Explaining the persistence of false memories: a proposal based on associative activation and thematic extraction

Emotional false memories: the impact of response bias under speeded retrieval conditions

Emotional false memory findings using the DRM paradigm have been marked by higher false alarms to negatively arousing compared to neutral critical lure items. Explanations for these findings have mainly focused on false memory-based accounts. However, here we address the question of whether a response bias for emotional stimuli can, at least in part, explain this phenomenon. Participants viewed both neutral and negative arousing DRM lists and completed a recognition test in speeded or self-paced conditions. Speeded test reduces the opportunity to adjust response bias. Analysis showed no significant difference in false recognition across critical lure types for the speeded condition, but false recognition was higher for negative compared to neutral critical lures in the self-paced condition. We argue that when retrieval does not allow for shifts in response criteria, false alarms to negative emotional critical lures appear more similar to neutral equivalents. The discussion explores memory-based and criterion-shift explanations for the enhanced emotional false memory finding.

False memory-guided eye movements: insights from a DRM-Saccade paradigm

The Deese-Roediger and McDermott (DRM) paradigm and visually guided saccade tasks are both prominent research tools in their own right. This study introduces a novel DRM-Saccade paradigm, merging both methodologies. We used rule-based saccadic eye movements whereby participants were presented with items at test and were asked to make a saccade to the left or right of the item to denote a recognition or non-recognition decision. We measured old/new recognition decisions and saccadic latencies. Experiment 1 used a pro/anti saccade task to a single target. We found slower saccadic latencies for correct rejection of critical lures, but no latency difference between correct recognition of studied items and false recognition of critical lures. Experiment 2 used a two-target saccade task and also measured corrective saccades. Findings corroborated those from Experiment 1. Participants adjusted their initial decisions to increase accurate recognition of studied items and rejection of unrelated lures but there were no such corrections for critical lures. We argue that rapid saccades indicate cognitive processing driven by familiarity thresholds. These occur before slower source-monitoring is able to process any conflict. The DRM-Saccade task could effectively track real-time cognitive resource use during recognition decisions.

Imagination Reduces False Memories for Everyday Action Sentences: Evidence From Pragmatic Inferences

Human memory can be unreliable, and when reading a sentence with a pragmatic implication, such as "the karate champion hit the cinder block," people often falsely remember that the karate champion "broke" the cinder block. Yet, research has shown that encoding instructions affect the false memories we form. On the one hand, instructing participants to imagine themselves manipulating the to-be-recalled items increase false memories (imagination inflation effect). But on the other hand, instructions to imagine have reduced false memories in the DRM paradigm (imagination facilitation effect). Here, we explored the effect of imaginal encoding with pragmatic inferences, a way to study false memories for information about everyday actions. Across two experiments, we manipulated imaginal encoding through the instructions given to participants and the after-item filler task (none vs. math operations). In Experiment 1, participants were either assigned to the encoding condition of imagine+no filler; pay attention+math; or memorize+math. In Experiment 2, the encoding instructions (imagine vs. memorize) and the filler task (none vs. math) were compared across four separate conditions. Results from the two experiments showed that imagination instructions lead to better memory, by showing a higher proportion of correct responses and better performance in a memory benefit index. Similarly, a significant reduction of false memories was observed across both experiments, even though a complementary Bayesian analysis only supported this conclusion for Experiment 1. The findings show that imaginal encoding improves memory, suggesting the engagement of a distinctiveness heuristic and source-monitoring process.

Evidence for adult age-invariance in associative false recognition

Older people are more prone to memory distortions and errors than young people, but do not always show greater false recognition in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task. We report two preregistered experiments investigating whether recent findings of age-invariant false recognition extend to designs in which studied items are blocked. According to (Tun, P. A., Wingfield, A., Rosen, M. J., & Blanchard, L. (1998). Response latencies for false memories: Gist-based processes in normal aging. Psychology and Aging, 13(2), 230-241.), age effects on false recognition in the DRM task are due to a greater reliance on gist processing which is enhanced under blocked study conditions. Experiment 1 assessed false recognition in an online variant of the DRM task where words were presented visually, with incidental encoding. The results showed Bayesian evidence against greater false recognition by older adults, whether lures were semantically associated with studied lists, or perceptually related (presented in the same distinctive font as studied lists) or both. Experiment 2 used a typical DRM procedure with auditory lists and intentional encoding, closely reproducing (Tun, P. A., Wingfield, A., Rosen, M. J., & Blanchard, L. (1998). Response latencies for false memories: Gist-based processes in normal aging. Psychology and Aging, 13(2), 230-241.) Experiment 2 but omitting an initial test of recall. The results showed evidence against an age-related increase in critical lure false recognition under these conditions. Together, the data suggest that older people do not make more associative memory errors in recognition tests than young people.