Trends in the risk of U.S. polio outbreaks and poliovirus vaccine availability for response

Molecular epidemiology of enteroviruses from Guatemalan wastewater isolated from human lung fibroblasts

The Global Specialized Polio Laboratory at CDC supports the Global Poliovirus Laboratory Network with environmental surveillance (ES) to detect the presence of vaccine strain polioviruses, vaccine-derived polioviruses, and wild polioviruses in high-risk countries. Environmental sampling provides valuable supplementary information, particularly in areas with gaps in surveillance of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) mainly in children less than 15 years. In collaboration with Guatemala's National Health Laboratory (Laboratorio Nacional de Salud Guatemala), monthly sewage collections allowed screening enterovirus (EV) presence without incurring additional costs for sample collection, transport, or concentration. Murine recombinant fibroblast L-cells (L20B) and human rhabdomyosarcoma (RD) cells are used for the isolation of polioviruses following a standard detection algorithm. Though non-polio-Enteroviruses (NPEV) can be isolated, the algorithm is optimized for the detection of polioviruses. To explore if other EV's are present in sewage not found through standard methods, five additional cell lines were piloted in a small-scale experiment, and next-generation sequencing (NGS) was used for the identification of any EV types. Human lung fibroblast cells (HLF) were selected based on their ability to isolate EV-A genus. Sewage concentrates collected between 2020-2021 were isolated in HLF cells and any cytopathic effect positive isolates used for NGS. A large variety of EVs, including echoviruses 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 13, 18, 19, 25, 29; coxsackievirus A13, B2, and B5, EV-C99, EVB, and polioviruses (Sabin 1 and 3) were identified through genomic typing in NGS. When the EV genotypes were compared by phylogenetic analysis, it showed many EV's were genomically like viruses previously isolated from ES collected in Haiti. Enterovirus occurrence did not follow a seasonality, but more diverse EV types were found in ES collection sites with lower populations. Using the additional cell line in the existing poliovirus ES algorithm may add value by providing data about EV circulation, without additional sample collection or processing. Next-generation sequencing closed gaps in knowledge providing molecular epidemiological information on multiple EV types and full genome sequences of EVs present in wastewater in Guatemala.

Modeling Poliovirus Transmission and Responses in New York State

BACKGROUND

In July 2022, New York State (NYS) reported a case of paralytic polio in an unvaccinated young adult, and subsequent wastewater surveillance confirmed sustained local transmission of type 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV2) in NYS with genetic linkage to the paralyzed patient.

METHODS

We adapted an established poliovirus transmission and oral poliovirus vaccine evolution model to characterize dynamics of poliovirus transmission in NYS, including consideration of the immunization activities performed as part of the declared state of emergency.

RESULTS

Despite sustained transmission of imported VDPV2 in NYS involving potentially thousands of individuals (depending on seasonality, population structure, and mixing assumptions) in 2022, the expected number of additional paralytic cases in years 2023 and beyond is small (less than 0.5). However, continued transmission and/or reintroduction of poliovirus into NYS and other populations remains a possible risk in communities that do not achieve and maintain high immunization coverage.

CONCLUSIONS

In countries such as the United States that use only inactivated poliovirus vaccine, even with high average immunization coverage, imported polioviruses may circulate and pose a small but nonzero risk of causing paralysis in nonimmune individuals.

Trade-offs of different poliovirus vaccine options for outbreak response in the United States and other countries that only use inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization

Delays in achieving polio eradication have led to ongoing risks of poliovirus importations that may cause outbreaks in polio-free countries. Because of the low, but non-zero risk of paralysis with oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs), countries that achieve and maintain high national routine immunization coverage have increasingly shifted to exclusive use of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) for all preventive immunizations. However, immunization coverage within countries varies, with under-vaccinated subpopulations potentially able to sustain transmission of imported polioviruses and experience local outbreaks. Due to its cost, ease-of-use, and ability to induce mucosal immunity, using OPV as an outbreak control measure offers a more cost-effective option in countries in which OPV remains in use. However, recent polio outbreaks in IPV-only countries raise questions about whether and when IPV use for outbreak response may fail to stop poliovirus transmission and what consequences may follow from using OPV for outbreak response in these countries. We systematically reviewed the literature to identify modeling studies that explored the use of IPV for outbreak response in IPV-only countries. In addition, applying a model of the 2022 type 2 poliovirus outbreak in New York, we characterized the implications of using different OPV formulations for outbreak response instead of IPV. We also explored the hypothetical scenario of the same outbreak except for type 1 poliovirus instead of type 2. We find that using IPV for outbreak response will likely only stop outbreaks for polioviruses of relatively low transmission potential in countries with very high overall immunization coverage, seasonal transmission dynamics, and only if IPV immunization interventions reach some unvaccinated individuals. Using OPV for outbreak response in IPV-only countries poses substantial risks and challenges that require careful consideration, but may represent an option to consider for some outbreaks in some populations depending on the properties of the available vaccines and coverage attainable.

