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Prutean N, Vermeylen L, Kukkonen N, Steendam ST, Eayrs JO, Krebs RM, Wiersema JR, Vassena E, Boehler CN, Notebaert W. Mind the instructions: Reward cues are liked first, wanted later. Cognition 2024; 251:105885. [PMID: 39024843 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105885] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2023] [Revised: 05/16/2024] [Accepted: 07/09/2024] [Indexed: 07/20/2024]
Abstract
Current theories propose that mental effort is invested only when the anticipated benefits, such as rewards, outweigh the associated costs, like task difficulty. Yet, it remains unclear whether this motivational and mitigating aspect of reward processing is reflected in the evaluation of reward/difficulty cues as such, and to what extent it depends on task experience. In a pre-registered experiment (N = 84), we used the affect misattribution procedure (AMP) to gauge affective evaluations of nonword cues predicting reward and task difficulty levels. Contrary to previous studies, the AMP was administered at the outset, after cue instructions, and after the cues were used in a random dot motion (RDM) task. Compared to baseline, cues predicting a larger reward were evaluated more positively after RDM task experience, and most importantly, already after cue instructions, with no difference between the two phases. This evaluative effect manifested in increased performance after larger reward cues in the RDM task. Our results suggest that AMP effects may generally capture performance expectations which are independent of task experience. Importantly, these instructed expectations of reward and difficulty play a crucial role in the evaluation and subsequent investment of mental effort.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nicoleta Prutean
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium.
| | | | - Nanne Kukkonen
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium.
| | | | - Joshua O Eayrs
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium.
| | - Ruth M Krebs
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium.
| | - Jan R Wiersema
- Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium.
| | - Eliana Vassena
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
| | - C Nico Boehler
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium.
| | - Wim Notebaert
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium.
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2
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Wischnewski M, Hörberg MOY, Schutter DJLG. Electrophysiological correlates of (mis)judging social information. Psychophysiology 2024; 61:e14590. [PMID: 38632827 DOI: 10.1111/psyp.14590] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/27/2023] [Revised: 04/02/2024] [Accepted: 04/03/2024] [Indexed: 04/19/2024]
Abstract
Social information can be used to optimize decision-making. However, the simultaneous presentation of multiple sources of advice can lead to a distinction bias in judging the validity of the information. While the involvement of event-related potential (ERP) components in social information processing has been studied, how they are modulated by (mis)judging an advisor's information validity remains unknown. In two experiments participants performed a decision-making task with highly accurate or inaccurate cues. Each experiment consisted of an initial, learning, and test phase. During the learning phase, three advice cues were simultaneously presented and the validity of them had to be assessed. The effect of different cue constellations on ERPs was investigated. In the subsequent test phase, the willingness to follow or oppose an advice cue was tested. Results demonstrated the distinction bias with participants over or underestimating the accuracy of the most uncertain cues. The P2 amplitude was significantly increased during cue presentation when advisors were in disagreement as compared to when all were in agreement, regardless of cue validity. Further, a larger P3 amplitude during outcome presentation was found when advisors were in disagreement and increased with more informative cues. As such, the most uncertain cues were related to the smallest P3 amplitude. The findings hint at the possible role of P3 in judging and learning the predictability of social cues. This study provides novel insights into the role of P2 and P3 components during the judgment of social information validity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Miles Wischnewski
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA
| | - Michael O Y Hörberg
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Dennis J L G Schutter
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Helmholtz Institute, Utrecht University, Utrecht, the Netherlands
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3
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Grahek I, Leng X, Musslick S, Shenhav A. Control adjustment costs limit goal flexibility: Empirical evidence and a computational account. BIORXIV : THE PREPRINT SERVER FOR BIOLOGY 2024:2023.08.22.554296. [PMID: 37662382 PMCID: PMC10473589 DOI: 10.1101/2023.08.22.554296] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/05/2023]
Abstract
