Maintenance of self-imposed delay of gratification by four chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and an orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus)

Time-mapping and future-oriented behavior in free-ranging wild fruit bats

Episodic memory and mental time travel have been viewed as uniquely human traits.1,2,3 This view began to shift with the development of behavioral criteria to assess what is referred to as "episodic-like memory" in animals.4,5 Key findings have ranged from evidence of what-where-when memory in scrub-jays, rats, and bees; through decision-making that impacts future foraging in frugivorous primates; to evidence of planning based on future needs in scrub-jays and tool use planning in great apes.4,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 Field studies of these issues have been rare, though there is field-based evidence for future-oriented behaviors in primates.8,10,14,15 We report evidence that free-ranging wild fruit bats rely on mental temporal maps and exhibit future-oriented behaviors when foraging. We tracked young bats as they navigated and foraged, documenting every tree they visited over many months. We prevented the bats from foraging outside for different time periods and monitored their foraging decisions, revealing that the bats map the spatiotemporal patterns of resources in their environment. Following a long period in captivity, the bats did not visit those trees that were no longer providing fruit. We show that this time-mapping ability requires experience and is lacking in inexperienced bats. Careful analysis of the bats' movement and foraging choices indicated that they plan which tree to visit while still in the colony, thus exhibiting future-oriented behavior and delayed gratification on a nightly basis. Our findings demonstrate how the need for spatiotemporal mental mapping can drive the evolution of high cognitive abilities that were previously considered exclusive to humans.

Intrinsic anticipatory motives in non-human primate food consumption behavior

Future-oriented behavior is regarded as a cornerstone of human cognition. One key phenomenon through which future orientation can be studied is the delay of gratification, when consumption of an immediate reward is withstood to achieve a larger reward later. The delays used in animal delay of gratification paradigms are rather short to be considered relevant for studying human-like future orientation. Here, for the first time, we show that rhesus macaques exhibit human-relevant future orientation downregulating their operant food consumption in anticipation of a nutritionally equivalent but more palatable food with an unprecedentedly long delay of approximately 2.5 h. Importantly, this behavior is not a result of conditioning but intrinsic to the animals. Our results show that the cognitive time horizon of primates, when tested in ecologically valid foraging-like experiments, extends much further into the future than previously considered, opening up new avenues for translational biomedical research.

The Inner Lives of Cephalopods

The minds of cephalopods have captivated scientists for millennia, yet the extent that we can understand their subjective experiences remains contested. In this article, we consider the sum of our scientific progress towards understanding the inner lives of cephalopods. Here, we outline the behavioral responses to specific experimental paradigms that are helping us to reveal their subjective experiences. We consider evidence from three broad research categories, which help to illuminate whether soft-bodied cephalopods (octopus, cuttlefish, and squid) have an awareness of self, awareness of others, and an awareness of time. Where there are current gaps in the literature, we outline cephalopod behaviors that warrant experimental investigation. We argue that investigations, especially framed through the lens of comparative psychology, have the potential to extend our understanding of the inner lives of this extraordinary class of animals.

I'll (not) take that: The reverse-reward contingency task as a test of self-control and inhibition

While searching for more evidence of quantitative skills in chimpanzees to add to what she already had found, Boysen discovered something else. When training chimpanzees to point at what they would not get, and not pointing at what they would get, none could do this for piles of food items. Even when those items in the pointed-at set were given away to another chimpanzee, and even with experience in the task, failure persisted. This test, the reverse-reward contingency test, has now been used with many species, as a means of assessing inhibitory control and perhaps self-control in animals. Typically, the task is difficult, and only specific manipulations have worked to allow primates to overcome the reversed contingencies. This includes using symbolic stimuli, adding another layer to the story, and more value to the task itself as a measure perhaps of forms of cognitive control in other species. I will discuss some of these empirical results, including from other chimpanzees who were given variations of the task, and how these studies have influenced numerous areas within comparative cognitive science.

Profiles of animal consciousness: A species-sensitive, two-tier account to quality and distribution

The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how conscious experience differs in detail between species (the quality question). We propose a framework which clearly distinguishes both questions and tackles both of them. This two-tier account distinguishes consciousness along ten dimensions and suggests cognitive capacities which serve as distinct operationalizations for each dimension. The two-tier account achieves three valuable aims: First, it separates strong and weak indicators of the presence of consciousness. Second, these indicators include not only different specific contents but also differences in the way particular contents are processed (by processes of learning, reasoning or abstraction). Third, evidence of consciousness from each dimension can be combined to derive the distinctive multi-dimensional consciousness profile of various species. Thus, the two-tier account shows how the kind of conscious experience of different species can be systematically compared.

Waiting for a better possibility: delay of gratification in corvids and its relationship to other cognitive capacities

Self-control, the ability to resist temptation and wait for better but delayed possibilities, is an important cognitive skill that underpins decision-making and planning. The capacity to exert self-control has been linked to intelligence in humans, chimpanzees and most recently cuttlefish. Here, we presented 10 Eurasian jays, Garrulus glandarius, with a delayed maintenance task, which measured the ability to choose a preferred outcome as well as the ability to sustain the delay prior to that outcome. Jays were able to wait for better possibilities, but maximum wait times varied across the subjects. We also presented them with five cognitive tasks that assessed spatial memory, spatial relationships and learning capacity. These tasks are commonly used as measures of general intelligence within an ecological context. Individual performance was correlated across the cognitive tasks, which suggests that there was a general intelligence factor underlying their performance. Performance in these tasks was correlated significantly with the jays' capacity to wait for better possibilities. This study demonstrates that self-control and intelligence are correlated in jays. The fact that this correlation exists in diverse species suggests that self-control is a fundamental feature of cognition. Our results are discussed in the context of convergent evolution.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny’.

