Emotions in "Black and White" or Shades of Gray? How We Think About Emotion Shapes Our Perception and Neural Representation of Emotion

Embodied sequential sampling models and dynamic neural fields for decision-making: Why hesitate between two when a continuum is the answer

As two alternative options in a forced choice task are separated by design, two classes of computational models of decision-making have thrived independently in the literature for nearly five decades. While sequential sampling models (SSM) focus on response times and keypresses in binary decisions in experimental paradigms, dynamic neural fields (DNF) focus on continuous sensorimotor dimensions and tasks found in perception and robotics. Recent attempts have been made to address limitations in their application to other domains, but strong similarities and compatibility between prominent models from both classes were hardly considered. This article is an attempt at bridging the gap between these classes of models, and simultaneously between disciplines and paradigms relying on binary or continuous responses. A unifying formulation of representative SSM and DNF equations is proposed, varying the number of units which interact and compete to reach a decision. The embodiment of decisions is also considered by coupling cognitive and sensorimotor processes, enabling the model to generate decision trajectories at trial level. The resulting mechanistic model is therefore able to target different paradigms (forced choices or continuous response scales) and measures (final responses or dynamics). The validity of the model is assessed statistically by fitting empirical distributions obtained from human participants in moral decision-making mouse-tracking tasks, for which both dichotomous and nuanced responses are meaningful. Comparing equations at the theoretical level, and model parametrizations at the empirical level, the implications for psychological decision-making processes, as well as the fundamental assumptions and limitations of models and paradigms are discussed.

More than labels: neural representations of emotion words are widely distributed across the brain

Although emotion words such as "anger," "disgust," "happiness," or "pride" are often thought of as mere labels, increasing evidence points to language as being important for emotion perception and experience. Emotion words may be particularly important for facilitating access to the emotion concepts. Indeed, deficits in semantic processing or impaired access to emotion words interfere with emotion perception. Yet, it is unclear what these behavioral findings mean for affective neuroscience. Thus, we examined the brain areas that support processing of emotion words using representational similarity analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging data (N = 25). In the task, participants saw 10 emotion words (e.g. "anger," "happiness") while in the scanner. Participants rated each word based on its valence on a continuous scale ranging from 0 (Pleasant/Good) to 1 (Unpleasant/Bad) scale to ensure they were processing the words. Our results revealed that a diverse range of brain areas including prefrontal, midline cortical, and sensorimotor regions contained information about emotion words. Notably, our results overlapped with many regions implicated in decoding emotion experience by prior studies. Our results raise questions about what processes are being supported by these regions during emotion experience.

The inside out model of emotion recognition: how the shape of one's internal emotional landscape influences the recognition of others' emotions

Some people are exceptional at reading emotional expressions, while others struggle. Here we ask whether the way we experience emotion "on the inside" influences the way we expect emotions to be expressed in the "outside world" and subsequently our ability to read others' emotional expressions. Across multiple experiments, incorporating discovery and replication samples, we develop EmoMap (N = 20; N = 271) and ExpressionMap (N = 98; replication N = 193) to map adults' experiences of emotions and visual representations of others' emotions. Some individuals have modular maps, wherein emotional experiences and visual representations are consistent and distinct-anger looks and feels different from happiness, which looks and feels different from sadness. In contrast, others have experiences and representations that are variable and overlapping-anger, happiness, and sadness look and feel similar and are easily confused for one another. Here we illustrate an association between these maps: those with consistent and distinct experiences of emotion also have consistent and distinct visual representations of emotion. Finally (N = 193), we construct the Inside Out Model of Emotion Recognition, which explains 60.8% of the variance in emotion recognition and illuminates multiple pathways to emotion recognition difficulties. These findings have important implications for understanding the emotion recognition difficulties documented in numerous clinical populations.

The increasing instance of negative emotion reduce the performance of emotion recognition

Introduction

Emotion recognition plays a crucial role in affective computing. Recent studies have demonstrated that the fuzzy boundaries among negative emotions make recognition difficult. However, to the best of our knowledge, no formal study has been conducted thus far to explore the effects of increased negative emotion categories on emotion recognition.

