Zooming In and Out on One's Life: Autobiographical Representations at Multiple Time Scales

What is autonoetic consciousness? Examining what underlies subjective experience in memory and future thinking

Autonoetic consciousness is the awareness that an event we remember is one that we ourselves experienced. It is a defining feature of our subjective experience of remembering and imagining future events. Given its subjective nature, there is ongoing debate about how to measure it. Our goal was to develop a framework to identify cognitive markers of autonoetic consciousness. Across two studies (N = 342) we asked young, healthy participants to provide written descriptions of two autobiographical memories, two plausible future events, and an experimentally encoded video. Participants then rated their subjective experience during remembering and imagining. Exploratory Factor Analysis of this data uncovered the latent variables underlying autonoetic consciousness across these different events. In contrast to work that emphasizes the distinction between Remember and Know as being key to autonoetic consciousness, Re-experiencing, and Pre-experiencing for future events, were consistently identified as core markers of autonoetic consciousness. This was alongside Mental Time Travel in all types of memory events, but not for imagining the future. In addition, our factor analysis allows us to demonstrate directly - for the first time - the features of mental imagery associated with the sense of autonoetic consciousness in autobiographical memory; vivid, visual imagery from a first-person perspective. Finally, with regression analysis, the emergent factor structure of autonoetic consciousness was able to predict the richness of autobiographical memory texts, but not of episodic recall of the encoded video. This work provides a novel way to assess autonoetic consciousness, illustrates how autonoetic consciousness manifests differently in memory and imagination and defines the mental representations intrinsic to this process.

Episodic recombination and the role of time in mental travel

Mental time travel is often presented as a singular mechanism, but theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that it is composed of component processes. What are these components? Three hypotheses about the major components of mental time travel are commonly considered: (i) remembering and imagining might, respectively, rely on different processes, (ii) past- and future-directed forms of mental time travel might, respectively, rely on different processes, and (iii) the creation of episodic representations and the determination of their temporal orientation might, respectively, rely on different processes. Here, we flesh out the last of these proposals. First, we argue for 'representational continuism': the view that different forms of mental travel are continuous with regard to their core representational contents. Next, we propose an updated account of episodic recombination (the mechanism generating these episodic contents) and review evidence in its support. On this view, episodic recombination is a natural kind best viewed as a form of compositional computation. Finally, we argue that episodic recombination should be distinguished from mechanisms determining the temporal orientation of episodic representations. Thus, we suggest that mental travel is a singular capacity, while mental time travel has at least two major components: episodic representations and their temporal orientation. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Beyond the episodic-semantic continuum: the multidimensional model of mental representations

Tulving's concept of mental time travel (MTT), and the related distinction of episodic and semantic memory, have been highly influential contributions to memory research, resulting in a wealth of findings and a deeper understanding of the neurocognitive correlates of memory and future thinking. Many models have conceptualized episodic and semantic representations as existing on a continuum that can help to account for various hybrid forms. Nevertheless, in most theories, MTT remains distinctly associated with episodic representations. In this article, we review existing models of memory and future thinking, and critically evaluate whether episodic representations are distinct from other types of explicit representations, including whether MTT as a neurocognitive capacity is uniquely episodic. We conclude by proposing a new framework, the Multidimensional Model of Mental Representations (MMMR), which can parsimoniously account for the range of past, present and future representations the human mind is capable of creating. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Towards a neurodevelopmental cognitive perspective of temporal processing

The ability to organize and memorize the unfolding of events over time is a fundamental feature of cognition, which develops concurrently with the maturation of the brain. Nonetheless, how temporal processing evolves across the lifetime as well as the links with the underlying neural substrates remains unclear. Here, we intend to retrace the main developmental stages of brain structure, function, and cognition linked to the emergence of timing abilities. This neurodevelopmental perspective aims to untangle the puzzling trajectory of temporal processing aspects across the lifetime, paving the way to novel neuropsychological assessments and cognitive rehabilitation strategies.

What makes an event significant: an fMRI study on self-defining memories

Self-defining memories are highly significant personal memories that contribute to an individual's life story and identity. Previous research has identified 4 key subcomponents of self-defining memories: content, affect, specificity, and self-reflection. However, these components were not tested under functional neuroimaging. In this study, we first explored how self-defining memories distinguish themselves from everyday memories (non-self-defining) through their associated brain activity. Next, we evaluated the different self-defining memory subcomponents through their activity in the underlying brain system. Participants recalled both self-defining and non-self-defining memories under functional MRI and evaluated the 4 subcomponents for each memory. Multivoxel pattern analysis uncovered a brain system closely related to the default mode network to discriminate between self-defining and non-self-defining memories. Representational similarity analysis revealed the neural coding of each subcomponent. Self-reflection was coded mainly in the precuneus, middle and inferior frontal gyri, and cingulate, lateral occipital, and insular cortices. To a much lesser extent, content coding was primarily in the left angular gyrus and fusiform gyrus. No region was found to represent information on affect and specificity. Our findings highlight the marked difference in brain processing between significant and non-significant memories, and underscore self-reflection as a predominant factor in the formation and maintenance of self-defining memories, inviting a reassessment of what constitutes significant memories.