Worst-case scenarios: Modeling uncontrolled type 2 polio transmission

In May 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated the cessation of all use of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2), except for emergency outbreak response. Since then, paralytic polio cases caused by type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses now exceed 3,000 cases reported by 39 countries. In 2022 (as of April 25, 2023), 20 countries reported detection of cases and nine other countries reported environmental surveillance detection, but no reported cases. Recent development of a genetically modified novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) may help curb the generation of neurovirulent vaccine-derived strains; its use since 2021 under Emergency Use Listing is limited to outbreak response activities. Prior modeling studies showed that the expected trajectory for global type 2 viruses does not appear headed toward eradication, even with the best possible properties of nOPV2 assuming current outbreak response performance. Continued persistence of type 2 poliovirus transmission exposes the world to the risks of potentially high-consequence events such as the importation of virus into high-transmission areas of India or Bangladesh. Building on prior polio endgame modeling and assuming current national and GPEI outbreak response performance, we show no probability of successfully eradicating type 2 polioviruses in the near term regardless of vaccine choice. We also demonstrate the possible worst-case scenarios could result in rapid expansion of paralytic cases and preclude the goal of permanently ending all cases of poliomyelitis in the foreseeable future. Avoiding such catastrophic scenarios will depend on the development of strategies that raise population immunity to type 2 polioviruses.

Coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine use: Options and potential consequences

Due to the very low, but nonzero, paralysis risks associated with the use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), eradicating poliomyelitis requires ending all OPV use globally. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated cessation of Sabin type 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) in 2016, except for emergency outbreak response. However, as of early 2023, plans for cessation of bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 OPV) remain undefined, and OPV2 use for outbreak response continues due to ongoing transmission of type 2 polioviruses and reported type 2 cases. Recent development and use of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) leads to additional potential vaccine options and increasing complexity in strategies for the polio endgame. Prior applications of integrated global risk, economic, and poliovirus transmission modeling consistent with GPEI strategic plans that preceded OPV2 cessation explored OPV cessation dynamics and the evaluation of options to support globally coordinated risk management efforts. The 2022-2026 GPEI strategic plan highlighted the need for early bOPV cessation planning. We review the published modeling and explore bOPV cessation immunization options as of 2022, assuming that the GPEI partners will not support restart of the use of any OPV type in routine immunization after a globally coordinated cessation of such use. We model the potential consequences of globally coordinating bOPV cessation in 2027, as anticipated in the 2022-2026 GPEI strategic plan. We do not find any options for bOPV cessation likely to succeed without a strategy of bOPV intensification to increase population immunity prior to cessation.

Modeling undetected poliovirus circulation following the 2022 outbreak in the United States

BACKGROUND

New York State (NYS) reported a polio case (June 2022) and outbreak of imported type 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) (last positive wastewater detection in February 2023), for which uncertainty remains about potential ongoing undetected transmission.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Extending a prior deterministic model, we apply an established stochastic modeling approach to characterize the confidence about no circulation (CNC) of cVDPV2 as a function of time since the last detected signal of transmission (i.e. poliovirus positive acute flaccid myelitis case or wastewater sample).

RESULTS

With the surveillance coverage for the NYS population majority and its focus on outbreak counties, modeling suggests a high CNC (95%) within 3-10 months of the last positive surveillance signal, depending on surveillance sensitivity and population mixing patterns. Uncertainty about surveillance sensitivity implies longer durations required to achieve higher CNC.

CONCLUSIONS

In populations that maintain high overall immunization coverage with inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV), rare polio cases may occur in un(der)-vaccinated individuals. Modeling demonstrates the unlikeliness of type 2 outbreaks reestablishing endemic transmission or resulting in large absolute numbers of paralytic cases. Achieving and maintaining high immunization coverage with IPV remains the most effective measure to prevent outbreaks and shorten the duration of imported poliovirus transmission.

Oral polio vaccine stockpile modeling: insights from recent experience

BACKGROUND

Achieving polio eradication requires ensuring the delivery of sufficient supplies of the right vaccines to the right places at the right times. Despite large global markets, decades of use, and large quantity purchases of polio vaccines by national immunization programs and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), forecasting demand for the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) stockpile remains challenging.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

We review OPV stockpile experience compared to pre-2016 expectations, actual demand, and changes in GPEI policies related to the procurement and use of type 2 OPV vaccines. We use available population and immunization schedule data to explore polio vaccine market segmentation, and its role in polio vaccine demand forecasting.

RESULTS

We find that substantial challenges remain in forecasting polio vaccine needs, mainly due to (1) deviations in implementation of plans that formed the basis for earlier forecasts, (2) lack of alignment of tactics/objectives among GPEI partners and other key stakeholders, (3) financing, and (4) uncertainty about development and licensure timelines for new polio vaccines and their field performance characteristics.

CONCLUSIONS

Mismatches between supply and demand over time have led to negative consequences associated with both oversupply and undersupply, as well as excess costs and potentially preventable cases.

Health economic analysis of vaccine options for the polio eradication endgame: 2022-2036

BACKGROUND

: Multiple vaccine options are available for polio prevention and risk management. Integrated global risk, economic, and poliovirus transmission modeling provides a tool to explore the dynamics of ending all use of one or more poliovirus vaccines to simplify the polio eradication endgame.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

: With global reported cases of poliomyelitis trending higher since 2016, we apply an integrated global model to simulate prospective vaccine policies and strategies for OPV-using countries starting with initial conditions that correspond to the epidemiological poliovirus transmission situation at the beginning of 2022.

