Why not lie? Costs enforce honesty in an experimental signalling game

Group vocal composition and decision-making during roost finding in Spix's disk-winged bats

Theoretical work suggests that having many informed individuals within social groups can promote efficient resource location. However, it may also give rise to group fragmentation if members fail to reach consensus on their direction of movement. In this study, we investigate whether the number of informed individuals, exemplified by bats emitting calls from different roosts, influences group cohesion in Spix's disk-winged bats (Thyroptera tricolor). Additionally, we explore the role of signal reliability, quantified through signalling rates, in group consensus on where to roost. These bats use contact calls to announce the location of a roost site and recruit conspecifics. The groups they form exhibit high levels of cohesion and consist of both vocal and non-vocal bats, with vocal behaviour being consistent over time. Our findings revealed that an increase in the number of roosts broadcasting calls is strongly associated with the likelihood of groups fragmenting among multiple roosts. Additionally, we found that a majority of group members enter the roost with higher calling rates. This phenomenon can mitigate the risk of group fragmentation, as bats emitting more calls may contribute to greater group consensus on roosting locations, thereby reducing the likelihood of individuals separating and enhancing overall group cohesion. Our results highlight the potential costs of having too many information producers for group coordination, despite their established role in finding critical resources. This article is part of the theme issue 'The power of sound: unravelling how acoustic communication shapes group dynamics'.

Developing the genotype-to-phenotype relationship in evolutionary theory: A primer of developmental features

For decades, there have been repeated calls for more integration across evolutionary and developmental biology. However, critiques in the literature and recent funding initiatives suggest this integration remains incomplete. We suggest one way forward is to consider how we elaborate the most basic concept of development, the relationship between genotype and phenotype, in traditional models of evolutionary processes. For some questions, when more complex features of development are accounted for, predictions of evolutionary processes shift. We present a primer on concepts of development to clarify confusion in the literature and fuel new questions and approaches. The basic features of development involve expanding a base model of genotype-to-phenotype to include the genome, space, and time. A layer of complexity is added by incorporating developmental systems, including signal-response systems and networks of interactions. The developmental emergence of function, which captures developmental feedbacks and phenotypic performance, offers further model elaborations that explicitly link fitness with developmental systems. Finally, developmental features such as plasticity and developmental niche construction conceptualize the link between a developing phenotype and the external environment, allowing for a fuller inclusion of ecology in evolutionary models. Incorporating aspects of developmental complexity into evolutionary models also accommodates a more pluralistic focus on the causal importance of developmental systems, individual organisms, or agents in generating evolutionary patterns. Thus, by laying out existing concepts of development, and considering how they are used across different fields, we can gain clarity in existing debates around the extended evolutionary synthesis and pursue new directions in evolutionary developmental biology. Finally, we consider how nesting developmental features in traditional models of evolution can highlight areas of evolutionary biology that need more theoretical attention.

Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling

How and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences that needs to be understood to explain the evolution of communication. In situations in which the receiver needs to differentiate between low- and high-quality signallers, once a ruling paradigm, the Handicap Principle has claimed that honest signals have to be costly to produce. Subsequent game theoretical models, however, highlighted that honest signals are not necessarily costly. Honesty is maintained by the potential cost of cheating: by the difference in the marginal benefit to marginal cost for low versus high-quality signallers; i.e. by differential trade-offs. Owing to the difficulties of manipulating signal costs and benefits, there is lack of empirical tests of these predictions. We present the results of a laboratory decision-making experiment with human participants to test the role of equilibrium signal cost and signalling trade-offs for the development of honest communication. We found that the trade-off manipulation had a much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the manipulation of the equilibrium cost of signal. Contrary to the predictions of the Handicap Principle, negative production cost promoted honesty at a very high level in the differential trade-off condition.

Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling

How and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences that needs to be understood to explain the evolution of communication. In situations in which the receiver needs to differentiate between low- and high-quality signallers, once a ruling paradigm, the Handicap Principle has claimed that honest signals have to be costly to produce. Subsequent game theoretical models, however, highlighted that honest signals are not necessarily costly. Honesty is maintained by the potential cost of cheating: by the difference in the marginal benefit to marginal cost for low versus high-quality signallers; i.e. by differential trade-offs. Owing to the difficulties of manipulating signal costs and benefits, there is lack of empirical tests of these predictions. We present the results of a laboratory decision-making experiment with human participants to test the role of equilibrium signal cost and signalling trade-offs for the development of honest communication. We found that the trade-off manipulation had a much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the manipulation of the equilibrium cost of signal. Contrary to the predictions of the Handicap Principle, negative production cost promoted honesty at a very high level in the differential trade-off condition.

Female preference for super-sized male ornaments and its implications for the evolution of ornament allometry

It has been argued that disproportionately larger ornaments in bigger males—positive allometry—is the outcome of sexual selection operating on the size of condition dependent traits. We reviewed the literature and found a general lack of empirical testing of the assumed link between female preferences for large ornaments and a pattern of positive allometry in male ornamentation. We subsequently conducted a manipulative experiment by leveraging the unusual terrestrial fish, Alticus sp. cf. simplicirrus, on the island of Rarotonga. Males in this species present a prominent head crest to females during courtship, and the size of this head crest in the genus more broadly exhibits the classic pattern of positive allometry. We created realistic male models standardized in body size but differing in head crest size based on the most extreme allometric scaling recorded for the genus. This included a crest size well outside the observed range for the study population (super-sized). The stimuli were presented to free-living females in a manner that mimicked the spatial distribution of courting males. Females directed greater attention to the male stimulus that exhibited the super-sized crest, with little difference in attention direct to other size treatments. These data appear to be the only experimental evidence from the wild of a female preference function that has been implicitly assumed to drive selection that results in the evolution of positive allometry in male ornamentation.

Vocal modulation in human mating and competition

The human voice is dynamic, and people modulate their voices across different social interactions. This article presents a review of the literature examining natural vocal modulation in social contexts relevant to human mating and intrasexual competition. Altering acoustic parameters during speech, particularly pitch, in response to mating and competitive contexts can influence social perception and indicate certain qualities of the speaker. For instance, a lowered voice pitch is often used to exert dominance, display status and compete with rivals. Changes in voice can also serve as a salient medium for signalling a person's attraction to another, and there is evidence to support the notion that attraction and/or romantic interest can be distinguished through vocal tones alone. Individuals can purposely change their vocal behaviour in attempt to sound more attractive and to facilitate courtship success. Several findings also point to the effectiveness of vocal change as a mechanism for communicating relationship status. As future studies continue to explore vocal modulation in the arena of human mating, we will gain a better understanding of how and why vocal modulation varies across social contexts and its impact on receiver psychology. This article is part of the theme issue 'Voice modulation: from origin and mechanism to social impact (Part I)'.

Crowd wisdom enhanced by costly signaling in a virtual rating system

Costly signaling theory from ecology posits that signals will be more honest and thus information will be accurately communicated when signaling carries a nontrivial cost. Our study combines this concept from behavioral ecology with methods of computational social science to show how costly signaling can improve crowd wisdom in human, online rating systems. Specifically, we endowed a rating widget with virtual friction to increase the time cost for reporting extreme scores. Even without any conflicts of interests or incentives to cheat, costly signaling helped obtain reliable crowd estimates of quality. Our results have implications for the ubiquitous solicitation of evaluations in e-commerce, and the approach can be generalized and tested in a variety of large-scale online communication systems.

Costly signaling theory was developed in both economics and biology and has been used to explain a wide range of phenomena. However, the theory’s prediction that signal cost can enforce information quality in the design of new communication systems has never been put to an empirical test. Here we show that imposing time costs on reporting extreme scores can improve crowd wisdom in a previously cost-free rating system. We developed an online game where individuals interacted repeatedly with simulated services and rated them for satisfaction. We associated ratings with differential time costs by endowing the graphical user interface that solicited ratings from the users with “physics,” including an initial (default) slider position and friction. When ratings were not associated with differential cost (all scores from 0 to 100 could be given by an equally low-cost click on the screen), scores correlated only weakly with objective service quality. However, introducing differential time costs, proportional to the deviation from the mean score, improved correlations between subjective rating scores and objective service performance and lowered the sample size required for obtaining reliable, averaged crowd estimates. Boosting time costs for reporting extreme scores further facilitated the detection of top performances. Thus, human collective online behavior, which is typically cost-free, can be made more informative by applying costly signaling via the virtual physics of rating devices.