Effects of past and future autobiographical thinking on the working self-concept

While the role of autobiographical memory in self-representation is well established, the identity function of future thinking has received much less attention. Yet, most people commonly imagine future events that convey meaningful information about the person they wish or expect to become. In three experiments, we assessed the extent to which thinking about such self-defining future events influences the current content of self-representation (i.e., the working self-concept). Participants were asked to think about either a past or future self-defining event, or a control topic, before describing aspects of their identity in the form of "I am" statements (Experiments 1 and 3) or completing scales assessing self-related dimensions (Experiments 2 and 3). We found that thinking about a future self-defining event led participants to conceptualise themselves more in terms of their psychological traits, as did thinking about a past self-defining event. Furthermore, thinking about a future self-defining event increased the sense of present-future self-continuity, whereas thinking about a past self-defining event increased the sense of past-present self-continuity. These results suggest that self-representations are fuelled not only by autobiographical memories, but also by projections into the future.

The hippocampus dissociates present from past and future goals

Our brain adeptly navigates goals across time frames, distinguishing between urgent needs and those of the past or future. The hippocampus is a region known for supporting mental time travel and organizing information along its longitudinal axis, transitioning from detailed posterior representations to generalized anterior ones. This study investigates the role of the hippocampus in distinguishing goals over time: whether the hippocampus encodes time regardless of detail or abstraction, and whether the hippocampus preferentially activates its anterior region for temporally distant goals (past and future) and its posterior region for immediate goals. We use a space-themed experiment with 7T functional MRI on 31 participants to examine how the hippocampus encodes the temporal distance of goals. During a simulated Mars mission, we find that the hippocampus tracks goals solely by temporal proximity. We show that past and future goals activate the left anterior hippocampus, while current goals engage the left posterior hippocampus. This suggests that the hippocampus maps goals using timestamps, extending its long axis system to include temporal goal organization.

Working memory capacity for continuous events: The root of temporal compression in episodic memory?

Remembering the unfolding of past episodes usually takes less time than their actual duration. In this study, we evaluated whether such temporal compression emerges when continuous events are too long to be fully held in working memory. To do so, we asked 90 young adults to watch and mentally replay video clips showing people performing a continuous action (e.g., turning a car jack) that lasted 3, 6, 9, 12, or 15 s. For each clip, participants had to carefully watch the event and then to mentally replay it as accurately and precisely as possible. Results showed that mental replay durations increased with event duration but in a non-linear manner: they were close to the actual event duration for short videos (3-9 s), but significantly smaller for longer videos (12 and 15 s). These results suggest that working memory is temporally limited in its capacity to represent continuous events, which could in part explain why the unfolding of events is temporally compressed in episodic memory.

Uncertainty salience reduces the accessibility of episodic future thoughts

We live in uncertain times and how this pervasive sense of uncertainty affects our ability to think about the future remains largely unexplored. This study aims to investigate the effects of uncertainty salience on episodic future thinking-the ability to mentally represent specific future events. Experiment 1 assessed the impact of uncertainty on the accessibility of episodic future thoughts using an event fluency task. Participants were randomly assigned to either an uncertainty induction or control condition, and then were asked to imagine as many future events as possible that could happen in different time periods. The results showed that participants in the uncertainty condition produced fewer events, suggesting that uncertainty salience reduced the accessibility of episodic future thoughts. Experiment 2 investigated in further detail the mechanisms of production of episodic future thoughts that are affected by uncertainty. The results showed that uncertainty primarily reduced the accessibility of previously formed future thoughts (i.e., memories of the future) rather than affecting the ability to generatively think about the future and construct events. These findings shed new light on the impact of uncertainty on episodic future thinking, paving the way to further investigation into its implications for decision-making and future-oriented behavior.

The autobiographical fluency task: Validity and reliability of a tool to assess episodic autobiographical memory and experience-near personal semantics

The assessment of autobiographical memory is challenging in clinical settings. The Autobiographical Fluency Task (AFT) - that is designed to test both Episodic Autobiographical Memory (EAM) and experience-near Personal Semantics (enPS) - may represent a feasible and rapid method to test access to autobiographical memories. Here we tested the reliability and the construct validity of the AFT. A total number of 51 individuals participated in the present study, with 24 included in Experiment 1 and 27 in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, participants performed both the AFT and the Survey of Autobiographical Memory (SAM). In Experiment 2, participants completed the AFT and the Autobiographical Interview (AI). The AFT showed a moderate-to-high reliability. Also, EAM and enPS scores significantly correlated with the episodic subscale of the SAM. Results of Experiment 1 were replicated and expanded in Experiment 2. Again, the AFT showed a high reliability. Both EAM and enPS showed a significant correlation with the number of internal details produced during the AI; enPS also correlated with the number of external details. Overall, the present results show that the AFT may be a feasible instrument to assess autobiographical memory, especially for testing episodic autobiographical memory and experience-near personal semantics in clinical settings.