Methods

A dataset of three sessions containing consistent non-negative emotions and increased types of negative emotions was designed and built which consisted the electroencephalogram (EEG) and the electrocardiogram (ECG) recording of 45 participants.

Results

The results revealed that as negative emotion categories increased, the recognition rates decreased by more than 9%. Further analysis depicted that the discriminative features gradually reduced with an increase in the negative emotion types, particularly in the θ, α, and β frequency bands.

Discussion

This study provided new insight into the balance of emotion-inducing stimuli materials.

Mapping the mental space of emotional concepts through kinematic measures of decision uncertainty

Emotional concepts and their mental representations have been extensively studied. Yet, some ecologically relevant aspects, such as how they are processed in ambiguous contexts (e.g., in relation to other emotional stimuli that share similar characteristics), are incompletely known. We employed a similarity judgement of emotional concepts and manipulated the contextual congruency of the responses along the two main affective dimensions of hedonic valence and physiological activation, respectively. Behavioural and kinematics (mouse-tracking) measures were combined to gather a novel 'similarity index' between emotional concepts, to derive topographical maps of their mental representations. Self-report (interoceptive sensibility, positive-negative affectivity, depression) and physiological measures (heart rate variability, HRV) have been collected to explore their possible association with emotional conceptual representation. Results indicate that emotional concepts typically associated with low arousal profit by contextual congruency, with faster responses and reduced uncertainty when contextual ambiguity decreases. The emotional maps recreate two almost orthogonal axes of valence and arousal, and the similarity measure captures the smooth boundaries between emotions. The emotional map of a subgroup of individuals with low positive affectivity reveals a narrower conceptual distribution, with variations in positive emotions and in individuals with reduced arousal (such as those with reduced HRV). Our work introduces a novel methodology to study emotional conceptual representations, bringing the behavioural dynamics of decision-making processes and choice uncertainty into the affective domain. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Does social cognition change? Evidence after 4 years from the Italian Network for Research on Psychoses

BACKGROUND

Deficits in social cognition (SC) are significantly related to community functioning in schizophrenia (SZ). Few studies investigated longitudinal changes in SC and its impact on recovery. In the present study, we aimed: (a) to estimate the magnitude and clinical significance of SC change in outpatients with stable SZ who were assessed at baseline and after 4 years, (b) to identify predictors of reliable and clinically significant change (RCSC), and (c) to determine whether changes in SC over 4 years predicted patient recovery at follow-up.

METHODS

The reliable change index was used to estimate the proportion of true change in SC, not attributable to measurement error. Stepwise multiple logistic regression models were used to identify the predictors of RCSC in a SC domain (The Awareness of Social Inference Test [TASIT]) and the effect of change in TASIT on recovery at follow-up.

RESULTS

In 548 participants, statistically significant improvements were found for the simple and paradoxical sarcasm of TASIT scale, and for the total score of section 2. The reliable change index was 9.8. A cut-off of 45 identified patients showing clinically significant change. Reliable change was achieved by 12.6% and RCSC by 8% of participants. Lower baseline TASIT sect. 2 score predicted reliable improvement on TASIT sect. 2. Improvement in TASIT sect. 2 scores predicted functional recovery, with a 10-point change predicting 40% increase in the probability of recovery.

CONCLUSIONS

The RCSC index provides a conservative way to assess the improvement in the ability to grasp sarcasm in SZ, and is associated with recovery.

Recovering Individual Emotional States from Sparse Ratings Using Collaborative Filtering

A fundamental challenge in emotion research is measuring feeling states with high granularity and temporal precision without disrupting the emotion generation process. Here we introduce and validate a new approach in which responses are sparsely sampled and the missing data are recovered using a computational technique known as collaborative filtering (CF). This approach leverages structured covariation across individual experiences and is available in Neighbors, an open-source Python toolbox. We validate our approach across three different experimental contexts by recovering dense individual ratings using only a small subset of the original data. In dataset 1, participants (n=316) separately rated 112 emotional images on 6 different discrete emotions. In dataset 2, participants (n=203) watched 8 short emotionally engaging autobiographical stories while simultaneously providing moment-by-moment ratings of the intensity of their affective experience. In dataset 3, participants (n=60) with distinct social preferences made 76 decisions about how much money to return in a hidden multiplier trust game. Across all experimental contexts, CF was able to accurately recover missing data and importantly outperformed mean and multivariate imputation, particularly in contexts with greater individual variability. This approach will enable new avenues for affective science research by allowing researchers to acquire high dimensional ratings from emotional experiences with minimal disruption to the emotion-generation process.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-022-00161-2.

