Mental imagery can generate and regulate acquired differential fear conditioned reactivity

Suffering more in imagination than in reality? Mental imagery and fear generalization

Mental imagery may represent a weaker form of perception and, thus, mental images may be more ambiguous than visual percepts. If correct, the acquisition of fear would be less specific for imagined fears in comparison to perceptual fears, perhaps facilitating broader fear generalization. To test this idea, a two-day differential fear conditioning experiment (N = 98) was conducted. On day one, two groups of participants underwent differential fear conditioning such that a specific Gabor patch orientation (CS+) was paired with mild shocks (US) while a second Gabor patch of orthogonal orientation (CS-) was never paired with shock. Critically, one group imagined the Gabor patches and the other group was visually presented the Gabor patches. Next, both groups were presented visual Gabor patches of similar orientations (GCS) to the CS+. On day two, to assess the persistence of imagined fear, participants returned to the lab and were tested on the GCS devoid of shock. For day one, in contrast to our primary hypothesis, both self-report and skin conductance response measures did not show a significant interaction between the GCS and groups. On day two, both measures demonstrated a persistence of imagined fear, without US delivery. Taken together, rather than demonstrating an overgeneralization effect, the results from this study suggest that imagery-based fear conditioning generalizes to a similar extent as perceptually acquired fear conditioning. Further, the persistence of imagery-based fear may have unique extinction qualities in comparison to perceptual-based fear.

Attenuating conditioned fear using imagery-based interventions: An overview

A growing literature has sought to include mental imagery in fear conditioning studies. Imaginal extinction and imagery rescripting are mental imagery-based interventions that reduce conditioned fear. In the current study, we reviewed the recent findings on the efficacy of imaginal extinction and imagery rescripting as interventions to attenuate conditioned fear responses among healthy individuals. In accordance with the PRISMA guidelines, we conducted a literature search in four databases, PubMed, Scopus, Science Direct, and Web of Science to find published original empirical articles involving imagery-based interventions using a fear conditioning paradigm. The inclusion criteria were (i) use of an imagery-based intervention (either imaginal extinction or imagery rescripting), and (ii) use of a differential fear conditioning paradigm. 13 original articles reporting 15 experimental studies were included in the review. The review revealed that imagery-based interventions are effective in reducing conditioned fear. Although studies have shown that imaginal extinction and standard extinction have comparable effects in fear extinction, many studies have not been conducted to confirm the findings, or explore the underlying mechanisms. We also found the need for a standardized intervention protocol to enhance experimental control in intervention-based fear conditioning studies.

Extensive functional connectivity between brain areas implicated in mental imagery production and phobic fear during both emotional and neutral mental imagery

Mental imagery is used by most people in their day-to-day cognition, for example, in planning, daydreaming, or remembering. Importantly, mental imagery has a powerful influence on emotion and is critically involved in many mental disorders. Thus, understanding the link between mental imagery and emotion is of clinical interest. For example, exposure therapy can be successfully conducted using mental imagery of fear-provoking stimuli, i.e., imaginal exposure. In this vein, accumulating evidence shows that mental imagery of a fearful stimulus produces a similar physiological and neural response as actual perception of the stimulus. Alas, knowledge of the neural processes underlying the link between mental imagery and emotion is limited. Functional magnetic resonance imaging data from a previous study on imaginal exposure (N = 30) was used to examine the functional connectivity during the production of phobic and neutral mental imagery. Regions of interest were selected from meta-analyses on brain regions consistently recruited during mental imagery production and phobic fear, respectively. Results showed that these regions were positively correlated during both phobic and neutral mental imagery production. Very few differences in functional connectivity between phobic and neutral imagery were found. Specifically, weaker functional connectivity between the supplemental motor area and a region including parts of the left insula and inferior frontal gyrus was observed during phobic (vs neutral) imagery. In conclusion, our findings suggest that brain regions previously implicated in mental imagery production and phobic fear are highly interconnected during the production of both phobic and neutral imagery.