Post-traumatic stress disorder and experiences involving violence or sexual abuse in a clinical sample of autistic adults with intellectual disabilities: Prevalence and clinical correlates

LAY ABSTRACT

Post-traumatic stress disorder is a mental health disorder that may be triggered by the experience of events perceived as terrifying or overwhelming. Examples of such events include being the victim of violence or sexual abuse. Compared with other people, autistic people have increased risk of being exposed to violence or sexual abuse. In addition, autistic people may be more vulnerable to developing post-traumatic stress disorder following such exposure. However, knowledge is limited concerning the prevalence of experiences involving violence and sexual abuse, and post-traumatic stress disorder, in autistic people with co-occurring intellectual disabilities. Detection of these experiences, and identification of post-traumatic stress disorder, may be challenging in these individuals, and previous research indicates that post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms may be overlooked or misinterpreted. In this study, we examined prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder, violence and sexual abuse in a clinical sample of 88 autistic adults with intellectual disabilities referred for mental health assessment. Only 3.4% were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, even if experiences involving violence (34.1%) or sexual abuse (17.0%) were common. Anxiety and affective disorders were common diagnoses among participants with these experiences. Controlling for autism characteristics, level of intellectual disability and communication skills, experiences of violence/sexual abuse were found to be associated with a measure of 'challenging' behaviours. These results indicate that potentially traumatic experiences are common in autistic adults with intellectual disabilities referred for mental health assessment, and that post-traumatic stress disorder may be under-recognised. The findings highlight the importance of trauma screening and post-traumatic stress disorder assessment, as well as the importance of trauma-informed care, in this population.

Mental Time Travel as Self-Affirmation

ACADEMIC ABSTRACT

This article integrates and advances the scope of research on the role of mental time travel in bolstering the self. We propose that imagining the self in the future (prospection) or in the past (retrospection) highlights central and positive self-aspects. Thus, bringing to mind one's future or past broadens the perceived bases of self-integrity and offers a route to self-affirmation. In reviewing corresponding research programs on self-prospection and nostalgia, we illustrate that mental time travel serves to affirm the self in terms of self-esteem, coherence, and control. Mental time travel could be implemented as a source of self-affirmation for facilitating coping and behavior change in several domains such as relationships, health, education, and organizational contexts.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

People can mentally travel to their future or to their past. When people imagine what they will be like in the future, or what they were like in the past, they tend to think about themselves in terms of the important and positive attributes that they possess. Thinking about themselves in such an affirming way expands and consolidates their self-views. This broader image of themselves can increase self-esteem (the extent to which one likes who they are), coherence (the extent to which one perceives life as meaningful), and control (the extent to which one feels capable of initiating and pursuing goals or effecting desirable outcomes). Mental time travel, then, has favorable or affirming consequences for one's self-views. These consequences can be harnessed to modify one's behavior in such life domains as relationships, health, education, and work.

Effects of the perceived temporal distance of events on mental time travel and on its underlying brain circuits

Mental Time Travel (MTT) allows us to remember past events and imagine future ones. According to previous literature, the Temporal Distance of events affects MTT: our ability to order events worsens for close, compared to far, events. However, those studies established distances a-priori, albeit the way we perceive events' temporal distance may subjectively differ from their objective distance. Thus, in the current study, we aimed to investigate the effects of Perceived Temporal Distance (PTD) on the MTT ability and the brain areas mediating this process. Thirty-three healthy volunteers took part in an fMRI MTT task. Participants were asked to project themselves into the past, present, or future, and to judge a series of events as relative-past or relative-future, in relation to the adopted time location. Outside the scanner, participants provided PTD estimates for each stimulus of the MTT task. Participants' performance and functional activity were analyzed as a function of these estimations. At the behavioural level, PTD predicts the modulation of the performance for relative-past and relative-future. Bilateral angular gyrus, retrosplenial cortex, temporo-parietal region and medial, middle and superior frontal gyri mediate the PTD effect. In addition to these areas, the closer the relative-future events are perceived, the higher the involvement of left parahippocampal and lingual gyri and right cerebellum. Thus, perceived proximity of events activates frontal and posterior parietal areas, which therefore might mediate the processing of PTD in the cognitive spatial representation of time. Future proximity also activates cerebellum and medial temporal areas, known to be involved in imaginative and constructive cognitive functions.

Goal characteristics predict the occurrence of goal-related events through belief in future occurrence

While previous studies have highlighted the role of episodic future thinking in goal pursuit, the underlying cognitive mechanisms remain unexplored. Episodic future thinking may promote goal pursuit by shaping the feeling that imagined events will (or will not) happen in the future - referred to as belief in future occurrence. We investigated whether goal self-concordance (Experiment 1) and other goal characteristics identified as influential in goal pursuit (Experiment 2) modulate belief in the future occurrence of goal-related events and predict the actual occurrence of these events. Results showed that goal self-concordance, engagement, and expectancy had an indirect effect on the actual occurrence of events, which was (partially) mediated by belief in future occurrence. The mediating role of belief supports the view that belief in future occurrence when imagining events conveys useful information, allowing us to make informed decisions and undertake adaptive actions in the process of goal pursuit.