RESULTS

: Abruptly ending all OPV use in 2023 and relying only on IPV to prevent paralysis with current routine immunization coverage would lead to expected reestablished endemic transmission of poliovirus types 1 and 2, and approximately 150,000 expected cases of poliomyelitis per year. Alternatively, if OPV-using countries restart trivalent OPV (tOPV) use for all immunization activities and end IPV use, the model shows the lowest anticipated annual polio cases and lowest costs.

CONCLUSIONS

: Poor global risk management and coordination of OPV cessation remain a critical failure mode for the polio endgame, and national and global decision makers face difficult choices due to multiple available polio vaccine options and immunization strategies.

A dynamically consistent computational method to solve numerically a mathematical model of polio propagation with spatial diffusion

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE

In this work, a mathematical model based on differential equations is proposed to describe the propagation of polio in a human population. The motivating system is a compartmental nonlinear model which is based on the use of ordinary differential equations and four compartments, namely, susceptible, exposed, infected and vaccinated individuals.

METHODS

In this manuscript, the mathematical model is extended in order to account for spatial diffusion in one dimension. Nonnegative initial conditions are used, and we impose homogeneous Neumann conditions at the boundary. We determine analytically the disease-free and the endemic equilibria of the system along with the basic reproductive number.

RESULTS

We establish thoroughly the nonnegativity and the boundedness of the solutions of this problem, and the stability analysis of the equilibrium solutions is carried out rigorously. In order to confirm the validity of these results, we propose an implicit and linear finite-difference method to approximate the solutions of the continuous model.

CONCLUSIONS

The numerical model is stable in the sense of von Neumann, it yields consistent approximations to the exact solutions of the differential problem, and that it is capable of preserving unconditionally the positivity of the approximations. For illustration purposes, we provide some computer simulations that confirm some theoretical results derived in the present manuscript.

A Health Economic Analysis for Oral Poliovirus Vaccine to Prevent COVID-19 in the United States

COVID-19 led to a recent high-profile proposal to reintroduce oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in the United States (U.S.), initially in clinical trials, but potentially for widespread and repeated use. We explore logistical challenges related to U.S. OPV administration in 2020, review the literature related to nonspecific effects of OPV to induce innate immunity, and model the health and economic implications of the proposal. The costs of reintroducing a single OPV dose to 331 million Americans would exceed $4.4 billion. Giving a dose of bivalent OPV to the entire U.S. population would lead to an expected 40 identifiable cases of vaccine-associated paralytic polio, with young Americans at the highest risk. Reintroducing any OPV use in the U.S. poses a risk of restarting transmission of OPV-related viruses and could lead to new infections in immunocompromised individuals with B-cell related primary immunodeficiencies that could lead to later cases of paralysis. Due to the lack of a currently licensed OPV in the U.S., the decision to administer OPV to Americans for nonspecific immunological effects would require purchasing limited global OPV supplies that could impact polio eradication efforts. Health economic modeling suggests no role for reintroducing OPV into the U.S. with respect to responding to COVID-19. Countries that currently use OPV experience fundamentally different risks, costs, and benefits than the U.S. Successful global polio eradication will depend on sufficient OPV supplies, achieving and maintaining high OPV coverage in OPV-using countries, and effective global OPV cessation and containment in all countries, including the U.S.

Reflections on Modeling Poliovirus Transmission and the Polio Eradication Endgame

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners engaged modelers during the past nearly 20 years to support strategy and policy discussions and decisions, and to provide estimates of the risks, costs, and benefits of different options for managing the polio endgame. Limited efforts to date provided insights related to the validation of the models used for GPEI strategy and policy decisions. However, modeling results only influenced decisions in some cases, with other factors carrying more weight in many key decisions. In addition, the results from multiple modeling groups do not always agree, which supports selection of some strategies and/or policies counter to the recommendations from some modelers but not others. This analysis reflects on our modeling, and summarizes our premises and recommendations, the outcomes of these recommendations, and the implications of key limitations of models with respect to polio endgame strategy. We briefly review the current state of the GPEI given epidemiological experience as of early 2020, which includes failure of the GPEI to deliver on the objectives of its 2013-2018 strategic plan despite full financial support. Looking ahead, we provide context for why the GPEI strategy of global oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation to end all cases of poliomyelitis looks infeasible given the current state of the GPEI and the failure to successfully stop all transmission of serotype 2 live polioviruses within four years of the April-May 2016 coordinated cessation of serotype 2 OPV use in routine immunization.

Review of poliovirus modeling performed from 2000 to 2019 to support global polio eradication

INTRODUCTION

Over the last 20 years (2000-2019) the partners of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) invested in the development and application of mathematical models of poliovirus transmission as well as economics, policy, and risk analyses of polio endgame risk management options, including policies related to poliovirus vaccine use during the polio endgame.

AREAS COVERED

This review provides a historical record of the polio studies published by the three modeling groups that primarily performed the bulk of this work. This review also systematically evaluates the polio transmission and health economic modeling papers published in English in peer-reviewed journals from 2000 to 2019, highlights differences in approaches and methods, shows the geographic coverage of the transmission modeling performed, identified common themes, and discusses instances of similar or conflicting insights or recommendations.

