Six sigma tools for a patient safety-oriented, quality-checklist driven radiation medicine department

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this work was to develop and implement six sigma practices toward the enhancement of patient safety in an electronic, quality checklist-driven, multicenter, paperless radiation medicine department.

METHODS AND MATERIALS

A quality checklist process map (QPM), stratified into consultation through treatment-completion stages was incorporated into an oncology information systems platform. A cross-functional quality management team conducted quality-function-deployment and define-measure-analyze-improve-control (DMAIC) six sigma exercises with a focus on patient safety. QPM procedures were Pareto-sorted in order of decreasing patient safety risk with failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). Quantitative metrics for a grouped set of highest risk procedures were established. These included procedural delays, associated standard deviations and six sigma Z scores. Baseline performance of the QPM was established over the previous year of usage. Data-driven analysis led to simplification, standardization, and refinement of the QPM with standard deviation, slip-day reduction, and Z-score enhancement goals. A no-fly policy (NFP) for patient safety was introduced at the improve-control DMAIC phase, with a process map interlock imposed on treatment initiation in the event of FMEA-identified high-risk tasks being delayed or not completed. The NFP was introduced in a pilot phase with specific stopping rules and the same metrics used for performance assessments. A custom root-cause analysis database was deployed to monitor patient safety events.

RESULTS

Relative to the baseline period, average slip days and standard deviations for the risk-enhanced QPM procedures improved by over threefold factors in the NFP period. The Z scores improved by approximately 20%. A trend for proactive delays instead of reactive hard stops was observed with no adverse effects of the NFP. The number of computed potential no-fly delays per month dropped from 60 to 20 over a total of 520 cases. The fraction of computed potential no-fly cases that were delayed in NFP compliance rose from 28% to 45%. Proactive delays rose to 80% of all delayed cases. For potential no-fly cases, event reporting rose from 18% to 50%, while for actually delayed cases, event reporting rose from 65% to 100%.

CONCLUSIONS

With complex technologies, resource-compromised staff, and pressures to hasten treatment initiation, the use of the six sigma driven process interlocks may mitigate potential patient safety risks as demonstrated in this study.

Implementation of a "No Fly" safety culture in a multicenter radiation medicine department

PURPOSE

The safe delivery of radiation therapy requires multiple disciplines and interactions to perform flawlessly for each patient. Because treatment is individualized and every aspect of the patient's care is unique, it is difficult to regiment a delivery process that works flawlessly. The purpose of this study is to describe one safety-directed component of our quality program called the "No Fly Policy" (NFP).

METHODS AND MATERIALS

Our quality assurance program for radiation therapy reviewed the entire process of care prior, during, and after a patient's treatment course. Each component of care was broken down and rebuilt within a matrix of multidisciplinary safety quality checklists (QCL). The QCL process map was subsequently streamlined with revised task due dates and stopping rules. The NFP was introduced to place a holding pattern on treatment initiation pending reconciliation of associated stopping events. The NFP was introduced in a pilot phase using a Six-Sigma process improvement approach. Quantitative analysis on the performance of the new QCLs was performed using crystal reports in the Oncology Information Systems. Root cause analysis was conducted.

RESULTS

Notable improvements in QCL performance were observed. The variances among staff in completing tasks reduced by a factor of at least 3, suggesting better process control. Steady improvements over time indicated an increasingly compliant and controlled adoption of the new safety-oriented process map. Stopping events led to rescheduling treatments with average and maximum delays of 2 and 4 days, respectively, with no reported adverse effects. The majority of stopping events were due to incomplete plan approvals stemming from treatment planning delays. Whereas these may have previously solicited last-minute interventions, including intensity modulated radiation therapy quality assurance, the NFP enabled nonpunitive, reasonable schedule adjustments to mitigate compromises in safe delivery.

CONCLUSIONS

Implementation of the NFP has helped to mitigate risk from expedited care, convert reactive to proactive delays, and created a checklist, process driven, and variance-reducing culture in a large, multicenter department.