Brain connectivity patterns associated with individual differences in the access to experience-near personal semantics: a resting-state fMRI study

It has been proposed that a continuum of specificity exists between episodic and semantic autobiographical memory. Personal semantics have been theorized to situate intermediately on this continuum, with more "experience-near" personal semantics (enPS) closer to the episodic end. We used individual differences in behavior as a model to investigate brain networks associated with the access to episodic autobiographical (EAM) and enPS information, assessing the relation between performance in the EAM and enPS conditions of the Autobiographical Fluency Task (AFT) and intrinsic brain connectivity. Results of an intrinsic connectivity contrast analysis showed that the global connectivity of two clusters in the left and right posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) was predicted by performance in the enPS conditions. Moreover, enPS scores predicted the connectivity strength of the right PCC with the bilateral anterior hippocampus (aHC), anterior middle temporal gyrus (aMTG) and medial orbitofrontal cortex, and the left aMTG and PCC. enPS scores also predicted the connectivity strength of the left PCC with the bilateral HC and MTG. The network highlighted involves parts of the core and of the dorsal medial subsystems of the Default Mode Network, in line with the proposal that enPS represents an intermediate entity between episodic and semantic memory.

Journeying to the past: time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?

Spatial models dominated memory research throughout much of the twentieth century, but in recent decades, the concept of memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) to the past has gained prominence. Initially introduced as a metaphor, the MTT perspective shifted the focus from internal memory processes to the subjective conscious experience of remembering. Despite its significant impact on empirical and theoretical memory research, there has been limited discussion regarding the meaning and adequacy of the MTT metaphor in accounting for memory. While in previous work I have addressed the general limitations of the MTT metaphor in explaining memory, the objective of this article is more focused and modest: to gain a better understanding of what constitutes MTT to the past. To achieve this objective, a detailed analysis of the characteristics of MTT to the past is presented through a comparison with time travel (TT) to the past. Although acknowledging that TT does not refer to an existing physical phenomenon, it is an older concept extensively discussed in the philosophical literature and provides commonly accepted grounds, particularly within orthodox theories of time, that can offer insights into the nature of MTT. Six specific characteristics serve as points of comparison: (1) a destination distinct from the present, (2) the distinction between subjective time and objective time, (3) the subjective experience of the time traveler, (4) their differentiation from the past self, (5) the existence of the past, and (6) its unchangeability. Through this research, a detailed exploration of the phenomenal and metaphysical aspects of MTT to the past is undertaken, shedding light on the distinct features that mental time travel to the past acquires when it occurs within the realm of the mind rather than as a physical phenomenon. By examining these characteristics, a deeper understanding of the nature of mental time travel is achieved, offering insights into how it operates in relation to memory and the past.

Time processing in neurological and psychiatric conditions

A central question in understanding cognition and pathology-related cognitive changes is how we process time. However, time processing difficulties across several neurological and psychiatric conditions remain seldom investigated. The aim of this review is to develop a unifying taxonomy of time processing, and a neuropsychological perspective on temporal difficulties. Four main temporal judgments are discussed: duration processing, simultaneity and synchrony, passage of time, and mental time travel. We present an integrated theoretical framework of timing difficulties across psychiatric and neurological conditions based on selected patient populations. This framework provides new mechanistic insights on both (a) the processes involved in each temporal judgement, and (b) temporal difficulties across pathologies. By identifying underlying transdiagnostic time-processing mechanisms, this framework opens fruitful avenues for future research.

Neurocognitive Model of Schema-Congruent and -Incongruent Learning in Clinical Disorders: Application to Social Anxiety and Beyond

Negative schemas lie at the core of many common and debilitating mental disorders. Thus, intervention scientists and clinicians have long recognized the importance of designing effective interventions that target schema change. Here, we suggest that the optimal development and administration of such interventions can benefit from a framework outlining how schema change occurs in the brain. Guided by basic neuroscientific findings, we provide a memory-based neurocognitive framework for conceptualizing how schemas emerge and change over time and how they can be modified during psychological treatment of clinical disorders. We highlight the critical roles of the hippocampus, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and posterior neocortex in directing schema-congruent and -incongruent learning (SCIL) in the interactive neural network that comprises the autobiographical memory system. We then use this framework, which we call the SCIL model, to derive new insights about the optimal design features of clinical interventions that aim to strengthen or weaken schema-based knowledge through the core processes of episodic mental simulation and prediction error. Finally, we examine clinical applications of the SCIL model to schema-change interventions in psychotherapy and provide cognitive-behavior therapy for social anxiety disorder as an illustrative example.

Bringing Order to Life: Temporal Order Effects during the Recall of Important Autobiographical Memories in Young and Old Adults

OBJECTIVE

The present study investigated whether younger and older adults differ in the extent to which they order their important autobiographical memories (AMs) in a chronological way during recall. Moreover, the number of autobiographical memories to be recalled was systematically varied in order to examine whether manipulating the size of the search sample affects the use of a chronological recall strategy.