EXPERT OPINION

Polio modeling performed during the last 20 years substantially impacted polio vaccine choices, immunization policies, and the polio eradication pathway. As the polio endgame continues, national preferences for polio vaccine formulations and immunization strategies will likely continue to change. Future modeling will likely provide important insights about their cost-effectiveness and their relative benefits with respect to controlling polio and potentially achieving and maintaining eradication.

Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment and Infectious Disease Transmission Modeling of Waterborne Enteric Pathogens

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Waterborne enteric pathogens remain a global health threat. Increasingly, quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) and infectious disease transmission modeling (IDTM) are used to assess waterborne pathogen risks and evaluate mitigation. These modeling efforts, however, have largely been conducted independently for different purposes and in different settings. In this review, we examine the settings where each modeling strategy is employed.

RECENT FINDINGS

QMRA research has focused on food contamination and recreational water in high-income countries (HICs) and drinking water and wastewater in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). IDTM research has focused on large outbreaks (predominately LMICs) and vaccine-preventable diseases (LMICs and HICs). Human ecology determines the niches that pathogens exploit, leading researchers to focus on different risk assessment research strategies in different settings. To enhance risk modeling, QMRA and IDTM approaches should be integrated to include dynamics of pathogens in the environment and pathogen transmission through populations.

Global certification of wild poliovirus eradication: insights from modelling hard-to-reach subpopulations and confidence about the absence of transmission

OBJECTIVE

To explore the extent to which undervaccinated subpopulations may influence the confidence about no circulation of wild poliovirus (WPV) after the last detected case.

DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS

We used a hypothetical model to examine the extent to which the existence of an undervaccinated subpopulation influences the confidence about no WPV circulation after the last detected case as a function of different characteristics of the subpopulation (eg, size, extent of isolation). We also used the hypothetical population model to inform the bounds on the maximum possible time required to reach high confidence about no circulation in a completely isolated and unvaccinated subpopulation starting either at the endemic equilibrium or with a single infection in an entirely susceptible population.

RESULTS

It may take over 3 years to reach 95% confidence about no circulation for this hypothetical population despite high surveillance sensitivity and high vaccination coverage in the surrounding general population if: (1) ability to detect cases in the undervaccinated subpopulation remains exceedingly small, (2) the undervaccinated subpopulation remains small and highly isolated from the general population and (3) the coverage in the undervaccinated subpopulation remains very close to the minimum needed to eradicate. Fully-isolated hypothetical populations of 4000 people or less cannot sustain endemic transmission for more than 5 years, with at least 20 000 people required for a 50% chance of at least 5 years of sustained transmission in a population without seasonality that starts at the endemic equilibrium. Notably, however, the population size required for persistent transmission increases significantly for realistic populations that include some vaccination and seasonality and/or that do not begin at the endemic equilibrium.

CONCLUSIONS

Significant trade-offs remain inherent in global polio certification decisions, which underscore the need for making and valuing investments to maximise population immunity and surveillance quality in all remaining possible WPV reservoirs.

Using integrated modeling to support the global eradication of vaccine-preventable diseases

The long-term management of global disease eradication initiatives involves numerous inherently dynamic processes, health and economic trade-offs, significant uncertainty and variability, rare events with big consequences, complex and inter-related decisions, and a requirement for cooperation among a large number of stakeholders. Over the course of more than 16 years of collaborative modeling efforts to support the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, we developed increasingly complex integrated system dynamics models that combined numerous analytical approaches, including differential equation-based modeling, risk and decision analysis, discrete-event and individual-based simulation, probabilistic uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, health economics, and optimization. We discuss the central role of systems thinking and system dynamics in the overall effort and the value of integrating different modeling approaches to appropriately address the trade-offs involved in some of the policy questions. We discuss practical challenges of integrating different analytical tools and we provide our perspective on the future of integrated modeling.

Lessons From the Polio Endgame: Overcoming the Failure to Vaccinate and the Role of Subpopulations in Maintaining Transmission

Background

Recent detections of circulating serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus in northern Nigeria (Borno and Sokoto states) and Pakistan (Balochistan Province) and serotype 1 wild poliovirus in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria (Borno) represent public health emergencies that require aggressive response.

Methods

We demonstrate the importance of undervaccinated subpopulations, using an existing dynamic poliovirus transmission and oral poliovirus vaccine evolution model. We review the lessons learned during the polio endgame about the role of subpopulations in sustaining transmission, and we explore the implications of subpopulations for other vaccine-preventable disease eradication efforts.

Results

Relatively isolated subpopulations benefit little from high surrounding population immunity to transmission and will sustain transmission as long as they do not attain high vaccination coverage. Failing to reach such subpopulations with high coverage represents the root cause of polio eradication delays. Achieving and maintaining eradication requires addressing the weakest links, which includes immunizing populations in insecure areas and/or with disrupted or poor-performing health systems and managing the risks of individuals with primary immunodeficiencies who can excrete vaccine-derived poliovirus long-term.

Conclusions

Eradication efforts for vaccine-preventable diseases need to create performance expectations for countries to immunize all people living within their borders and maintain high coverage with appropriate interventions.Keywords. Polio; eradication; transmission; heterogeneity.