Physiological and subjective arousal to prospective mental imagery: A mechanism for behavioral change?

Emotional prospective mental imagery, in which we simulate possible future events within our minds, have a pronounced impact on behavior. For example, repeated engagement in positive prospective imagery can lead to behavioral activation, while negative prospective imagery can lead to catastrophizing and avoidance. Physiological arousal boosts memory consolidation, creating emotional memories. Thus, if emotional prospective imagery produces an arousal response, the memory consolidation of these simulations of the future may be boosted, offering a possible underlying mechanism for the impact of emotional prospective imagery on behavior. In order to examine the feasibility of arousal as a possible mechanism behind the impact of emotional prospective imagery on behavior, sixty participants produced autobiographical prospective imagery of 30 scenes (10 positive, 10 neutral, and 10 negative), during which arousal responses (skin conductance) were measured, and ratings for subjective arousal, valence, and imagery vividness were collected. Moreover, because vividness of prospective imagery has been related to anxiety and depression, the study examined this relation also for event-related autobiographical prospective imagery. The results showed that emotional prospective imagery were associated with higher subjective arousal ratings as compared to neutral imagery. Physiological arousal responses showed a similar pattern, but further data is needed for a firm conclusion. Nevertheless, arousal-boosted consolidation remains a possible contributing mechanism for the impact of emotional prospective imagery on behavior. Moreover, results suggest both anxiety and depression may entail a reduced ability to invent prospective life situations. However, only anxiety was associated with less vivid imaginations, unless the imaginations were of negative content. Hence, anxious individuals may experience negative prospective imagery more vividly than imagery with neutral and positive content.

Looking on the bright side: the impact of ambivalent images on emotion regulation choice

Previous research has found that people choose to reappraise low intensity images more often than high intensity images. However, this research does not account for image ambivalence, which is presence of both positive and negative cues in a stimulus. The purpose of this research was to determine differences in ambivalence in high intensity and low intensity images used in previous research (experiments 1-2), and if ambivalence played a role in emotion regulation choice in addition to intensity (experiments 3-4). Experiments 1 and 2 found that the low intensity images were more ambivalent than the high intensity images. Experiment 2 further found a positive relationship between ambivalence of an image and reappraisal affordances. Experiments 3 and 4 found that people chose to reappraise ambivalent images more often than non-ambivalent images, and they also chose to reappraise low intensity images more often than high intensity images. These experiments support the idea that ambivalence is a factor in emotion regulation choice. Future research should consider the impact ambivalent stimuli have on emotion regulation, including the potential for leveraging ambivalent stimuli to improve one's emotion regulation ability.

Conscious expectancy rather than associative strength elicits brain activity during single-cue fear conditioning

The neurocognitive processes underlying Pavlovian conditioning in humans are still largely debated. The conventional view is that conditioned responses (CRs) emerge automatically as a function of the contingencies between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US). As such, the associative strength model asserts that the frequency or amplitude of CRs reflects the strength of the CS-US associations. Alternatively, the expectation model asserts that the presentation of the CS triggers conscious expectancy of the US, which is responsible for the production of CRs. The present study tested the hypothesis that there are dissociable brain networks related to the expectancy and associative strength theories using a single-cue fear conditioning paradigm with a pseudo-random intermittent reinforcement schedule during functional magnetic resonance imaging. Participants' (n = 21) trial-by-trial expectations of receiving shock displayed a significant linear effect consistent with the expectation model. We also found a positive linear relationship between the expectancy model and activity in frontoparietal brain areas including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and dorsomedial PFC. While an exploratory analysis found a linear relationship consistent with the associated strength model in the insula and early visual cortex, our primary results are consistent with the view that conscious expectancy contributes to CRs.

