Strategic offloading of delayed intentions into the external environment

Is precrastination related to updating and inhibition aspects of executive function?

ABSTRACTPrecrastination is the act of completing a task as soon as possible even at the expense of extra effort. Past research has suggested that individuals precrastinate due to a desire to reduce their cognitive load, also known as the cognitive load-reduction (CLEAR) hypothesis [VonderHaar, R. L., McBride, D. M., & Rosenbaum, D. A. (2019). Task order choices in cognitive and perceptual-motor tasks: The cognitive-load-reduction (CLEAR) hypothesis. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 81(7), 2517-2525. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-019-01754-z]. This idea stems from the notion that it is taxing to hold intentions in working memory and completing a task as soon as possible releases cognitive resources for other tasks. Based on this hypothesis, we predicted that aspects of executive function may play a role in precrastination. We tested this prediction using a box-moving task developed in a previous study to measure precrastination. We also incorporated tasks measuring updating and inhibition aspects of executive function: the Stroop interference (both experiments) and Simon tasks (Experiment 2) to measure inhibition and the 2-Back memory task (Experiment 1) to measure updating. We found that the majority of participants precrastinated significantly throughout the box-moving task trials, consistent with results from past studies. However, no relation was found between the executive function tasks and rates of precrastination. These results may be due to the automaticity of precrastination when cognitive resources are limited.

Can you help me? Using others to offload cognition

One of the most ancient and widely used forms of cognitive offloading is the outsourcing of cognitive operations onto other humans. Here, we explore whether humans preferentially seek out and use information from more competent compared with less competent others in an ongoing cognitive task. Participants (N = 120) completed a novel computerised visuospatial working memory task where each trial required them to remember either one, five, or ten target locations and recall them after a brief delay. Next, participants watched two virtual people compete in a distinct memory game, where one performed relatively well, demonstrating a stronger memory, and the other performed relatively poorly, demonstrating a weaker memory. Finally, participants completed the initial memory task again, but this time, either the strong-memory person or the weak-memory person was available to help with recall on each trial. Our results showed that, through observation and without direct instruction, participants acquired beliefs about the virtual people's cognitive proficiencies and could readily draw upon these beliefs to inform offloading decisions. Participants were typically more likely to ask for help from the strong-memory person, and this tendency was independent from other factors known to drive cognitive offloading more generally, like task difficulty, unaided cognitive ability, and metacognitive confidence.

The saving enhanced memory effect can be observed when only a subset of items are saved

Saving one list of words, such as on a computer or by writing them down, can improve a person's ability to learn and remember a second list of words that are not saved. This phenomenon, known as the saving enhanced memory effect, is typically observed by comparing the recall of nonsaved items when other items are saved versus when they are not saved. In past research, the effect has been shown to occur when participants save an entire list before learning a new list. In the current research, we examined whether the effect can be observed when participants save a subset of items within a single list. The results of two experiments confirmed that partial saving can lead to a saving enhanced memory effect, with the effect observed regardless of whether participants saved items by clicking a button on the computer or writing them out by hand. The effect was observed on an item-specific cued-recall test (Experiment 1) as well as a free recall test that did not control the order of output (Experiment 2). However, the effect size did vary as a function of how participants attempted to recall the items on the final test. Specifically, participants who initiated their output by recalling nonsaved items exhibited a significantly larger saving enhanced memory effect than those who initiated their output by reproducing saved items. Together, these findings expand our understanding of the saving enhanced memory effect and shine new light on the impacts of cognitive offloading on human memory.

Intention offloading: Domain-general versus task-specific confidence signals

Intention offloading refers to the use of external reminders to help remember delayed intentions (e.g., setting an alert to help you remember when you need to take your medication). Research has found that metacognitive processes influence offloading such that individual differences in confidence predict individual differences in offloading regardless of objective cognitive ability. The current study investigated the cross-domain organization of this relationship. Participants performed two perceptual discrimination tasks where objective accuracy was equalized using a staircase procedure. In a memory task, two measures of intention offloading were collected, (1) the overall likelihood of setting reminders, and (2) the bias in reminder-setting compared to the optimal strategy. It was found that perceptual confidence was associated with the first measure but not the second. It is shown that this is because individual differences in perceptual confidence capture meaningful differences in objective ability despite the staircase procedure. These findings indicate that intention offloading is influenced by both domain-general and task-specific metacognitive signals. They also show that even when task performance is equalized via staircasing, individual differences in confidence cannot be considered a pure measure of metacognitive bias.

Children's metacognition and cognitive offloading in an immediate memory task

Cognitive offloading is used to supplement internal processing demands through external actions such as writing down information. While metacognition plays a critical role in adults' cognitive offloading decisions, less is known about the relation between metacognition and cognitive offloading in children. Here, we introduced an immediate memory task to 11- to 12-year-olds under two conditions: no choice to offload and choice to offload. Participants made metacognitive judgements about their memory capacity, and the task performance components such as accuracy and effort. Our results revealed that recall accuracy of the to-be-remembered items increased in the choice condition. Interestingly, while there was a consensus amongst participants that they chose to offload to maximise accuracy and reduce effort, there was no relation between offloading behaviour and metacognitions about accuracy and effort. On the other hand, metacognition for memory capacity was related to offloading behaviour. We discuss the implications for further understanding of the relation between cognitive offloading and metacognition in children.

Self-reported strategy use and prospective memory: The roles of cue focality and task importance

Interest in the metacognitive aspects of prospective memory (PM) is growing. Yet, the interplay between participants' metacognitive awareness of PM task demands and features that contribute to successful PM require further attention. To this aim, participants in the current study completed laboratory-based PM tasks of varying difficulty (cue focality: focal, nonfocal-category, or nonfocal-syllable) and reported their strategy use and perceptions of PM task importance. Most participants reported using a strategy regardless of cue focality. However, only under the most challenging condition (i.e., nonfocal-syllable) did participants who reported using a strategy exhibit better PM performance compared to those who did not use a strategy. Additionally, strategy use and cue focality were independently associated with greater costs to ongoing task performance: strategy users exhibited greater slowing relative to individuals who did not use a strategy, and the extent of slowing was greater as the task difficulty increased across cue focality. Finally, perceived task importance appeared to play an important role in the interactive link between cue focality and strategy use on PM performance for the more challenging, nonfocal PM tasks. Specifically, moderation analyses suggested that greater perceived task importance alone may improve the likelihood of PM success for moderately challenging PM tasks (i.e., nonfocal-category), but for the most challenging PM tasks (i.e., nonfocal-syllable), individuals' strategy use was still associated with better PM performance. The present study expands our understanding of metacognition's role in PM performance and has implications for everyday PM performance.

