intelligence?

Noting that some theropod dinosaurs had large brains, large grasping hands, and likely binocular vision, paleontologist Dale Russell suggested that a branch of these dinosaurs might have evolved to a human intelligence level, had dinosaurs not become extinct. I offer reasons why the likely pallial organization in dinosaurs would have made this improbable, based on four assumptions. First, it is assumed that achieving human intelligence requires evolving an equivalent of the about 200 functionally specialized cortical areas characteristic of humans. Second, it is assumed that dinosaurs had an avian nuclear type of pallial organization, in contrast to the mammalian cortical organization. Third, it is assumed that the interactions between the different neuron types making up an information processing unit within pallium are critical to its role in analyzing information. Finally, it is assumed that increasing axonal length between the neuron sets carrying out this operation impairs its efficacy. Based on these assumptions, I present two main reasons why dinosaur pallium might have been unable to add the equivalent of 200 efficiently functioning cortical areas. First, a nuclear pattern of pallial organization would require increasing distances between the neuron groups corresponding to the separate layers of any given mammalian cortical area, as more sets of nuclei equivalent to a cortical area are interposed between the existing sets, increasing axon length and thereby impairing processing efficiency. Second, because of its nuclear organization, dinosaur pallium could not reduce axon length by folding to bring adjacent areas closer together, as occurs in cerebral cortex.

Human and chimpanzee shared and divergent neurobiological systems for general and specific cognitive brain functions

A long-standing topic of interest in human neurosciences is the understanding of the neurobiology underlying human cognition. Less commonly considered is to what extent such systems may be shared with other species. We examined individual variation in brain connectivity in the context of cognitive abilities in chimpanzees (n = 45) and humans in search of a conserved link between cognition and brain connectivity across the two species. Cognitive scores were assessed on a variety of behavioral tasks using chimpanzee- and human-specific cognitive test batteries, measuring aspects of cognition related to relational reasoning, processing speed, and problem solving in both species. We show that chimpanzees scoring higher on such cognitive skills display relatively strong connectivity among brain networks also associated with comparable cognitive abilities in the human group. We also identified divergence in brain networks that serve specialized functions across humans and chimpanzees, such as stronger language connectivity in humans and relatively more prominent connectivity between regions related to spatial working memory in chimpanzees. Our findings suggest that core neural systems of cognition may have evolved before the divergence of chimpanzees and humans, along with potential differential investments in other brain networks relating to specific functional specializations between the two species.

Autism attenuates the perception of the mind-body divide

People are intuitive Dualists-they tacitly consider the mind as ethereal, distinct from the body. Here we ask whether Dualism emerges naturally from the conflicting core principles that guide reasoning about objects, on the one hand, and about the minds of agents (theory of mind, ToM), on the other. To address this question, we explore Dualist reasoning in autism spectrum disorder (ASD)-a congenital disorder known to compromise ToM. If Dualism arises from ToM, then ASD ought to attenuate Dualism and promote Physicalism. In line with this prediction, Experiment 1 shows that, compared to controls, people with ASD are more likely to view psychological traits as embodied-as likely to manifest in a replica of one's body. Experiment 2 demonstrates that, unlike controls, people with ASD do not consider thoughts as disembodied-as persistent in the afterlife (upon the body's demise). If ASD promotes the perception of the psyche as embodied, and if (per Essentialism) embodiment suggests innateness, then ASD should further promote Nativism-this bias is shown in Experiment 3. Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrates that, in neurotypical (NT) participants, difficulties with ToM correlate with Physicalism. These results are the first to show that ASD attenuates Dualist reasoning and to link Dualism to ToM. These conclusions suggest that the mind-body distinction might be natural for people to entertain.

Hooded Crows (Corvus cornix) May Be Aware of Their Own Body Size

Body-awareness is one of the manifestations of self-awareness, expressed in the ability of people and animals to represent their own body physical properties. Relatively little work has been devoted to this phenomenon in comparison with the studies of the ability of self-recognition in the mirror, and most studies have been conducted on mammals and human infants. Crows are known to be “clever” birds, so we investigated whether hooded crows (Corvus cornix) may be aware of their own body size. We set up an experimental design in which the crows had to pass through one of three openings to reach the bait. In the first experiment, we studied whether crows prefer a larger hole if all the three are suitable for passage, and what other predictors influence their choice. In the second experiment, we assessed the ability of the crows to select a single passable hole out of three on the first attempt, even though the area of the former was smaller than that of the other two. The results of the first experiment suggest that when choosing among three passable holes, crows prefer those holes that require less effort from them, e.g., they do not need to crouch or make other additional movements. In the second experiment, three of the five crows reliably more often chose a single passable hole on the first try, despite its smaller size. We believe that these results suggest that hooded crows may be aware of their own body size.

Avian pallial circuits and cognition: A comparison to mammals

Cognitive functions are similar in birds and mammals. So, are therefore pallial cellular circuits and neuronal computations also alike? In search of answers, we move in from bird's pallial connectomes, to cortex-like sensory canonical circuits and connections, to forebrain micro-circuitries and finally to the avian "prefrontal" area. This voyage from macro- to micro-scale networks and areas reveals that both birds and mammals evolved similar neural and computational properties in either convergent or parallel manner, based upon circuitries inherited from common ancestry. Thus, these two vertebrate classes evolved separately within 315 million years with highly similar pallial architectures that produce comparable cognitive functions.

Genetically identified neurons in avian auditory pallium mirror core principles of their mammalian counterparts

In vertebrates, advanced cognitive abilities are typically associated with the telencephalic pallium. In mammals, the pallium is a layered mixture of excitatory and inhibitory neuronal populations with distinct molecular, physiological, and network phenotypes. This cortical architecture is proposed to support efficient, high-level information processing. Comparative perspectives across vertebrates provide a lens to understand the common features of pallium that are important for advanced cognition. Studies in songbirds have established strikingly parallel features of neuronal types between mammalian and avian pallium. However, lack of genetic access to defined pallial cell types in non-mammalian vertebrates has hindered progress in resolving connections between molecular and physiological phenotypes. A definitive mapping of the physiology of pallial cells onto their molecular identities in birds is critical for understanding how synaptic and computational properties depend on underlying molecular phenotypes. Using viral tools to target excitatory versus inhibitory neurons in the zebra finch auditory association pallium (calmodulin-dependent kinase alpha [CaMKIIα] and glutamate decarboxylase 1 [GAD1] promoters, respectively), we systematically tested predictions derived from mammalian pallium. We identified two genetically distinct neuronal populations that exhibit profound physiological and computational similarities with mammalian excitatory and inhibitory pallial cells, definitively aligning putative cell types in avian caudal nidopallium with these molecular identities. Specifically, genetically identified CaMKIIα and GAD1 cell types in avian auditory association pallium exhibit distinct intrinsic physiological parameters, distinct auditory coding principles, and inhibitory-dependent pallial synchrony, gamma oscillations, and local suppression. The retention, or convergence, of these molecular and physiological features in both birds and mammals clarifies the characteristics of pallial circuits for advanced cognitive abilities.