Emotion Differentiation and Youth Mental Health: Current Understanding and Open Questions

A growing body of research identifies emotion differentiation-the ability to specifically identify one's emotions-as a key skill for well-being. High emotion differentiation is associated with healthier and more effective regulation of one's emotions, and low emotion differentiation has been documented in several forms of psychopathology. However, the lion's share of this research has focused on adult samples, even though approximately 50% of mental disorders onset before age 18. This review curates what we know about the development of emotion differentiation and its implications for youth mental health. I first review published studies investigating how emotion differentiation develops across childhood and adolescence, as well as studies testing relations between emotion differentiation and mental health in youth samples. Emerging evidence suggests that emotion differentiation actually falls across childhood and adolescence, a counterintuitive pattern that merits further investigation. Additionally, several studies find relations between emotion differentiation and youth mental health, but some instability in results emerged. I then identify open questions that limit our current understanding of emotion differentiation, including (i) lack of clarity as to the valid measurement of emotion differentiation, (ii) potential third variables that could explain relations between emotion differentiation and mental-health (e.g., mean negative affect, IQ, personality, and circularity with outcomes), and (iii) lack of clear mechanistic models regarding the development of emotion differentiation and how it facilitates well-being. I conclude with a discussion of future directions that can address open questions and work toward interventions that treat (or even prevent) psychopathology.

Developmental Differences in Affective Representation Between Prefrontal and Subcortical Structures

Developmental studies have identified differences in prefrontal and subcortical affective structures between children and adults, which correspond with observed cognitive and behavioral maturations from relatively simplistic emotional experiences and expressions to more nuanced, complex ones. However, developmental changes in the neural representation of emotions have not yet been well explored. It stands to reason that adults and children may demonstrate observable differences in the representation of affect within key neurological structures implicated in affective cognition. Forty-five participants (25 children; 20 adults) passively viewed positive, negative, and neutral clips from popular films while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Using representational similarity analysis (RSA) to measure variability in neural pattern similarity, we found developmental differences between children and adults in the amygdala, nucleus accumbens (NAcc), and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), such that children generated less pattern similarity within subcortical structures relative to the vmPFC; a phenomenon not replicated among their older counterparts. Furthermore, children generated valence-specific differences in representational patterns across regions; these valence-specific patterns were not found in adults. These results may suggest that affective representations grow increasingly dissimilar over development as individuals mature from visceral affective responses to more evaluative analyses.

Naturalistic Stimuli in Affective Neuroimaging: A Review

Naturalistic stimuli such as movies, music, and spoken and written stories elicit strong emotions and allow brain imaging of emotions in close-to-real-life conditions. Emotions are multi-component phenomena: relevant stimuli lead to automatic changes in multiple functional components including perception, physiology, behavior, and conscious experiences. Brain activity during naturalistic stimuli reflects all these changes, suggesting that parsing emotion-related processing during such complex stimulation is not a straightforward task. Here, I review affective neuroimaging studies that have employed naturalistic stimuli to study emotional processing, focusing especially on experienced emotions. I argue that to investigate emotions with naturalistic stimuli, we need to define and extract emotion features from both the stimulus and the observer.