Cognitive offloading is value-based decision making: Modelling cognitive effort and the expected value of memory

How do people decide between maintaining information in short-term memory or offloading it to external reminders? How does this affect subsequent memory? This article presents a simple computational model based on two principles: A) items stored in brain-based memory occupy its limited capacity, generating an opportunity cost; B) reminders incur a small physical-action cost, but capacity is effectively unlimited. These costs are balanced against the value of remembering, which determines the optimal strategy. Simulations reproduce many empirical findings, including: 1) preferential offloading of high-value items; 2) increased offloading at higher memory loads; 3) offloading can cause forgetting of offloaded items ('Google effect') but 4) improved memory for other items ('saving-enhanced memory'); 5) reduced saving-enhanced-memory effect when reminders are unreliable; 6) influence of item-value: people may preferentially offload high-value items and store additional low-value items in brain-based memory; 7) greatest sensitivity to the effort of reminder-setting at intermediate rather than highest/lowest levels of task difficulty; 8) increased offloading in individuals with poorer memory ability. Therefore, value-based decision-making provides a simple unifying account of many cognitive offloading phenomena. These results are consistent with an opportunity-cost model of cognitive effort, which can explain why internal memory feels effortful but reminders do not.

Influence of the physical effort of reminder-setting on strategic offloading of delayed intentions

Intention offloading involves using external reminders such as diaries, to-do lists, and digital alerts to help us remember delayed intentions. Recent studies have provided evidence for various cognitive and metacognitive factors that guide intention offloading, but little research has investigated the physical cost of reminder-setting itself. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments investigating how the cost of physical effort associated with reminder-setting influences strategic intention offloading under different levels of memory load. At all memory loads, reminder-setting was reduced when it was more effortful. The ability to set reminders allowed participants to compensate for the influence of memory load on accuracy in the low-effort condition; this effect was attenuated in the high-effort condition. In addition, there was evidence that participants with less confidence in their memory abilities were more likely to set reminders. Contrary to prediction, physical effort had the greatest effect on reminder-setting at intermediate memory loads. We speculate that the physical costs of reminder-setting might have the greatest impact when participants are uncertain about their strategy choice. These results demonstrate the importance of physical effort as one of the factors relevant to cost-benefit decision-making about cognitive offloading strategies.

Human and AI collaboration in the higher education environment: opportunities and concerns

In service of the goal of examining how cognitive science can facilitate human-computer interactions in complex systems, we explore how cognitive psychology research might help educators better utilize artificial intelligence and AI supported tools as facilitatory to learning, rather than see these emerging technologies as a threat. We also aim to provide historical perspective, both on how automation and technology has generated unnecessary apprehension over time, and how generative AI technologies such as ChatGPT are a product of the discipline of cognitive science. We introduce a model for how higher education instruction can adapt to the age of AI by fully capitalizing on the role that metacognition knowledge and skills play in determining learning effectiveness. Finally, we urge educators to consider how AI can be seen as a critical collaborator to be utilized in our efforts to educate around the critical workforce skills of effective communication and collaboration.

Medication management error types: Associations with mild cognitive impairment subtype

Objective: Medication management errors are suspected to be prevalent among older adults with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). This study examined types of simulated medication-taking errors in cognitively normal older adults (CN; n = 131), single domain amnestic MCI (sdMCI, n = 91), and multi-domain MCI (mdMCI, n = 44). Errors were measured using the medication management ability assessment (MMAA). Methods: 266 participants seen for neuropsychological evaluation (94.4% White, 57.9% female, average age = 72, average education = 14 years) completed the MMAA (version 4.1), a performance-based task of medication management. Group differences in MMAA total scores, accuracy, and error types were evaluated using Kruskall-Wallis H tests. This study was the first to explore a newly operationalized error, perseverations, caused by taking a specific dose ≥2 times during the simulation. Results: CN and sdMCI groups had higher MMAA total scores than individuals with mdMCI, indicating better overall performance. The mdMCI group made a higher number of omission errors (missed pills) than other groups, but no differences were found for commission errors (extra pills). The sdMCI group made more perseverative errors compared to the CN group. Conclusions: Individuals with mdMCI made more simulated medication management errors than CN and sdMCI groups, indicating that they may be most vulnerable to difficulties in medication management. In contrast, sdMCI individuals were more likely to make perseverative errors, which may reflect a tendency towards overcompensation of memory loss. Future studies should assess whether MMAA performance is associated with patterns of real-world medication-taking in more diverse samples of older adults.

Assessing time-based prospective memory online: A comparison study between laboratory-based and web-based testing

Prospective memory (PM, i.e., the ability to remember and perform future intentions) is assessed mainly within laboratory settings; however, in the last two decades, several studies have started testing PM online. Most part of those studies focused on event-based PM (EBPM), and only a few assessed time-based PM (TBPM), possibly because time keeping is difficult to control or standardise without experimental control. Thus, it is still unclear whether time monitoring patterns in online studies replicate typical patterns obtained in laboratory tasks. In this study, we therefore aimed to investigate whether the behavioural outcome measures obtained from the traditional TBPM paradigm in the laboratory-accuracy and time monitoring-are comparable with an online version in a sample of 101 younger adults. Results showed no significant difference in TBPM performance in the laboratory versus online setting, as well as no difference in time monitoring. However, we found that participants were somewhat faster and more accurate at the ongoing task during the laboratory assessment, but those differences were not related to holding an intention in mind. The findings suggest that, although participants seemed generally more distracted when tested remotely, online assessment yielded similar results in key temporal characteristics and behavioural performance as for the laboratory assessment. The results are discussed in terms of possible conceptual and methodological implications for online testing.