Choose, rate or squeeze: Comparison of economic value functions elicited by different behavioral tasks

A standard view in neuroeconomics is that to make a choice, an agent first assigns subjective values to available options, and then compares them to select the best. In choice tasks, these cardinal values are typically inferred from the preference expressed by subjects between options presented in pairs. Alternatively, cardinal values can be directly elicited by asking subjects to place a cursor on an analog scale (rating task) or to exert a force on a power grip (effort task). These tasks can vary in many respects: they can notably be more or less costly and consequential. Here, we compared the value functions elicited by choice, rating and effort tasks on options composed of two monetary amounts: one for the subject (gain) and one for a charity (donation). Bayesian model selection showed that despite important differences between the three tasks, they all elicited a same value function, with similar weighting of gain and donation, but variable concavity. Moreover, value functions elicited by the different tasks could predict choices with equivalent accuracy. Our finding therefore suggests that comparable value functions can account for various motivated behaviors, beyond economic choice. Nevertheless, we report slight differences in the computational efficiency of parameter estimation that may guide the design of future studies.

Signals and cues in the evolution of plant-microbe communication

Communication has played a key role in organismal evolution. If sender and receiver have a shared interest in propagating reliable information, such as when they are kin relatives, then effective communication can bring large fitness benefits. However, interspecific communication (among different species) is more prone to dishonesty. Over the last decade, plants and their microbial root symbionts have become a model system for studying interspecific molecular crosstalk. However, less is known about the evolutionary stability of plant-microbe communication. What prevents partners from hijacking or manipulating information to their own benefit? Here, we focus on communication between arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi and their host plants. We ask how partners use directed signals to convey specific information, and highlight research on the problem of dishonest signaling.

Attention-Seeking Displays

Animal communication abounds with extravagant displays. These signals are usually interpreted as costly signals of quality. However, there is another important function for these signals: to call the attention of the receiver to the signaller. While there is abundant empirical evidence to show the importance of this stage, it is not yet incorporated into standard signalling theory. Here I investigate a general model of signalling - based on a basic action-response game - that incorporates this searching stage. I show that giving attention-seeking displays and searching for them can be an ESS. This is a very general result and holds regardless whether only the high quality signallers or both high and low types give them. These signals need not be costly at the equilibrium and they need not be honest signals of any quality, as their function is not to signal quality but simply to call the attention of the potential receivers. These kind of displays are probably more common than their current weight in the literature would suggest.

Composition of distinct sub-proteomes in Myxococcus xanthus: metabolic cost and amino acid availability

Subsets of proteins involved in distinct functional processes are subject to different selective pressures. We investigated whether there is an amino acid composition bias (AACB) inherent in discrete subsets of proteins, and whether we could identify changing patterns of AACB during the life cycle of the social bacterium Myxococcus xanthus. We quantitatively characterised the cellular, soluble secreted, and outer membrane vesicle (OMV) sub-proteomes of M. xanthus, identifying 315 proteins. The AACB of the cellular proteome differed only slightly from that deduced from the genome, suggesting that genome-inferred proteomes can accurately reflect the AACB of their host. Inferred AA deficiencies arising from prey consumption were exacerbated by the requirements of the 68%GC genome, whose character thus seems to be selected for directly rather than via the proteome. In our analysis, distinct subsets of the proteome (whether segregated spatially or temporally) exhibited distinct AACB, presumably tailored according to the needs of the organism's lifestyle and nutrient availability. Secreted AAs tend to be of lower cost than those retained in the cell, except for the early developmental A-signal, which is a particularly costly sub-proteome. We propose a model of AA reallocation during the M. xanthus life cycle, involving ribophagy during early starvation and sequestration of limiting AAs within cells during development.