Direct Human-AI Comparison in the Animal-AI Environment

Artificial Intelligence is making rapid and remarkable progress in the development of more sophisticated and powerful systems. However, the acknowledgement of several problems with modern machine learning approaches has prompted a shift in AI benchmarking away from task-oriented testing (such as Chess and Go) towards ability-oriented testing, in which AI systems are tested on their capacity to solve certain kinds of novel problems. The Animal-AI Environment is one such benchmark which aims to apply the ability-oriented testing used in comparative psychology to AI systems. Here, we present the first direct human-AI comparison in the Animal-AI Environment, using children aged 6-10 (n = 52). We found that children of all ages were significantly better than a sample of 30 AIs across most of the tests we examined, as well as performing significantly better than the two top-scoring AIs, "ironbar" and "Trrrrr," from the Animal-AI Olympics Competition 2019. While children and AIs performed similarly on basic navigational tasks, AIs performed significantly worse in more complex cognitive tests, including detour tasks, spatial elimination tasks, and object permanence tasks, indicating that AIs lack several cognitive abilities that children aged 6-10 possess. Both children and AIs performed poorly on tool-use tasks, suggesting that these tests are challenging for both biological and non-biological machines.

Cuttlefish exert self-control in a delay of gratification task

The ability to exert self-control varies within and across taxa. Some species can exert self-control for several seconds whereas others, such as large-brained vertebrates, can tolerate delays of up to several minutes. Advanced self-control has been linked to better performance in cognitive tasks and has been hypothesized to evolve in response to specific socio-ecological pressures. These pressures are difficult to uncouple because previously studied species face similar socio-ecological challenges. Here, we investigate self-control and learning performance in cuttlefish, an invertebrate that is thought to have evolved under partially different pressures to previously studied vertebrates. To test self-control, cuttlefish were presented with a delay maintenance task, which measures an individual's ability to forgo immediate gratification and sustain a delay for a better but delayed reward. Cuttlefish maintained delay durations for up to 50-130 s. To test learning performance, we used a reversal-learning task, whereby cuttlefish were required to learn to associate the reward with one of two stimuli and then subsequently learn to associate the reward with the alternative stimulus. Cuttlefish that delayed gratification for longer had better learning performance. Our results demonstrate that cuttlefish can tolerate delays to obtain food of higher quality comparable to that of some large-brained vertebrates.

Non-human primate token use shows possibilities but also limitations for establishing a form of currency

Non-human primates evaluate choices based on quantitative information and subjective valuation of options. Non-human primates can learn to value tokens as placeholders for primary rewards (such as food). With those tokens established as a potential form of 'currency', it is then possible to examine how they respond to opportunities to earn and use tokens in ways such as accumulating tokens or exchanging tokens with each other or with human experimenters to gain primary rewards. Sometimes, individuals make efficient and beneficial choices to obtain tokens and then exchange them at the right moments to gain optimal reward. Sometimes, they even accumulate such rewards through extended delay of gratification, or through other exchange-based interactions. Thus, non-human primates are capable of associating value to arbitrary tokens that may function as currency-like stimuli, but there also are strong limitations on how non-human primates can integrate such tokens into choice situations or use such tokens to fully 'symbolize' economic decision-making. These limitations are important to acknowledge when considering the evolutionary emergence of currency use in our species. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Comparative performance of orangutans (Pongo spp.), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), and drills (Mandrillus leucophaeus), in an ephemeral foraging task

A goal of the comparative approach is to test a variety of species on the same task. Here, we examined whether the factors that helped capuchin monkeys improve their performance in a dichotomous choice task would generalize to three other primate species: orangutans, gorillas, and drill monkeys. In this task, subjects have access to two options, each resulting in an identical food, but one (the ephemeral option) is only available if it is chosen first, whereas the other one (the permanent option) is always available. Therefore, the food-maximizing solution is to choose the ephemeral option first, followed by the permanent option for an additional reward. On the original version (plate task), the options were discriminated by the color and pattern of the plates holding the food, while on two subsequent versions we used altered cues that we predicted would improve performance: (1) the color of the foods themselves (color task), which we hypothesized was relevant to primates, who choose foods rather than substrates on which foods are found when foraging, and (2) patterned cups covering the foods (cup task), which we hypothesized would help primates avoid the prepotent response associated with visible food. Like capuchins, all three species initially failed to solve the plate task. However, while orangutans improved their performance from the plate to the color task, they did not for the cup task, and only a few gorillas and no drills succeeded in either task. Unfortunately, our ability to interpret these data was obscured by differences in the subjects' level of experience with cognitive testing and practical constraints that precluded the use of completely identical procedures across species. Nonetheless, we consider what these results can tell us, and discuss the value of conducting studies across multiple sites despite unavoidable differences.

Building Thinking Machines by Solving Animal Cognition Tasks

In ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, Turing, sceptical of the question ‘Can machines think?’, quickly replaces it with an experimentally verifiable test: the imitation game. I suggest that for such a move to be successful the test needs to be relevant, expansive, solvable by exemplars, unpredictable, and lead to actionable research. The Imitation Game is only partially successful in this regard and its reliance on language, whilst insightful for partially solving the problem, has put AI progress on the wrong foot, prescribing a top-down approach for building thinking machines. I argue that to fix shortcomings with modern AI systems a nonverbal operationalisation is required. This is provided by the recent Animal-AI Testbed, which translates animal cognition tests for AI and provides a bottom-up research pathway for building thinking machines that create predictive models of their environment from sensory input.

Are the roots of human economic systems shared with non-human primates?

