Why a standard IAT effect cannot provide evidence for association formation: the role of similarity construction

Improving the reliability and validity of the IAT with a dynamic model driven by similarity

The Implicit Association Test (IAT), like many behavioral measures, seeks to quantify meaningful individual differences in cognitive processes that are difficult to assess with approaches like self-reports. However, much like other behavioral measures, many IATs appear to show low test-retest reliability and typical scoring methods fail to quantify all of the decision-making processes that generate the overt task performance. Here, we develop a new modeling approach for IATs based on the geometric similarity representation (GSR) model. This model leverages both response times and accuracy on IATs to make inferences about representational similarity between the stimuli and categories. The model disentangles processes related to response caution, stimulus encoding, similarities between concepts and categories, and response processes unrelated to the choice itself. This approach to analyzing IAT data illustrates that the unreliability in IATs is almost entirely attributable to the methods used to analyze data from the task: GSR model parameters show test-retest reliability around .80-.90, on par with reliable self-report measures. Furthermore, we demonstrate how model parameters result in greater validity compared to the IAT D-score, Quad model, and simple diffusion model contrasts, predicting outcomes related to intergroup contact and motivation. Finally, we present a simple point-and-click software tool for fitting the model, which uses a pre-trained neural network to estimate best-fit parameters of the GSR model. This approach allows easy and instantaneous fitting of IAT data with minimal demands on coding or technical expertise on the part of the user, making the new model accessible and effective.

Two social minds in one brain? error-related negativity provides evidence for parallel processing pathways during social evaluation

Several authors assume that evaluative conditioning (EC) relies on high-level propositional thinking. In contrast, the dual-process perspective proposes two processing pathways, one associative and the other propositional, contributing to EC. Dual-process theorists argue that attitudinal ambiguity resulting from these two pathways' conflicting evaluations demonstrate the involvement of both automatic and controlled processes in EC. Previously, we suggested that amplitude variations of error-related negativity and error-positivity, two well-researched event-related potentials of performance monitoring, allow for the detection of attitudinal ambiguity at the neural level. The present study utilises self-reported evaluation, categorisation performance, and neural correlates of performance monitoring to explore associative-propositional ambiguity during social attitude formation. Our results show that compared to associative-propositional harmony, attitudinal ambiguity correlates with more neutral subjective evaluations, longer response times, increased error commission, and diminished error-related negativity amplitudes. While our findings align with dual-process models, we aim to offer a propositional interpretation. We discuss dual-process theories in the context of evolutionary psychology, suggesting that associative processes may only represent a small piece of the EC puzzle.

Agency influences vicarious approach/avoidance effects

Social learning plays a prominent role in shaping individual preferences. The vicarious approach-avoidance effect consists of developing a preference for attitudinal objects that have been approached over objects that have been avoided by another person (model). In two experiments (N = 448 participants), we explored how the vicarious approach-avoidance effect is affected by agency (model's voluntary choice) and identification with the model. The results consistently revealed vicarious approach-avoidance effects in preference, as indicated by the semantic differential and the Implicit Association Test. Agency increased the size of the preference assessed through the semantic differential but did not significantly impact preference in the Implicit Association Test. Identification with the model had no significant impact on the vicarious approach-avoidance effect. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.

An Assimilative Effect of Stimulus Co-Occurrence on Evaluation Despite Contrasting Relational Information

The co-occurrence of a neutral stimulus with affective stimuli typically causes the neutral stimulus's evaluation to shift toward the affective stimuli's valence. Does that assimilative effect occur even when one knows the co-occurrence is due to an opposition relation between the stimuli (e.g., Batman stops crime)? Previous evidence tentatively supported that possibility, based on results compatible with an assimilative effect obscured by a larger contrast effect of the opposition relation (e.g., people like Batman less than expected, perhaps due to his co-occurrence with crime). We report three experiments (N = 802) in which participants preferred stimuli that stopped positive events over stimuli that stopped negative events-an assimilative effect of co-occurrence, unobscured by a contrast effect, despite comprehending the opposition relation and its evaluative implications. Our findings suggest that the assimilative effect of co-occurrence is potentially ubiquitous, not limited only to co-occurrence due to relations that suggest valence similarity.

Articulation dynamics and evaluative conditioning: investigating the boundary conditions, mental representation, and origin of the in-out effect

People prefer linguistic stimuli with an inward (e.g. BODIKA) over those with an outward articulation dynamic (e.g. KODIBA), a phenomenon known as the articulatory in-out effect. Despite its robustness across languages and contexts, the phenomenon is still poorly understood. To learn more about the effect's boundary conditions, mental representation, and origin, we crossed the in-out effect with evaluative conditioning research. In five experiments (N = 713, three experiments pre-registered), we systematically paired words containing inward versus outward dynamics with pictures of negative versus positive valence. Although this evaluative conditioning procedure reversed the preference for inward over outward words, this was the case only for words with the same consonant sequences as the conditioned words. For words with inward/outward dynamics but different consonant sequences than the conditioned ones, a regular in-out effect emerged. Also, no preference reversal at all emerged for the conditioned consonant sequences when the contingency between single consonants at specific positions and positive/negative valence was zero. Implications of these findings for the in-out effect and evaluative conditioning are discussed.