Estimating enhanced prevaccination measles transmission hotspots in the context of cross-scale dynamics

A key question in clarifying human-environment interactions is how dynamic complexity develops across integrative scales from molecular to population and global levels. Apart from its public health importance, measles is an excellent test bed for such an analysis. Simple mechanistic models have successfully illuminated measles dynamics at the city and country levels, revealing seasonal forcing of transmission as a major driver of long-term epidemic behavior. Seasonal forcing ties closely to patterns of school aggregation at the individual and community levels, but there are few explicit estimates of school transmission due to the relative lack of epidemic data at this scale. Here, we use data from a 1904 measles outbreak in schools in Woolwich, London, coupled with a stochastic Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model to analyze measles incidence data. Our results indicate that transmission within schools and age classes is higher than previous population-level serological data would suggest. This analysis sheds quantitative light on the role of school-aged children in measles cross-scale dynamics, as we illustrate with references to the contemporary vaccination landscape.

Framework for Optimal Global Vaccine Stockpile Design for Vaccine-Preventable Diseases: Application to Measles and Cholera Vaccines as Contrasting Examples

Managing the dynamics of vaccine supply and demand represents a significant challenge with very high stakes. Insufficient vaccine supplies can necessitate rationing, lead to preventable adverse health outcomes, delay the achievements of elimination or eradication goals, and/or pose reputation risks for public health authorities and/or manufacturers. This article explores the dynamics of global vaccine supply and demand to consider the opportunities to develop and maintain optimal global vaccine stockpiles for universal vaccines, characterized by large global demand (for which we use measles vaccines as an example), and nonuniversal (including new and niche) vaccines (for which we use oral cholera vaccine as an example). We contrast our approach with other vaccine stockpile optimization frameworks previously developed for the United States pediatric vaccine stockpile to address disruptions in supply and global emergency response vaccine stockpiles to provide on-demand vaccines for use in outbreaks. For measles vaccine, we explore the complexity that arises due to different formulations and presentations of vaccines, consideration of rubella, and the context of regional elimination goals. We conclude that global health policy leaders and stakeholders should procure and maintain appropriate global vaccine rotating stocks for measles and rubella vaccine now to support current regional elimination goals, and should probably also do so for other vaccines to help prevent and control endemic or epidemic diseases. This work suggests the need to better model global vaccine supplies to improve efficiency in the vaccine supply chain, ensure adequate supplies to support elimination and eradication initiatives, and support progress toward the goals of the Global Vaccine Action Plan.

Characterization of Heterogeneity in Childhood Immunization Coverage in Central Florida Using Immunization Registry Data

Despite high vaccine coverage in the United States in general, and in the State of Florida specifically, some children miss scheduled vaccines due to health system failures or vaccine refusal by their parents. Recent experiences with outbreaks in the United States suggest that geographic clustering of un(der)vaccinated populations represent a threat to the elimination status of some vaccine-preventable diseases. Immunization registries continue to expand and play an important role in efforts to track vaccine coverage and use. Using nearly 700,000 de-identified immunization records from the Florida Department of Health immunization information system (Florida SHOTS™) for children born during 2003-2014, we explored heterogeneity and potential clustering of un(der)vaccinated children in six counties in central Florida-Brevard, Lake, Orange, Oseola, Polk, and Seminole-that represent a high-risk area for importation due to family tourist attractions in the area. By zip code, we mapped the population density, the percent of children with religious exemptions, the percent of children on track or overdue for each vaccine series without and with exemptions, and the numbers of children with no recorded dose of each vaccine. Overall, we found some heterogeneity in coverage among the counties and zip codes, but relatively consistent and high coverage. We found that some children with an exemption in the system received the vaccines we analyzed, but exemption represents a clear risk factor for un(der)immunization. We identified many challenges associated with using immunization registry data for spatial analysis and potential opportunities to improve registries to better support future analyses.

Modeling Measles Transmission in the North American Amish and Options for Outbreak Response

Measles outbreaks in the United States continue to occur in subpopulations with sufficient numbers of undervaccinated individuals, with a 2014 outbreak in Amish communities in Ohio pushing the annual cases to the highest national number reported in the last 20 years. We adapted an individual-based model developed to explore potential poliovirus transmission in the North American Amish to characterize a 1988 measles outbreak in the Pennsylvania Amish and the 2014 outbreak in the Ohio Amish. We explored the impact of the 2014 outbreak response compared to no or partial response. Measles can spread very rapidly in an underimmunized subpopulation like the North American Amish, with the potential for national spread within a year or so in the absence of outbreak response. Vaccination efforts significantly reduced the transmission of measles and the expected number of cases. Until global eradication, measles importations will continue to pose a threat to clusters of underimmunized individuals in the United States. Aggressive outbreak response efforts in Ohio probably prevented widespread transmission of measles within the entire North American Amish.

Modeling and Managing the Risks of Measles and Rubella: A Global Perspective, Part I

Over the past 50 years, the use of vaccines led to significant decreases in the global burdens of measles and rubella, motivated at least in part by the successive development of global control and elimination targets. The Global Vaccine Action Plan (GVAP) includes specific targets for regional elimination of measles and rubella in five of six regions of the World Health Organization by 2020. Achieving the GVAP measles and rubella goals will require significant immunization efforts and associated financial investments and political commitments. Planning and budgeting for these efforts can benefit from learning some important lessons from the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). Following an overview of the global context of measles and rubella risks and discussion of lessons learned from the GPEI, we introduce the contents of the special issue on modeling and managing the risks of measles and rubella. This introduction describes the synthesis of the literature available to support evidence-based model inputs to support the development of an integrated economic and dynamic disease transmission model to support global efforts to optimally manage these diseases globally using vaccines.