Mutual interplay between cognitive offloading and secondary task performance

Various modern tools, such as smartphones, allow for cognitive offloading (i.e., the externalization of cognitive processes). In this study, we examined the use and consequences of cognitive offloading in demanding situations in which people perform multiple tasks concurrently-mimicking the requirements of daily life. In a preregistered study, we adapted the dual-task paradigm so that one of the tasks allowed for cognitive offloading. As a primary task, our participants (N = 172) performed the pattern copy task-a highly demanding working memory task that allows for offloading at various degrees. In this task, we manipulated the temporal costs of offloading. Concurrently, half of the participants responded to a secondary N-back task. As our main research question, we investigated the impact of offloading behavior on secondary task performance. We observed that more pronounced offloading in the condition without temporal costs was accompanied by a more accurate performance in the N-back task. Furthermore, the necessity to respond to the N-back task increased offloading behavior. These results suggest an interplay between offloading and secondary task performance: in demanding situations, individuals increasingly use cognitive offloading, which releases internal resources that can then be devoted to improving performance in other, concurrent tasks.

Just write it down: Similarity in the benefit from cognitive offloading in young and older adults

Past research conducted primarily in young adults has demonstrated the utility of cognitive offloading for benefitting performance of memory-based tasks, particularly at high memory loads. At the same time, older adults show declines in a variety of memory abilities, including subtle changes in short-term memory, suggesting that cognitive offloading could also benefit performance of memory-based tasks in this group. To this end, 94 participants (62 young adults, 32 older adults) were tested on a retrospective audiovisual short-term memory task in two blocked conditions. Offloading was permitted in the offloading choice condition but not in the internal memory condition. Performance was improved for both age groups in the offloading choice condition compared to the internal memory condition. Moreover, the choice to use the offloading strategy was similar across age groups at high memory loads, and use of the offloading strategy benefitted performance for young and older adults similarly. These data suggest that older adults can make effective use of cognitive offloading to rescue performance of memory-based activities, and invites future research on the benefits of cognitive offloading for older adults in other, more complex tasks where age-related memory impairment is expected to be more prominent.

Psychological distance intervention reminders reduce alcohol consumption frequency in daily life

Modifying behaviors, such as alcohol consumption, is difficult. Creating psychological distance between unhealthy triggers and one's present experience can encourage change. Using two multisite, randomized experiments, we examine whether theory-driven strategies to create psychological distance-mindfulness and perspective-taking-can change drinking behaviors among young adults without alcohol dependence via a 28-day smartphone intervention (Study 1, N = 108 participants, 5492 observations; Study 2, N = 218 participants, 9994 observations). Study 2 presents a close replication with a fully remote delivery during the COVID-19 pandemic. During weeks when they received twice-a-day intervention reminders, individuals in the distancing interventions reported drinking less frequently than on control weeks-directionally in Study 1, and significantly in Study 2. Intervention reminders reduced drinking frequency but did not impact amount. We find that smartphone-based mindfulness and perspective-taking interventions, aimed to create psychological distance, can change behavior. This approach requires repeated reminders, which can be delivered via smartphones.

Prospective memories in the wild: Predicting memory for intentions in natural environments

Prospective memory, the ability to remember an intention at the appropriate future moment, is often investigated in the laboratory to maximize experimental control. However, demands of laboratory prospective memory tasks only partly map onto everyday demands. Therefore, it is an open question whether factors which predict prospective memory in the laboratory also predict prospective memory in the real world. We combined diary and ecological momentary assessment methods to investigate which factors, that have been repeatedly shown to predict prospective memory performance in laboratory tasks, are related to the fulfillment of everyday intentions. Results showed that substantial portions of variance in real-world prospective memory performance could be explained with the factors found to be significant in laboratory. The most powerful predictors were perceived intention importance, the use of external memory aids, delay interval, and conscientiousness. However, some meaningful laboratory predictors (e.g., working memory) played only a minor role in natural environments and a large portion of the variance in everyday intention fulfillment remained unexplained. The results substantially extend the understanding of conditions and personality variables most conducive to remembering intentions, but they also suggest that additional factors influencing real-world prospective memory remain to be discovered.

Eye Movements as Proxy for Visual Working Memory Usage: Increased Reliance on the External World in Korsakoff Syndrome

In the assessment of visual working memory, estimating the maximum capacity is currently the gold standard. However, traditional tasks disregard that information generally remains available in the external world. Only when to-be-used information is not readily accessible, memory is taxed. Otherwise, people sample information from the environment as a form of cognitive offloading. To investigate how memory deficits impact the trade-off between sampling externally or storing internally, we compared gaze behaviour of individuals with Korsakoff amnesia (n = 24, age range 47-74 years) and healthy controls (n = 27, age range 40-81 years) on a copy task that provoked different strategies by having information freely accessible (facilitating sampling) or introducing a gaze-contingent waiting time (provoking storing). Indeed, patients sampled more often and longer, compared to controls. When sampling became time-consuming, controls reduced sampling and memorised more. Patients also showed reduced and longer sampling in this condition, suggesting an attempt at memorisation. Importantly, however, patients sampled disproportionately more often than controls, whilst accuracy dropped. This finding suggests that amnesia patients sample frequently and do not fully compensate for increased sampling costs by memorising more at once. In other words, Korsakoff amnesia resulted in a heavy reliance on the world as 'external memory'.