METHODS

Data come from 118 younger adults (M = 23.12, SD = 3.33) and 124 older adults (M = 69.79, SD = 8.94) who recalled either seven or thirteen important AMs.

RESULTS

Using multilevel linear growth models, a temporal order effect for younger and older adults was found. For older adults, the temporal order effect was much more pronounced. The number of recalled events, however, did not affect the temporal order effect.

CONCLUSION

Our findings point to a higher need for a structured search or a stronger engagement in autobiographical reasoning processes in older age. Furthermore, asking for important AMs encourages participants to provide a comprehensive overview of their life independent of the number of important AMs to be recalled.

Repeated simulation increases belief in the future occurrence of uncertain events

The feeling that an imagined event will or will not occur in the future - referred to as belief in future occurrence - plays a key role in guiding our decisions and actions. Recent research suggests that this belief may increase with repeated simulation of future events, but the boundary conditions for this effect remain unclear. Considering the key role of autobiographical knowledge in shaping belief in occurrence, we suggest that the effect of repeated simulation only occurs when prior autobiographical knowledge does not clearly support or contradict the occurrence of the imagined event. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the repetition effect for events that were either plausible or implausible due to their coherence or incoherence with autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 1), and for events that initially appeared uncertain because they were not clearly supported or contradicted by autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 2). We found that all types of events became more detailed and took less time to construct after repeated simulation, but belief in their future occurrence increased only for uncertain events; repetition did not influence belief for events already believed or considered implausible. These findings show that the effect of repeated simulation on belief in future occurrence depends on the consistency of imagined events with autobiographical knowledge.

The role of posterior parietal cortex and medial prefrontal cortex in distraction and mind-wandering

Distraction reflects a drift of attention away from the task at hand towards task-irrelevant external or internal information (mind-wandering). The right posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) are known to mediate attention to external information and mind-wandering, respectively, but it is not clear whether they support each process selectively or rather they play similar roles in supporting both. In this study, participants performed a visual search task including salient color singleton distractors before and after receiving cathodal (inhibitory) transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to the right PPC, the mPFC, or sham tDCS. Thought probes assessed the intensity and contents of mind-wandering during visual search. The results show that tDCS to the right PPC but not mPFC reduced the attentional capture by the singleton distractor during visual search. tDCS to both mPFC and PPC reduced mind-wandering, but only tDCS to the mPFC specifically reduced future-oriented mind-wandering. These results suggest that the right PPC and mPFC play a different role in directing attention towards task-irrelevant information. The PPC is involved in both external and internal distraction, possibly by mediating the disengagement of attention from the current task and its reorienting to salient information, be this a percept or a mental content (mind-wandering). By contrast, the mPFC uniquely supports mind-wandering, possibly by mediating the endogenous generation of future-oriented thoughts capable to draw attention inward, away from ongoing activities.

Hippocampal timestamp for goals

Our brain must manage multiple goals that differ in their temporal proximity. Some goals require immediate attention, while others have already been accomplished, or will be relevant later in time. Here, we examined how the hippocampus represents the temporal distance to different goals using a novel space-themed paradigm during 7T functional MRI (n=31). The hippocampus has an established role in mental time travel and a system in place to stratify information along its longitudinal axis on the basis of representational granularity. Previous work has documented a functional transformation from fine-grained, detail rich representations in the posterior hippocampus to coarse, gist-like representations in the anterior hippocampus. We tested whether the hippocampus uses this long axis system to dissociate goals based upon their temporal distance from the present. We hypothesized that the hippocampus would distinguish goals relevant for ones' current needs from those that are removed in time along the long axis, with temporally removed past and future goals eliciting increasingly anterior activation. We sent participants on a mission to Mars where they had to track goals that differed in when they needed to be accomplished. We observed a long-axis dissociation, where temporally removed past and future goals activated the left anterior hippocampus and current goals activated the left posterior hippocampus. Altogether, this study demonstrates that the timestamp attached to a goal is a key driver in where the goal is represented in the hippocampus. This work extends the scope of the hippocampus' long axis system to the goal-mapping domain.

The role of depressive symptoms in the interplay between aging and temporal processing

Temporal processing, the ability to mentally represent and process the dynamical unfolding of events over time, is a fundamental feature of cognition that evolves with advancing age. Aging has indeed been associated with slower and more variable performance in timing tasks. However, the role of depressive symptoms in age-related changes in temporal processing remains to be investigated. Therefore, the present work aims to shed light on the link between temporal processing and depressive symptoms, which are frequent with advancing age. We relied on the multicentric "Blursday Project" database, providing measures of temporal processing together with questionnaires investigating psychological wellbeing. Results reveal that aging influences several timing abilities, from the reproduction of short time intervals to verbal estimations of longer temporal distances. Furthermore, the slowing down of felt passage of time regarding the last few days with age was fully mediated by the intensity of depressive symptoms. Overall, these findings suggest that depressive symptoms may play a pivotal role in age-related temporal processing changes.

