When Objective Ambivalence Predicts Subjective Ambivalence: An Affect-Cognition Matching Perspective

Understanding when people are likely to feel ambivalent is important, as ambivalence is associated with key attitude outcomes, such as attitude-behavior consistency. Interestingly, the presence of conflicting positive and negative reactions (objective ambivalence) is weakly related to feeling conflicted (subjective ambivalence). We tested a novel situation that can influence the correspondence between objective and subjective ambivalence: whether a message and a recipient's topic match in affective versus cognitive orientation. When a person encounters a message with an affective or cognitive match to the topic, conflicting reactions may be more accessible, increasing feelings of ambivalence. Across five studies, greater objective-subjective ambivalence correspondence occurred with an affective-cognitive match between message and topic orientation. Studies 4 and 5 also demonstrated that this primarily occurred when the message was counterattitudinal. This work contributes to the literature explaining the gap between measures of objective and subjective ambivalence as well as how messages can influence attitude strength properties.

Defensive Confidence and Certainty in Unchanged Attitudes: The Role of Affect-Cognition Matching

Despite much prior research on matching appeals to the affective-cognitive orientation of attitudes, little attention has focused on the consequences of affect-cognition (mis)matching when individuals resist persuasion. We propose that unlike a matched attack, an attack that is mismatched to the affective-cognitive orientation of attitudes would result in low defensive confidence individuals holding onto their unchanged attitudes with less certainty than high defensive confidence individuals. As hypothesized, low defensive confidence participants were less certain after an affective than a cognitive attack for a cognitive issue (Study 1), and the opposite was true for an affective issue (Study 2). Both patterns occurred again when the affective-cognitive orientation of attitudes was manipulated (Study 3) or measured as an individual difference (Study 4). Moreover, perceived knowledge mediated the effects on attitude certainty (Study 4). We end by discussing implications for our understanding of affect-cognition matching and attitude certainty.

Tugging at Their Heartstrings: Partner's Knowledge of Affective Meta-Bases Predicts Use of Emotional Advocacies in Close Relationships

Traditional studies of attitude change have focused on attempts between strangers, but what about in close relationships? The present article examines whether accuracy regarding a partner's meta-attitudinal bases can influence persuasion attempts. Because meta-bases reflect informationprocessing goals, we hypothesized that given partners with more affective meta-bases, greater accuracy regarding partners' meta-bases would predict use of emotional advocacies and their perceived persuasiveness. Self and partner ratings of meta-bases were assessed, and emotional advocacies as well as cognitive ones were provided to participants to present to their partners. Results revealed that the correspondence between perceptions of partner's affective meta-bases and use of emotional advocacies was greater among those whose partners rated themselves as having more affective meta-bases compared to those whose partners rated themselves as having less affective meta-bases. Results remained significant when controlling for perceived similarity. Implications of meta-bases for understanding interpersonal influence are discussed.

Perceived Knowledge Moderates the Relation Between Subjective Ambivalence and the “Impact” of Attitudes: An Attitude Strength Perspective

Previous work has reliably demonstrated that when people experience more subjective ambivalence about an attitude object, their attitudes have less impact on strength-related outcomes such as attitude-related thinking, judging, or behaving. However, previous research has not considered whether the amount of perceived knowledge a person has about the topic might moderate these effects. Across eight studies on different topics using a variety of outcome measures, the current research demonstrates that perceived knowledge can moderate the relation between ambivalence and the impact of attitudes on related thinking, judging, and behaving. Although the typical Attitude × Ambivalence effect emerged when participants had relatively high perceived knowledge, this interaction did not emerge when participants were lower in perceived knowledge. This work provides a more nuanced view of the effects of subjective ambivalence on attitude impact and highlights the importance of understanding the combined impact of attitude strength antecedents.

Challenging Moral Attitudes With Moral Messages

When crafting a message, communicators may turn to moral rhetoric as a means of influencing an audience’s opinion. In the present research, we tested whether the persuasiveness of explicitly moral counterattitudinal messages depends on how much people have already based their attitudes on moral considerations. A survey of the literature suggests several competing hypotheses that we tested across two studies. The results support a persuasive-matching pattern: A moral appeal was more persuasive than a nonmoral appeal to the extent that initial attitudes were based on moral concerns (i.e., attitudes were moralized), but the opposite was true when initial attitudes had less of a moral basis. Exploratory analyses also showed that these effects were mediated by valenced thoughts about the message and moderated by political orientation. These findings add new insight to literatures on both the effects of moral arguments and moralized attitudes.

The Role of Affective and Cognitive Individual Differences in Social Perception

Three studies explored the connection between social perception processes and individual differences in the use of affective and cognitive information in relation to attitudes. Study 1 revealed that individuals high in need for affect (NFA) accentuated differences in evaluations of warm and cold traits, whereas individuals high in need for cognition (NFC) accentuated differences in evaluations of competent and incompetent traits. Study 2 revealed that individual differences in NFA predicted liking of warm or cold targets, whereas individual differences in NFC predicted perceptions of competent or incompetent targets. Furthermore, the effects of NFA and NFC were independent of structural bases and meta-bases of attitudes. Study 3 revealed that differences in the evaluation of warm and cold traits mediated the effects of NFA and NFC on liking of targets. The implications for social perception processes and for individual differences in affect-cognition are discussed.

Heart Versus Mind

Abstract. Several researchers have pursued the question of whether affective or cognitive persuasion appeals are more successful in changing attitudes. The vast majority of studies in this field have found that the persuasiveness of affective and cognitive appeals depends on the extent to which recipients’ existing attitudes are based on affect or cognition: Affective messages are more successful in changing affect-based attitudes; cognitive messages are more successful in changing cognition-based attitudes. However, research to date has not uncovered the processes leading to these effects. In the present article it is argued that there are two plausible explanations. First, matching messages to informational attitude bases might heighten message scrutiny. This would mean that a central process underlies the effects. Second, a peripheral process might account for the effects. Specifically, processing fluency might act as a peripheral cue. The results of an experimental study clearly suggest that that processing fluency underlies the effects.

Are Leftists More Emotion-Driven Than Rightists? The Interactive Influence of Ideology and Emotions on Support for Policies

Although emotions and ideology are important factors guiding policy support in conflict, their interactive influence remains unclear. Based on prior findings that ideological leftists’ beliefs are more susceptible to change than rightists’ beliefs, we tested a somewhat counterintuitive extension that leftists would be more susceptible to influence by their emotional reactions than rightists. In three laboratory studies, inducing positive and negative emotions affected Jewish–Israeli leftists’, but not rightists’, support for conciliatory policies toward an adversarial (Studies 1 and 3) and a non-adversarial (Study 2) outgroup. Three additional field studies showed that positive and negative emotions were related to leftists’, but not rightists’, policy support in positive as well as highly negative conflict-related contexts, among both Jewish (Studies 4 and 5) and Palestinian (Study 6) citizens of Israel. Across different conflicts, emotions, conflict-related contexts, and even populations, leftists’ policy support changed in accordance with emotional reactions more than rightists’ policy support.