Take a load off: examining partial and complete cognitive offloading of medication information

Although cognitive offloading, or the use of physical action to reduce internal cognitive demands, is a commonly used strategy in everyday life, relatively little is known about the conditions that encourage offloading and the memorial consequences of different offloading strategies for performance. Much of the extant work in this domain has focused on laboratory-based tasks consisting of word lists, letter strings, or numerical stimuli and thus makes little contact with real-world scenarios under which engaging in cognitive offloading might be likely. Accordingly, the current work examines offloading choice behavior and potential benefits afforded by offloading health-related information. Experiment 1 tests for internal memory performance for different pieces of missing medication interaction information. Experiment 2 tests internal memory and offloading under full offloading and partial offloading instructions for interaction outcomes that are relatively low severity (e.g., sweating). Experiment 3 extends Experiment 2 by testing offloading behavior and benefit in low-severity, medium-severity (e.g., backache), and high-severity interaction outcomes (e.g., heart attack). Here, we aimed to elucidate the potential benefits afforded by partial offloading and to examine whether there appears to be a preference for choosing to offload (i) difficult-to-remember information across outcomes that vary in severity, as well as (ii) information from more severe interaction outcomes. Results suggest that partial offloading benefits performance compared to relying on internal memory alone, but full offloading is more beneficial to performance than partial offloading.

Outsourcing Memory to External Tools: A Review of 'Intention Offloading'

How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as 'intention offloading'. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals' ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies that are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools.

Framing cognitive offloading in terms of gains or losses: achieving a more optimal use of reminders

Nowadays individuals can readily set reminders to offload intentions onto external resources, such as smartphone alerts, rather than using internal memory. Individuals tend to be biased, setting more reminders than would be optimal. We address the question whether the reminder bias depends on offloading scenarios being framed as either gains or losses, both between-participants (Experiment 1) and within-participants (Experiment 2). In both experiments, framing of reminders in terms of gains resulted in participants employing a risk-averse strategy and using more reminders than would be optimal. Importantly, however, participants used reminders more optimally and were more willing to choose the risk-seeking option of remembering internally when reminders implied a loss. Based on metacognitive measures in Experiment 2, the reminder bias increased the more underconfident participants were about their memory abilities in both framing scenarios. Framing did not alter this relationship between erroneous metacognitive underconfidence and reminder bias but provides an additional influence. We conclude that emphasizing the losses (costs) associated with external reminders helps in achieving more optimal decisions in offloading situations, and that in addition to cognitive effort and metacognitive judgments, framing needs to be considered in improving individuals’ offloading behavior.

Prevalence of digital amnesia, somatic symptoms and sleep disorders among youth during COVID-19 pandemic

Background

The proliferation of COVID-19 radically altered people's daily routines over the last two years, particularly among young. Closures of schools and colleges resulted in virtual learning that increased reliance on gadgets causing digital dependency among youth. The prevalence of digital amnesia, somatic symptoms and sleep disorders among youth during this pandemic require considerable attention since it has not been addressed widely.

Methods

Cross-sectional study was carried out among 326 youth aged between 18 to 25 years. Digital Amnesia Scale, Somatic Symptom Disorder-B Criteria Scale (SSD-12) and Sleep disorders Symptom Checklist (SDS-CL-17) were used to collect data from participants.

Results

Significant positive relationship was found between digital amnesia, somatic symptoms and sleep disorders among youth. Youth differed significantly in their somatic symptoms based on demographic variables such as gender, family type and area of residence. Digital amnesia had significant impact on somatic symptoms through the mediation effect of insomnia and circadian rhythm dimensions of sleep disorders.

Conclusion

Productive use of digital devices would help youth reduce digital amnesia. Practicing digital break/digital detox could also help them improve their cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects, as well as their quality of sleep.

Prospective memory assessment: Scientific advances and future directions

Prospective Memory (PM), the ability to remember to realize intended actions in the future, is crucial for maintaining autonomy. Decades of research has focused on a so-called age PM paradox, where older adults outperformed younger adults on some PM tasks, but not others. Contributing to this paradox is heterogeneity in and a lack of valid assessment methods. Previous research showed a lack of convergent validity between performance-based PM and both self-report and informant-report measures. We argue that questionnaires may be relevant to obtain information regarding patients’ awareness of their PM difficulties but need to be used in conjunction with performance-based tools. Within performance-based PM tools there are also difficulties in measurement: 15–60 min experimental tasks and batteries have a good reliability but cannot usually fit in a standard clinical evaluation, while shorter PM measures have lower reliability and sensitivity. In this perspective paper, we encourage researchers to develop more ecologically valid tools. Innovative PM paradigms that allow participants to generate their own intentions and that take task costs into consideration should be developed. Future research will also need to focus on cognitive factors, personality and online evaluation, to improve PM assessment and develop ad-hoc rehabilitation programs.

Supporting Cognition With Modern Technology: Distributed Cognition Today and in an AI-Enhanced Future

In the present article, we explore prospects for using artificial intelligence (AI) to distribute cognition via cognitive offloading (i.e., to delegate thinking tasks to AI-technologies). Modern technologies for cognitive support are rapidly developing and increasingly popular. Today, many individuals heavily rely on their smartphones or other technical gadgets to support their daily life but also their learning and work. For instance, smartphones are used to track and analyze changes in the environment, and to store and continually update relevant information. Thus, individuals can offload (i.e., externalize) information to their smartphones and refresh their knowledge by accessing it. This implies that using modern technologies such as AI empowers users via offloading and enables them to function as always-updated knowledge professionals, so that they can deploy their insights strategically instead of relying on outdated and memorized facts. This AI-supported offloading of cognitive processes also saves individuals' internal cognitive resources by distributing the task demands into their environment. In this article, we provide (1) an overview of empirical findings on cognitive offloading and (2) an outlook on how individuals' offloading behavior might change in an AI-enhanced future. More specifically, we first discuss determinants of offloading such as the design of technical tools and links to metacognition. Furthermore, we discuss benefits and risks of cognitive offloading. While offloading improves immediate task performance, it might also be a threat for users' cognitive abilities. Following this, we provide a perspective on whether individuals will make heavier use of AI-technologies for offloading in the future and how this might affect their cognition. On one hand, individuals might heavily rely on easily accessible AI-technologies which in return might diminish their internal cognition/learning. On the other hand, individuals might aim at enhancing their cognition so that they can keep up with AI-technologies and will not be replaced by them. Finally, we present own data and findings from the literature on the assumption that individuals' personality is a predictor of trust in AI. Trust in modern AI-technologies might be a strong determinant for wider appropriation and dependence on these technologies to distribute cognition and should thus be considered in an AI-enhanced future.