At the Neural Intersection Between Language and Emotion

What role does language play in emotion? Behavioral research shows that emotion words such as "anger" and "fear" alter emotion experience, but questions still remain about mechanism. Here, we review the neuroscience literature to examine whether neural processes associated with semantics are also involved in emotion. Our review suggests that brain regions involved in the semantic processing of words: (i) are engaged during experiences of emotion, (ii) coordinate with brain regions involved in affect to create emotions, (iii) hold representational content for emotion, and (iv) may be necessary for constructing emotional experience. We relate these findings with respect to four theoretical relationships between language and emotion, which we refer to as "non-interactive," "interactive," "constitutive," and "deterministic." We conclude that findings are most consistent with the interactive and constitutive views with initial evidence suggestive of a constitutive view, in particular. We close with several future directions that may help test hypotheses of the constitutive view.

Emotion Naming Impedes Both Cognitive Reappraisal and Mindful Acceptance Strategies of Emotion Regulation

Friends and therapists often encourage people in distress to say how they feel (i.e., name their emotions) with the hope that identifying their emotions will help them cope. Although lay and some psychological theories posit that emotion naming should facilitate subsequent emotion regulation, there is little research directly testing this question. Here, we report on two experimental studies that test how naming the emotions evoked by aversive images impacts subsequent regulation of those emotions. In study 1 (N = 80), participants were randomly assigned into one of four between-subjects conditions in which they either (i) passively observed aversive images, (ii) named the emotions that these images made them feel, (iii) regulated their emotions by reappraising the meaning of images, or (iv) both named and regulated their emotions. Analyses of self-reported negative affect revealed that emotion naming impeded emotion regulation via reappraisal. Participants who named their emotions before reappraising reported feeling worse than those who regulated without naming. Study 2 (N = 60) replicated these findings in a within-participants design, demonstrated that emotion naming also impeded regulation via mindful acceptance, and showed that observed effects were unrelated to a measure of social desirability, thereby mitigating the concern of experimenter demand. Together, these studies show that the impact of emotion naming on emotion regulation opposes common intuitions: instead of facilitating emotion regulation via reappraisal or acceptance, constructing an instance of a specific emotion category by giving it a name may "crystalize" one's affective experience and make it more resistant to modification.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-021-00036-y.

Empirical investigation of the relationship between bilingualism and social flexibility

Recently, a relationship between bilingualism and enhanced social flexibility has been suggested. However, research on the subject is scarce and what little exists is limited by several conceptual and methodological concerns. In the current study, we attempted to (a) replicate the findings from a study by Ikizer and Ramírez-Esparza (Bilingualism: Language and Cognition 21:957–969, 2018) by using the scales that the authors developed, and (b) test the concept of social flexibility experimentally with a switch-task using socially relevant stimuli. In the first part, participants (n = 194) filled out the scales developed by Ikizer and Ramírez-Esparza. We could not find that bilingualism leads to enhanced social flexibility. We did, however, find that higher level of education led to higher scores on the social flexibility scale. In the second part, a subsample (n = 74) from Part 1 completed a task where they were asked to identify the congruency between a face and a voice based on either gender or emotion, and to switch between these two tasks. The experimental task did not show an advantage for the bilingual participants. On the contrary, higher proficiency in a second language led to lower accuracy in the congruent emotion condition, while level of education led to higher accuracy in that same condition. We suggest that factors other than bilingualism, such as level of education and biculturalism, most likely drove the effect found both in the current study and originally by Ikizer and Ramírez-Esparza.

Charting the development of emotion comprehension and abstraction from childhood to adulthood using observer-rated and linguistic measures

This study examined two facets of emotion development: emotion word comprehension (knowing the meaning of emotion words such as "anger" or "excitement") and emotion concept abstraction (representing emotions in terms of internal psychological states that generalize across situations). Using a novel emotion vocabulary assessment, we captured how a cross-sectional sample of participants aged 4-25 (N = 196) defined 24 emotions. Smoothing spline regression models suggested that emotion comprehension followed an emergent shape: Knowledge of emotion words increased across childhood and plateaued around age 11. Human coders rated the abstractness of participants' responses, and these ratings also followed an emergent shape but plateaued significantly later than comprehension, around age 18. An automated linguistic analysis of abstractness supported coders' perceptions of increased abstractness across age. Finally, coders assessed the definitional strategies participants used to describe emotions. Young children tended to describe emotions using concrete strategies such as providing example situations that evoked those emotions or by referring to physiological markers of emotional experiences. Whereas use of these concrete strategies decreased with age, the tendency to use more abstract strategies such as providing general definitions that delineated the causes and characteristics of emotions or by providing synonyms of emotion words increased with age. Overall, this work (a) provides a tool for assessing definitions of emotion terms, (b) demonstrates that emotion concept abstraction increases across age, and (c) suggests that adolescence is a period in which emotion words are comprehended but their level of abstraction continues to mature. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Intersubject representational similarity analysis reveals individual variations in affective experience when watching erotic movies