We review and analyze evidence for an evolutionary rooting of human economic behaviors and organization in non-human primates. Rather than focusing on the direct application of economic models that a priori account for animal decision behavior, we adopt an inductive definition of economic behavior in terms of the contribution of individual cognitive capacities to the provision of resources within an exchange structure. We spell out to what extent non-human primates' individual and strategic decision behaviors are shared with humans. We focus on the ability to trade, through barter or token-mediated exchanges, as a landmark of an economic system among members of the same species. It is an open question why only humans have reached a high level of economic sophistication. While primates have many of the necessary cognitive abilities (symbolic and computational) in isolation, one plausible issue we identify is the limits in exerting cognitive control to combine several sources of information. The difference between human and non-human primates' economies might well then be in degree rather than kind.

Self-control in crows, parrots and nonhuman primates

Self-control is critical for both humans and nonhuman animals because it underlies complex cognitive abilities, such as decision-making and future planning, enabling goal-directed behavior. For instance, it is positively associated with social competence and life success measures in humans. We present the first review of delay of gratification as a measure of self-control in nonhuman primates, corvids (crow family) and psittacines (parrot order): disparate groups that show comparable advanced cognitive abilities and similar socio-ecological factors. We compare delay of gratification performance and identify key issues and outstanding areas for future research, including finding the best measures and drivers of delayed gratification. Our review therefore contributes to our understanding of both delayed gratification as a measure of self-control and of complex cognition in animals. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Innovative problem solving in great apes: the role of visual feedback in the floating peanut task

Nonhuman great apes show remarkable behavioural flexibility. Some individuals are even able to use water as a tool: They spit water into a vertical tube to make a peanut float upwards until it comes into reach (floating peanut task; FPT). In the current study, we used the FPT to investigate how visual feedback, an end-state demonstration and a social demonstration affect task performance in nonhuman great apes in three experiments. Our results indicate that apes who had acquired the solution with a clear tube maintained it with an opaque one. However, apes starting with an opaque tube failed to solve the task. Additionally, facing the peanut floating on a water-filled tube (i.e., an end-state demonstration) promoted success independent on the availability of visual feedback. Moreover, experiencing how water was poured into the tube either by a human demonstrator or by a water tap that had been opened either by the ape or a human did not seem to be of further assistance. First, this study suggests that great apes require visual feedback for solving the FPT, which is no longer required after the initial acquisition. Second, some subjects benefit from encountering the end-state, a finding corroborating previous studies.

Why has evolution not selected for perfect self-control?

Self-control refers to the ability to deliberately reject tempting options and instead select ones that produce greater long-term benefits. Although some apparent failures of self-control are, on closer inspection, reward maximizing, at least some self-control failures are clearly disadvantageous and non-strategic. The existence of poor self-control presents an important evolutionary puzzle because there is no obvious reason why good self-control should be more costly than poor self-control. After all, a rock is infinitely patient. I propose that self-control failures result from cases in which well-learned (and thus routinized) decision-making strategies yield suboptimal choices. These mappings persist in the decision-makers' repertoire because they result from learning processes that are adaptive in the broader context, either on the timescale of learning or of evolution. Self-control, then, is a form of cognitive control and the subjective feeling of effort likely reflects the true costs of cognitive control. Poor self-control, in this view, is ultimately a result of bounded optimality. This article is part of the theme issue 'Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications.

Orangutans (Pongo abelii) make flexible decisions relative to reward quality and tool functionality in a multi-dimensional tool-use task

Making economic decisions in a natural foraging situation that involves the use of tools may require an animal to consider more levels of relational complexity than merely deciding between an immediate and a delayed food option. We used the same method previously used with Goffin´s cockatoos to investigate the orangutans' flexibility for making the most profitable decisions when confronted with five different settings that included one or two different apparatuses, two different tools and two food items (one more preferred than the other). We found that orangutans made profitable decisions relative to reward quality, when the task required the subjects to select a tool over an immediately accessible food reward. Furthermore, most subjects were sensitive to work-effort when the immediate and the delayed option (directly accessible by using a tool) led to the same outcome. Most subjects continued to make profitable decisions that required taking into account the tool functionality. In a final multidimensional task design in which subjects had to simultaneously focus on two apparatuses, two reward qualities and two different tools, the orangutans chose the functional tool to access the high quality reward.

Better, Not Just More-Contrast in Qualitative Aspects of Reward Facilitates Impulse Control in Pigs

Delay-of-gratification paradigms, such as the famous "Marshmallow Test," are designed to investigate the complex cognitive concepts of self-control and impulse control in humans and animals. Such tests determine whether a subject will demonstrate impulse control by choosing a large, delayed reward over an immediate, but smaller reward. Documented relationships between impulsive behavior and aggression in humans and animals suggest important implications for farm animal husbandry and welfare, especially in terms of inadequate social behavior, tail biting and maternal behavior. In a preliminary study, we investigated whether the extent of impulse control would differ between quantitatively and qualitatively different aspects of reward in pigs. Twenty female piglets were randomly divided into two groups, with 10 piglets each. After a preference test to determine individual reward preference among six different food items, a discrimination test was conducted to train for successful discrimination between different amounts of reward (one piece vs. four pieces) and different qualitative aspects of reward (highly preferred vs. least preferred food item). Then, an increasing delay (2, 4, 8, 16, 24, 32 s) was introduced for the larger/highly preferred reward. Each piglet could choose to get the smaller/least preferred reward immediately or to wait for the larger/highly preferred reward. Piglets showed clear differences in their preference for food items. Moreover, the "quality group" displayed faster learning in the discrimination test (number of sessions until 90% of the animals completed the discrimination test: "quality group"-3 days vs. "quantity group"-5 days) and reached a higher level of impulse control in the delay-of-gratification test compared to the "quantity group" (maximum delay that was mastered: "quality group"-24 s vs. "quantity group"-8 s). These results demonstrate that impulse control is present in piglets but that the opportunity to get a highly preferred reward is more valued than the opportunity to get more of a given reward. This outcome also underlines the crucial role of motivation in cognitive test paradigms. Further investigations will examine whether impulse control is related to traits that are relevant to animal husbandry and welfare.

