Increased social distance makes people more risk-neutral

Neural bases of loss aversion when choosing for oneself versus known or unknown others

Despite the ubiquitous interdependence between one's own decisions and others' welfare, and the controversial evidence on the behavioral effect of choosing for others, the neural bases of making decisions for another versus oneself remain unexplored. We investigated whether loss aversion (LA; the tendency to avoid losses over approaching equivalent gains) is modulated by (i) choosing for oneself, other individuals, or both; (ii) knowing or not knowing the other recipients; or (iii) an interaction between these factors. We used fMRI to assess the brain activations associated with choosing whether to accept or reject mixed gambles, either for oneself, for another player, or both, in 2 groups of 28 participants who had or had not briefly interacted with the other players before scanning. Participants displayed higher LA for choices involving their payoff compared with those affecting only the payoff of other, known, players. This "social" modulation of decision-making was found to engage the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and its inhibitory connectivity to the middle cingulate cortex. This pattern might underpin decision-making for known others via self-other distinction processes associated with dorsomedial prefrontal areas, with this in turn promoting the inhibition of socially oriented responses through the downregulation of the midcingulate node of the empathy network.

Deciding Alone or with Others: Employment Anxiety and Social Distance Predict Intuitiveness in Career Decision Making

Intuitive career decisions can influence people's career choices and subsequent job competencies, which are related to their development and happiness. There is evidence that both anxiety and social distance influence intuitive career decisions individually, but it is unclear how employment anxiety and social distance influence intuitive career decisions individually and how they interact to influence intuitive career decisions. Drawing on the cognitive-emotional dual-system model, in this study, 298 college students and 386 senior job-seeking students were tested through behavioral experiments and questionnaires, respectively. The results showed that employment anxious individuals have a higher intuitive level in career decision making, and they also have a higher intuitive level when making career decisions for others at a far social distance. In addition, employment anxiety and social distance interact to influence the intuitiveness of career decision making. When making career decisions for themselves and those who are close to them, the increase in employment anxiety will increase the intuitive level. Therefore, in a non-anxious situation, you can make career decisions on your own or get help from someone close to you, but in anxious situations, you can turn to others who are at a far social distance to help make decisions.

The Influence of Trait Emotion and Spatial Distance on Risky Choice Under the Framework of Gain and Loss

In the time of the COVID-19 pandemic, people are often faced with uncertain risky choice. Risky choice will be affected by different descriptions of the event's gain or loss framework, this phenomenon is known as the framing effect. With the continuous expansion and in-depth study of frame effects in the field of risky choice, researchers have found that the are quite different in different situations. People have different interpretations of the same event at different psychological distances, and will also be affected by their own emotions. Therefore, the current study examines the common influence of task frame, spatial distance, and trait emotion on risky choice through two studies. Study 1 used a 2 (framework: gain vs. loss) × 2 (trait sentiment: high vs. low) inter-subject design, and the dependent variable is the choice of the rescue plan for the classic "Asian disease" problem. The results revealed that trait anger did not predict individuals' risky choice preferences, and high trait anxiety led individuals to be more risk-averse. The framing effect exists in risky choice, and individuals prefer risk seeking in the loss frame. Study 2 used a 2 (spatial distance: distant vs. proximal) × 2 (framework: gain vs. loss) × 2 (trait sentiment: high vs. low) three-factor inter-subject design in which the dependent variable is the choice of rescue plan. The results indicate that the framing effect also exists in risky choice, and individuals prefer risk seeking in a loss frame. High trait anxiety lead individuals to be more risk-averse, while trait anger has no significant predictive effect on risk preference. Distant spatial distance lead individuals to increase their preference for risk-seeking under the gain frame, which leads to the disappearance of the framing effect. In conclusion, trait anxiety and spatial distance have a certain degree of influence on risky choice under the framework of gain and loss.

Perceived Social Norms Guide Health Care Decisions for Oneself and Others: A Cross-Sectional Experiment in a US Online Panel

BACKGROUND

Global aging has increased the reliance on surrogates to make health care decisions for others. We investigated the differences between making health care decisions and predicting health care decisions, self-other differences for made and predicted health care decisions, and the roles of perceived social norms, emotional closeness, empathy, age, and gender.