A cornerstone of human intelligence is the ability to flexibly adjust our cognition and behavior as our goals change. For instance, achieving some goals requires efficiency, while others require caution. Adapting to these changing goals require corresponding adjustments in cognitive control (e.g., levels of attention, response thresholds). However, adjusting our control to meet new goals comes at a cost: we are better at achieving a goal in isolation than when transitioning between goals. The source of these control adjustment costs remains poorly understood, and the bulk of our understanding of such costs comes from settings in which participants transition between discrete task sets, rather than performance goals. Across four experiments, we show that adjustments in continuous control states incur a performance cost, and that a dynamical systems model can explain the source of these costs. Participants performed a single cognitively demanding task under varying performance goals (e.g., to be fast or to be accurate). We modeled control allocation to include a dynamic process of adjusting from one's current control state to a target state for a given performance goal. By incorporating inertia into this adjustment process, our model accounts for our empirical findings that people under-shoot their target control state more (i.e., exhibit larger adjustment costs) when (a) goals switch rather than remain fixed over a block (Study 1); (b) target control states are more distant from one another (Study 2); (c) less time is given to adjust to the new goal (Study 3); and (d) when anticipating having to switch goals more frequently (Study 4). Our findings characterize the costs of adjusting control to meet changing goals, and show that these costs can emerge directly from cognitive control dynamics. In so doing, they shed new light on the sources of and constraints on flexibility in human goal-directed behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ivan Grahek
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences; Carney Institute for Brain Science; Brown University; Providence, RI, USA
| | - Xiamin Leng
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences; Carney Institute for Brain Science; Brown University; Providence, RI, USA
| | - Sebastian Musslick
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences; Carney Institute for Brain Science; Brown University; Providence, RI, USA
- Institute of Cognitive Science; Osnabrück University; Osnabrück, Germany
| | - Amitai Shenhav
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences; Carney Institute for Brain Science; Brown University; Providence, RI, USA
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Braem S, Held L, Shenhav A, Frömer R. Learning how to reason and deciding when to decide. Behav Brain Sci 2023; 46:e115. [PMID: 37462203 PMCID: PMC10597599 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22003090] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/20/2023]
Abstract
Research on human reasoning has both popularized and struggled with the idea that intuitive and deliberate thoughts stem from two different systems, raising the question how people switch between them. Inspired by research on cognitive control and conflict monitoring, we argue that detecting the need for further thought relies on an intuitive, context-sensitive process that is learned in itself.
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Affiliation(s)
- Senne Braem
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Universiteit Gent, Gent, Belgium ; https://users.ugent.be/~sbraem/
| | - Leslie Held
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Universiteit Gent, Gent, Belgium ; https://users.ugent.be/~sbraem/
| | - Amitai Shenhav
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA ; https://www.shenhavlab.org
| | - Romy Frömer
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA ; https://www.shenhavlab.org
- Centre for Human Brain Health, School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
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Kotler S, Mannino M, Kelso S, Huskey R. First few seconds for flow: A comprehensive proposal of the neurobiology and neurodynamics of state onset. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 143:104956. [PMID: 36368525 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104956] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/03/2022] [Revised: 10/22/2022] [Accepted: 11/06/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Flow is a cognitive state that manifests when there is complete attentional absorption while performing a task. Flow occurs when certain internal as well as external conditions are present, including intense concentration, a sense of control, feedback, and a balance between the challenge of the task and the relevant skillset. Phenomenologically, flow is accompanied by a loss of self-consciousness, seamless integration of action and awareness, and acute changes in time perception. Research has begun to uncover some of the neurophysiological correlates of flow, as well as some of the state's neuromodulatory processes. We comprehensively review this work and consider the neurodynamics of the onset of the state, considering large-scale brain networks, as well as dopaminergic, noradrenergic, and endocannabinoid systems. To accomplish this, we outline an evidence-based hypothetical situation, and consider the flow state in a broader context including other profound alterations in consciousness, such as the psychedelic state and the state of traumatic stress that can induce PTSD. We present a broad theoretical framework which may motivate future testable hypotheses.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Scott Kelso
- Human Brain & Behavior Laboratory, Center for Complex Systems and Brain Sciences, Florida Atlantic University, United States; Intelligent Systems Research Centre, Ulster University, Derry∼Londonderry, North Ireland
| | - Richard Huskey
- Cognitive Communication Science Lab, Department of Communication, University of California Davis, United States; Cognitive Science Program, University of California Davis, United States; Center for Mind and Brain, University of California Davis, United States.
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