An economic analysis of poliovirus risk management policy options for 2013-2052

Background

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, but many questions remain related to long-term poliovirus risk management policies.

Methods

We used an integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to simulate possible futures and estimate the health and economic outcomes of maintaining the 2013 status quo of continued OPV use in most developing countries compared with OPV cessation policies with various assumptions about global inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) adoption.

Results

Continued OPV use after global WPV eradication leads to continued high costs and/or high cases. Global OPV cessation comes with a high probability of at least one outbreak, which aggressive outbreak response can successfully control in most instances. A low but non-zero probability exists of uncontrolled outbreaks following a poliovirus reintroduction long after OPV cessation in a population in which IPV-alone cannot prevent poliovirus transmission. We estimate global incremental net benefits during 2013–2052 of approximately $16 billion (US$2013) for OPV cessation with at least one IPV routine immunization dose in all countries until 2024 compared to continued OPV use, although significant uncertainty remains associated with the frequency of exportations between populations and the implementation of long term risk management policies.

Conclusions

Global OPV cessation offers the possibility of large future health and economic benefits compared to continued OPV use. Long-term poliovirus risk management interventions matter (e.g., IPV use duration, outbreak response, containment, continued surveillance, stockpile size and contents, vaccine production site requirements, potential antiviral drugs, and potential safer vaccines) and require careful consideration. Risk management activities can help to ensure a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks and preserve or further increase the positive net benefits of OPV cessation. Important uncertainties will require more research, including characterizing immunodeficient long-term poliovirus excretor risks, containment risks, and the kinetics of outbreaks and response in an unprecedented world without widespread live poliovirus exposure.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12879-015-1112-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

An economic analysis of poliovirus risk management policy options for 2013-2052

BACKGROUND

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, but many questions remain related to long-term poliovirus risk management policies.

METHODS

We used an integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to simulate possible futures and estimate the health and economic outcomes of maintaining the 2013 status quo of continued OPV use in most developing countries compared with OPV cessation policies with various assumptions about global inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) adoption.

RESULTS

Continued OPV use after global WPV eradication leads to continued high costs and/or high cases. Global OPV cessation comes with a high probability of at least one outbreak, which aggressive outbreak response can successfully control in most instances. A low but non-zero probability exists of uncontrolled outbreaks following a poliovirus reintroduction long after OPV cessation in a population in which IPV-alone cannot prevent poliovirus transmission. We estimate global incremental net benefits during 2013-2052 of approximately $16 billion (US$2013) for OPV cessation with at least one IPV routine immunization dose in all countries until 2024 compared to continued OPV use, although significant uncertainty remains associated with the frequency of exportations between populations and the implementation of long term risk management policies.

CONCLUSIONS

Global OPV cessation offers the possibility of large future health and economic benefits compared to continued OPV use. Long-term poliovirus risk management interventions matter (e.g., IPV use duration, outbreak response, containment, continued surveillance, stockpile size and contents, vaccine production site requirements, potential antiviral drugs, and potential safer vaccines) and require careful consideration. Risk management activities can help to ensure a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks and preserve or further increase the positive net benefits of OPV cessation. Important uncertainties will require more research, including characterizing immunodeficient long-term poliovirus excretor risks, containment risks, and the kinetics of outbreaks and response in an unprecedented world without widespread live poliovirus exposure.

Modeling options to manage type 1 wild poliovirus imported into Israel in 2013

BACKGROUND

After 25 years without poliomyelitis cases caused by circulating wild poliovirus (WPV) in Israel, sewage sampling detected WPV type 1 (WPV1) in April 2013, despite high vaccination coverage with only inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) since 2005.

METHODS

We used a differential equation-based model to simulate the dynamics of poliovirus transmission and population immunity in Israel due to past exposure to WPV and use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in addition to IPV. We explored the influences of various immunization options to stop imported WPV1 circulation in Israel.

RESULTS

We successfully modeled the potential for WPVs to circulate without detected cases in Israel. Maintaining a sequential IPV/OPV schedule instead of switching to an IPV-only schedule in 2005 would have kept population immunity high enough in Israel to prevent WPV1 circulation. The Israeli response to WPV1 detection prevented paralytic cases; a more rapid response might have interrupted transmission more quickly.

CONCLUSIONS

IPV-based protection alone might not provide sufficient population immunity to prevent poliovirus transmission after an importation. As countries transition to IPV in immunization schedules, they may need to actively manage population immunity and consider continued use of OPV, to avoid the potential circulation of imported live polioviruses before globally coordinated cessation of OPV use.