Impact of Intrinsic Cognitive Skills and Metacognitive Beliefs on Tool Use Performance

Cognitive tools (e.g., calculators) provide all users with the same potential. Yet when people use such cognitive tools, interindividual variations are observed. Previous findings have indicated that 2 main factors could explain these variations: intrinsic cognitive skills (i.e., the “non–tool use” cognitive skills associated with the task targeted) and metacognitive beliefs about one's performance with tool use. In this study we sought to reproduce these findings and to investigate in more detail the nature of the relationships (i.e., linear vs. exponential) between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills. In Experiment 1, 200 participants completed 2 cognitive tasks (calculation and geography) in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use). In Experiment 2, 70 participants performed a geography task in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use) and estimated their performance in each condition before completing the task. Results indicated that intrinsic cognitive skills and, to a lesser extent, metacognitive beliefs improved tool use performance: The higher the intrinsic cognitive skills and the higher participants estimated their tool use performance, the higher this tool use performance was. The nature of the relationship between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills appeared to be linear rather than exponential. These findings extend previous research showing a strong impact of intrinsic cognitive skills on the performance associated with the use of cognitive tools or external aids.

Keeping Your Glass Half Full: Cognitive Strategy Intervention for Older Adults

When older adults experience memory dysfunction it often compromises their confidence. Older adults' confidence in their memory can be improved through interventions designed to teach strategies for improving everyday memory functioning. The present study examines the efficacy of a five-session cognitive strategy program designed to be optimistic and inclusive for older adults living in a residential community. The memory self-efficacy of participants in the intervention group improved significantly relative to a control group. Additionally, participants' knowledge of memory strategies improved overall after completion of this program. Such findings highlight the benefits of practical cognitive-behavioral interventions for bolstering older adults' confidence and knowledge of memory strategies.

Integrated responding improves prospective memory accuracy

Prospective memory (PM) supports the planning and execution of future activities, and is particularly important in applied settings. We investigate a new response method that aims to improve PM accuracy by integrating the responses to an occasional PM task and a routine ongoing lexical-decision task. Instead of the most common three-choice method where the PM response replaces the ongoing response, participants were obligated to make explicit PM (present vs. absent) and ongoing (word vs. non-word) classifications on every trial through a four-choice response. Although replacement and obligatory responses were initially similar in PM accuracy, an advantage emerged with practice for the new obligatory method that was not simply due to slower responding associated with making four versus three choices. The nature of the errors differed between methods, with obligatory responding being characterised by fast PM errors and replacement by slower errors, suggesting avenues for further potential improvements in PM accuracy.

Young children spontaneously devise an optimal external solution to a cognitive problem

Metacognition plays an essential role in adults' cognitive offloading decisions. Despite possessing basic metacognitive capacities, however, preschool-aged children often fail to offload effectively. Here, we introduced 3- to 5-year-olds to a novel search task in which they were unlikely to perform optimally across trials without setting external reminders about the location of a target. Children watched as an experimenter first hid a target in one of three identical opaque containers. The containers were then shuffled out of view before children had to guess where the target was hidden. In the test phase, children could perform perfectly by simply placing a marker in a transparent jar attached to the target container prior to shuffling, and then later selecting the marked container. Children of all ages used this external strategy above chance levels if they had seen it demonstrated to them, but only the 4- and 5-year-olds independently devised the strategy to improve their future performance. These results suggest that, when necessary for optimal performance, even 4- and 5-year-olds can use metacognitive knowledge about their own future uncertainty to deploy effective external solutions.

The Geneva Space Cruiser: a fully self-administered online tool to assess prospective memory across the adult lifespan

The current study aimed to examine whether the Geneva Space Cruiser - a new online adaptation of the Cruiser - represents a valid, reliable and useful tool to assess prospective memory (PM) across the adult lifespan via fully self-administered online testing. Therefore, an adult lifespan sample of 252 adults (19-86 years old) performed the Geneva Space Cruiser in the laboratory and online, at home, and also performed a more traditional laboratory PM task. A second sample of 224 young adults (19-35 years old) participated in a test-retest online assessment of the Geneva Space Cruiser. Bayesian analyses showed that the Geneva Space Cruiser yielded similar results when administered in the laboratory versus online, both in terms of data distribution as well as of key outcome measures (i.e., PM performance and monitoring). Results further showed very good test-retest reliability and acceptable construct validity. Finally, the online tool was sensitive for detecting age-differences similar to those typically observed in laboratory studies. Together, our findings suggest that the Geneva Space Cruiser represents a rather valid, moderately to highly reliable, and generally useful tool to assess PM in online testing across wide ranges of the adult lifespan, with certain limitations for the oldest participants and for women.

Individual differences in working memory capacity predict benefits to memory from intention offloading

Research suggests that individuals with lower working memory have difficulty remembering to fulfil delayed intentions. The current study examined whether the ability to offload intentions onto the environment mitigated these deficits. Participants (N = 268) completed three versions of a delayed intention task with and without the use of reminders, along with three measures of working memory capacity. Results showed that individuals with higher working memory fulfilled more intentions when having to rely on their own memory, but this difference was eliminated when offloading was permitted. Individuals with lower working memory chose to offload more often, suggesting that they were less willing to engage in effortful maintenance of internal representations when given the option. Working memory was not associated with metacognitive confidence or optimal offloading choices based on point value. These findings suggest offloading may help circumvent capacity limitations associated with maintaining and remembering delayed intentions.

