Justification of principles for healthcare priority setting: the relevance and roles of empirical studies exploring public values

Unravelling Elements of Value of Healthcare and Assessing their Importance Using Evidence from Two Discrete-Choice Experiments in England

BACKGROUND

Health systems are moving towards value-based care, implementing new care models that allegedly aim beyond patient outcomes. Therefore, a policy and academic debate is underway regarding the definition of value in healthcare, the inclusion of costs in value metrics, and the importance of each value element. This study aimed to define healthcare value elements and assess their relative importance (RI) to the public in England.

METHOD

Using data from 26 semi-structured interviews and a literature review, and applying decision-theory axioms, we selected a comprehensive and applicable set of value-based elements. Their RI was determined using two discrete choice experiments (DCEs) based on Bayesian D-efficient DCE designs, with one DCE incorporating healthcare costs expressed as income tax rise. Respondent preferences were analysed using mixed logit models.

RESULTS

Six value elements were identified: additional life-years, health-related quality of life, patient experience, target population size, equity, and cost. The DCE surveys were completed by 402 participants. All utility coefficients had the expected signs and were statistically significant (p < 0.05). Additional life-years (25.3%; 95% confidence interval [CI] 22.5-28.6%) and patient experience (25.2%; 95% CI 21.6-28.9%) received the highest RI, followed by target population size (22.4%; 95% CI 19.1-25.6%) and quality of life (17.6%; 95% CI 15.0-20.3%). Equity had the lowest RI (9.6%; 95% CI 6.4-12.1%), decreasing by 8.8 percentage points with cost inclusion. A similar reduction was observed in the RI of quality of life when cost was included.

CONCLUSION

The public prioritizes value elements not captured by conventional metrics, such as quality-adjusted life-years. Although cost inclusion did not alter the preference ranking, its inclusion in the value metric warrants careful consideration.

Preparing popular views for inclusion in a reflective equilibrium: A case study on illness severity

Principles for priority setting in health care are typically forged by experts influenced by the normative literature on priority setting. Meanwhile, their implementation is subject to democratic deliberation, political pressures, and administrative bureaucracy. Sometimes expert proposals are democratically rejected. This points towards a problem: on the one hand, the fact that a majority shares a moral belief does not inherently validate this belief. On the other hand, when justifying a position to others, we cannot expect much success without engaging with their moral judgments. In this work we examine the possibility of including so-called popular views in a reflective equilibrium process. In reflective equilibrium processes, we are usually interested in considered judgments rather than mere intuitions. Popular views, arguably, often do not meet this standard. To mitigate this, we propose to bolster popular views by linking them with theoretical frameworks echoing similar moral perspectives. We use illness severity as a case study and show that a set of popular accounts can provide considered judgments that merit inclusion in a publicly informed reflective equilibrium process. This is plausibly a way forward in the search for priority setting principles that are both normatively sound and acceptable to the public. Our method provides a general framework for refining available data on popular views on moral questions, including when we cannot assess the consideredness of such views.

An empirical ethics study of the coherence of NICE technology appraisal policy and its implications for moral justification

BACKGROUND

As the UK's main healthcare priority-setter, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has good reason to want to demonstrate that its decisions are morally justified. In doing so, it has tended to rely on the moral plausibility of its principle of cost-effectiveness and the assertion that it has adopted a fair procedure. But neither approach provides wholly satisfactory grounds for morally defending NICE's decisions. In this study we adopt a complementary approach, based on the proposition that a priority-setter's claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the coherence of its approach and that the reliability of any such claim is undermined by the presence of dissonance within its moral system. This study is the first to empirically assess the coherence of NICE's formal approach and in doing so to generate evidence-based conclusions about the extent to which this approach is morally justified.

METHODS

The study is grounded in the theory, methods and standards of empirical bioethics. Twenty NICE policy documents were coded to identify and classify the normative commitments contained within NICE technology appraisal policy as of 31 December 2021. Coherence was systematically assessed by attempting to bring these commitments into narrow reflective equilibrium (NRE) and by identifying sources of dissonance.

FINDINGS

Much of NICE policy rests on coherent values that provide a strong foundation for morally justified decision-making. However, NICE's formal approach also contains several instances of dissonance which undermine coherence and prevent NRE from being fully established. Dissonance arises primarily from four sources: i) NICE's specification of the principle of cost-effectiveness; ii) its approach to prioritising the needs of particular groups; iii) its conception of reasonableness in the context of uncertainty, and iv) its concern for innovation as an independent value.

CONCLUSION

At the time of analysis, the level of coherence across NICE policy provides reason to question the extent to which its formal approach to technology appraisal is morally justified. Some thoughts are offered on why, given these findings, NICE has been able to maintain its legitimacy as a healthcare priority-setter and on what could be done to enhance coherence.

The ethical canary: narrow reflective equilibrium as a source of moral justification in healthcare priority-setting

Healthcare priority-setting institutions have good reason to want to demonstrate that their decisions are morally justified-and those who contribute to and use the health service have good reason to hope for the same. However, finding a moral basis on which to evaluate healthcare priority-setting is difficult. Substantive approaches are vulnerable to reasonable disagreement about the appropriate grounds for allocating resources, while procedural approaches may be indeterminate and insufficient to ensure a just distribution. In this paper, we set out a complementary, coherence-based approach to the evaluation of healthcare priority-setting. Drawing on Rawls, we argue that an institutional priority-setter's claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the extent to which its many normative commitments are mutually supportive and free from dissonance; that is, on the ability to establish narrow reflective equilibrium across the normative content of a priority-setter's policy and practice. While we do not suggest that the establishment of such equilibrium is sufficient for moral justification, we argue that failure to do so might-like the proverbial canary in the coalmine-act as a generalised warning that something is awry. We offer a theoretical argument in support of this view and briefly outline a practical method for systematically examining coherence across priority-setting policy and practice.

Public preferences for the allocation of societal resources over different healthcare purposes

OBJECTIVE

Increasing healthcare expenditures require governments to make difficult prioritization decisions. Considering public preferences can help raise citizens' support. Previous research has predominantly elicited preferences for the allocation of public resources towards specific treatments or patient groups and principles for resource allocation. This study contributes by examining public preferences for budget allocation over various healthcare purposes in the Netherlands.

METHODS

We conducted a Participatory Value Evaluation (PVE) choice experiment in which 1408 respondents were asked to allocate a hypothetical budget over eight healthcare purposes: general practice and other easily accessible healthcare, hospital care, elderly care, disability care, mental healthcare, preventive care by encouragement, preventive care by discouragement, and new and better medicines. A default expenditure was set for each healthcare purpose, based on current expenditures. Respondents could adjust these default expenditures using sliders and were presented with the implications of their adjustments on health and well-being outcomes, the economy, and the healthcare premium. As a constraint, the maximum increase in the mandatory healthcare premium for adult citizens was €600 per year. The data were analysed using descriptive statistics and a Latent Class Cluster Analysis (LCCA).

RESULTS

On average, respondents preferred to increase total expenditures on all healthcare purposes, but especially on elderly care, new and better medicines, and mental healthcare. Three preference clusters were identified. The largest cluster preferred modest increases in expenditures, the second a much higher increase of expenditures, and the smallest favouring a substantial reduction of the healthcare premium by decreasing the expenditure on all healthcare purposes. The analyses also demonstrated substantial preference heterogeneity between clusters for budget allocation over different healthcare purposes.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of this choice experiment show that most citizens in the Netherlands support increasing healthcare expenditures. However, substantial heterogeneity was identified in preferences for healthcare purposes to prioritize. Considering these preferences may increase public support for prioritization decisions.