The Role of Beta Oscillations in Mental Time Travel

The brain processes short-interval timing but also allows people to project themselves into the past and the future (i.e., mental time travel [MTT]). Beta oscillations index seconds-long-interval timing (i.e., higher beta power is associated with longer durations). Here, we used parietal transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) to investigate whether MTT is also supported by parietal beta oscillations and to test the link between MTT and short intervals. Thirty adults performed a novel MTT task while receiving beta and alpha tACS, in addition to no stimulation. Beta tACS corresponded to a temporal underestimation in past but not in future MTT. Furthermore, participants who overestimated seconds-long intervals also overestimated temporal distances in the past-projection MTT condition and showed a stronger effect of beta tACS. These data provide a unique window into temporal perception, showing how beta oscillations may be a common mechanism for short intervals and MTT.

Anticipated nostalgia

Anticipated nostalgia is the foreseeing of looking back on life events and expecting to feel nostalgic about it in the future. I review recent findings on the content, affective profile, and psychological benefits of anticipated nostalgia. I also review neurological and cognitive evidence that may explain the mechanism underlying anticipated nostalgia. Finally, I discuss anticipated nostalgia in an applied setting, consumer behavior.

Investigating the shift between externally and internally oriented cognition: a novel task-switching paradigm

Despite our constant need to flexibly balance internal and external information, research on cognitive flexibility has focused solely on shifts between externally oriented tasks. In contrast, switches across internally oriented processes (and self-referential cognition specifically) and between internal and external domains have never been investigated. Here, we report a novel task-switching paradigm developed to explore the behavioural signatures associated with cognitive flexibility when self-referential processes, as well as more traditional external processes, are involved. Two hundred healthy volunteers completed an online task. In each trial, participants performed one of four possible tasks on written words, as instructed by a pre-stimulus cue. These included two externally and two internally oriented tasks: assessing whether the third letter was a consonant or the penultimate letter was a vowel versus assessing whether the adjective applied to their personality or if it described a bodily sensation they were currently experiencing. In total, 40% of trials involved switches to another task, and these were equally distributed across within-external, within-internal, internal-to-external and external-to-internal switches. We found higher response times for switches compared to repetitions both in the external and internal domains, thus demonstrating the presence of switch costs in self-referential tasks for the first time. We also found higher response times for between-domain switches compared to switches within each domain. We propose that these effects originate from the goal-directed engagement of different domain-specific cognitive systems that flexibly communicate and share domain-general control features.

Self-Enhancement and the Medial Prefrontal Cortex: The Convergence of Clinical and Experimental Findings

Self-enhancement (SE) is often overlooked as a fundamental cognitive ability mediated via the Prefrontal Cortex (PFC). Here, we present research that establishes the relationship between the PFC, SE, and the potential evolved beneficial mechanisms. Specifically, we believe there is now enough evidence to speculate that SE exists to provide significant benefits and should be considered a normal aspect of the self. Whatever the metabolic or social cost, the upside of SE is great enough that it is a core and fundamental psychological construct. Furthermore, though entirely theoretical, we suggest that a critical reason the PFC has evolved so significantly in Homo sapiens is to, in part, sustain SE. We, therefore, elaborate on its proximate and ultimate mechanisms.

Episodic Memory Dysfunction and Effective Connectivity in Adult Patients With Newly Diagnosed Nonlesional Temporal Lobe Epilepsy

Objective

Epilepsy is associated with both changes in brain connectivity and memory function, usually studied in the chronic patients. The aim of this study was to explore the presence of connectivity alterations measured by EEG in the parietofrontal network in patients with temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE), and to examine episodic memory, at the time point of diagnosis.

Methods

The parietofrontal network of newly diagnosed patients with TLE (N = 21) was assessed through electroencephalography (EEG) effective connectivity and compared with that of matched controls (N = 21). Furthermore, we assessed phenomenological aspects of episodic memory in both groups. Association between effective connectivity and episodic memory were assessed through correlation.

Results

Patients with TLE displayed decreased episodic (p ≤ 0.001, t = −5.18) memory scores compared with controls at the time point of diagnosis. The patients showed a decreased right parietofrontal connectivity (p = 0.03, F = 4.94) compared with controls, and significantly weaker connectivity in their right compared with their left hemisphere (p = 0.008, t = −2.93). There were no significant associations between effective connectivity and episodic memory scores.

Conclusions

We found changes in both memory function and connectivity at the time point of diagnosis, supporting the notion that TLE involves complex memory functions and brain networks beyond the seizure focus to strongly interconnected brain regions, already early in the disease course. Whether the observed connectivity changes can be interpreted as functionally important to the alterations in memory function, it remains speculative.