METHODS

Participants (N = 2037) from a nationally representative US panel were randomly assigned to make or to predict a health care decision. They were also randomly assigned to 1 of 5 recipients: themselves, a loved one 60 y or older, a loved one younger than 60 y, a distant acquaintance 60 y or older, or a distant acquaintance younger than 60 y. Hypothetical health care scenarios depicted choices between relatively safe lower-risk treatments with a good chance of yielding mild health improvements versus higher-risk treatments that offered a moderate chance of substantial health improvements. Participants reported their likelihood of choosing lower- versus higher-risk treatments, their perceptions of family and friends' approval of risky health care decisions, and their empathy.

RESULTS

We present 3 key findings. First, made decisions involved less risk taking than predicted decisions, especially for distant others. Second, predicted decisions were similar for others and oneself, but made decisions were less risk taking for others than oneself. People predicted that loved ones would be less risk taking than distant others would be. Third, perceived social norms were more strongly associated than empathy with made and predicted decisions.

LIMITATIONS

Hypothetical scenarios may not adequately represent emotional processes in health care decision making.

CONCLUSIONS

Perceived social norms may sway people to take less risk in health care decisions, especially when making decisions for others. These findings have implications for improving surrogate decision making.

HIGHLIGHTS

People made less risky health care decisions for others than for themselves, even though they predicted others would make decisions similar to their own. This has implications for understanding how surrogates apply the substituted judgment standard when making decisions for patients.Perceived social norms were more strongly related to decisions than treatment-recipient (relationship closeness, age) and decision-maker (age, gender, empathy) characteristics. Those who perceived that avoiding health care risks was valued by their social group were less likely to choose risky medical treatments.Understanding the power of perceived social norms in shaping surrogates' decisions may help physicians to engage surrogates in shared decision making.Knowledge of perceived social norms may facilitate the design of decision aids for surrogates.

Development of decision making based on internal and external information: A hierarchical Bayesian approach

In decision making, people may rely on their own information as well as on information from external sources, such as family members, peers, or experts. The current study investigated how these types of information are used by comparing four decision strategies: 1) an internal strategy that relies solely on own information; 2) an external strategy that relies solely on the information from an external source; 3) a sequential strategy that relies on information from an external source only after own information is deemed inadequate; 4) an integrative strategy that relies on an integration of both types of information. Of specific interest were individual and developmental differences in strategy use. Strategy use was examined via Bayesian hierarchical mixture model analysis. A visual decision task was administered to children and young adolescents (N=305, ages 9–14). Individual differences but no age-related changes were observed in either decision accuracy or strategy use. The internal strategy was dominant across ages, followed by the integrative and sequential strategy, respectively, while the external strategy was extremely rare. This suggests a reluctance to rely entirely on information provided by external sources. We conclude that there are individual differences but not developmental changes in strategy use pertaining to perceptual decision-making in 9- through 14-year-olds. Generalizability of these findings is discussed with regard to different forms of social influence and varying perceptions of the external source. This study provides stepping stones in better understanding and modeling decision making processes in the presence of both internal and external information.

Fear From Afar, Not So Risky After All: Distancing Moderates the Relationship Between Fear and Risk Taking

A growing line of research has shown that individuals can regulate emotional biases in risky judgment and decision-making processes through cognitive reappraisal. In the present study, we focus on a specific tactic of reappraisal known as distancing. Drawing on appraisal theories of emotion and the emotion regulation literature, we examine how distancing moderates the relationship between fear and risk taking and anger and risk taking. In three pre-registered studies (N_total = 1,483), participants completed various risky judgment and decision-making tasks. Replicating previous results, Study 1 revealed a negative relationship between fear and risk taking and a positive relationship between anger and risk taking at low levels of distancing. Study 2 replicated the interaction between fear and distancing but found no interaction between anger and distancing. Interestingly, at high levels of distancing, we observed a reversal of the relationship between fear and risk taking in both Study 1 and 2. Study 3 manipulated emotion and distancing by asking participants to reflect on current fear-related and anger-related stressors from an immersed or distanced perspective. Study 3 found no main effect of emotion nor any evidence of a moderating role of distancing. However, exploratory analysis revealed a main effect of distancing on optimistic risk estimation, which was mediated by a reduction in self-reported fear. Overall, the findings suggest that distancing can help regulate the influence of incidental fear on risk taking and risk estimation. We discuss implications and suggestions for future research.

Do We Become More Cautious for Others When Large Amounts of Money Are at Stake?