We spend much of our lives pursuing or avoiding affective experiences. However, surprisingly little is known about how these experiences are represented in the brain and if they are shared across individuals. Here, we explored variations in the construction of an affective experience during a naturalistic viewing paradigm based on subjective preferences in sociosexual desire and self-control using intersubject representational similarity analysis (IS-RSA). We found that when watching erotic movies, intersubject variations in sociosexual desire preferences of 26 heterosexual males were associated with similarly structured fluctuations in the cortico-striatal reward, default mode, and mentalizing networks. In contrast, variations in the self-control preferences were associated with shared dynamics in the fronto-parietal executive control and cingulo-insular salience networks. Importantly, these results were specific to the affective experience, as we did not observe any relationship with variation in preferences when individuals watched neutral movies. Moreover, these results appear to require multivariate representations of preferences as we did not observe any significant associations using single scalar summary scores. Our findings indicate that multidimensional variations in individual preferences can be used to uncover unique dimensions of an affective experience, and that IS-RSA can provide new insights into the neural processes underlying psychological experiences elicited through naturalistic experimental designs.

"Grumpy" or "furious"? arousal of emotion labels influences judgments of facial expressions

Whether language information influences recognition of emotion from facial expressions remains the subject of debate. The current studies investigate how variations in emotion labels that are paired with expressions influences participants' judgments of the emotion displayed. Static (Study 1) and dynamic (Study 2) facial expressions depicting eight emotion categories were paired with emotion labels that systematically varied in arousal (low and high). Participants rated the arousal, valence, and dominance of expressions paired with labels. Isolated faces and isolated labels were also rated. As predicted, the label presented influenced participants' judgments of the expressions. Across both studies, higher arousal labels were associated with: 1) higher ratings of arousal for sad, angry, and scared expressions, and 2) higher ratings of dominance for angry, proud, and disgust expressions. These results indicate that emotion labels influence judgments of facial expressions.

Guilty by association: How group-based (collective) guilt arises in the brain

People do not only feel guilty for transgressions that they are causally responsible for (i.e., personal guilt); they also feel guilty for transgressions committed by those they identify as in-group members (i.e., collective or group-based guilt). Decades of research using scenario-based imagination tasks and self-reported measures has shown that when reminded of transgressions committed by in-group members, people express guilt and are willing to make amends, even when they are not causally responsible for the transgressions. However, it remains elusive whether people genuinely experience guilt or simply display remorseful gestures deemed appropriate in those contexts. To resolve this puzzle, it is critical to closely examine the neurocognitive basis of group-based guilt and its relationship with personal guilt, a goal that self-reported measures alone cannot satisfactorily achieve. Here, we combined functional MRI with an interaction-based minimal group paradigm in which participants either directly caused harm to a group of victims (i.e., personal guilt), or observed in-group members cause harm to the victims (i.e., group-based guilt). In three experiments (N ​= ​90), we demonstrated and replicated that the perceived responsibility one shared with in-group members in transgression predicted both behavioral and neural manifestations of group-based guilt. Multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) of the functional MRI data showed that group-based guilt recruited patterns of neural responses in anterior middle cingulate cortex that resembled personal guilt. These results have broadened our understanding of how group membership is integrated into the neurocognitive processes underlying social emotions.