Chimpanzee food preferences, associative learning, and the origins of cooking

A recent report suggested that chimpanzees demonstrate the cognitive capacities necessary to understand cooking (Warneken & Rosati, 2015). We offer alternate explanations and mechanisms that could account for the behavioral responses of those chimpanzees, without invoking the understanding of cooking as a process. We discuss broader issues surrounding the use of chimpanzees in modeling hominid behavior and understanding aspects of human evolution.

Self-Control in Chimpanzees Relates to General Intelligence

For humans, there appears to be a clear link between general intelligence and self-control behavior, such as sustained delay of gratification [1-9]. Chimpanzees also delay gratification [10-12] and can be given tests of general intelligence (g) [13-15], but these two constructs have never been compared within the same sample of nonhuman animals. We presented 40 chimpanzees with the hybrid delay task (HDT) [16, 17], which measures inter-temporal choices and the capacity for sustained delay of gratification, and the primate cognitive test battery (PCTB), which measures g in chimpanzees [13-15]. Importantly, none of the sub-tasks in the PCTB directly assesses self-control or other forms of behavioral inhibition. Rather, they assess areas of physical cognition (e.g., quantity discrimination) or social cognition (e.g., gaze following). In three phases of testing, we consistently found that the strongest relation was between chimpanzee g scores and efficiency in the HDT. Chimpanzee g was not most closely related to the proportion of trials the chimpanzees chose to try to wait for delayed rewards, but rather most closely related to how good they were at waiting for those rewards when they chose to do so. We also found the same strong relation between HDT efficiency and those factors in the PCTB that loaded most strongly on chimpanzee g. These results highlight that, as with humans, there is a strong relation between chimpanzees' self-control and overall intelligence-a relation that likely reflects the role of successful inhibitory control during cognitive processing of information and intelligent decision-making.

Measures of Dogs' Inhibitory Control Abilities Do Not Correlate across Tasks

Inhibitory control, the ability to overcome prepotent but ineffective behaviors, has been studied extensively across species, revealing the involvement of this ability in many different aspects of life. While various different paradigms have been created in order to measure inhibitory control, only a limited number of studies have investigated whether such measurements indeed evaluate the same underlying mechanism, especially in non-human animals. In humans, inhibitory control is a complex construct composed of distinct behavioral processes rather than of a single unified measure. In the current study, we aimed to investigate the validity of inhibitory control paradigms in dogs. Sixty-seven dogs were tested in a battery consisting of frequently used inhibitory control tests. Additionally, dog owners were asked to complete an impulsivity questionnaire about their dog. No correlation of dogs' performance across tasks was found. In order to understand whether there are some underlying behavioral aspects explaining dogs' performance across tests, we performed principle component analyses. Results revealed that three components (persistency, compulsivity and decision speed) explained the variation across tasks. The questionnaire and dogs' individual characteristics (i.e., age and sex) provided only limited information for the derived components. Overall, results suggest that no unique measurement for inhibitory control exists in dogs, but tests rather measure different aspects of this ability. Considering the context-specificity of inhibitory control in dogs and most probably also in other non-human animals, extreme caution is needed when making conclusions about inhibitory control abilities based on a single test.

Thinking chickens: a review of cognition, emotion, and behavior in the domestic chicken

Domestic chickens are members of an order, Aves, which has been the focus of a revolution in our understanding of neuroanatomical, cognitive, and social complexity. At least some birds are now known to be on par with many mammals in terms of their level of intelligence, emotional sophistication, and social interaction. Yet, views of chickens have largely remained unrevised by this new evidence. In this paper, I examine the peer-reviewed scientific data on the leading edge of cognition, emotions, personality, and sociality in chickens, exploring such areas as self-awareness, cognitive bias, social learning and self-control, and comparing their abilities in these areas with other birds and other vertebrates, particularly mammals. My overall conclusion is that chickens are just as cognitively, emotionally and socially complex as most other birds and mammals in many areas, and that there is a need for further noninvasive comparative behavioral research with chickens as well as a re-framing of current views about their intelligence.

Chimpanzees can point to smaller amounts of food to accumulate larger amounts but they still fail the reverse-reward contingency task

The reverse-reward contingency task presents 2 food sets to an animal, and they are required to choose the smaller of the 2 sets in order to receive the larger food set. Intriguingly, the majority of species tested on the reverse-reward task fail to learn this contingency in the absence of large trial counts, correction trials, and punishment techniques. The unique difficulty of this seemingly simple task likely reflects a failure of inhibitory control which is required to point toward a smaller and less desirable reward rather than a larger and more desirable reward. This failure by chimpanzees and other primates to pass the reverse-reward task is striking given the self-control they exhibit in a variety of other paradigms. For example, chimpanzees have consistently demonstrated a high capacity for delay of gratification in order to maximize accumulating food rewards in which foods are added item-by-item to a growing set until the subject consumes the rewards. To study the mechanisms underlying success in the accumulation task and failure in the reverse-reward task, we presented chimpanzees with several combinations of these 2 tasks to determine when chimpanzees might succeed in pointing to smaller food sets over larger food sets and how the nature of the task might determine the animals' success or failure. Across experiments, 3 chimpanzees repeatedly failed to solve the reverse-reward task, whereas they accumulated nearly all food items across all instances of the accumulation self-control task, even when they had to point to small amounts of food to accumulate larger amounts. These data indicate that constraints of these 2 related but still different tasks of behavioral inhibition are dependent upon the animals' perceptions of the choice set, their sense of control over the contents of choice sets, and the nature of the task constraints. (PsycINFO Database Record