A considerable proportion of financial decisions are made by agents acting on behalf of other people. Although people are more cautious for others when making medical decisions, this does not seem to be the case for economic decisions. However, studies with large amounts of money are particularly absent from the literature, which precludes a clear comparison to studies in the medical domain. To address this gap, we investigated the effect of outcome magnitude in two experiments where participants made choices between safe and risky options. Decision-makers were not more cautious for others over large amounts. In fact, risk-taking was accentuated for large amounts in the gain domain. We did not find self-other differences in the loss domain for either outcome magnitude. This suggests that the caution observed in medical decisions does not replicate in financial decisions with large amounts, or at least not in the same way. These results echo the concerns that have been raised about excessive risk-taking by financial agents.

Social Distance Reduces the Biases of Overweighting Small Probabilities and Underweighting Large Probabilities

People often exhibit biases in probability weighting such as overweighting small probabilities and underweighting large probabilities. Our research examines whether increased social distance would reduce such biases. Participants completed valuation and choice tasks of probabilistic lotteries under conditions with different social distances. The results showed that increased social distance reduced these biases in both hypothetical (Studies 1 and 2) and incentivized (Study 3) settings. This reduction was accompanied by a decrease in emotional intensity and an increase in the attention to probability in the decision-making process (Study 4). Moreover, the bias-buffering effect of social distance was stronger in the gain domain than in the loss domain (Studies 1-4). These results suggest that increasing the social distance from the beneficiaries of the decisions can reduce biases in probability weighting and shed light on the relationship between social distance and the emotional-cognitive process in decision-making.

Social distance modulates the process of uncertain decision-making: evidence from event-related potentials

Purpose

Social distance affects risk perception in uncertain decision-making, but how this effect works and the mechanism of how social distance influences the early processing stages of uncertain decision-making are still unclear. This investigation aimed to explore how social distance influences risk-taking during uncertain decision-making using the Iowa Gambling Task with recording of event-related potentials.

Methods

A total of 57 healthy subjects (36 female) participated in the modified single-choice Iowa Gambling Task when they gambled based on three quantified social distances (self, friend, and stranger). The social distance between participant and beneficiary was quantified on a scale of 0–100 points, with 0 representing self, 5 representing a close friend, and 100 representing a stranger.

Results

Three stages of uncertain decision-making were analyzed. Behavioral results showed that social distance worked interactively with choice frame, and high social distance made people choose a more advantageous deck and a less disadvantageous deck than low social distance. The P300 in the choice-evaluation stage, which reflects stimulus discrimination, directly proved this result by showing that gambling for a stranger caused higher P300 when evaluating an advantageous deck and lower P300 when evaluating a disadvantageous deck than for others. Decision preceding negativity in the response-selection stage represents the anticipation of risky choices: this was larger with high social distance when choosing a disadvantageous deck. Feedback-related negativity and feedback-related P300 had motivational significance, showing smaller amplitudes when gambling for a stranger than for oneself.

Conclusion

These results provide evidence that social distance works interactively with choice frames of uncertain decision-making. People at high social distance are more risk-taking in an advantageous frame and more risk-avoid ant in a disadvantageous frame.

Riskier for me or for others? The role of domain and probability in self-other differences, in risky decision-making

In social and economic interactions, people often decide differently for others, as against for themselves, under situations involving risks. This sometimes leads to conflicts or contradictions. Although previous studies have explored such contradictions, the findings have been inconsistent. To reconcile these inconsistencies, this paper investigates the role played by the different domains and probabilities in the self-other differences under risk. Two groups of participants completed a gambling task combining different domains (gain vs. loss) and probabilities (small vs. large). One group made decisions for others and the other group made decisions for themselves. The results revealed a four pattern of discrepancy: the ones who made decisions for others were less risk-seeking than those who made decisions for themselves over the small probability gains. This was reversed over the large probability gains. Conversely, the participants who made decisions for others were more risk-seeking than those who made decisions for themselves over the small probability losses. The results were reversed over the large probability losses. These results reconcile the contradictory findings of the previous studies and suggest the significant role played by contextual factors in such discrepancies.

Do our risk preferences change when we make decisions for others? A meta-analysis of self-other differences in decisions involving risk

BACKGROUND

Are we more risk-averse or risk-seeking when we make decisions on behalf of other people as opposed to ourselves? So far, findings have not been able to provide a clear and consistent answer.

METHOD

We propose a meta-analysis to assess whether self-other differences vary according to particular features of the decision. We reviewed 78 effect sizes from 49 studies (7,576 participants).