Dynamic interactive theory as a domain-general account of social perception

The perception of social categories, emotions, and personality traits from others' faces each have been studied extensively but in relative isolation. We synthesize emerging findings suggesting that, in each of these domains of social perception, both a variety of bottom-up facial features and top-down social cognitive processes play a part in driving initial perceptions. Among such top-down processes, social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in how we perceive others' faces. Extending the Dynamic Interactive framework (Freeman & Ambady, 2011), we outline a perspective whereby the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as emerging from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. Such an account of social perception would envision perceptions to be a rapid, but gradual, process of negotiation between the variety of visual cues inherent to a person and the social cognitive knowledge an individual perceiver brings to the perceptual process. We describe growing evidence in support of this perspective as well as its theoretical implications for social psychology.

The Default Mode Network's Role in Discrete Emotion

Emotions are often assumed to manifest in subcortical limbic and brainstem structures. While these areas are clearly important for representing affect (e.g., valence and arousal), we propose that the default mode network (DMN) is additionally important for constructing discrete emotional experiences (of anger, fear, disgust, etc.). Findings from neuroimaging studies, invasive electrical stimulation studies, and lesion studies support this proposal. Importantly, our framework builds on a constructionist theory of emotion to explain how instances involving diverse physiological and behavioral patterns can be conceptualized as belonging to the same emotion category. We argue that this ability requires abstraction (from concrete features to broad mental categories), which the DMN is well positioned to support, and we make novel predictions from our proposed framework.

Development of Human Emotion Circuits Investigated Using a Big-Data Analytic Approach: Stability, Reliability, and Robustness

Emotion perception is fundamental to affective and cognitive development and is thought to involve distributed brain circuits. Efforts to chart neurodevelopmental changes in emotion have been severely hampered by narrowly focused approaches centered on activation of individual brain regions and small sample sizes. Here we investigate the maturation of human functional brain circuits associated with identification of fearful, angry, sad, happy, and neutral faces using a large sample of 759 children, adolescents, and adults (ages 8-23; female/male = 419/340). Network analysis of emotion-related brain circuits revealed three functional modules, encompassing lateral frontoparietal, medial prefrontal-posterior cingulate, and subcortical-posterior insular cortices, with hubs in medial prefrontal, but not posterior cingulate, cortex. This overall network architecture was stable by age 8, and it anchored maturation of circuits important for salience detection and cognitive control, as well as dissociable circuit patterns across distinct emotion categories. Our findings point to similarities and differences in functional circuits associated with identification of fearful, angry, sad, happy, and neutral faces, and reveal aspects of brain circuit organization underlying emotion perception that are stable over development as well as features that change with age. Reliability analyses demonstrated the robustness of our findings and highlighted the importance of large samples for probing functional brain circuit development. Our study emphasizes a need to focus beyond amygdala circuits and provides a robust neurodevelopmental template for investigating emotion perception and identification in psychopathology.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Emotion perception is fundamental to cognitive and affective development. However, efforts to chart neurodevelopmental changes in emotion perception have been hampered by narrowly focused approaches centered on the amygdala and prefrontal cortex and small sample sizes. Using a large sample of 759 children, adolescents, and adults and a multipronged analytical strategy, we investigated the development of brain network organization underlying identification and categorization of fearful, happy, angry, sad, and neutral facial expressions. Results revealed a developmentally stable modular architecture that anchored robust age-related and emotion category-related changes in brain connectivity across multiple brain systems that extend far beyond amygdala circuits and provide a new template for investigation of emotion processing in the developing brain.

The neural representation of facial-emotion categories reflects conceptual structure

Humans reliably categorize configurations of facial actions into specific emotion categories, leading some to argue that this process is invariant between individuals and cultures. However, growing behavioral evidence suggests that factors such as emotion-concept knowledge may shape the way emotions are visually perceived, leading to variability-rather than universality-in facial-emotion perception. Understanding variability in emotion perception is only emerging, and the neural basis of any impact from the structure of emotion-concept knowledge remains unknown. In a neuroimaging study, we used a representational similarity analysis (RSA) approach to measure the correspondence between the conceptual, perceptual, and neural representational structures of the six emotion categories Anger, Disgust, Fear, Happiness, Sadness, and Surprise. We found that subjects exhibited individual differences in their conceptual structure of emotions, which predicted their own unique perceptual structure. When viewing faces, the representational structure of multivoxel patterns in the right fusiform gyrus was significantly predicted by a subject's unique conceptual structure, even when controlling for potential physical similarity in the faces themselves. Finally, cross-cultural differences in emotion perception were also observed, which could be explained by individual differences in conceptual structure. Our results suggest that the representational structure of emotion expressions in visual face-processing regions may be shaped by idiosyncratic conceptual understanding of emotion categories.

