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Bulley A, Lempert KM, Conwell C, Irish M, Schacter DL. Intertemporal choice reflects value comparison rather than self-control: insights from confidence judgements. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2022; 377:20210338. [PMID: 36314145 PMCID: PMC9619231 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0338] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/23/2021] [Accepted: 05/24/2022] [Indexed: 12/21/2023] Open
Abstract
Intertemporal decision-making has long been assumed to measure self-control, with prominent theories treating choices of smaller, sooner rewards as failed attempts to override immediate temptation. If this view is correct, people should be more confident in their intertemporal decisions when they 'successfully' delay gratification than when they do not. In two pre-registered experiments with built-in replication, adult participants (n = 117) made monetary intertemporal choices and rated their confidence in having made the right decisions. Contrary to assumptions of the self-control account, confidence was not higher when participants chose delayed rewards. Rather, participants were more confident in their decisions when possible rewards were further apart in time-discounted subjective value, closer to the present, and larger in magnitude. Demonstrating metacognitive insight, participants were more confident in decisions that better aligned with their separate valuation of possible rewards. Decisions made with less confidence were more prone to changes-of-mind and more susceptible to a patience-enhancing manipulation. Together, our results establish that confidence in intertemporal choice tracks uncertainty in estimating and comparing the value of possible rewards-just as it does in decisions unrelated to self-control. Our findings challenge self-control views and instead cast intertemporal choice as a form of value-based decision-making about future possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Bulley
- The University of Sydney School of Psychology and Brain and Mind Centre, Sydney, NSW 2050, Australia
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Karolina M. Lempert
- Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
| | - Colin Conwell
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Muireann Irish
- The University of Sydney School of Psychology and Brain and Mind Centre, Sydney, NSW 2050, Australia
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Roberts AR, Fishbach A. Can’t wait or won’t wait? The two barriers to patient decisions. Trends Cogn Sci 2022; 26:283-285. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.01.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2021] [Revised: 01/13/2022] [Accepted: 01/16/2022] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
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Ye JY, Ding QY, Cui JF, Liu Z, Jia LX, Qin XJ, Xu H, Wang Y. A meta-analysis of the effects of episodic future thinking on delay discounting. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2021; 75:1876-1891. [PMID: 34841982 DOI: 10.1177/17470218211066282] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
Delay discounting (DD) refers to the phenomenon in which the subjective value of future rewards is reduced over time. There are individual differences in the DD rate, and increased discounting has been observed in those with various psychiatric disorders. Episodic future thinking (EFT) is the act of vividly imagining events that may happen in the future. Studies have shown that EFT could reduce DD, although inconsistent results have been reported. The aim of this meta-analysis was to clarify the efficacy with which EFT reduces DD and to identify potential moderators. Forty-seven studies (including 63 contrasts) were included in the final analysis. EFT was found to significantly reduce DD (Hedges' g = 0.52). Moderator analysis showed that positive EFT (g = 0.64) was more effective in reducing DD than EFT with the valence not specifically mentioned (g = 0.28) and EFT with neutral or negative valence (g = -0.03). In addition, several factors related to the control task and DD task were related to the efficacy of EFT to reduce DD. These findings have implications for using EFT to reduce DD in the future.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jun-Yan Ye
- Neuropsychology and Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Lab, CAS Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Beijing, China.,Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Qing-Yu Ding
- Teachers' College, Beijing Union University, Beijing, China
| | - Ji-Fang Cui
- Research Center for Information and Statistics, National Institute of Education Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Zhe Liu
- Teachers' College, Beijing Union University, Beijing, China
| | - Lu-Xia Jia
- Neuropsychology and Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Lab, CAS Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Beijing, China.,Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Xiao-Jing Qin
- Neuropsychology and Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Lab, CAS Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Beijing, China.,Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Hua Xu
- Teachers' College, Beijing Union University, Beijing, China
| | - Ya Wang
- Neuropsychology and Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Lab, CAS Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Beijing, China.,Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
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4
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Weighting on waiting: Willpower and attribute weighting models of decision making. Behav Brain Sci 2021; 44:e38. [PMID: 33899707 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x20000850] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Willpower is often conceptualized as incorporating effortful and momentary suppression of immediate but ultimately inferior rewards. Yet, growing evidence instead supports a process of attribute weighting, whereby normatively optimal choices arise from separable evaluation of different attributes (e.g., time and money). Strategic allocation of attention settles conflicts between competing choice-relevant attributes, which could be expanded to include self-referential predictions ("resolve").
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Abstract
Most authors who discuss willpower assume that everyone knows what it is, but our assumptions differ to such an extent that we talk past each other. We agree that willpower is the psychological function that resists temptations - variously known as impulses, addictions, or bad habits; that it operates simultaneously with temptations, without prior commitment; and that use of it is limited by its cost, commonly called effort, as well as by the person's skill at executive functioning. However, accounts are usually not clear about how motivation functions during the application of willpower, or how motivation is related to effort. Some accounts depict willpower as the perceiving or formation of motivational contingencies that outweigh the temptation, and some depict it as a continuous use of mechanisms that interfere with re-weighing the temptation. Some others now suggest that impulse control can bypass motivation altogether, although they refer to this route as habit rather than willpower.It is argued here that willpower should be recognized as either or both of two distinct functions, which can be called resolve and suppression. Resolve is based on interpretation of a current choice as a test case for a broader set of future choices, which puts at stake more than the outcome of the current choice. Suppression is inhibiting valuation of (modulating) and/or keeping attention from (filtering) immediate alternatives to a current intention. Perception of current choices as test cases for broader outcomes may result in reliable preference for these outcomes, which is experienced as an effortless habit - a successful result of resolve, not an alternative method of self-control. Some possible brain imaging correlates are reviewed.