Primate cognition: attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, self-control, and metacognition as examples of cognitive control in nonhuman primates

Primate Cognition is the study of cognitive processes, which represent internal mental processes involved in discriminations, decisions, and behaviors of humans and other primate species. Cognitive control involves executive and regulatory processes that allocate attention, manipulate and evaluate available information (and, when necessary, seek additional information), remember past experiences to plan future behaviors, and deal with distraction and impulsivity when they are threats to goal achievement. Areas of research that relate to cognitive control as it is assessed across species include executive attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, metacognition, and self-control. Executive attention refers to the ability to control what sensory stimuli one attends to and how one regulates responses to those stimuli, especially in cases of conflict. Episodic memory refers to memory for personally experienced, autobiographical events. Prospective memory refers to the formation and implementation of future-intended actions, such as remembering what needs to be done later. Metacognition consists of control and monitoring processes that allow individuals to assess what information they have and what information they still need, and then if necessary to seek information. Self-control is a regulatory process whereby individuals forego more immediate or easier to obtain rewards for more delayed or harder to obtain rewards that are objectively more valuable. The behavioral complexity shown by nonhuman primates when given tests to assess these capacities indicates psychological continuities with human cognitive control capacities. However, more research is needed to clarify the proper interpretation of these behaviors with regard to possible cognitive constructs that may underlie such behaviors. WIREs Cogn Sci 2016, 7:294-316. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1397 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Testing the Glucose Hypothesis among Capuchin Monkeys: Does Glucose Boost Self-Control?

The ego-depletion hypothesis states that self-control diminishes over time and with exertion. Accordingly, the glucose hypothesis attributes this depletion of self-control resources to decreases in blood glucose levels. Research has led to mixed findings among humans and nonhuman animals, with limited evidence for such a link between glucose and self-control among closely-related nonhuman primate species, but some evidence from more distantly related species (e.g., honeybees and dogs). We tested this hypothesis in capuchin monkeys by manipulating the sugar content of a calorie-matched breakfast meal following a nocturnal fast, and then presenting each monkey with the accumulation self-control task. Monkeys were presented with food items one-by-one until the subject retrieved and ate the accumulating items, which required continual inhibition of food retrieval in the face of an increasingly desirable reward. Results indicated no relationship between self-control performance on the accumulation task and glucose ingestion levels following a fast. These results do not provide support for the glucose hypothesis of self-control among capuchin monkeys within the presented paradigm. Further research assessing self-control and its physiological correlates among closely- and distantly-related species is warranted to shed light on the mechanisms underlying self-control behavior.

Flexible decision-making relative to reward quality and tool functionality in Goffin cockatoos (Cacatua goffiniana)

Decisions involving the use of tools may require an agent to consider more levels of relational complexity than merely deciding between an immediate and a delayed option. Using a new experimental approach featuring two different types of tools, two apparatuses as well as two different types of reward, we investigated the Goffin cockatoos’ ability to make flexible and profitable decisions within five different setups. Paralleling previous results in primates, most birds overcame immediate drives in favor of future gains; some did so even if tool use involved additional work effort. Furthermore, at the group level subjects maximized their profit by simultaneously considering both the quality of an immediate versus a delayed food reward (accessible with a tool) and the functionality of the available tool. As their performance levels remained stable across trials in all testing setups, this was unlikely the result of a learning effect. The Goffin cockatoos’ ability to focus on relevant information was constrained when all task components (both food qualities, both apparatuses and both tools) were presented at the same time.

Self-control assessments of capuchin monkeys with the rotating tray task and the accumulation task

Recent studies of delay of gratification in capuchin monkeys using a rotating tray (RT) task have shown improved self-control performance in these animals in comparison to the accumulation (AC) task. In this study, we investigated whether this improvement resulted from the difference in methods between the rotating tray task and previous tests, or whether it was the result of greater overall experience with delay of gratification tasks. Experiment 1 produced similar performance levels by capuchins monkeys in the RT and AC tasks when identical reward and temporal parameters were used. Experiment 2 demonstrated a similar result using reward amounts that were more similar to previous AC experiments with these monkeys. In Experiment 3, monkeys performed multiple versions of the AC task with varied reward and temporal parameters. Their self-control behavior was found to be dependent on the overall delay to reward consumption, rather than the overall reward amount ultimately consumed. These findings indicate that these capuchin monkeys' self-control capacities were more likely to have improved across studies because of the greater experience they had with delay of gratification tasks. Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 tested new, task-naïve monkeys on both tasks, finding more limited evidence of self-control, and no evidence that one task was more beneficial than the other in promoting self-control. The results of this study suggest that future testing of this kind should focus on temporal parameters and reward magnitude parameters to establish accurate measures of delay of gratification capacity and development in this species and perhaps others.

Chimpanzees Remember the Results of One-by-One Addition of Food Items to Sets Over Extended Time Periods

Four chimpanzees were highly accurate in selecting the larger of two concurrent accumulations of bananas in two opaque containers over a span of 20 min. One at a time, bananas were placed into the containers, which were outside the chimpanzees' cages. The chimpanzees never saw more than one banana at a time, and there were no cues indicating the locations of the bananas after they were placed into the containers. The performance of these animals matched that of human infants and young children in similar tests. The chimpanzees were successful even when the sets to be compared were sufficiently large (5 vs. 8, 5 vs. 10, and 6 vs. 10) to cast doubt on the possibility that the chimpanzees were using an object file mechanism. These chimpanzees are the first nonhuman animals to demonstrate extended memory for accumulated quantity.