Affect and Decision Making: Insights and Predictions from Computational Models

In recent years interest in integrating the affective and decision sciences has skyrocketed. Immense progress has been made, but the complexities of each field, which can multiply when combined, present a significant obstacle. A carefully defined framework for integration is needed. The shift towards computational modeling in decision science provides a powerful basis and a path forward, but one whose synergistic potential will only be fully realized by drawing on the theoretical richness of the affective sciences. Reviewing research using a popular computational model of choice (the drift diffusion model), we discuss how mapping concepts to parameters reduces conceptual ambiguity and reveals novel hypotheses.

Historical pitfalls and new directions in the neuroscience of emotion

In this article, we offer a brief history summarizing the last century of neuroscientific study of emotion, highlighting dominant themes that run through various schools of thought. We then summarize the current state of the field, followed by six key points for scientific progress that are inspired by a multi-level constructivist theory of emotion.

Age-related trajectories of social cognition in youth at clinical high risk for psychosis: An exploratory study

BACKGROUND

Clinical high risk (CHR) status is characterized by impairments in social cognition, but questions remain concerning their stability over development. In cross-sectional analysis of a large naturalistic sample, the current study examined whether those at CHR status show deviant trajectories for age-related change in social cognitive ability, and whether these trajectories are influenced by treatment history.

METHOD

Emotion perception (EP) and theory of mind (ToM) were assessed in 675 CHR and 263 healthy comparison (HC) participants aged 12-35. Age effects in CHR were modeled against HC age-expected performance. Prior medication status was tested for interactions with age.

RESULTS

CHR exhibited normal age trajectory for EP, but significantly lower slopes for ToM from age 17 onward. This effect was specific to stimuli exhibiting sarcasm and not to detection of lies. When treatment history was included in the model, age-trajectory appeared normal in CHR subjects previously prescribed both antipsychotics and antidepressant medication, although the blunted trajectory still characterized 80% of the sample.

DISCUSSION

Cross-sectional analyses suggested that blunting of ToM in CHR develops in adolescence, while EP abilities were diminished evenly across the age range. Exploratory analyses of treatment history suggested that ToM was not affected, however, in CHRs with lifetime histories of both antipsychotic and antidepressant medications. Reduction in age-expected ToM ability may impair the ability of individuals at CHR to meet social developmental challenges in adolescence. Medication effects on social cognition deserve further study.

Common and Unique Neural Systems Underlying the Working Memory Maintenance of Emotional vs. Bodily Reactions to Affective Stimuli: The Moderating Role of Trait Emotional Awareness

Many leading theories suggest that the neural processes underlying the experience of one's own emotional reactions partially overlap with those underlying bodily perception (i.e., interoception, somatosensation, and proprioception). However, the goal-directed maintenance of one's own emotions in working memory (EWM) has not yet been compared to WM maintenance of one's own bodily reactions (BWM). In this study, we contrasted WM maintenance of emotional vs. bodily reactions to affective stimuli in 26 healthy individuals while they underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging. Specifically, we examined the a priori hypothesis that individual differences in trait emotional awareness (tEA) would lead to greater differences between these two WM conditions within medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). We observed that MPFC activation during EWM (relative to BWM) was positively associated with tEA. Whole-brain analyses otherwise suggested considerable similarity in the neural activation patterns associated with EWM and BWM. In conjunction with previous literature, our findings not only support a central role of body state representation/maintenance in EWM, but also suggest greater engagement of MPFC-mediated conceptualization processes during EWM in those with higher tEA.