To organise or not to organise? Understanding search strategy preferences using Lego building blocks

Humans routinely organise or reconfigure the environment as part of their everyday activities, such as placing a set of keys in a designated location to reduce the need to remember its location. This type of spatial organisation is widely thought to reduce both the physical and cognitive demands of a task to allow individuals to perform tasks more easily. Although spatial organisation can be a useful strategy when searching for items in the environment, individuals do not always choose to utilise these organisational strategies when carrying out everyday tasks. Across three experiments, we examined individuals' preference for spatial organisation in the context of a real-world search task, and the degree to which individuals engaged in time- and effort-based cost-benefit analysis to inform whether to choose between an organisation-based or non-organisation-based search strategy. We found that individuals' strategy preferences could be explained by the perceived task time associated with each strategy, but not perceived task effort. However, even statistically controlling for relative perceived task time or reported effort, participants showed a strong systematic preference against organisation prior to engaging in the task, and, post-task, a strong preference towards organisation. Implications for understanding individuals' use of spatial organisation are discussed.

Media, Technology, and the Sins of Memory

Human memory is prone to error and distortion. Schacter (1999, 2001) proposed that memory's misdeeds can be classified into seven categories or "sins". This article discusses the impact of media and technology on four memory sins, transience (forgetting over time), absent-mindedness (lapses in attention that produce forgetting), misattribution (attributing a memory to the wrong source), and suggestibility (implanted memories). Growing concerns have been expressed about the negative impact of media and technology on memory. With respect to transience, I review research regarding the impact of the Internet (ie, Google), GPS, and photographs. Studies have documented impaired memory following specific tasks on which people rely on media/technology (eg, poor memory for a route after using GPS), but have revealed little evidence for broader impairments (eg, generally impaired memory in GPS users), and have also documented some mnemonic benefits (eg, reviewing photos of past experiences). For absent-mindedness, there is strong evidence that media multitasking is associated with poor memory for a target task (eg, a lecture) because of attentional lapses, suggestive evidence that chronic media multitasking could be associated with broader memory problems, and emerging evidence that technology can help to reduce certain kinds of absent-minded errors. Regarding misattribution and suggestibility, there is clear evidence that manipulated or misleading photos are associated with false memories for personal events and fake news, but no evidence of broader effects on susceptibility to memory distortion. Further study of the impact of media and technology on the memory sins is a fruitful pursuit for interdisciplinary studies.

Brain circuitry underlying the ABC model of anxiety

Anxiety Disorders are prevalent and often chronic, recurrent conditions that reduce quality of life. The first-line treatments, such as serotonin reuptake inhibitors and cognitive behavioral therapy, leave a significant proportion of patients symptomatic. As psychiatry moves toward targeted circuit-based treatments, there is a need for a theory that unites the phenomenology of anxiety with its underlying neural circuits. The Alarm, Belief, Coping (ABC) theory of anxiety describes how the neural circuits associated with anxiety interact with each other and domains of the anxiety symptoms, both temporally and spatially. The latest advancements in neuroimaging techniques offer the ability to assess these circuits in vivo. Using Neurosynth, a large open-access meta-analytic imaging database, the association between terms related to specific neural circuits was explored within the ABC theory framework. Alarm-related terms were associated with the amygdala, anterior cingulum, insula, and bed nucleus of stria terminalis. Belief-related terms were associated with medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, bilateral temporal poles, and hippocampus. Coping-related terms were associated with the ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, basal ganglia, and anterior cingulate. Neural connections underlying the functional neuroanatomy of the ABC model were observed. Additionally, there was considerable interaction and overlap between circuits associated with the symptom domains. Further neuroimaging research is needed to explore the dynamic interaction between the functional domains of the ABC theory. This will pave the way for probing the neuroanatomical underpinnings of anxiety disorders and provide an evidence-based foundation for the development of targeted treatments, such as neuromodulation.

Individual differences in cognitive offloading: a comparison of intention offloading, pattern copy, and short-term memory capacity

The cognitive load of many everyday life tasks exceeds known limitations of short-term memory. One strategy to compensate for information overload is cognitive offloading which refers to the externalization of cognitive processes such as reminder setting instead of memorizing. There appears to be remarkable variance in offloading behavior between participants which poses the question whether there is a common factor influencing offloading behavior across different tasks tackling short-term memory processes. To pursue this question, we studied individual differences in offloading behavior between two well-established offloading paradigms: the intention offloading task which tackles memory for intentions and the pattern copy task which tackles continuous short-term memory load. Our study also included an unrelated task measuring short-term memory capacity. Each participant completed all tasks twice on two consecutive days in order to obtain reliability scores. Despite high reliability scores, individual differences in offloading behavior were uncorrelated between the two offloading tasks. In both tasks, however, individual differences in offloading behavior were correlated with the individual differences in an unrelated short-term memory task. Our results therefore show that offloading behavior cannot simply be explained in terms of a single common factor driving offloading behavior across tasks. We discuss the implications of this finding for future research investigating the interrelations of offloading behavior across different tasks.

Prospective Memory Performance in Simulated Air Traffic Control : Robust to Interruptions but Impaired by Retention Interval

OBJECTIVE

To examine the effects of interruptions and retention interval on prospective memory for deferred tasks in simulated air traffic control.

BACKGROUND

In many safety-critical environments, operators need to remember to perform a deferred task, which requires prospective memory. Laboratory experiments suggest that extended prospective memory retention intervals, and interruptions in those retention intervals, could impair prospective memory performance.

METHOD

Participants managed a simulated air traffic control sector. Participants were sometimes instructed to perform a deferred handoff task, requiring them to deviate from a routine procedure. We manipulated whether an interruption occurred during the prospective memory retention interval or not, the length of the retention interval (37-117 s), and the temporal proximity of the interruption to deferred task encoding and execution. We also measured performance on ongoing tasks.

RESULTS

Increasing retention intervals (37-117 s) decreased the probability of remembering to perform the deferred task. Costs to ongoing conflict detection accuracy and routine handoff speed were observed when a prospective memory intention had to be maintained. Interruptions did not affect individuals' speed or accuracy on the deferred task.

CONCLUSION

Longer retention intervals increase risk of prospective memory error and of ongoing task performance being impaired by cognitive load; however, prospective memory can be robust to effects of interruptions when the task environment provides cuing and offloading.

APPLICATION

To support operators in performing complex and dynamic tasks, prospective memory demands should be reduced, and the retention interval of deferred tasks should be kept as short as possible.