Evaluative Conditioning: Past, Present, and Future

Evaluative conditioning (EC) research investigates changes in the evaluation of a stimulus after co-occurrence with an affective stimulus. To explain the motivation behind this research, this review begins with an overview of the history of EC research, followed by a summary of the state of the art with respect to three key questions. First, how should EC procedures be used to influence evaluation? We provide a guide based on evidence concerning the functional properties of EC effects. Second, how does the EC effect occur? We discuss the possible mediating cognitive processes and their automaticity. Third, are EC effects ubiquitous outside the lab? We discuss the evidence for the external validity of EC research. We conclude that the most important open questions pertain to the relevance of EC to everyday life and to the level of control that characterizes the processes that mediate the EC effect after people notice the stimulus co-occurrence.

We like it ‘cause you take it: vicarious effects of approach/avoidance behaviours on observers

We present five studies investigating the effects of approach and avoidance behaviours when individuals do not enact them but, instead, learn that others have performed them. In Experiment 1, when participants read that a fictitious character (model) had approached a previously unknown product, they ascribed to this model a liking for the object. In contrast, they ascribed to the model a disliking for the avoided product. In Experiment 2, this result emerged, with a smaller effect size, even when it was clear that the behaviours followed specific instructions from a third party. The model had been a mere executor instead of behaving autonomously. Finally, in Experiments 3, 4, and 5, we showed, with direct and indirect measures of attitudes, that reading that the model had approached vs avoided products was sufficient to create preferences in the participant for the approached one, regardless of whether it was explained that the model was a mere executor. This research highlights the largely unexplored effects of vicarious approach/avoidance behaviours. Theoretical and practical implications and possible developments of this line of research are discussed.

The role of causal structure in implicit evaluation

Causal relationships, unlike mere co-occurrence, allow humans to obtain rewards and avoid punishments by intervening on their environment. Accordingly, explicit (controlled) evaluations of stimuli encountered in the environment are known to be sensitive to causal relationships above and beyond mere co-occurrence. In this project, we conduct stringent tests of whether implicit (automatic) evaluation also reflects causal relationships and begin to probe the representational mechanisms underlying such sensitivity. Participants (N = 4836) observed causal events during which two stimuli were equally contingent with positive or negative outcomes but only one of them was causally responsible for these outcomes. Across 6 studies, varying in design and amount of verbal scaffolding provided, differences in causal status consistently guided not only explicit measures of evaluation (Likert and slider scales; Bayes Factor meta-analysis: Cohen's d = 0.28, BF₁₀ > 10⁴⁶) but also their implicit counterparts (Implicit Association Tests; Bayes Factor meta-analysis: Cohen's d = 0.22, BF₁₀ > 10²⁹). However, unlike their explicit counterparts, implicit evaluations were not sensitive to causal relationships that had to be flexibly derived by combining disparate past experiences. Taken together, these studies suggest that implicit evaluations are sensitive to causal information. Such sensitivity seems to be mediated via precompiled, causally informed value representations rather than online computations over a causal model.

Effects of self-instructed stimulus-affect plans on indirectly measured and self-reported evaluative responses

Repeatedly experiencing a specific stimulus-affect contingency influences subsequent evaluative responses towards the respective stimulus (e.g., evaluative conditioning). In the present research, we provide further evidence that verbally processed stimulus-affect contingencies in the form of if-then plans have comparable evaluative consequences. We present three studies (N = 323) in which participants verbally linked cupcakes to either a positive ("delicious") or a negative ("disgusting") affective response while being instructed with the same health-related goal. We tested the evaluative consequences of processing these verbal stimulus-affect plans in a valence-based response-compatibility paradigm (Implicit Association Test, IAT) and self-reported liking ratings. We failed to observe the predicted effect in the first study and updated the methodology for the following two studies. With the updated procedure (two studies, N = 239), we found the hypothesized effect that processing a verbal stimulus-affect plan influences subsequent responses in the IAT and self-reported ratings in an evaluatively congruent direction. We discuss these results in relation to similar effects following directly experienced stimulus-affect contingencies and instructed evaluative conditioning. Furthermore, our present research highlights the potential to use verbal self-instruction in a stimulus-affect format to self-regulate one's evaluative responses towards specific stimuli (e.g., unhealthy snacks).