Social choice for one: On the rationality of intertemporal decisions

When faced with an intertemporal choice between a smaller short-term reward and a larger long-term prize, is opting for the latter always indicative of delay tolerance? And is delay tolerance always to be regarded as a manifestation of self-control, and thus as a rational solution to intertemporal dilemmas? I argue in favor of a negative answer to both questions, based on evidence collected in the delay discounting literature. This highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of rationality in intertemporal choice, to capture also situations in which waiting is not the optimal strategy. This paper suggests that such an understanding is fostered by adopting social choice theory as a promising framework to model intertemporal decision making. Some preliminary results of this approach are discussed, and its potential is compared with a much more studied formal model for intertemporal choice, i.e. game theory.

Prospection and the Present Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed Rewards

Humans are capable of imagining future rewards and the contexts in which they may be obtained. Functionally, intertemporal choices between smaller but immediate and larger but delayed rewards may be made without such episodic foresight. However, we propose that explicit simulations of this sort enable more flexible and adaptive intertemporal decision-making. Emotions triggered through the simulation of future situations can motivate people to forego immediate pleasures in the pursuit of long-term rewards. However, we stress that the most adaptive option need not always be a larger later reward. When the future is anticipated to be uncertain, for instance, it may make sense for preferences to shift toward more immediate rewards, instead. Imagining potential future scenarios and assessment of their likelihood and affective consequences allows humans to determine when it is more adaptive to delay gratification in pursuit of a larger later reward, and when the better strategy is to indulge in a present temptation. We discuss clinical studies that highlight when and how the effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making can be altered, and consider the relevance of this perspective to understanding the nature of self-control.

Learning to wait for more likely or just more: greater tolerance to delays of reward with increasingly longer delays

Little research has focused on training greater tolerance to delays of rewards in the context of delayed gratification. In delayed gratification, waiting for a delayed outcome necessitates the ability to resist defection for a continuously available smaller, immediate outcome. The present research explored the use of a fading procedure for producing greater waiting in a video-game based, delayed gratification task. Participants were assigned to conditions in which either the reward magnitude, or the probability of receiving a reward, was a function of time waited and the delay to the maximum reward was gradually increased throughout this training. Waiting increased for all participants but less for those waiting for a greater reward magnitude than a greater reward probability. All participants showed a tendency to wait in a final testing phase, but training with probabilistic outcomes produced a significantly greater likelihood of waiting during testing. The behavioral requirements of delay discounting versus delay gratification are discussed, as well as the benefits of training greater self-control in a variety of contexts.

Chimpanzee Cognitive Control

Cognitive control processes are a feature of human cognition. Recent comparative tests have shown that some nonhuman animals also might share aspects of cognitive control with humans. Two of the executive processes that constitute cognitive control are metacognition and self-control, and recent experiments with chimpanzees are described that demonstrate metacognitive monitoring and control when these animals engage in an information-seeking task. Chimpanzees also show strategic responding in a self-control task by exhibiting self-distraction as an aid to delay of gratification. These demonstrations indicate continuity with similar human cognitive capacities, and the performances of chimpanzees in these kinds of tests have implications for considering the nature of the intelligence of these animals.

Self-control depletion in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.): does delay of gratification rely on a limited resource?

Self-control failure has enormous personal and societal consequences. One of the most debated models explaining why self-control breaks down is the Strength Model, according to which self-control depends on a limited resource. Either previous acts of self-control or taking part in highly demanding cognitive tasks have been shown to reduce self-control, possibly due to a reduction in blood glucose levels. However, several studies yielded negative findings, and recent meta-analyses questioned the robustness of the depletion effect in humans. We investigated, for the first time, whether the Strength Model applies to a non-human primate species, the tufted capuchin monkey. We tested five capuchins in a self-control task (the Accumulation task) in which food items were accumulated within individual’s reach for as long as the subject refrained from taking them. We evaluated whether capuchins’ performance decreases: (i) when tested before receiving their daily meal rather than after consuming it (Energy Depletion Experiment), and (ii) after being tested in two tasks with different levels of cognitive complexity (Cognitive Depletion Experiment). We also tested, in both experiments, how implementing self-control in each trial of the Accumulation task affected this capacity within each session and/or across consecutive sessions. Repeated acts of self-control in each trial of the Accumulation task progressively reduced this capacity within each session, as predicted by the Strength Model. However, neither experiencing a reduction in energy level nor taking part in a highly demanding cognitive task decreased performance in the subsequent Accumulation task. Thus, whereas capuchins seem to be vulnerable to within-session depletion effects, to other extents our findings are in line with the growing body of studies that failed to find a depletion effect in humans. Methodological issues potentially affecting the lack of depletion effects in capuchins are discussed.

Trading up: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show self-control through their exchange behavior

Self-control is defined as the ability or capacity to obtain an objectively more valuable outcome rather than an objectively less valuable outcome though tolerating a longer delay or a greater effort requirement (or both) in obtaining that more valuable outcome. A number of tests have been devised to assess self-control in non-human animals, including exchange tasks. In this study, three chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) participated in a delay of gratification task that required food exchange as the behavioral response that reflected self-control. The chimpanzees were offered opportunities to inhibit eating and instead exchange a currently possessed food item for a different (and sometimes better) item, often needing to exchange several food items before obtaining the highest valued reward. We manipulated reward type, reward size, reward visibility, delay to exchange, and location of the highest valued reward in the sequence of exchange events to compare performance within the same individuals. The chimpanzees successfully traded until obtaining the best item in most cases, although there were individual differences among participants in some variations of the test. These results support the idea that self-control is robust in chimpanzees even in contexts in which they perhaps anticipate future rewards and sustain delay of gratification until they can obtain the ultimately most valuable item.