From metacognitive beliefs to strategy selection: does fake performance feedback influence cognitive offloading?

The ubiquitous availability of technological aids requires individuals to constantly decide between either externalizing cognitive processes into these aids (i.e. cognitive offloading) or relying on their own internal cognitive resources. With the present research, we investigated the influence of metacognitive beliefs on individuals’ offloading behavior in an experimental setup (N = 159). We manipulated participants’ metacognitive beliefs about their memory abilities by providing fake performance feedback: below-average feedback, above-average feedback, or no feedback (control-group). We then measured offloading behavior, using a pattern copying task in which participants copied a color pattern from a model window into a workspace window. While solving this task, participants could rely either more on an internal memory strategy or more on an offloading strategy. Fake performance feedback affected the participants’ metacognitive evaluations about their memory abilities (below-group < control-group < above-group). Although fake performance feedback did not affect actual offloading behavior, the participants receiving below-average performance feedback reported that they had relied more on an offloading strategy than those participants receiving above-average performance feedback. Furthermore, the participants in the below-group reported lower general memory abilities than the other groups at the end of the experiment. We conclude that while fake performance feedback strongly influenced metacognitive beliefs, this did not transfer into a change of strategy selection, thus not influencing offloading behavior. We propose to consider not only metacognitive beliefs but also metacognitive experiences as potential determinants of cognitive offloading.

The effect of metacognitive training on confidence and strategic reminder setting

Individuals often choose between remembering information using their own memory ability versus using external resources to reduce cognitive demand (i.e. ‘cognitive offloading’). For example, to remember a future appointment an individual could choose to set a smartphone reminder or depend on their unaided memory ability. Previous studies investigating strategic reminder setting found that participants set more reminders than would be optimal, and this bias towards reminder-setting was predicted by metacognitive underconfidence in unaided memory ability. Due to the link between underconfidence in memory ability and excessive reminder setting, the aim of the current study was to investigate whether metacognitive training is an effective intervention to a) improve metacognitive judgment accuracy, and b) reduce bias in strategic offloading behaviour. Participants either received metacognitive training which involved making performance predictions and receiving feedback on judgment accuracy, or were part of a control group. As predicted, metacognitive training increased judgment accuracy: participants in the control group were significantly underconfident in their memory ability, whereas the experimental group showed no significant metacognitive bias. However, contrary to predictions, both experimental and control groups were significantly biased toward reminder-setting, and did not differ significantly. Therefore, reducing metacognitive bias was not sufficient to eliminate the bias towards reminders. We suggest that the reminder bias likely results in part from erroneous metacognitive evaluations, but that other factors such as a preference to avoid cognitive effort may also be relevant. Finding interventions to mitigate these factors could improve the adaptive use of external resources.

Trait anxiety does not correlate with metacognitive confidence or reminder usage in a delayed intentions task

Setting external reminders provides a convenient way to reduce cognitive demand and ensure accurate retrieval of information for prospective tasks. Recent experimental evidence has demonstrated that the decision to offload cognitive information to external resources is guided by metacognitive belief, that is, individuals’ confidence in their unaided ability. Other work has also suggested a relationship between metacognitive belief and trait anxiety. In the present study (N = 300), we bridged these two areas by investigating whether trait anxiety correlated with metacognitive belief and—consequently—propensity to offload information in a delayed intentions paradigm. Participants received a financial reward based on their ability to remember targets. However, participants could take a reduced reward per target if they decided to use reminders. We replicated previous findings that participants were biased to use more reminders than would be optimal, and this bias was correlated with metacognitive judgements. However, we show no evidence that trait anxiety held a relationship with metacognitive belief or reminder usage. Indeed, Bayesian analyses strongly favoured the null. Therefore, variation in self-reported trait anxiety does not necessarily influence confidence and strategy when participants remember delayed intentions.

Excessive use of reminders: Metacognition and effort-minimisation in cognitive offloading

People often use external reminders to help remember delayed intentions. This is a form of "cognitive offloading". Individuals sometimes offload more often than would be optimal (Gilbert et al., 2020). This bias has been linked to participants' erroneous metacognitive underconfidence in their memory abilities. However, underconfidence is unlikely to fully explain the bias. An additional, previously-untested factor that may contribute to the offloading bias is a preference to avoid cognitive effort associated with remembering internally. The present Registered Report examined evidence for this hypothesis. One group of participants received payment contingent on their performance of the task (hypothesised to increase cognitive effort, and therefore reduce the bias towards offloading); another group received a flat payment for taking part, as in the earlier experiment. The offloading bias was significantly reduced (but not eliminated) in the rewarded group, suggesting that a preference to avoid cognitive effort influences cognitive offloading.

Children Devise and Selectively Use Tools to Offload Cognition

From maps sketched in sand to supercomputing software, humans ubiquitously enhance cognitive performance by creating and using artifacts that bear mental load [1-5]. This extension of information processing into the environment has taken center stage in debates about the nature of cognition in humans and other animals [6-9]. How does the human mind acquire such strategies? In two experiments, we investigated the developmental origins of cognitive offloading in 150 children aged between 4 and 11 years. We created a memory task in which children were required to recall the location of hidden targets. In one experiment, participants were provided with a pre-specified cognitive offloading opportunity: an option to mark the target locations with tokens during the hiding period. Even 4-year-old children quickly adopted this external strategy and, in line with a metacognitive account, children across ages offloaded more often when the task was more difficult. In a second experiment, we provided children with the means to devise their own cognitive offloading strategy. Very few younger children spontaneously devised a solution, but by ages 10 and 11, nearly all did so. In a follow-up test phase, a simple prompt greatly increased the rate at which the younger children devised an offloading strategy. These findings suggest that sensitivity to the difficulties of thinking arises early in development and improves throughout the early school years, with children learning to modify the world around them to compensate for their cognitive limits.