RESULTS

There was no overall self-other difference, but there were moderating effects of domain and frame. Decisions in the interpersonal domain were more risk-averse for self than for other. Decisions in the medical domain were more risk-seeking for self than for other. There were no overall self-other differences in the financial domain, however there was a moderating effect of frame: decisions in a gain frame were more risk-averse for self than other whereas decisions in a loss frame were more risk-seeking for self than other. This effect of frame was slightly different overall and in the medical domain, where self-other differences occurred in a loss frame but not in a gain frame.

CONCLUSION

Future work should continue to investigate how the specific content and context of the decision impacts self-other differences in order to understand the effects of domain and frame we report.

Gain-loss situation modulates neural responses to self-other decision making under risk

Although self-other behavioral differences in decision making under risk have been observed in some contexts, little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying such differences. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the cups task, in which participants choose between risky and sure options for themselves and others in gain and loss situations, we found that people were more risk-taking when making decisions for themselves than for others in loss situations but were equally risk-averse in gain situations. Significantly stronger activations were observed in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and anterior insula (AI) when making decisions for the self than for others in loss situations but not in gain situations. Furthermore, the activation in the dmPFC was stronger when people made sure choices for others than for themselves in gain situations but not when they made risky choices, and was both stronger when people made sure and risky choices for themselves than for others in loss situations. These findings suggest that gain-loss situation modulates self-other differences in decision making under risk, and people are highly likely to differentiate the self from others when making decisions in loss situations.

Why Can't We Accurately Predict Others' Decisions? Prediction Discrepancy in Risky Decision-Making

Individuals often fail to accurately predict others' decisions in a risky environment. In this paper, we investigate the characteristics and causes of this prediction discrepancy. Participants completed a risky decision-making task mixed with different domains (gain vs. loss) and probabilities (small vs. large), with some participants making decisions for themselves (the actor) and the others predicting the actors' decisions (the predictor). The results demonstrated a prediction discrepancy: predictions were more risk-averse than the actual decisions over small-probability gains and more risk-seeking over large-probability gains, while these patterns were reversed in the loss domain. Reported and predicted levels of emotional stimulation revealed a pattern that is consistent with the notion of risk-as-feelings and empathy gaps. Mediation analysis provided strong evidence that such prediction discrepancy is driven mainly by the predictor's underestimate of the intensity (not the impact) of the actor's emotional state.

Effects of psychological distance on attraction effect

The present study demonstrated that psychological distance influences the attraction effect by changing the weights of the attributes of options. Construal level theory proposes that the weight of a superordinate attribute increases with psychological distance, whereas the weight of a subordinate attribute decreases with psychological distance. The present hypothesis proposed that an asymmetrical change of weights of attributes would influence the relationship between options, and, consequently, the attraction effect would vary. The present study comprised two studies. In study 1, participants made choices among three lotteries in near and distant future conditions. Study 2 asked the participants to choose among three events in similar and dissimilar other conditions. The results showed that the choice of the asymmetrically dominating option, which was superior in superordinate attributes, increased as the psychological distance increased, whereas the choice of the asymmetrically dominating option, which was superior in subordinate attributes, decreased or stayed static.

Self-Distancing Reduces Probability-Weighting Biases

We have abundant evidence that people exhibit biases in weighting probability information. The current study aims to examine whether self-distancing would reduce these biases. Participants in this study were instructed to use either a self-distancing or a self-immersing strategy to regulate their reasoning when they indicated their valuations of different lotteries. The results show that, compared to the baseline group, participants in the self-distancing group exhibited less distortion in the probability-weighting function, while those in the self-immersing group exhibited more distortion. These results offer evidence for the power of self-distancing in reducing probability-weighting biases.

Decisions for Others Are Less Risk-Averse in the Gain Frame and Less Risk-Seeking in the Loss Frame Than Decisions for the Self

Despite the fact that people make decisions for others as often as they make decisions for themselves, little is known about how decisions for others are different from those made for the self. In two experiments, we investigated the effect of social distance (i.e., making decisions for oneself, a friend, or a stranger) on risk preferences in both gain and loss situations. We found that people were more risk averse in gain situations when they made decisions for themselves than for a stranger (Studies 1 and 2), but were equally risk averse for themselves and their friends (Study 2). However, people were more risk seeking in loss situations when they made decisions for themselves than for their friends as well as for a stranger, and were more risk seeking for their friends than for a stranger (Study 2). Furthermore, the effect of social distance on risk preferences was stronger in loss than in gain situations. Mediation analysis indicated that outcome-induced loss aversion was responsible for effects of social distance on risk preferences. These findings demonstrate that social distance influences risk preferences via perceived loss aversion, which sheds new light on self-other differences in decision making.