Present and future self in memory: the role of vmPFC in the self-reference effect

Self-related information is remembered better than other-related information (self-reference effect; SRE), a phenomenon that has been convincingly linked to the medial prefrontal cortex. It is not clear whether information related to our future self would also have a privileged status in memory, as medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) regions respond less to the future than to the present self, as if it were an 'other'. Here we ask whether the integrity of the ventral mPFC (vmPFC) is necessary for the emergence of the present and future SRE, if any. vmPFC patients and brain-damaged and healthy controls judged whether each of a series of trait adjectives was descriptive of their present self, future self, another person and that person in the future and later recognized studied traits among distractors. Information relevant to the present (vs future) was generally recognized better, across groups. However, whereas healthy and brain-damaged controls exhibited strong present and future SREs, these were absent in vmPFC patients, who concomitantly showed reduced certainty about their own present and anticipated traits compared to the control groups. These findings indicate that vmPFC is necessary to impart a special mnemonic status to self-related information, including our envisioned future self, possibly by instantiating the self-schema.

I remember it like it was yesterday: Age-related differences in the subjective experience of remembering

It has been frequently described that older adults subjectively report the vividness of their memories as being as high, or even higher, than young adults, despite poorer objective memory performance. Here, we review studies that examined age-related differences in the subjective experience of memory vividness. By examining vividness calibration and resolution, studies using different types of approaches converge to suggest that older adults overestimate the intensity of their vividness ratings relative to young adults, and that they rely on retrieved memory details to a lesser extent to judge vividness. We discuss potential mechanisms underlying these observations. Inflation of memory vividness with regard to the richness of memory content may stem from age-differences in vividness criterion or scale interpretation and psycho-social factors. The reduced reliance on episodic memory details in older adults may stem from age-related differences in how they monitor these details to make their vividness ratings. Considered together, these findings emphasize the importance of examining age-differences in memory vividness using different analytical methods and they provide valuable evidence that the subjective experience of remembering is more than the reactivation of memory content. In this vein, we recommend that future studies explore the links between memory vividness and other subjective memory scales (e.g., ratings of details or memory confidence) in healthy aging and/or other populations, as it could be used as a window to better characterize the cognitive processes that underpin the subjective assessment of the quality of recollected events.

A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away: How temporal are episodic contents?

A prominent feature of mental event (i.e. 'episodic') simulations is their temporal orientation: human adults can generate episodic representations directed towards the past or the future. Here, we investigated how the temporal orientation of imagined events relates to the contents of these events. Is there something intrinsically temporal about episodic contents? Or does their temporality rely on a distinct set of representations? In three experiments (N = 360), we asked participants to generate and later recall a series of imagined events differing in (1) location, (2) time of day, (3) temporal orientation, and (4) weekday. We then tested to what extent successful recall of episodic content (i.e. (1) and (2)) would predict recall of temporality and/or weekday information. Results showed that recall of temporal orientation was only weakly predicted by recall of episodic contents. Nonetheless, temporal orientation was more strongly predicted by content recall than weekday recall. This finding suggests that episodic simulations are unlikely to be intrinsically temporal in nature. Instead, similar to other forms of temporal information, temporal orientation might be determined from such contents by reconstructive post-retrieval processes. These results have implications for how the human ability to 'mentally travel' in time is cognitively implemented.

Evidence for a pervasive autobiographical memory impairment in Logopenic Progressive Aphasia

Although characterized primarily as a language disorder, mounting evidence indicates episodic amnesia in Logopenic Progressive Aphasia (LPA). Whether such memory disturbances extend to information encoded pre-disease onset remains unclear. To address this question, we examined autobiographical memory in 10 LPA patients, contrasted with 18 typical amnestic Alzheimer's disease and 16 healthy Control participants. A validated assessment, the Autobiographical Interview, was employed to explore autobiographical memory performance across the lifespan under free and probed recall conditions. Relative to Controls, LPA patients showed global impairments across all time periods for free recall, scoring at the same level as disease-matched cases of Alzheimer's disease. Importantly, these retrieval deficits persisted in LPA, even when structured probing was provided, and could not be explained by overall level of language disruption or amount of information generated during autobiographical narration. Autobiographical memory impairments in LPA related to gray matter intensity decrease in predominantly posterior parietal brain regions implicated in memory retrieval. Together, our results suggest that episodic memory disturbances may be an under-appreciated clinical feature of LPA.

Memory, Future Thinking, and the Self. In Honour of Martial Van Der Linden

Over the past 20 years, much progress has been made in understanding the relations between memory and future thinking, and their role in shaping our sense of self and identity. My own interest in these research questions owes much to Martial Van der Linden, with whom I had the chance to interact closely for several years. The purpose of this article is to pay tribute to him by reviewing the work we initiated together on autobiographical memory and future-oriented thinking. I first review our early work on the relationship between memory and future thinking and discuss their role in self-representation. Then, I provide an overview of the underlying neural bases and describe the alterations of autobiographical thinking that characterize certain psychological disorders. Finally, I outline an integrative framework that I recently proposed to account for the cognitive structure of past and future autobiographical thinking.