Waiting for what comes later: capuchin monkeys show self-control even for nonvisible delayed rewards

Self-control tasks used with nonhuman animals typically involve the choice between an immediate option and a delayed, but more preferred option. However, in many self-control scenarios, not only does the more impulsive option come sooner in time, it is often more concrete than the delayed option. For example, studies have presented children with the option of eating a visible marshmallow immediately, or foregoing it for a better reward that can only be seen later. Thus, the immediately available option is visible and concrete, whereas the delayed option is not visible and more abstract. We tested eight capuchin monkeys to better understand this potential effect by manipulating the visibility of the response options and the visibility of the baiting itself. Monkeys observed two food items (20 or 5 g pieces of banana) each being placed either on top of or inside of one of the two opaque containers attached to a revolving tray apparatus, either in full view of monkeys or occluded by a barrier. Trials ended when monkeys removed a reward from the rotating tray. To demonstrate self-control, monkeys should have allowed the smaller piece of food to pass if the larger piece was forthcoming. Overall, monkeys were successful on the task, allowing a smaller, visible piece of banana to pass from reach in order to access the larger, nonvisible banana piece. This was true even when the entire baiting process took place out of sight of the monkeys. This finding suggests that capuchin monkeys succeed on self-control tasks even when the delayed option is also more abstract than the immediate one-a situation likely faced by primates in everyday life.

The evolutionary roots of human decision making

Humans exhibit a suite of biases when making economic decisions. We review recent research on the origins of human decision making by examining whether similar choice biases are seen in nonhuman primates, our closest phylogenetic relatives. We propose that comparative studies can provide insight into four major questions about the nature of human choice biases that cannot be addressed by studies of our species alone. First, research with other primates can address the evolution of human choice biases and identify shared versus human-unique tendencies in decision making. Second, primate studies can constrain hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms underlying such biases. Third, comparisons of closely related species can identify when distinct mechanisms underlie related biases by examining evolutionary dissociations in choice strategies. Finally, comparative work can provide insight into the biological rationality of economically irrational preferences.

Translational research into intertemporal choice: the Western scrub-jay as an animal model for future-thinking

Decisions often involve outcomes that will not materialise until later, and choices between immediate gratification and future consequences are thought to be important for human health and welfare. Combined human and animal research has identified impulsive intertemporal choice as an important factor in drug-taking and pathological gambling. In this paper, we give an overview of recent research into intertemporal choice in non-human animals, and argue that this work could offer insight into human behaviour through the development of animal models. As an example, we discuss the role of future-thinking in intertemporal choice, and review the case for the Western scrub-jay (Aphelocoma californica) as an animal model of such prospective cognition. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: Tribute to Tom Zentall.

Risky business: rhesus monkeys exhibit persistent preferences for risky options

Rhesus monkeys have been shown to prefer risky over safe options in experiential decision-making tasks. These findings might be due, however, to specific contextual factors, such as small amounts of fluid reward and minimal costs for risk-taking. To better understand the factors affecting decision-making under risk in rhesus monkeys, we tested multiple factors designed to increase the stakes including larger reward amounts, distinct food items rather than fluid reward, a smaller number of trials per session, and risky options with greater variation that also included non-rewarded outcomes. We found a consistent preference for risky options, except when the expected value of the safe option was greater than the risky option. Thus, with equivalent mean utilities between the safe and risky options, rhesus monkeys appear to have a robust preference for the risky options in a broad range of circumstances, akin to the preferences found in human children and some adults in similar tasks. One account for this result is that monkeys make their choices based on the salience of the largest payoff, without integrating likelihood and value across trials. A related idea is that they fail to override an impulsive tendency to select the option with the potential to obtain the highest possible outcome. Our results rule out strict versions of both accounts and contribute to an understanding of the diversity of risky decision-making among primates.

Waiting for better, not for more: corvids respond to quality in two delay maintenance tasks

Self-control, that is, overcoming impulsivity towards immediate gratification in favour of a greater but delayed reward, is seen as a valuable skill when making future-oriented decisions. Experimental studies in nonhuman primates revealed that individuals of some species are willing to tolerate delays of up to several minutes in order to gain food of a higher quantity or quality. Recently, birds (carrion crows, Corvus corone, common ravens, Corvus corax, Goffin cockatoos, Cacatua goffiniana) performed comparably to primates in an exchange task, contradicting previous notions that birds may lack any impulse control. However, performance differed strikingly with the currency of exchange: individuals of all three species performed better when asked to wait for a higher food quality, rather than quantity. Here, we built on this work and tested whether the apparent difference in levels of self-control expressed in quality versus quantity tasks reflects cognitive constraints or is merely due to methodological limitations. In addition to the exchange paradigm, we applied another established delay maintenance methodology: the accumulation task. In this latter task, food items accumulated to a maximum of four pieces, whereas in the exchange task, an initial item could be exchanged for a reward item after a certain time delay elapsed. In both tasks, birds (seven crows, five ravens) were asked to wait in order to optimize either the quality or the quantity of food. We found that corvids were willing to delay gratification when it led to a food reward of higher quality, but not when waiting was rewarded with a higher quantity, independent of the experimental paradigm. This study is the first to test crows and ravens with two different paradigms, the accumulation and the exchange of food, within the same experiment, allowing for fair comparisons between methods and species.

Working and waiting for better rewards: self-control in two monkey species (Cebus apella and Macaca mulatta)

Self-control is typically defined as choosing a greater, delayed reward over a lesser, more immediate reward. However, in nature, there are other costs besides delay associated with obtaining the greatest outcome including increased effort, potential punishment, and low probability of reward. Effort is an interesting case because it sometimes impairs self-control, by acting as an additional cost, and at other times facilitates self-control, by distracting one from impulsive options. Additionally, different species may perform differently in effortful self-control tasks, based on their natural ecology. To gain insight into these aspects of self-control behavior, we examined capuchin monkeys' and rhesus monkeys' self-control in separate working and waiting choice tasks. We hypothesized that capuchins would show greater self-control in the working task, given their naturally higher activity level, whereas rhesus would perform similarly in both tasks. Rhesus performed as predicted, whereas contrary to our hypothesis, capuchins exhibited lesser performance in the working task. Nonetheless, these results may still stem from inherent species differences interacting with details of the methodology. Capuchins, being highly energetic and social monkeys, may have divided their energy and attention between the working task and other elements of the test environment such as visible group mates or manipulanda.