Visualizing risky situations induces a stronger neural response in brain areas associated with mental imagery and emotions than visualizing non-risky situations

In an fMRI study, we tested the prediction that visualizing risky situations induces a stronger neural response in brain areas associated with mental imagery and emotions than visualizing non-risky and more positive situations. We assumed that processing mental images that allow for "trying-out" the future has greater adaptive importance for risky than non-risky situations, because the former can generate severe negative outcomes. We identified several brain regions that were activated when participants produced images of risky situations and these regions overlap with brain areas engaged in visual, speech, and movement imagery. We also found that producing images of risky situations, in contrast to non-risky situations, was associated with increased neural activation in the insular cortex and cerebellum-the regions involved, among other functions, in emotional processing. Finally, we observed an increased BOLD signal in the cingulate gyrus associated with reward-based decision making and monitoring of decision outcomes. In summary, risky situations increased neural activation in brain areas involved in mental imagery, emotional processing, and decision making. These findings imply that the evaluation of everyday risky situations may be driven by emotional responses that result from mental imagery.

Emotion in the mind's eye: Imagination for adaptive cognition

In a complex world, we are constantly faced with environmental stimuli that shape our moment-to-moment experiences. But just as rich and complex as the external world is the internal milieu-our imagination. Imagination offers a powerful vehicle for playing out hypothetical experiences in the mind's eye. It allows us to mentally time travel to behold what the future might bring, including our greatest desires or fears. Indeed, imagined experiences tend to be emotion-laden. How and why are humans capable of this remarkable feat? Based on psychological findings, we highlight the importance of imagination for emotional aspects of cognition and behavior, namely in the generation and regulation of emotions. Based on recent cognitive neuroscience work, we identify putative neural networks that are most critical for emotional imagination, with a major focus on the default mode network. Finally, we briefly highlight the possible functional implications of individual differences in imagination. Overall, we hope to address why humans have the capacity to simulate hypothetical emotional experiences and how this ability can be harnessed in adaptive (and sometimes maladaptive) ways. We end by discussing open questions.

Fear in the mind's eye: the neural correlates of differential fear acquisition to imagined conditioned stimuli

Mental imagery is involved in both the expression and treatment of fear-related disorders such as anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. However, the neural correlates associated with the acquisition and generalization of differential fear conditioning to imagined conditioned stimuli are relatively unknown. In this study, healthy human participants (n = 27) acquired differential fear conditioning to imagined conditioned stimuli paired with a physical unconditioned stimulus (i.e. mild shock), as measured via self-reported fear, the skin conductance response and significant right anterior insula (aIn) activation. Multivoxel pattern analysis cross-classification also demonstrated that the pattern of activity in the right aIn during imagery acquisition was quantifiably similar to the pattern produced by standard visual acquisition. Additionally, mental imagery was associated with significant differential fear generalization. Fear conditioning acquired to imagined stimuli generalized to viewing those same stimuli as measured with self-reported fear and right aIn activity, and likewise fear conditioning to visual stimuli was associated with significant generalized differential self-reported fear and right aIn activity when imagining those stimuli. Together, the study provides a novel understanding of the neural mechanisms associated with the acquisition of differential fear conditioning to imagined stimuli and that of the relationship between imagery and emotion more generally.

Fear in the Theater of the Mind: Differential Fear Conditioning With Imagined Stimuli

Many symptoms of anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder are elicited by fearful mental imagery. Yet little is known about how visual imagery of conditioned stimuli (CSs) affects the acquisition of differential fear conditioning. Across three experiments with younger human adults (Experiment 1: n = 33, Experiment 2: n = 27, Experiment 3: n = 26), we observed that participants acquired differential fear conditioning to both viewed and imagined percepts serving as the CSs, as measured via self-reported fear and skin conductance responses. Additionally, this differential conditioning generalized across CS-percept modalities such that differential conditioning acquired in response to visual percepts generalized to the corresponding imagined percepts and vice versa. This is novel evidence that perceived and imagined stimuli engage learning processes in very similar ways and is consistent with the theory that mental imagery is depictive and recruits neural resources shared with visual perception. Our findings also provide new insight into the mechanisms of anxiety and related disorders.