The Nonlinear Development of Emotion Differentiation: Granular Emotional Experience Is Low in Adolescence

People differ in how specifically they separate affective experiences into different emotion types-a skill called emotion differentiation or emotional granularity. Although increased emotion differentiation has been associated with positive mental health outcomes, little is known about its development. Participants ( N = 143) between the ages of 5 and 25 years completed a laboratory measure of negative emotion differentiation in which they rated how much a series of aversive images made them feel angry, disgusted, sad, scared, and upset. Emotion-differentiation scores were computed using intraclass correlations. Emotion differentiation followed a nonlinear developmental trajectory: It fell from childhood to adolescence and rose from adolescence to adulthood. Mediation analyses suggested that an increased tendency to report feeling emotions one at a time explained elevated emotion differentiation in childhood. Importantly, two other mediators (intensity of emotional experiences and scale use) did not explain this developmental trend. Hence, low emotion differentiation in adolescence may arise because adolescents have little experience conceptualizing co-occurring emotions.

Longitudinal effects of cognitive behavioral therapy for depression on the neural correlates of emotion regulation

Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is effective for a substantial minority of patients suffering from major depressive disorder (MDD), but its mechanism of action at the neural level is not known. As core techniques of CBT seek to enhance emotion regulation, we scanned 31 MDD participants prior to 14 sessions of CBT using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a task in which participants engaged in a voluntary emotion regulation strategy while recalling negative autobiographical memories. Eighteen healthy controls were also scanned. Twenty-three MDD participants completed post-treatment fMRI scanning, and 12 healthy volunteers completed repeat scanning without intervention. Better treatment outcome was associated with longitudinal enhancement of the emotion regulation-dependent BOLD contrast within subgenual anterior cingulate, medial prefrontal cortex, and lingual gyrus. Baseline emotion regulation-dependent BOLD contrast did not predict treatment outcome or differ between MDD and control groups. CBT response may be mediated by enhanced downregulation of neural activity during emotion regulation; brain regions identified overlap with those found using a similar task in a normative sample, and include regions related to self-referential and emotion processing. Future studies should seek to determine specificity of this downregulation to CBT, and evaluate it as a treatment target in MDD.

Increasing verbal knowledge mediates development of multidimensional emotion representations

How do people represent their own and others' emotional experiences? Contemporary emotion theories and growing evidence suggest that the conceptual representation of emotion plays a central role in how people understand the emotions both they and other people feel.1-6 Although decades of research indicate that adults typically represent emotion concepts as multidimensional, with valence (positive-negative) and arousal (activating-deactivating) as two primary dimensions,7-10 little is known about how this bidimensional (or circumplex) representation arises.11 Here we show that emotion representations develop from a monodimensional focus on valence to a bidimensional focus on both valence and arousal from age 6 to age 25. We investigated potential mechanisms underlying this effect and found that increasing verbal knowledge mediated emotion representation development over and above three other potential mediators: (i) fluid reasoning, (ii) the general ability to represent non-emotional stimuli bidimensionally, and (iii) task-related behaviors (e.g., using extreme ends of rating scales). These results suggest that verbal development facilitates the expansion of emotion concept representations (and potentially emotional experiences) from a "positive or negative" dichotomy in childhood to a multidimensional organization in adulthood.

The role of language in the experience and perception of emotion: a neuroimaging meta-analysis

Recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies demonstrate that labeling one's emotional experiences and perceptions alters those states. Here, we used a comprehensive meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature to systematically explore whether the presence of emotion words in experimental tasks has an impact on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions across studies. Using a database of 386 studies, we assessed brain activity when emotion words (e.g. 'anger', 'disgust') and more general affect words (e.g. 'pleasant', 'unpleasant') were present in experimental tasks vs not present. As predicted, when emotion words were present, we observed more frequent activations in regions related to semantic processing. When emotion words were not present, we observed more frequent activations in the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus, bilaterally. The presence of affect words did not have the same effect on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions, suggesting that our observed effects are specific to emotion words. These findings are consistent with the psychological constructionist prediction that in the absence of accessible emotion concepts, the meaning of affective experiences and perceptions are ambiguous. Findings are also consistent with the regulatory role of 'affect labeling'. Implications of the role of language in emotion construction and regulation are discussed.