Waiting by mistake: symbolic representation of rewards modulates intertemporal choice in capuchin monkeys, preschool children and adult humans

In the Delay choice task subjects choose between a smaller immediate option and a larger delayed option. This paradigm, also known as intertemporal choice task, is frequently used to assess delay tolerance, interpreting a preference for the larger delayed option as willingness to wait. However, in the Delay choice task subjects face a dilemma between two preferred responses: "go for more" (i.e., selecting the larger, but delayed, option) vs. "go for sooner" (i.e., selecting the immediate, but smaller, option). When the options consist of visible food amounts, at least some of the choices of the larger delayed option might be due to a failure to inhibit a prepotent response towards the larger option rather than to a sustained delay tolerance. To disentangle this issue, we tested 10 capuchin monkeys, 101 preschool children, and 88 adult humans in a Delay choice task with food, low-symbolic tokens (objects that can be exchanged with food and have a one-to-one correspondence with food items), and high-symbolic tokens (objects that can be exchanged with food and have a one-to-many correspondence with food items). This allows evaluating how different methods of representing rewards modulate the relative contribution of the "go for more" and "go for sooner" responses. Consistently with the idea that choices for the delayed option are sometimes due to a failure at inhibiting the prepotent response for the larger quantity, we expected high-symbolic tokens to decrease the salience of the larger option, thus reducing "go for more" responses. In fact, previous findings have shown that inhibiting prepotent responses for quantity is easier when the problem is framed in a symbolic context. Overall, opting for the larger delayed option in the visible-food version of the Delay choice task seems to partially result from an impulsive preference for quantity, rather than from a sustained delay tolerance. In capuchins and children high-symbolic stimuli decreased the individual's preference for the larger reward by distancing from its appetitive features. Conversely, the sophisticated symbolic skills of adult humans prevented the distancing effect of high-symbolic stimuli in this population, although this result may be due to methodological differences between adult humans and the other two populations under study. Our data extend the knowledge concerning the influence of symbols on both human and non-human primate behavior and add a new element to the interpretation of the Delay choice task. Since high-symbolic stimuli decrease the individual's preference for the larger reward by eliminating those choices due to prepotent responses towards the larger quantity, they allow to better discriminate responses based on genuine delay aversion. Thus, these findings invite greater caution in interpreting the results obtained with the visible-food version of the Delay choice task, which may overestimate delay tolerance.

No evidence of temporal preferences in caching by Western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica)

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We ask whether scrub-jays prefer earlier cache-retrieval when caching.

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Caching appears similar for trays that come back after 1 h, 25 h, and 49 h.

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Caching appears similar for delays of 7 min and 26 h when no choice of trays is provided.

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We find no evidence of a preference to cache in trays that are more accessible for recovery.

Humans and other animals often favour immediate gratification over long-term gain. Primates, including humans, appear more willing to wait for rewards than other animals, such as rats or pigeons. Another group displaying impressive patience are the corvids, which possess large brains and show sophisticated cognitive abilities. Here, we assess intertemporal choice in one corvid species, the Western scrub-jay (Aphelocoma californica). These birds cache food for future consumption and respond flexibly to future needs. Cache-theft and cache-degradation are time-dependent processes in scrub-jay ecology that might necessitate sensitivity to delays between caching and retrieval. We adopt a caching paradigm with delays of up to 49 h. Across two experiments we find no evidence of a preference for earlier recovery. We highlight the possibility that, although scrub-jays can discriminate between the present and the future, they may not understand how far into the future an event will occur.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) can wait, when they choose to: a study with the hybrid delay task

Self-control has been studied in nonhuman animals using a variety of tasks. The inter-temporal choice (ITC) task presents choices between smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) options. Using food amounts as rewards, this presents two problems: (a) choices of the LL option could either reflect self-control or instead result from animals' difficulty with pointing to smaller amounts of food; (b) there is no way to verify whether the subjects would not revert their choice for the LL option, if given the opportunity to do so during the ensuing delay. To address these problems, we have recently introduced a new protocol, the hybrid delay task, which combines an initial ITC with a subsequent accumulation phase in which selection of the SS option leads to its immediate delivery, but choice of the LL option then leads to one-by-one presentation of those items that continues only as long as the subject does not eat any of the accumulated items. The choice of the LL option therefore only reflects self-control when the number of items obtained from LL choices during the accumulation phase is higher than what could be received in the SS option. Previous research with capuchin monkeys demonstrated that their apparent self-control responses in the ITC task may have overestimated their general self-control abilities, given their poor performance in the hybrid delay task. Here, chimpanzees instead demonstrated that their choices for the LL option in the ITC phase of the hybrid delay task were confirmed by their ability to sustain long delays during accumulation of LL rewards.

Delay choice versus delay maintenance: different measures of delayed gratification in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Delaying gratification involves 2 components: (1) delay choice (selecting a delayed reward over an immediate one) and (2) delay maintenance (sustaining the decision to delay gratification even if the immediate reward is available during the delay). Two tasks most commonly have explored these components in primates: the intertemporal choice task and the accumulation task. It is unclear whether these tasks provide equivalent measures of delay of gratification. Here, we compared the performance on the intertemporal choice task and the accumulation task of capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) belonging to 2 study populations. We found only limited evidence of a significant correlation in performance. Consequently, in contrast to what is often assumed, our data provide only partial support for the hypothesis that these tasks provide equivalent measures of delay of gratification.