Developmental origins of cognitive offloading

Many animals manipulate their environments in ways that appear to augment cognitive processing. Adult humans show remarkable flexibility in this domain, typically relying on internal cognitive processing when adequate but turning to external support in situations of high internal demand. We use calendars, calculators, navigational aids and other external means to compensate for our natural cognitive shortcomings and achieve otherwise unattainable feats of intelligence. As yet, however, the developmental origins of this fundamental capacity for cognitive offloading remain largely unknown. In two studies, children aged 4-11 years (n = 258) were given an opportunity to manually rotate a turntable to eliminate the internal demands of mental rotation--to solve the problem in the world rather than in their heads. In study 1, even the youngest children showed a linear relationship between mental rotation demand and likelihood of using the external strategy, paralleling the classic relationship between angle of mental rotation and reaction time. In study 2, children were introduced to a version of the task where manually rotating inverted stimuli was sometimes beneficial to performance and other times redundant. With increasing age, children were significantly more likely to manually rotate the turntable only when it would benefit them. These results show how humans gradually calibrate their cognitive offloading strategies throughout childhood and thereby uncover the developmental origins of this central facet of intelligence.

The effect of recent reminder setting on subsequent strategy and performance in a prospective memory task

The technological advancement that is rapidly taking place in today's society allows increased opportunity for "cognitive offloading" by storing information in external devices rather than relying on internal memory. This opens the way to fundamental questions regarding the interplay between internal and external memory and the potential benefits and costs of placing information in the external environment. This article reports the results of three pre-registered online experiments investigating the consequences of prior cognitive offloading on A) subsequent unaided ability, and B) strategic decisions whether to engage in future cognitive offloading. We administered a web-based task requiring participants to remember delayed intentions for a brief period and manipulated the possibility of setting reminders to create an external cue. Earlier cognitive offloading had little effect upon individuals' subsequent unaided ability, leading to a small and nonsignificant drop in subsequent performance. However, there was a strong effect on participants' subsequent likelihood of setting reminders. These findings suggest that the short-term impact of cognitive offloading is more likely to be seen on individuals' strategy choices rather than basic memory processes.

Offloading items from memory: individual differences in cognitive offloading in a short-term memory task

Cognitive offloading refers to the act of reducing the mental processing requirements of a task through physical actions like writing down information or storing information on a cell phone or computer. Offloading can lead to improved performance on ongoing tasks with high cognitive demand, such as tasks where multiple pieces of information must be simultaneously maintained. However, less is known about why some individuals choose to engage in offloading and under what conditions they might choose to do so. In the present study, offloading behavior is investigated in a short-term memory task requiring memory for letters. The present study is a replication and extension of a previous study conducted by Risko and Dunn, and tests the new prediction that individuals with lower working memory capacity will be more likely to offload. Here, we find that offloading information confers a performance advantage over relying on internal memory stores, particularly at higher memory loads. However, we fail to observe that those with poorer memory abilities have a greater propensity for offloading or benefit more from it. Instead, our findings suggest that cognitive offloading may be a valid compensatory strategy to improve performance of memory-based tasks for individuals with a wide range of memory ability.

Confidence guides spontaneous cognitive offloading

BACKGROUND

Cognitive offloading is the use of physical action to reduce the cognitive demands of a task. Everyday memory relies heavily on this practice; for example, when we write down to-be-remembered information or use diaries, alerts, and reminders to trigger delayed intentions. A key goal of recent research has been to investigate the processes that trigger cognitive offloading. This research has demonstrated that individuals decide whether or not to offload based on a potentially erroneous metacognitive evaluation of their mental abilities. Therefore, improving the accuracy of metacognitive evaluations may help to optimise offloading behaviour. However, previous studies typically measure participants' use of an explicitly instructed offloading strategy, in contrast to everyday life where offloading strategies must often be generated spontaneously.

RESULTS

We administered a computer-based task requiring participants to remember delayed intentions. One group of participants was explicitly instructed on a method for setting external reminders; another was not. The latter group spontaneously set reminders but did so less often than the instructed group. Offloading improved performance in both groups. Crucially, metacognition (confidence in unaided memory ability) guided both instructed and spontaneous offloading: Participants in both groups set more reminders when they were less confident (regardless of actual memory ability).

CONCLUSIONS

These results show that the link between metacognition and cognitive offloading holds even when offloading strategies need to be spontaneously generated. Thus, metacognitive interventions are potentially able to alter offloading behaviour, without requiring offloading strategies to be explicitly instructed.

Cognitive Offloading: Structuring the Environment to Improve Children's Working Memory Task Performance

Research has shown that adults can engage in cognitive offloading, whereby internal processes are offloaded onto the environment to help task performance. Here, we investigate an application of this approach with children, in particular children with poor working memory. Participants were required to remember and recall sequences of colors by placing colored blocks in the correct serial order. In one condition the blocks were arranged to facilitate cognitive offloading (i.e., grouped by color), whereas in the other condition they were arranged randomly. Across two experiments (total N = 166) the ordered condition improved task performance for children with low working memory ability. In addition, participants in Experiment 2 rated the difficulty of the two arrangements and performed a further condition in which they were given an opportunity to freely arrange the blocks before completing the task. Despite performing better in the ordered condition, children with low working memory ability did not rate the ordered arrangement as easier, nor did they choose an ordered arrangement when given the opportunity to do so. This research shows that cognitive offloading can also be a useful process in populations other than typical adults, and the implications of this work for supporting children with poor working memory are discussed.

How did I remember to do that? Self-reported strategy use for laboratory prospective memory tasks

The role of metacognition in prospective memory (PM) has received relatively little attention. This study combined data from several experiments to identify the strategy repertoire employed during a classic laboratory PM task and to determine whether self-reported strategy was related to performance. Participants (N = 668) completed either a focal or nonfocal PM task embedded in an ongoing lexical decision task. The results indicated that participants reported the same strategy repertoire regardless of PM task focality. Participants who reported using a strategy performed better than those who did not report using one, and this was especially true under nonfocal conditions. Self-reported strategy use was also associated with more cost to the ongoing task when the opportunity to complete the PM task was present. These findings add to what is known about the metacognitive components of PM and underscore the need for additional research in this area.