Managing population immunity to reduce or eliminate the risks of circulation following the importation of polioviruses

Poliovirus importations into polio-free countries represent a major concern during the final phases of global eradication of wild polioviruses (WPVs). We extend dynamic transmission models to demonstrate the dynamics of population immunity out through 2020 for three countries that only used inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) for routine immunization: the US, Israel, and The Netherlands. For each country, we explore the vulnerability to re-established transmission following an importation for each poliovirus serotype, including the impact of immunization choices following the serotype 1 WPV importation that occurred in 2013 in Israel. As population immunity declines below the threshold required to prevent transmission, countries become at risk for re-established transmission. Although importations represent stochastic events that countries cannot fully control because people cross borders and polioviruses mainly cause asymptomatic infections, countries can ensure that any importations die out. Our results suggest that the general US population will remain above the threshold for transmission through 2020. In contrast, Israel became vulnerable to re-established transmission of importations of live polioviruses by the late 2000s. In Israel, the recent WPV importation and outbreak response use of bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) eliminated the vulnerability to an importation of poliovirus serotypes 1 and 3 for several years, but not serotype 2. The Netherlands experienced a serotype 1 WPV outbreak in 1992-1993 and became vulnerable to re-established transmission in religious communities with low vaccine acceptance around the year 2000, although the general population remains well-protected from widespread transmission. All countries should invest in active management of population immunity to avoid the potential circulation of imported live polioviruses. IPV-using countries may wish to consider prevention opportunities and/or ensure preparedness for response. Countries currently using a sequential IPV/OPV schedule should continue to use all licensed OPV serotypes until global OPV cessation to minimize vulnerability to circulation of imported polioviruses.

Modeling strategies to increase population immunity and prevent poliovirus transmission in 2 high-risk areas in northern India

BACKGROUND

India presented many challenges to the global effort to eliminate the transmission of wild polioviruses (WPVs) and poliomyelitis, with the last case of WPV type 2 in the world reported in northern India in 1999 and WPV types 1 and 3 circulating until early 2011.

METHODS

We used a differential equation-based model to characterize the dynamics of poliovirus transmission and various opportunities to increase and maintain high population immunity to poliovirus transmission for 2 high-risk areas in northern India. We explored options that India probably considered before 2011, to demonstrate the impact of strategies to accelerate WPV elimination and sustain high population immunity. We also characterized the impact of current and potential future vaccination strategies and explored the potential trade-offs associated with the various strategies.

RESULTS

National immunization policy choices impact population immunity, which leads to different numbers of expected paralytic cases and risks of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus outbreaks. Assuming that India maintains high vaccination intensity everywhere, we do not anticipate issues with outbreaks of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 infection following globally coordinated cessation of type 2-containting oral poliovirus vaccine use. We find a relatively modest potential role for inactivated poliovirus vaccine.

CONCLUSIONS

National policy makers should consider the impacts of their vaccine choices on population immunity to poliovirus transmission.

Individual-based modeling of potential poliovirus transmission in connected religious communities in North America with low uptake of vaccination

BACKGROUND

Pockets of undervaccinated individuals continue to raise concerns about their potential to sustain epidemic transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases. Prior importations of live polioviruses (LPVs) into Amish communities in North America led to their recognition as a potential and identifiable linked network of undervaccinated individuals.

METHODS

We developed an individual-based model to explore the potential transmission of a LPV throughout the North American Amish population.

RESULTS

Our model demonstrates the expected limited impact associated with the historical importations, which occurred in isolated communities during the low season for poliovirus transmission. We show that some conditions could potentially lead to wider circulation of LPVs and cases of paralytic polio in Amish communities if an importation occurred during or after 2013. The impact will depend on the uncertain historical immunity to poliovirus infection among members of the community.

CONCLUSIONS

Heterogeneity in immunization coverage represents a risk factor for potential outbreaks of polio if introduction of a LPV occurs, although overall high population immunity in North America suggests that transmission would remain relatively limited. Efforts to prevent spread between Amish church districts with any feasible measures may offer the best opportunity to contain an outbreak and limit its size.

National choices related to inactivated poliovirus vaccine, innovation and the endgame of global polio eradication

Achieving the goal of a world free of poliomyelitis still requires significant effort. Although polio immunization represents a mature area, the polio endgame will require new tools and strategies, particularly as national and global health leaders coordinate the cessation of all three serotypes of oral poliovirus vaccine and increasingly adopt inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV). Poliovirus epidemiology and the global options for managing polioviruses continue to evolve, along with our understanding and appreciation of the resources needed and the risks that require management. Based on insights from modeling, we offer some perspective on the current status of plans and opportunities to achieve and maintain a world free of wild polioviruses and to successfully implement oral poliovirus vaccine cessation. IPV costs and potential wastage will represent an important consideration for national policy makers. Innovations may reduce future IPV costs, but the world urgently needs lower-cost IPV options.

Review and assessment of poliovirus immunity and transmission: synthesis of knowledge gaps and identification of research needs

With the intensifying global efforts to eradicate wild polioviruses, policymakers face complex decisions related to achieving eradication and managing posteradication risks. These decisions and the expanding use of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) trigger renewed interest in poliovirus immunity, particularly the role of mucosal immunity in the transmission of polioviruses. Sustained high population immunity to poliovirus transmission represents a key prerequisite to eradication, but poliovirus immunity and transmission remain poorly understood despite decades of studies. In April 2010, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention convened an international group of experts on poliovirus immunology and virology to review the literature relevant for modeling poliovirus transmission, develop a consensus about related uncertainties, and identify research needs. This article synthesizes the quantitative assessments and research needs identified during the process. Limitations in the evidence from oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) challenge studies and other relevant data led to differences in expert assessments, indicating the need for additional data, particularly in several priority areas for research: (1) the ability of IPV-induced immunity to prevent or reduce excretion and affect transmission, (2) the impact of waning immunity on the probability and extent of poliovirus excretion, (3) the relationship between the concentration of poliovirus excreted and infectiousness to others in different settings, and (4) the relative role of fecal-oral versus oropharyngeal transmission. This assessment of current knowledge supports the immediate conduct of additional studies to address the gaps.