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Affiliation(s)
- George Ainslie
- Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Coatesville, PA19320; and School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch 7710, South Africa. ; http://www.picoeconomics.org
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Bulley A, Schacter DL. Deliberating trade-offs with the future. Nat Hum Behav 2020; 4:238-247. [PMID: 32184495 PMCID: PMC7147875 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-020-0834-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/11/2019] [Accepted: 02/05/2020] [Indexed: 12/12/2022]
Abstract
Many fundamental choices in life are intertemporal: they involve trade-offs between sooner and later outcomes. In recent years there has been a surge of interest into how people make intertemporal decisions, given that such decisions are ubiquitous in everyday life and central in domains from substance use to climate change action. While it is clear that people make decisions according to rules, intuitions and habits, they also commonly deliberate over their options, thinking through potential outcomes and reflecting on their own preferences. In this Perspective, we bring to bear recent research into the higher-order capacities that underpin deliberation-particularly those that enable people to think about the future (prospection) and their own thinking (metacognition)-to shed light on intertemporal decision-making. We show how a greater appreciation for these mechanisms of deliberation promises to advance our understanding of intertemporal decision-making and unify a wide range of otherwise disparate choice phenomena.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Bulley
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.
- The University of Sydney, School of Psychology and Brain and Mind Centre, Sydney, NSW, Australia.
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Bulley A, Miloyan B, Pepper GV, Gullo MJ, Henry JD, Suddendorf T. Cuing both positive and negative episodic foresight reduces delay discounting but does not affect risk-taking. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2019; 72:1998-2017. [DOI: 10.1177/1747021818819777] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Abstract
Humans frequently create mental models of the future, allowing outcomes to be inferred in advance of their occurrence. Recent evidence suggests that imagining positive future events reduces delay discounting (the devaluation of reward with time until its receipt), while imagining negative future events may increase it. Here, using a sample of 297 participants, we experimentally assess the effects of cued episodic simulation of positive and negative future scenarios on decision-making in the context of both delay discounting (monetary choice questionnaire) and risk-taking (balloon-analogue risk task). Participants discounted the future less when cued to imagine positive and negative future scenarios than they did when cued to engage in control neutral imagery. There were no effects of experimental condition on risk-taking. Thus, although these results replicate previous findings suggesting episodic future simulation can reduce delay discounting, they indicate that this effect is not dependent on the valence of the thoughts, and does not generalise to all other forms of “impulsive” decision-making. We discuss various interpretations of these results, and suggest avenues for further research on the role of prospection in decision-making.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Bulley
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD, Australia
| | - Beyon Miloyan
- School of Psychology and Health Sciences, Federation University Australia, Ballarat, VIC, Australia
| | | | - Matthew J Gullo
- Centre for Youth Substance Abuse Research, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD, Australia
| | - Julie D Henry
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD, Australia
| | - Thomas Suddendorf
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD, Australia
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Hu K, De Rosa E, Anderson AK. Differential temporal salience of earning and saving. Nat Commun 2018; 9:2843. [PMID: 30030433 PMCID: PMC6054624 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-05201-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2017] [Accepted: 05/29/2018] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
People are often characterized as poor savers. Here we examined whether cues associated with earning and saving have differential salience for attention and action. We first modeled earning and saving after positive and negative variants of monetary reinforcement, i.e., gains versus avoiding loss. Despite their equivalent absolute magnitude in a monetary incentive task, colors predicting saving were judged to appear after those that predicted earning in a temporal-order judgment task. This saving posteriority effect also occurred when savings were framed as earnings that come slightly later. Colors predicting savings, whether they acquired either negative or positive value, persisted in their posteriority. An attentional asymmetry away from money-saved relative to money-earned, potentially contributes to decreased everyday salience and future wealth. Economists have observed that many people seem unwilling to save for the future. Here, the authors show that earning and saving are subject to a basic asymmetry in attentional choice, such that cues that are associated with saving are perceived as occurring later than cues associated with earning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kesong Hu
- Department of Human Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, 14853-4401, NY, USA. .,Human Neuroscience Institute, Cornell University, Ithaca, 14853-4401, NY, USA.
| | - Eve De Rosa
- Department of Human Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, 14853-4401, NY, USA.,Human Neuroscience Institute, Cornell University, Ithaca, 14853-4401, NY, USA
| | - Adam K Anderson
- Department of Human Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, 14853-4401, NY, USA. .,Human Neuroscience Institute, Cornell University, Ithaca, 14853-4401, NY, USA.
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