The role of ventromedial prefrontal cortex in reward valuation and future thinking during intertemporal choice

Intertemporal choices require trade-offs between short-term and long-term outcomes. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) damage causes steep discounting of future rewards (delay discounting [DD]) and impoverished episodic future thinking (EFT). The role of vmPFC in reward valuation, EFT, and their interaction during intertemporal choice is still unclear. Here, 12 patients with lesions to vmPFC and 41 healthy controls chose between smaller-immediate and larger-delayed hypothetical monetary rewards while we manipulated reward magnitude and the availability of EFT cues. In the EFT condition, participants imagined personal events to occur at the delays associated with the larger-delayed rewards. We found that DD was steeper in vmPFC patients compared to controls, and not modulated by reward magnitude. However, EFT cues downregulated DD in vmPFC patients as well as controls. These findings indicate that vmPFC integrity is critical for the valuation of (future) rewards, but not to instill EFT in intertemporal choice.

A story to tell: the role of narratives in reducing delay discounting for people who strongly discount the future

Delay Discounting (DD) or devaluing a future, larger reward in favour of a smaller, more immediate reward, has been linked to negative health behaviours. One intervention that reduces DD is Episodic Future Thinking (EFT). EFT has participants generate cues representing positive future events that correspond to temporal windows during the DD task. The current study examined if incorporating EFT cues into narratives would strengthen effects on DD. One hundred and sixty adults were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and were randomised to traditional or narrative EFT. Results showed that participants in narrative EFT discounted the future less (p = 0.034) than participants who engaged in traditional EFT. This novel approach to EFT is well grounded in research and theory on the power of narratives to influence behaviour and can open a new window into ways to reduce DD to strengthen engagement in positive choices.

An asymmetry in past and future mental time travel following vmPFC damage

The role of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in mental time travel toward the past and the future is debated. Here, patients with focal lesions to the vmPFC and brain-damaged and healthy controls mentally projected themselves to a past, present or future moment of subjective time (self-projection) and classified a series of events as past or future relative to the adopted temporal self-location (self-reference). We found that vmPFC patients were selectively impaired in projecting themselves to the future and in recognizing relative-future events. These findings indicate that vmPFC damage hinders the mental processing of and movement toward future events, pointing to a prominent, multifaceted role of vmPFC in future-oriented mental time travel.

The role of self-reference and personal goals in the formation of memories of the future

Recent evidence suggests that some simulations of future events are encoded in memory and later recalled as "memories of the future," but the factors that determine the memorability of future simulations remain poorly understood. The current research aimed to test the hypothesis that imagined future events are better memorized when they are integrated in autobiographical knowledge structures. Across two experiments, we found that future events that involved the self were better recalled than future events that involved an acquaintance (Experiment 1), and that future events that were related to personal goals were better recalled than future events that were unrelated to goals (Experiment 2). Although self-reference and personal goals influenced the phenomenological characteristics of future simulations (e.g., their vividness and the clarity of event components), the enhanced recall of self-relevant and goal-relevant simulations was not simply due to these differences in the characteristics of simulations. Taken together, these findings suggest that the integration of simulated events with preexisting autobiographical knowledge is an important determinant of memories of the future.

Mapping the imaginative mind: Charting new paths forward

The fields of psychology and neuroscience are in the midst of an explosion of research seeking to understand human imagination - the ability to form thoughts and mental images that stretch beyond what is currently available to the senses. Imaginative thought is proving to be remarkably diverse, capturing the capacity to recall past experiences, consider what lies ahead, and understand others' minds, in addition to other forms of creative and spontaneous thinking. In the first part of this article, we introduce an integrative framework that attempts to explain how components of a core brain network facilitate interacting features of imagination that we refer to as the "mind's eye" and "mind's mind." We then highlight three emerging research directions that could inform our understanding of how imagination arises and unfolds in everyday life.

Processing of Different Temporal Scales in the Human Brain

While recalling life events, we reexperience events of different durations, ranging across varying temporal scales, from several minutes to years. However, the brain mechanisms underlying temporal cognition are usually investigated only in small-scale periods—milliseconds to minutes. Are the same neurocognitive systems used to organize memory at different temporal scales? Here, we asked participants to compare temporal distances (time elapsed) to personal events at four different temporal scales (hour, day, week, and month) under fMRI. Cortical activity showed temporal scale sensitivity at the medial and lateral parts of the parietal lobe, bilaterally. Activity at the medial parietal cortex also showed a gradual progression from large- to small-scale processing, along a posterior–anterior axis. Interestingly, no sensitivity was found along the hippocampal long axis. In the medial scale-sensitive region, most of the voxels were preferentially active for the larger scale (month), and in the lateral region, scale selectivity was higher for the smallest scale (hour). These results demonstrate how scale-selective activity characterizes autobiographical memory processing and may provide a basis for understanding how the human brain processes and integrates experiences across timescales in a hierarchical manner.

The temporal compression of events during episodic future thinking

While the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie episodic future thinking are increasingly well understood, little is known about how the temporal unfolding of events is represented in future simulations. In this study, we leveraged wearable camera technology to examine whether real-world events are structured and compressed in the same way when imagining the future as when remembering the past. We found that future events were simulated at proportionally higher speed than past events and that the density of experience units representing the unfolding of events was lower for future than for past episodes. Despite these differences, the nature of events influenced compression rates in the same way for past and future events. Furthermore, the perceived duration of both types of events depended on the density of represented experience units. These results provide novel insight into the mechanisms that structure the unfolding of events during future simulations.