Preeradication vaccine policy options for poliovirus infection and disease control

With the circulation of wild poliovirus (WPV) types 1 and 3 continuing more than a decade after the original goal of eradicating all three types of WPVs by 2000, policymakers consider many immunization options as they strive to stop transmission in the remaining endemic and outbreak areas and prevent reintroductions of live polioviruses into nonendemic areas. While polio vaccination choices may appear simple, our analysis of current options shows remarkable complexity. We offer important context for current and future polio vaccine decisions and policy analyses by developing decision trees that clearly identify potential options currently used by countries as they evaluate national polio vaccine choices. Based on a comprehensive review of the literature we (1) identify the current vaccination options that national health leaders consider for polio vaccination, (2) characterize current practices and factors that appear to influence national and international choices, and (3) assess the evidence of vaccine effectiveness considering sources of variability between countries and uncertainties associated with limitations of the data. With low numbers of cases occurring globally, the management of polio risks might seem like a relatively low priority, but stopping live poliovirus circulation requires making proactive and intentional choices to manage population immunity in the remaining endemic areas and to prevent reestablishment in nonendemic areas. Our analysis shows remarkable variability in the current national polio vaccine product choices and schedules, with combination vaccine options containing inactivated poliovirus vaccine and different formulations of oral poliovirus vaccine making choices increasingly difficult for national health leaders.

Modeling poliovirus risks and the legacy of polio eradication

This introduction to the special issue on modeling poliovirus risks provides context about historical efforts to manage polioviruses and reviews the insights from models developed to support risk management and policy development. Following an overview of the contents of the special issue, the introduction explores the road ahead and offers perspective on the legacy of polio eradication.

Modeling population immunity to support efforts to end the transmission of live polioviruses

Eradication of wild poliovirus (WPV) types 1 and 3, prevention and cessation of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses, and achievement and maintenance of a world free of paralytic polio cases requires active risk management by focusing on population immunity and coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV). We suggest the need for a complementary and different conceptual approach to achieve eradication compared to the current case-based approach using surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) to identify symptomatic poliovirus infections. Specifically, we describe a modeling approach to characterize overall population immunity to poliovirus transmission. The approach deals with the realities that exposure to live polioviruses (e.g., WPV, OPV) and/or vaccination with inactivated poliovirus vaccine provides protection from paralytic polio (i.e., disease), but does not eliminate the potential for reinfection or asymptomatic participation in poliovirus transmission, which may increase with time because of waning immunity. The AFP surveillance system provides evidence of symptomatic poliovirus infections detected, which indicate immunity gaps after outbreaks occur, and this system represents an appropriate focus for controlling disease outbreaks. We describe a conceptual dynamic model to characterize population immunity to poliovirus transmission that helps identify risks created by immunity gaps before outbreaks occur, which provides an opportunity for national and global policymakers to manage the risk of poliovirus and prevent outbreaks before they occur. We suggest that dynamically modeling risk represents an essential tool as the number of cases approaches zero.

Current polio global eradication and control policy options: perspectives from modeling and prerequisites for oral poliovirus vaccine cessation

As the Global Polio Eradication Initiative progresses toward the eradication of wild polioviruses, national and global health leaders must still actively consider options for managing poliovirus risks, including risks associated with using oral poliovirus vaccine. Oral poliovirus vaccine continues to represent a highly effective tool, but its use causes noticeable, rare cases of vaccine-associated paralytic polio and with low coverage it can evolve to become circulating vaccine-derived polioviruse that causes outbreaks. National leaders face a wide range of options, but their choices depend in part on global policies. This article explores the current set of global options for poliovirus eradication or control, discusses constraints and prerequisites for their implementation and offers some insights based on dynamic modeling to inform discussions and frame future economic analyses.

The probability of undetected wild poliovirus circulation after apparent global interruption of transmission

The Global Polio Laboratory Network maintains active surveillance for circulating live polioviruses by obtaining and testing stool samples from patients with acute flaccid paralysis. However, most poliovirus infections occur with no symptoms, and questions remain about the probability of undetected wild poliovirus (WPV) circulation after the apparent interruption of WPV transmission in different populations. In the context of making decisions about the timing of oral poliovirus vaccine cessation following global eradication of WPV, policy-makers need an understanding of this probability as a function of time. Prior modeling of the probability of undetected circulation relied on relatively simple models and assumptions, which limits extrapolation to current conditions. In this analysis, the authors revisit the topic and highlight important considerations for policy-makers related to the impact of initial conditions and seasonality and emphasize the need to focus on appropriate characterization of conditions in the last likely reservoirs of the virus. The authors conclude that the probability of undetected WPV circulation may vary significantly for different poliovirus serotypes, places, and conditions, which suggests that achieving the same level of confidence about the true interruption of WPV transmission will require different periods of time for different situations.