EXPRESS: Observational evaluative conditioning is sensitive to relational information

Social learning represents an important avenue via which evaluations can be formed or changed. Rather than learn slowly through trial and error, we can instead observe how another person (a "model") interacts with stimuli and quickly adjust our own behaviour. We report five studies (n = 912) that focused on one subtype of social learning, observational evaluative conditioning (OEC), and how it is moderated by relational information (i.e., information indicating how a stimulus and a model's reactions are related). Participants observed a model reacting positively to one stimulus and negatively to another, and were either told that these reactions were genuine, faked, or opposite to the model's actual feelings. Stimulus evaluations were then indexed using ratings and a personalised Implicit Association Test (pIAT). When the model's reactions were said to be genuine, OEC effects emerged in the expected direction. When the model's reactions were said to be faked, the magnitude of self-reported, but not pIAT, effects was reduced. Finally, stating that the model's reactions were opposite to his actual feelings eliminated or reversed self-reported effects and eliminated pIAT effects. We consider how these findings relate to previous work as well as mental-process theories.

Attitudes as propositional representations

Attitudes are mental representations that help to explain why stimuli evoke positive or negative responses. Until recently, attitudes were often thought of as associations in memory. This idea inspired extensive research on evaluative conditioning (EC) and implicit evaluation. However, attitudes can also be seen as propositional representations, which, unlike associations, specify relational information and have a truth value. We review research on EC and implicit evaluation that tested the basic tenets of the propositional perspective on attitudes. In line with this perspective, studies show that both phenomena are moderated by relational and truth information. We discuss implications for the prediction and influencing of seemingly irrational behavior such as excessive alcohol intake and implicit racial bias.

Attitudinal Effects of Stimulus Co-Occurrence and Stimulus Relations: Range and Limits of Intentional Control

Research suggests that evaluations of an object can be simultaneously influenced by (a) the mere co-occurrence of the object with a pleasant or unpleasant stimulus (e.g., mere co-occurrence of object A and negative event B) and (b) the object’s particular relation to the co-occurring stimulus (e.g., object A starts vs. stops negative event B). Using a multinomial modeling approach to disentangle the two kinds of influences on choice decisions, three experiments investigated whether learners can intentionally control the relative impact of stimulus co-occurrence and stimulus relations. An integrative analysis of the data from the three experiments ( N = 1,154) indicate that incentivized instructions to counteract effects of stimulus co-occurrence by focusing on stimulus relations increased the impact of stimulus relations without affecting the impact of stimulus co-occurrence. Implications for evaluative learning, intentional control, and public policy are discussed.

Automatic processes in evaluative learning

This special issue of Cognition and Emotion assembles recent advances in theorising and empirical research on the automaticity of evaluative learning. Based on a taxonomy of automatic processes in evaluative learning, we distinguish between processes that are involved in translating evaluative experiences into evaluative mental representations (acquisition), and processes that translate these representations into evaluative biases in perception, thought, and action (activation and application). We emphasise that automaticity concerns the operating conditions of these processes (unawareness, unintentionality, uncontrollability, efficiency), not their operating principles, and thus can vary within specific processes (e.g. inferences can occur in either an automatic or non-automatic fashion). We review and discuss contemporary theories and methodological approaches to automatic processes in evaluative learning against the backdrop of our framework, and we highlight the contributions of the papers of this special issue to the question whether and when evaluative changes can occur in an automatic manner.

Behavioral and Physiological Evidence Challenges the Automatic Acquisition of Evaluations

Dual-learning theories of evaluations posit that evaluations can be automatically (i.e., efficiently, unconsciously, uncontrollably, and involuntarily) acquired. They also often assume the existence of evaluative-learning processes that are impervious to verbal information. In this article, we explain that recent research challenges both assertions for three categories of measures: explicit evaluative measures, implicit evaluative measures, and physiological measures of fear. In doing so, we also question the widespread assumption that implicit (i.e., typically behavioral and physiological) compared with explicit (i.e., self-reported) evaluative measures are indicative of the way evaluations are acquired. In the second part of the article, we discuss the practical implications of these recent findings.

Research With Implicit Measures: Suggestions for a New Agenda of Sub-Personal Psychology

Research with implicit measures has been criticized for an unclear meaning of the term implicit and inadequate psychometric properties, as well as problems regarding internal validity and low predictive validity of implicit measures. To these criticisms, we add an overly restrictive theoretical focus and research agenda that is limited to the narrow dichotomy between associations versus propositional beliefs. In this article, we address the last problem by introducing a new perspective of a sub-personal psychology. This broad approach expands the conceptual horizon in order to make use of the full potential that experimental paradigms can offer for assessing, explaining, predicting, and modifying human functioning and behavior. Going beyond the analysis of associations and beliefs, we highlight the use of experimental paradigms to examine and modify motivational, environmental, and episodic memory factors that influence human action.